CourtListener 9567208•In re L.V. CA1/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/14/24 In re L.V. CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re L.V., A.V., and B.V.,
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
MENDOCINO COUNTY A168327
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Mendocino County
v.
Super Ct. Nos. 22JV00005-
01, 22JV00006-01,
22JV00007-01)
J.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
J.V. (Mother) and S.V. (Father) are the parents of six
children who were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court:
L.V., born in 2006, A.V., born in 2008, B.V., born in 2010 or 2011,
R.V., born in 2012, Z.V. born in 2018, and E.V., born in 2020. At
an 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court found that the
three eldest children (L.V., A.V., and B.V.) were at substantial
risk of detriment if returned to Mother’s custody (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.22, subd. (a)(1)),1 that the Mendocino County
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
1
Institutions Code. Mother’s and Father’s three youngest children
(R.V., Z.V., and E.V.) are no longer subject to the juvenile court’s
1
Department of Social Services (Department) had offered Mother
reasonable reunification services (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3)), and that
her reunification services should be terminated. Mother appeals
from those orders, challenging the juvenile court’s visitation
order, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the reasonable
services findings, and compliance with the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA). We remand the
matter for reconsideration of the visitation order and to ensure
ICWA compliance but otherwise conditionally affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
In February 2022, the juvenile court sustained dependency
petitions on behalf of each of the six children, finding true
allegations that they were at substantial risk of physical harm
and serious emotional damage due to the parents’ substance
abuse, domestic violence, physical abuse, untreated mental
health issues, and failure to provide medical treatment. (§ 300,
subds. (b), (c).) The Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (Judicial
Council Forms, form ICWA-010(A)) attached to the dependency
petition indicated that L.V., B.V., and A.V. “may have Indian
ancestry” based on Mother’s statement that she has “ ‘[h]eavy
Native American ancestry’ ” but was not enrolled in any tribe.
The family originally came to the attention of the
Department, in January 2022, on a report of neglect. When the
investigating social worker responded to the rural property where
the family was staying, she found broken-down vehicles, as well
as piles of garbage, broken windows, sharp rusted metal objects,
and hazardous chemicals strewn on the ground within reach of
the children. The trailer Mother and her children were living in
did not have running water, a toilet, or a septic system.
jurisdiction and have returned to Mother’s sole custody. R.V.,
Z.V., E.V., and Father are not involved in the instant appeal.
2
Mother admitted inappropriately disciplining her children
and engaging in significant physical violence with Father. The
older children also reported that Mother and Father yelled and
screamed, hit each other, and threw and broke things. If the
older children tried to intervene, the parents would shove or
strike them. Mother acknowledged the family had been homeless
for six years and admitted she last used methamphetamine two
weeks earlier (when they came to California from Tennessee).
Father initially agreed to submit to a drug test, but after the
social worker returned from retrieving the drug test kit from her
car, Father had left the property.
As a result of his parents’ domestic violence, L.V. had
observed black eyes, raised red welts, and blood on Mother. He
had observed scratches on Father. All three older children told
the social worker that they felt unsafe in their parents’ care. L.V.
suffers anxiety and regular nausea, A.V. suffers suicidal thoughts
and anxiety, and B.V. exhibits aggressive behaviors (such as
punching his family members) when frustrated or disappointed.
The oldest two children (L.V. and A.V.) took care of the younger
siblings and said they did not have enough food. L.V. and the
other children had not been in school for four years because
Mother would not allow it. He could not remember the last time
he (or any of the other children) saw a doctor or dentist, but it
was more than four years ago. He had at least one broken tooth
that hurt.
The children were detained and placed in different foster
care placements. At the detention hearing, Mother indicated that
she possibly has Choctaw, Chippewa, or Cherokee ancestry, but
that she was not enrolled in any tribe and that her grandmother
and other relatives with knowledge of this ancestry were now
deceased. The juvenile court ordered a minimum of two hours of
weekly (supervised) visitation between the children and their
parents and, on the Department’s and minors’ counsel’s request,
3
agreed that the older children’s parental “visitation [was] not to
be forced.” The juvenile court also indicated that further ICWA
inquiry (and possibly notice to the identified tribes) would be
needed.
B.
