CourtListener 9567266•People v. Young CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Young CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062008, G062017
v. (Super. Ct. Nos. 19HF1226,
18HF0581)
NATHAN IVAN YOUNG,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Scott
A. Steiner, Julian W. Bailey, and Michael F. Murray, Judges. Dismissed.
Motion to consolidate; granted. Benoit motion; denied. Request for judicial
notice; granted.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Stephanie A. Mitchell, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In two separate criminal cases, Nathan Ivan Young was twice
found not mentally competent to stand trial and ordered committed to the
Department of State Hospitals (DSH) under Penal Code section 1370.1
Young appeals from the second set of commitment orders, arguing the court
erred by failing to rule on his pending Marsden2 motions and by
miscalculating custody credits to be applied to his second commitment term.
While the appeals were pending, the charges against Young were dismissed
in the interest of justice.3 Given these developments, we cannot grant Young
any effective relief, and for that reason we dismiss the appeals as moot.
FACTS
We begin by summarizing the two cases from which the appeals
have been taken.
The first case, Orange County Superior Court case no. 18HF0581,
was filed on April 23, 2018 (the 2018 case; appeal no. G062017). A 2022
felony information charged Young with identity theft with a prior conviction
(§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2); counts 1, 3, 15, 17); identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a);
counts 2, 4, 7, 9–10); second degree burglary (§§ 459–460, subd. (b); counts 5
& 13); false personation (§ 529, subd. (a)(3); count 6); conspiracy to commit
the crime of unauthorized use of personal identifying information (§§ 182,
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
2
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
3
This court denied the People’s motion to consolidate appeal nos.
G062008 and G062017 (collectively, the appeals) for all purposes but deferred
the issue of consolidation for purposes of oral argument and opinion. The
parties waived oral argument. We now consolidate the appeals for purposes
of issuing this opinion.
2
subd. (a)(1), 530.5; count 8); non-sufficient fund check (§ 476a, subd. (a);
count 11); petty theft by false pretense (§§ 484, subd. (a), 485–488; count 12);
possession of a forged instrument (§ 475, subd. (a); counts 14 & 16); and
recording false and forged instruments (§ 115, subd. (a); counts 18–24).4 The
information further alleged enhancements and factors in aggravation for
several of the counts.
The second case, Orange County Superior Court case
no. 19HF1226, was filed on September 6, 2019 (the 2019 case; appeal
no. G062008). A 2022 amended felony information charged Young with
second degree burglary (§§ 459–460, subd. (b); count 1); identity theft
(§ 530.5, subd. (a); count 2); issuing a fictitious instrument (§ 476; count 3);
and identity theft with a prior conviction (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2); count 4), and
alleged factors in aggravation. These charged offenses allegedly occurred
while Young was released on bail in the 2018 case.
Hearings for the 2018 case and the 2019 case (collectively, the
underlying cases), along with other companion cases, were regularly
scheduled for the same day or around the same timeframe.5
In the summer of 2020, appointed defense counsel David Medina
raised doubt about Young’s competence to stand trial in the underlying cases.
At the hearing for the 2019 case, Medina also informed the court that Young
4
Counts 11 and 12 were charged as misdemeanors, and the
remainder as felonies.
5
In fact, because the issues on appeal and the underlying facts are
the same for the appeals, the Attorney General has requested that for the
appeal in the 2019 case, we take judicial notice of the appellate record in the
2018 case. The request is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459,
subd. (a).)
3
was making a Marsden request. The record does not reflect a similar request
having been made at the hearing for the 2018 case. Without ruling on the
Marsden request in the 2019 case, the court set a competency hearing in the
underlying cases.
The following events occurred in both the underlying cases.
On September 10, 2020, Judge Julian W. Bailey found Young
mentally incompetent to stand trial. The court later ordered Young to be
placed with DSH. On October 18, 2021, the court found Young had been
restored to competency and reinstated criminal proceedings.
On February 17, 2022, Young made a Marsden request to obtain
new counsel. At the time, he was being represented by appointed counsel
Ernest Eady. Eady was the sixth appointment in the 2018 case and the fifth
in the 2019 case; all prior counsel had either immediately or eventually
declared a conflict.
