CourtListener 9567231•People v. Bryant CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Bryant CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Nevada)
----
THE PEOPLE, C096799
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. F18000158A)
v.
SEAN DANIELLE BRYANT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Sean Danielle Bryant beat his 70-year-old friend with a metal chain,
shot him with an arrow, shot him multiple times with a paintball gun that he modified to
shoot glass marbles, and then instructed someone else to beat him with a baseball bat.
After a jury found Bryant guilty of first degree murder and found true a “murder with
torture” special circumstance, the trial court imposed a sentence of life without the
1
possibility of parole. On appeal, Bryant contends the trial court erred (1) by failing to
instruct the jury that evidence of voluntary intoxication could be considered in deciding
whether he acted in the heat of passion and (2) by instructing the jury that the prosecution
did not have to prove motive in connection with the murder and the special circumstance
allegation. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
Factual Background
One morning in April 2018, 51-year-old Bryant and his 70-year-old friend Stanley
Norman were both intoxicated when they went to Bryant’s girlfriend’s house. Bryant had
been dating his girlfriend (B.P.) for about five months and had a key to the house she
shared with her two teenage daughters. After the men arrived, Bryant went to sleep in an
upstairs bedroom, Norman stayed downstairs, and B.P. began to cook breakfast. At one
point, Norman put his arm around B.P.’s younger daughter and tried to kiss her.
B.P.’s daughter went to a bedroom and began to cry. B.P. followed her daughter
into the room and told her she would ask Bryant and Norman to leave, but would not tell
Bryant what Norman had done, because Norman was too drunk to know what he was
doing and she feared Bryant, a “hot headed” person, would become very upset.
Following through on her plan, B.P. went upstairs, woke Bryant, and told him “things
were getting weird and . . . they . . . needed to leave.” Bryant asked B.P. if “anything
sexual happened,” and B.P. said, “[N]o, things were just getting weird.” No more than
30 minutes elapsed between when Bryant went upstairs to sleep and when B.P. woke
him.
Bryant came downstairs and did not appear to be upset. As the men joked with
each other they fell to the floor and began wrestling in a playful and joking manner. B.P.
wanted the men to leave, so she walked over to help Norman get up. As she did so,
2
Norman grabbed her leg and said something like, “I want you” or “I want her.” Bryant
immediately got upset and yelled at Norman to apologize.
As he sat up against the base of a counter that separated the living room and
kitchen, Norman appeared to not understand why Bryant wanted him to apologize.
Bryant continued to yell at Norman as he grabbed an “air soft” gun or paintball gun that
he previously had shown to B.P. when he told her he had modified the weapon “so that it
was more high powered and that it could hurt somebody.” B.P. had seen Bryant use the
weapon to shoot glass marbles into a teddy bear from a distance of 15 feet.
Bryant continued demanding an apology and began shooting marbles at the base
of the counter near where Norman was sitting, though Norman still appeared to be
confused as to why Bryant wanted him to apologize. When Norman crawled away from
the base of the counter, Bryant shot him in the buttocks with a crossbow. The arrow
penetrated Norman’s buttocks and remained lodged there.
Scared, B.P. and her daughters went into a first-floor bedroom as Bryant began to
punch Norman in the face. Later, they heard Bryant drag a large, thick chain along the
floor and then hit Norman with it multiple times. They then heard more shots from the
paintball gun. At one point, B.P. saw Bryant hit Norman hard somewhere on his body
with the bottom of the handle of a Ka-Bar knife.
Sometime in the afternoon, hours after he began harming Norman, Bryant pulled
B.P.’s older daughter out of the first-floor bedroom and told her he was going to town,
showed her a gun and how to use it, and said she “would have to shoot” Norman if he
moved. After Bryant left, B.P. went into the living room and saw Norman. He was
moaning, bloody, and had a marble lodged in his face. Bryant returned about 30 minutes
later with codefendant Michael McCauley. Bryant told McCauley to hit Norman with a
baseball bat. McCauley hit Norman in the torso. Bryant told McCauley to hit harder.
McCauley complied.
3
Lying on the floor just before McCauley struck him the first time, Norman had
raised his hands to his face. After McCauley struck him, Norman stopped moving.
