Sathre v. Davis CA2/7

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Filed 6/17/24 Sathre v. Davis CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

CURTIS J. SATHRE III, B324459

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
No. BS136533)
v.

JAIMIE DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Jaimie Davis, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Reif Law Group, Brandon S. Reif, Marc S. Ehrlich, and
Drew Frey for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
INTRODUCTION

In 2012 Jaimie Davis lost an arbitration she filed against
her former investment advisor, Curtis J. Sathre III, and his
company to recover losses she incurred in risky investments. The
judgment confirming the arbitration award included an award
against Davis of over $135,000 in costs and expert fees, an award
Davis has never paid. As the 10-year anniversary of the
judgment approached, Sathre filed a renewal of judgment under
Code of Civil Procedure section 683.110,1 and the court ordered
the judgment renewed. Davis appeals from the trial court’s
orders denying her motions to vacate the renewal of judgment
and an amended renewal of judgment. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Sathre and Others Obtain an Arbitration Award of
Costs and Fees Against Davis, the Trial Court
Confirms the Award, and We Affirm
In 2010 Davis filed a statement of claim against
WFP Securities, Inc., an independent broker-dealer and licensed
member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA);2 John Schooler, WFP Securities’ president; and Sathre,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2 FINRA is a self-regulatory organization that provides
“arbitration and mediation . . . of disputes that arise between
investors and securities firms.” (Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v.
Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1096, internal quotation
marks omitted.)

2
a registered representative with WFP Securities. Davis alleged
she lost $350,000 in fraudulent investment products Sathre
falsely told her were safe, income-producing investments. She
further alleged she was in jeopardy of losing $1,862,500 in risky,
illiquid limited partnerships and non-publicly traded
investments. Davis asserted causes of action for negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, failure to supervise,
control person liability, and violation of the Corporations Code.
She sought more than $2 million in compensatory damages.
The parties arbitrated the dispute under FINRA’s rules
and procedures. The arbitration proceeded before a panel of
three arbitrators in 2011 and 2012. During the arbitration the
arbitrators excluded the testimony of Davis’s expert witness as a
discovery sanction. The arbitrators ultimately ruled against
Davis, finding that she “failed to prove by a preponderance of
evidence any of the causes of actions or allegations alleged” and
that her causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations. The arbitrators also ruled that Davis had filed
duplicative claims in other fora, that it was “highly likely” she
was seeking double recovery, and that her actions violated
Rule 12209 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer Disputes (which provides that, “[d]uring an arbitration,
no party may bring any suit, legal action, or proceeding against
any other party that concerns or that would resolve any of the
matters raised in the arbitration”). The arbitrators ordered
Davis to pay Sathre, Schooler, and WFP Securities $135,755.89
in costs and expert witness fees, plus interest at 10 percent per
year, and $21,000 in arbitration fees. The arbitrators also
recommended FINRA expunge the arbitration from Sathre’s and

3
Schooler’s registration records maintained in FINRA’s Central
Registration Depository (CRD).3
In 2012 the trial court confirmed the arbitration award and
ordered FINRA to expunge references to the arbitration from
Sathre’s and Schooler’s CRD records. Davis appealed from the
order confirming the award and denying her petition to vacate it,
arguing the trial court should have vacated the award because
the arbitrators erred in excluding her expert’s testimony and
because WFP Securities intimidated another investor from
testifying on her behalf. We affirmed. (WFP Securities, Inc. v.
Davis (Apr. 15, 2014, B244528) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. Davis Tries To Prevent Sathre from Enforcing the
Judgment and Asserts New Claims Against Him
In 2019 Sathre, seeking to enforce the judgment against
Davis, obtained an order requiring her to appear for a judgment
debtor examination. After the trial court denied various motions
and ex parte applications by Davis to prevent her judgment
debtor examination from occurring, Davis filed a petition for a
writ of mandate. We granted the petition and held the trial court

3 “FINRA is required to maintain registration information,
including records related to disciplinary proceedings. FINRA
maintains the necessary information in a computer database
called the Central Registry Depository (‘CRD’).” (Santos-Buch v.
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
32 F.Supp.3d 475, 479; see Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v.
Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1097 [CRD is “an electronic
database containing ‘“information reported in connection with the
registration or licensing of brokers and dealers and their
associated persons, including disciplinary actions, regulatory,
judicial, and arbitration proceedings”’”].)