At the Marsden hearing, Eady declared a doubt as to Young’s
mental competence, and Judge Scott A. Steiner ordered criminal proceedings
suspended. The court set a hearing to appoint doctors to evaluate Young; it
concluded the hearing without ruling on the Marsden motions.
On July 8, 2022, after receiving the reports from the appointed
doctors, Judge Bailey found Young mentally incompetent to stand trial. On
November 3, Judge Michael F. Murray ordered Young to again be placed with
DSH for treatment. Young was credited with 362 days for his first
competency treatment, against the applicable two-year limit under
section 1370. Young filed a timely notice of appeal of the November 3 order.
In the fall of 2023, the trial court ordered the public guardian to
initiate conservatorship proceedings and later granted the petition
appointing the public guardian as the conservator of Young’s person.
4
In January 2024, the trial court granted Young’s motion to
dismiss the underlying cases, in the interest of justice pursuant to
section 1385.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction to Consider the Appeal from the 2019 Case
At the outset, we must resolve the parties’ dispute about whether
we have jurisdiction to review the commitment order in the 2019 case. The
People contend we do not. They point to the notices of appeal included in the
appellate record for the underlying cases: The same copy is included in both
clerk’s transcripts. That copy bears a trial court file-stamp date of November
16, 2022, is signed and dated by attorney Eady, and identifies the 2018 case –
but not the 2019 – as the matter from which the appeal is taken.
Acknowledging the apparent deficiency in the notice of appeal, Young’s
appellate counsel moved to file a belated notice of appeal for the 2019 case,
under the doctrine of constructive filing. (In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72,
81–82 (Benoit).)
We deny the Benoit motion as unnecessary. As we will explain,
we conclude Young’s trial defense counsel properly filed two different notices
of appeal for each of the underlying cases. The appellate docket for the 2019
case contains a copy of a different notice of appeal (the appellate version)
from the one included the clerk’s transcript. The appellate version was sent
by the trial court clerk to the reviewing court clerk (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.304(c)(1), (3)) and is the document filed in the appellate docket for
purposes of this court’s initial review of jurisdiction. The appellate version,
like the one included in the clerk’s transcript, bears a trial court file-stamp
date of November 16, 2022, and is signed and dated by attorney Eady. But
the salient difference is that the appellate version correctly identifies the trial
5
court case number as the 2019 case: “19HF1226.” While we do not know
exactly how the wrong version of the notice of appeal wound up in the clerk’s
transcript for the 2019 case, we can safely conclude trial defense counsel
prepared two different, correct notices of appeal and timely filed them with
the trial court.
II. Mootness
Given the dismissals of the underlying cases, Young concedes the
case is moot because this court cannot offer him any relief. Yet Young asks
us to reach the merits of his Marsden claim because the issue is likely to
recur and could evade review. We decline to exercise our discretion here.
Generally, we will dismiss an appeal as moot when “‘“without any
fault of the [opposing party], an event occurs which renders it impossible for
this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [defendant], to grant him [or
her] any effectual relief whatever.”’” (People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640,
645.) We nonetheless have the discretion to reach the merits of an appeal if
it raises an important issue that is capable of repetition yet tends to evade
review. (People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897–898.)
Here, we are not convinced Young’s Marsden claim meets the
standard for this exception. Young argues the trial court should have decided
his Marsden motions before proceeding with the competency hearings. This
issue has already been addressed numerous times. (See People v. Taylor
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 600, fn. omitted [“trial court erred when it brushed
aside [defendant’s] initial requests for substitution of counsel in the belief
that the question of defendant’s competence to stand trial first had to be
resolved”]; see, e.g., In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 441, 456; People v.
Govea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 57, 61; People v. Solorzano (2005) 126
6
Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069–1070.) While the issue raised by Young is certainly
an important one, it is not a novel issue on which trial courts need guidance.
DISPOSITION
The People’s motion to consolidate appeal no. G062008 and
appeal no. G062017 is granted only for purposes of issuing this opinion.
Young’s Benoit motion is denied as unnecessary. The People’s request for
judicial notice is granted. The appeals are dismissed as moot.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
7
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