“Why did you make me do this?” Bryant yelled at Nelson before he tried to perform
CPR.
II
Procedural Background
At Bryant’s jury trial, the prosecution pursued two theories of first degree murder:
(1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and (2) murder by torture, which does
not require an intent to kill, but does require a causal relationship between a torturous act
and death. The prosecution also alleged a torture-murder special circumstance, which
does require intent to kill and contemplates torturous acts occurring within a larger time
frame that do not necessarily cause death. (See Pen. Code,1 §§ 189, subd. (a), 190.2,
subd. (a)(18)); People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 647; People v. Bemore (2000)
22 Cal.4th 809, 842-843.)
A. Jury Instructions
The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder
under the theory of murder by torture if: (1) he willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation intended to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on the victim while the
victim was alive; (2) he intended to inflict such pain on the victim for the calculated
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic reason; (3) the act causing
death involved a high degree of probability of death; and (4) torture was a cause of the
victim’s death.
Regarding the torture-murder special circumstance, the trial court told the jury the
prosecution had to prove Bryant: (1) intended to kill Norman; (2) intended to inflict
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4
extreme physical pain and suffering on Norman while Norman was alive; (3) intended to
inflict such pain and suffering on Norman for the calculated purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic reason; and (4) did an act involving the
infliction of extreme physical pain and suffering on Norman.
The trial court further instructed that a killing that would otherwise be murder is
reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone “because of a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion,” which occurs if: (1) the defendant was provoked; (2) as
a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense
emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment; and (3) the provocation would have
caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation. The
trial court also instructed the jury that if enough time passed between the provocation and
the killing for a person of average disposition to “cool off” and regain his or her clear
reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary manslaughter on this
basis.
Instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 625, the trial court explained that jurors
could consider evidence of “voluntary intoxication only in a limited way,” including
deciding whether Bryant acted with an intent to kill or acted with deliberation and
premeditation. “You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other
purpose,” the trial court said.
The trial court also instructed the jury that while the prosecution did not have to
prove Bryant had a motive to commit murder or the torture-murder special circumstance,
the jury could consider whether Bryant had a motive.
B. Closing Arguments
If Bryant had picked up a weapon and killed Norman the moment after Norman
grabbed B.P.’s leg and said, “I want you,” that “would probably be . . . voluntary
manslaughter,” the prosecutor argued in closing argument to the jury. “[B]ut that is not
what happened,” the prosecutor maintained, because “hours of torture” followed
5
Norman’s comment to B.P. According to defense counsel, “the real range” of culpability
for Bryant’s conduct was voluntary manslaughter at minimum and second degree murder
at most, “because not all of the elements . . . of first degree murder were met.”
C. Verdicts and Sentencing
In May 2022, after the jury found Bryant guilty of first degree murder (without
choosing a specific theory of murder) and found true the torture-murder special
circumstance, the trial court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
Bryant timely appealed in July 2022. After numerous extensions of time for preparation
of the record, a motion to augment the record, and extensions of time for preparation of
the augmented record, Bryant’s opening brief was filed in January 2024, and this case
became fully briefed on April 12, 2024.
DISCUSSION
I
Voluntary Intoxication and Heat of Passion
Bryant contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could
consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication in deciding whether he acted in the heat
of passion. The People argue (1) this contention is forfeited on appeal because Bryant
did not raise it below, (2) on the merits, the trial court did not err, and (3) any error was
harmless. On de novo review (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579), we
conclude the trial court did not err.2
In People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968 (Soto), our Supreme Court considered
section 29.4 and its history in ruling that evidence of voluntary intoxication is not
admissible on the question whether a defendant believed it necessary to act in self-
2 This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider Bryant’s other contentions on this
issue, including that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise the
issue below.
6
defense.3 (Id. at p. 970 [“CALCRIM No. 625 correctly permits the jury to consider
evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question of whether defendant intended to kill
but not on the question of whether he believed he needed to act in self-defense”].) The
reasoning of Soto renders Bryant’s claim unpersuasive.