4
erred in denying Davis’s motions and applications without
allowing her to appear telephonically at, and without providing a
court reporter for, the hearings. We reversed the orders and
directed the superior court to designate a different judge to hear
Davis’s motions. (Davis v. Superior Court (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
607.)
Meanwhile, in 2019 Davis moved to compel arbitration of
various new claims she was trying to assert against Sathre,
Schooler, and WFP Securities, as well as requests to stay Sathre’s
efforts to enforce the judgment against her and to vacate certain
abstracts of judgment and notices of lien. The trial court denied
Davis’s motion to compel arbitration, and Davis appealed. We
held that the trial court erred in denying Davis’s motion to
compel arbitration of her tort claims, but that the court did not
err in denying some of her other requests for relief.
(WFP Securities, Inc. v. Davis (May 14, 2021, B304048)
[nonpub. opn.].)

C. The Trial Court Denies Davis’s Motions To Vacate the
Renewal of Judgment
All this took time, and the clock was ticking on the
2012 judgment. So, on June 7, 2022 Sathre filed an application
for renewal of judgment under section 683.110, and the clerk of
the court renewed the judgment. A few days later, Sathre filed
an amended application for renewal of judgment to correct some
typographical errors in the original application. On July 8, 2022
the court granted Sathre’s amended application, and on July 14,
2022 the court entered a signed order granting the amended
application.

5
Davis filed motions to vacate both the original renewal of
judgment and the amended renewal of judgment. The trial court
denied both motions. Davis timely appealed from the orders
denying both motions.4

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A money judgment is enforceable for 10 years from the date
of its entry and may be renewed for another 10 years. (Fidelity
Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 200-
201.) A “judgment creditor has two distinct methods by which to
continue to pursue collection of a judgment as it nears expiration
of the 10-year period of enforceability: the renewal of judgment
provisions set forth in section 683.110 et seq., or an independent
action on the judgment. Although the two methods are distinct,
the defenses available to the judgment debtor in the statutory
procedure are the same as in an independent action on the
judgment.” (Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255,
260-261.) The trial court may vacate a renewal of a judgment “on
any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment,
including the ground that the amount of the renewed

4 “The renewal of a judgment is not an appealable
event . . . because there is no separate entity called a renewed
judgment. . . . Instead, it is the order denying a motion to vacate
renewal of a judgment that is appealable, as an order after (the
underlying) judgment.” (Goldman v. Simpson (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 255, 262, fn. 4, internal quotation marks
omitted.)

6
judgment . . . is incorrect.” (§ 683.170, subd. (a); see Altizer v.
Highsmith (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 331, 339.)
“In an independent action on a judgment, the debtor may
challenge the judgment ‘in accordance with the rules and
principles governing collateral attack.’” (Goldman v. Simpson,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.) “Collateral attack is proper to
contest lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or the
granting of relief which the court has no power to grant
[citations]. Nonjurisdictional errors, however, are not
appropriate procedural targets within this context.” (Armstrong
v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950; see People v. American
Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661 [when
“a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its
jurisdiction,” its judgment should be challenged directly and is
“generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is
final”].)
Section 683.170 is derived from section 1710.40, which
governs motions to vacate judgments entered in California based
on judgments from other states. (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v.
Browne, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 202.) Section 1710.40
contains language similar to section 683.170: It provides a
judgment “may be vacated on any ground which would be a
defense to an action in this state on the sister state
judgment . . . .” (§ 1710.40, subd. (a).) The Law Revision
Commission comment to section 1710.40 lists common defenses to
enforcement of a sister state judgment: “the judgment is not final
and unconditional . . . ; the judgment was obtained by extrinsic
fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the
judgment is not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff
is guilty of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; suit

7
on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations in the
state where enforcement is sought.” (Cal. Law Revision Com.
com., 20 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2007 ed.) foll. § 1710.40,
p. 385.)
In the trial court Davis had the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, she was entitled to vacate the
renewal of judgment under section 683.170, subdivision (a).
(See American Contractors Indemnity Co. v. Hernandez (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 845, 848; Rubin v. Ross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
153, 161.) On appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a
renewal of judgment under section 683.170, “we examine the
evidence in a light most favorable to the order under review and
the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.” (Fidelity
Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 199.)
We independently review issues of law. (Hernandez, at p. 848.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Davis’s
Motions To Vacate the Renewal of Judgment

1. Davis Has Not Shown the Trial Court
Misunderstood Its Discretion To Rule on Davis’s
Motions To Vacate the Renewal of Judgment
Davis contends the trial court “summarily dismissed” her
arguments “without exercising discretion” and denied her
motions “based not on law but on the history of the matter.” The
record does not support Davis’s argument.
In denying Davis’s motion, the trial court stated: “This is a
motion to vacate a renewal of judgment. The judgment itself was
entered on June 16, 2012. The Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment on April 15, 2014. I renewed the judgment . . . at the

8
10-year mark in June of this year. I read the motion. I read the
opposition. There is no reason for me to vacate the renewal of
this judgment.” Davis asked: “Is that just based solely on the
facts that the Court of Appeal affirmed the original judgment or
is that based on the arguments made in the papers?” The court
stated: “It’s based upon the arguments made in the papers.”
Davis stated the court had not issued a tentative ruling and
asked whether the court could “provide a little more specificity”
in its ruling. The court stated: “No, I really can’t. . . . This
matter I didn’t believe required a tentative because it’s so clear
that an award entered in this arbitration, confirmed by a
judgment, affirmed on appeal, in existence for 10 years and now
renewed doesn’t require a lot of explanation. But the explanation
is, in this case, amply provided in the opposition.” Similarly, in
denying Davis’s motion to vacate the amended renewal of
judgment, the trial court stated: “I’ve read the motion with the
opposition to the motion. My ruling is based upon the points
made in the opposition to the motion.” Contrary to Davis’s
argument, the record indicates that the trial court understood its
authority and that the court decided Davis had not met her
burden to show she was entitled to vacate the renewal of
judgment under section 683.170.

2. The Judgment Was Not Obtained by Extrinsic
Fraud
Davis argues the trial court should have vacated the
renewal of judgment because the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud. Davis contends that, at the time of the
arbitration, FINRA was investigating WFP Securities, that
information uncovered in the investigation would have proven

9
Davis’s claims, and that Sathre and his lawyer fraudulently
concealed the information during the arbitration. This argument
does not justify vacating the renewal of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud.
“Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the
opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court; where he
was kept ignorant or, other than from his own negligence,
fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the
proceeding. . . . The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party’s
preventing the other from having his day in court.” (City and
County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
1061, 1067; see Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 834, 844.) “Normally, if the party was aware of
the proceeding, the fraud is intrinsic, but if the fraud totally
precluded his raising a claim or defense it will be grounds for
relief.” (Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co. (1979)
95 Cal.App.3d 1, 7.) Extrinsic fraud is a defense to enforcement
of a judgment; intrinsic fraud is not. (Casey v. Hill (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 937, 970; Singh v. Lipworth (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 813, 827.)
Davis argues several pieces of evidence from the FINRA
investigation “would have proven [her] claims.” She cites
Schooler’s testimony that “there was no hard and fast rule”
regarding the “percentage of a client’s portfolio that could be put
to private placements” and that WFP Securities did not have
“guidelines on how a customer’s portfolio should be allocated.”
Davis also cites a finding in the settlement between FINRA and
Warren Rees Horney (WFP Securities’ Senior Vice President of
Due Diligence) that, although Horney was “responsible for
reviewing and approving the suitability of private placement and

10
REIT[5] recommendations by [WFP Securities’] representatives,”
Horney never used the company’s database of customers’ prior
transactions “in assessing the suitability of any particular
recommendation.”
Davis has not shown extrinsic fraud. First, Davis did not
identify specific facts demonstrating Sathre or his attorney,
Brandon Reif, fraudulently withheld the information. (See Singh
v. Lipworth, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 [“where a party
seeks ‘equitable relief based upon extrinsic fraud in obtaining a
judgment, the facts constituting the fraud must be pleaded with
particularity and specificity’”]; Kuehn v. Kuehn (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 824, 831 [same].) She does not cite any evidence
the arbitrators required Reif or Sathre to produce the FINRA
information to Davis.6

5 REIT is an acronym for Real Estate Investment Trust.
(Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
1092, 1101.) It is “‘an investment vehicle that enables large
numbers of investors to pool their capital and share in the
benefits of real estate investment and financing.’” (Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railroad
(3d Cir. 2017) 870 F.3d 244, 249, fn. 3.)