In that case, our Supreme Court observed the Legislature, in enacting what is now
section 29.4, intended to overrule the majority decision in People v. Whitfield (1994) 7
Cal.4th 437 and instead “adopt[ ] Justice Mosk’s position that evidence of voluntary
intoxication is not admissible on the question of implied malice, that is, to prove that
defendants did not know of the danger they were creating by their actions, or that they
did not consciously disregard that danger.” (Soto, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 977.) The court
explained that “it is clear what the Legislature intended to achieve when it amended”
what is now section 29.4: “to prohibit voluntary intoxication from being an excuse for
poor judgment when someone kills.” (Soto, at p. 978.) So in the case of a defense theory
that a killing was voluntary manslaughter because it was the result of an actual but
unreasonable belief in the need to act in self-defense, even though intoxication can
“impair the sound judgment that is needed when deciding to use lethal force in self-
defense,” the Legislature “apparently agreed with Justice Mosk that a defendant who acts
with conscious disregard for life should be punished for murder regardless of whether
3 Section 29.4 provides in relevant part: “(a) No act committed by a person while in a
state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that
condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity
to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose,
intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the
accused committed the act. [¶] (b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible
solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific
intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or
harbored express malice aforethought.”
7
voluntary intoxication impaired his or her judgment” that lethal force was necessary.4
(Id. at pp. 977-978, italics added.)
This reasoning applies to the doctrine of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.
The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective
component. While the circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion are viewed
objectively (because the heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be
aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and
circumstances) the defendant also must actually, subjectively, kill under the heat of
passion. (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 855.) Bryant accepts evidence of
his voluntary intoxication would not be relevant to the objective component of this
doctrine, but argues it would be relevant to the subjective component. But like using
evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove a defendant believed it necessary to kill in
self-defense, using evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove rashness attempts to use
such evidence to excuse poor judgment that resulted in a killing. As our Supreme Court
explained in Soto, that is precisely what the Legislature sought to prohibit in amending
what is now section 29.4. There was no instructional error.
Citing the Soto concurring and dissenting opinion, Bryant contends Soto “was
wrongly decided.” He contends evidence of voluntary intoxication should be admissible
on the question whether a defendant was acting in a heat of passion when killing
4 A two-justice concurring and dissenting opinion argued the majority improperly
rejected a straightforward reading of section 29.4: (1) because section 29.4, subdivision
(b) expressly permits the introduction of evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue
of whether a defendant “ ‘harbored express malice aforethought,’ ” (2) and express
malice requires an intent to kill “ ‘unlawfully,’ ” (3) then evidence of voluntary
intoxication should be admissible when the defense theory is that there was not an intent
to kill unlawfully, but rather an intent to kill under the honest but unreasonable belief in
the need to act in self-defense. (Soto, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 980 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu,
J.).)
8
someone, because (1) section 29.4 says evidence of intoxication is admissible on the
issue whether the defendant acted with express malice and (2) a person who kills in a heat
of passion does not act with express malice. Bryant also argues Soto “did not consider
the present question.” These contentions are unavailing. We must follow the holdings of
our Supreme Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455), and to the extent pertinent analysis in an opinion is properly characterized as
dictum, it is still highly persuasive (People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972, 994).
II
Motive
Bryant’s second claim is that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the
prosecution did not have to prove motive in connection with the murder and the special
circumstance allegation. As Bryant appears to acknowledge this claim is foreclosed by
People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 579-580, wherein our Supreme Court held motive
was not an element of murder by torture and explained that while the prosecution
generally must prove a required mental state such as malice or intent, the reason why
someone commits a crime (in other words, the motive) is rarely an element that must be
proven. Thus, the sadistic reason element of murder by torture articulated by the trial
court to the jury in this case is not about motive. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 580 [“the murder by
torture charge here did not reference or require motive, or any derivation of that term”].)
Likewise, the sadistic reason element of the torture-murder special circumstance
articulated by the trial court to the jury in this case is not about motive.
9
III
No Cumulative Error
As Bryant’s claims of trial court error lack merit, so does his claim that the
cumulative effect of error was prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
DUARTE, J.
10
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.