6 Davis repeatedly quotes Reif’s statement during the
arbitration that the arbitrators “gave a very comprehensive
discovery order to produce . . . everything that you guys have,”
but Davis does not cite a discovery order. Reif’s vague statement
the arbitrators ordered the parties to produce “everything” does
not establish Sathre had to produce FINRA investigation
testimony or settlements. Nor has Davis established Sathre or
Reif had custody or control of the documents during the
arbitration. Although Schooler testified in the FINRA

11
Second, even if Reif wrongfully withheld the FINRA
investigation testimony, such conduct would not justify vacating
the renewal of judgment. Concealing evidence is intrinsic fraud,
not extrinsic fraud. (See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior
Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 10 [“After the time for seeking a new
trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final
judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the
ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified;
in the language of the cases, such fraud is ‘intrinsic’ rather than
‘extrinsic.’”]; Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., supra,
95 Cal.App.3d at p. 8 [plaintiff alleged intrinsic fraud, not
extrinsic fraud, where the plaintiff “was not totally deprived of an
opportunity to present its claim, but rather its claim was
allegedly not as strong as it might have been if it had then had
available the documents which were allegedly concealed”].)
Third, even if information from the FINRA investigation
would have been helpful to Davis’s case, she has not
demonstrated the evidence would have resulted in a more
favorable outcome in the arbitration. (See Casey v. Hill, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 981 [“a claim of extrinsic fraud is not
available unless the defense the party was prevented from
asserting is a meritorious one”]; Hudson v. Foster (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 640, 664 [“to set aside a final order based on
extrinsic fraud, ‘the moving party must demonstrate that he or
she has a meritorious case’”].) The FINRA investigation
documents may have shown WFP Securities lacked adequate
practices and procedures for appropriately allocating its clients’

investigation in July 2010, one year before the arbitration,
FINRA did not file the disciplinary action against Horney until
April 2013, more than one year after the arbitration.

12
funds between safer and riskier investments and for ensuring its
representatives’ recommendations were suitable for the client.
But that evidence did not establish Sathre, Schooler, or
WFP Securities was liable to Davis on any of her causes of action.
None of the FINRA investigation documents Davis cites mentions
Davis, Sathre, or the investments Sathre recommended for Davis.
The record shows the FINRA examiner questioned Sathre and
Schooler about other clients’ investments, but not Davis’s.
Similarly, FINRA’s settlement with Horney includes a finding
WFP Securities representative Tom English “made multiple
unsuitable recommendations for the purchase of speculative and
illiquid private placements and non-traded REITS to seven
households, in violation of NASD Conduct Rules 2310 and 2110.”
But the settlement does not mention Sathre.
Finally, the arbitration award contains findings adverse to
Davis that would not have been affected by evidence
WFP Securities lacked appropriate procedures to ensure clients
invested in suitable investments. For example, the arbitrators
found that, because Davis testified she read the risk factors in
the private placement memorandum for one of the investments at
issue, Davis was “on notice that the investments” Sathre
recommended to her “involved substantial risks.” In addition, the
arbitrators ruled Davis’s causes of action were time-barred. The
evidence from the FINRA investigation would not have overcome
that defense.7

7 Davis also argues Sathre and Schooler committed perjury
by testifying at the arbitration “that they had a reasonable basis
for recommending the investments, that they adequately
supervised and performed due diligence, and that they had

13
3. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Confirm
the Arbitration Award and Enter Judgment
Davis argues the judgment (and therefore its renewal) is
void ab initio because the trial court lacked jurisdiction in 2012 to
confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment. Davis
contends “FINRA Rules” give federal district courts exclusive
jurisdiction to enforce FINRA arbitration awards, but she cites no
such rule. In fact, rule 12904(a) of the FINRA Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes states an
arbitration award “may be entered as a judgment in any court of
competent jurisdiction.” Similarly, the parties’ agreement to
submit the dispute to arbitration states “the parties hereby
voluntarily consent to submit to the jurisdiction of any court of
competent jurisdiction which may properly enter such judgment.”
The trial court was a court of competent jurisdiction.
Under section 1293 the “making of an agreement in this State
providing for arbitration to be had within this State shall be
deemed a consent of the parties thereto to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this State to enforce such agreement . . . by entering of
judgment on an award under the agreement.” (See Boghos v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (2005) 36 Cal.4th 495,
503 [section 1293 “gives California courts personal and subject
matter jurisdiction to compel arbitration and to enforce arbitral

proper guidelines in place to comply with the securities laws,” but
by testifying differently in the FINRA investigation. She
contends the false testimony, which typically is intrinsic fraud,
was extrinsic fraud because Sathre and Schooler owed her a
fiduciary duty. Sathre argues the arbitrators found he did not
owe Davis a fiduciary duty. We need not decide whether Sathre
or Schooler was a fiduciary because Davis has not demonstrated
either one testified falsely at the arbitration.

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awards when a contract to arbitrate is made in this state”]; Casey
v. Hill, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 970 [“parties to an agreement
to arbitrate in California consent to the jurisdiction of California
courts for the limited purpose of enforcing the arbitration
agreement and any resulting award” (italics omitted)]; see, e.g.,
Mave Enterprises, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1414-1415 [trial court did not err in
confirming an arbitration award and entering judgment in favor
of an insured, even though the insurer had filed a petition in
federal district court to vacate the award].)
Davis lived in California when she invested with
WFP Securities, whose principal place of business was in
California. The arbitration took place in California. The trial
court had jurisdiction to confirm the award, enter judgment, and
enforce the judgment.

4. The Arbitration Agreement Was Not Void
Davis argues the judgment is void because the direct
participation program (DPP) contracts (the investments she
purchased through Sathre) were void. Davis contends the DPP
contracts were void because Sathre and WFP Securities did not
fulfill “the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 or
FINRA suitability requirements to offer or to sell private
placement investments.” From that premise, Davis argues
(1) because the contracts were void, the arbitration agreements in
the contracts were void; (2) because the arbitration agreements
were void, the arbitration award was void; and (3) because the
award was void, the judgment was void.
By raising this argument for the first time on appeal,
however, Davis forfeited it. (See Westsiders Opposed to

15
Overdevelopment v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
1079, 1091 [an appellate court will not consider “issues or
theories not properly raised or presented in the trial court”];
Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892,
913 [“As a general rule, an appellate court will not review an
issue that was not raised by some proper method by a party in
the trial court.”].) Indeed, if Davis believed the DPP contracts
and their arbitration agreements were void, she should have
raised the issue before the parties submitted the matter to
arbitration in 2010. (See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992)
3 Cal.4th 1, 31 [a party contending an arbitration agreement is
illegal must raise the issue “prior to participating in the
arbitration process”]; Brawerman v. Loeb & Loeb LLP (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 1106, 1115, fn. 2 [“illegality of an entire contract
for purposes of avoiding arbitration cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal” and “must be raised for the first time in the trial
court before the matter is sent to arbitration”].)
The argument is also meritless. Davis offers no authority
or rationale for her contention the investment contracts were
void. She does not, for example, argue the contracts violated a
particular statute or rule. (Cf. Duffens v. Valenti (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 434, 441 [matchmaking agreements were void
and unenforceable because they “violated express requirements of
the dating service statutes” in Civil Code section 1694 et seq.].)
Although Davis says she is arguing the judgment is void, she is
actually relitigating her claims Sathre violated various tort,
contract, or statutory duties when he sold her the investments.
These arguments, which the arbitrators rejected, are not defenses
to an action on a judgment.

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5. Davis’s Other Arguments Are Not Defenses to an
Action on the Judgment
The remainder of Davis’s arguments are not appropriate
grounds to vacate a renewal of judgment. As discussed, under
section 683.170, subdivision (a), Davis may only raise defenses to
an action on the judgment. She may not relitigate her underlying
causes of action or challenge the conduct of the arbitration.
(See Goldman v. Simpson, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [in
an action on a judgment, a debtor may not raise nonjurisdictional
errors]; see also Casey v. Hill, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 977
[“section 1710.40 does not create an opportunity to raise defenses
to the merits of the underlying claims resolved in the sister state
judgment”].)
For example, Davis argues the arbitrators erred in
awarding costs of food, travel, and expert fees and in ruling her
causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. Davis
could have raised those arguments in the arbitration or in her
motion to vacate the arbitration award 12 years ago.8 They are
not jurisdictional issues, they are not defenses to an action on the
judgment, and they are not grounds to vacate a renewal of
judgment.
Davis also argues the arbitrators denied her the right to
cross-examine Sathre and Schooler during the hearing on their

8 Not that these arguments necessarily would have been
grounds to vacate the arbitration award. Judicial review of
arbitration awards is narrow. (Ahdout v. Hekmatjah (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 21, 33; Gray v. Chiu (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
1355, 1362.) Courts may not review arbitrators’ decisions for
errors of fact or law. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra,
3 Cal.4th at p. 11; Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 354.)

17
requests for expungement of their CRD records. Davis cites
Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
1092, where the court affirmed orders denying a brokerage firm’s
petition to confirm an arbitration award and granting a client’s
petition to vacate the award because the arbitrators refused to
hear the client’s evidence during an expungement proceeding.
(Id. at p. 1096.) In her motion to vacate the arbitration award,
Davis could have argued the arbitrators’ refusal to hear evidence
material to the controversy substantially prejudiced her rights
under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5). However, the argument
is not a defense to an action on the judgment and is not a basis
for vacating a renewal of judgment.
Next, Davis asserts her attorney at the arbitration did not
comply with discovery orders and did not hire a replacement
expert after the arbitrators excluded her expert as a discovery
sanction. Davis argues her attorney’s neglect amounted to
“positive misconduct” and “extrinsic mistake” warranting
equitable relief. Davis, however, cites no authority supporting
her assertion an attorney’s misconduct during an arbitration is a
basis for vacating a renewal of judgment. The cases Davis cites
address the impact of attorney misconduct in other contexts. For
example, in Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380
the trial court dismissed an action for failure to prosecute and
denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the dismissal on the
ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect
under section 473. (Daley, at pp. 383, 388.) The court in Daley
reversed, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to vacate because counsel for the plaintiff’s
“consistent and long-continued inaction was so visibly and
inevitably disastrous, that his client was effectually and

18
unknowingly deprived of representation.” (Id. at pp. 391, 396.)
The case has no bearing on a motion to vacate a renewal of
judgment.9

C. Any Ambiguity in the Date of Renewal Does Not
Prejudice Davis
Finally, Davis argues that “there are two renewals” and
that the “amended renewal of judgment should be deemed the
operative renewal and the original mooted.” As discussed, after
the trial court renewed the judgment on June 7, 2022, Sathre
filed an amended application for renewal of judgment to correct
typographical errors. The court ordered the judgment renewed a
second time on July 14, 2022. Davis asks this court “for a ruling
as to which application is operative.” Sathre contends that the
judgment was renewed on July 14, 2022 and that there is no
ambiguity.
To the extent there is any ambiguity regarding the date the
judgment was renewed, Davis has not shown any prejudice.
Even if the court renewed the judgment twice, there is only one
judgment. After a party renews a judgment, “there is no separate
entity called the ‘renewed judgment.’ There is simply ‘the
judgment,’ which remains enforceable for an additional
period . . . , but the rights of the judgment creditor arise from the
underlying judgment.” (Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v. Jones

9 Davis also cites In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d
337, where the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in
denying a party’s motion to vacate a judgment of dissolution of
marriage entered after she was deported, leaving her unable to
attend the proceeding or contest the action. (Id. at p. 343.) That
case has no relevance here.

19
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487; see Goldman v. Simpson,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [“The renewed judgment ‘has no
independent existence’ from the original judgment.”].)

DISPOSITION

The orders denying Davis’s motions to vacate the renewal
of judgment are affirmed. The parties are to bear their costs on
appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

20

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