The Department’s jurisdiction report noted that B.V. and
R.V. had attended an initial visit with Mother (along with E.V.
and Z.V.) but that B.V. left early. Since then, both B.V. and R.V.
refused to visit with either parent. L.V. and A.V. had also
declined all possible parental visitation and only attended sibling
visits. Mother had begun accessing services, was testing negative
and cooperating with the social worker. She had moved away
from Father and expressed some understanding of her older
children’s feelings. All four school aged children were now
enrolled and happy to be attending school.
Mother submitted a Parental Notification of Indian Status
form (Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-020), which stated that
one of her ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized
tribe and that her children may be members of, or eligible for
membership in, the Cherokee, Chippewa, or Choctaw tribes. In
the jurisdiction report, the social worker noted there was reason
to believe the children may be Indian children.
C.
By the time it filed its disposition report, in February of
2022, the Department had transferred the case to a new social
worker and was requesting a finding that ICWA did not apply.
On the latter point, the report notes that an assistant social
worker had discussed Native American heritage with L.V., who
said, “ ‘my mom said her grandmother or something was full
Cherokee.’ ” Mother had also recently completed a family tree
and stated that her paternal grandmother might have been
enrolled in an unknown tribe. Mother’s paternal uncle had also
4
been interviewed. He said that his mother was not a member of
any tribe, but “ ‘if you saw a picture of my grandmother (his
mother’s mother), you would think that she was Native
American.’ ” Based on the information obtained from both
Mother and her paternal uncle, the assistant social worker
conducted research on ancestry.com, but could not determine
whether the children are connected to any Native American tribe.
Mother told the new social worker that she was no longer
in a relationship with Father. She had moved into a shelter for
domestic violence victims, was participating in the “Alternatives
to Violence” program, and was engaged in therapy.
L.V., A.V., and B.V. all had initial assessments for
therapeutic services. B.V.’s treatment was aimed at reducing
symptoms and impairments of post-traumatic stress disorder.
A.V.’s treatment goals involved addressing his anxiety and past
suicidal ideation. L.V. reported feeling alone and depressed.
Although R.V. had recently agreed to monthly parental visits,
L.V., A.V., and B.V. continued to refuse.
At the disposition hearing, minors’ counsel stated L.V.,
A.V., and B.V. were very angry and were adamant that they
could not live with or be forced to visit either parent. The
juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply, adjudged each
child to be a dependent child and ordered them removed from
parental custody with reunification services.
The juvenile court also adopted the Department’s case plan,
which required Mother to engage in (1) parenting classes; (2)
individual therapy; (3) domestic violence counseling; and (4) drug
testing and substance abuse treatment. She was also required to
obtain suitable housing and meet her children’s medical and
dentals needs. The case plan directed Mother to have supervised
visits with the children for a minimum of three hours weekly, but
visitation was not to be forced. In making this order, the court
observed the children had been heavily traumatized, which would
5
not be quickly resolved. While the children were given space to
heal, the court asked the parents to consider writing letters.
The case plans for L.V., A.V., and B.V. required support of
their family relationship through court ordered visitation but did
not mandate therapy. Mother unsuccessfully requested family
therapy be added to the case plan. Mother did not appeal from
the dispositional findings and orders.
D.
The Department’s six-month review report indicated
Mother had obtained suitable housing, was employed, was
participating in a domestic violence program, and was fully
engaged in individual therapy. She now recognized the damage
domestic violence had imposed on her children. She was
regularly drug testing negative.
Mother’s visits with the three youngest children were
consistent and she was observed to be loving and appropriate.
Due to her stability in recovery, behavioral changes, and
consistent engagement in services, the Department recommended
that R.V. be placed in her care with family maintenance services.
The Department anticipated that E.V. and Z.V. would follow
shortly.
In his ongoing therapy, B.V. was openly angry about the
trauma suffered in his parents’ care. He was having nightmares.
A.V. had voluntarily ended his therapy, after two months, but
knew he could resume therapy by contacting his social worker or
therapist. L.V. was doing well in high school. He was on a
waitlist for therapy, but the social worker made a new referral so
that he could start therapy sooner.
The social worker encouraged all three of the oldest
children to visit Mother and told them about Mother’s
participation in services. However, the three eldest children still
refused and were adamant that they would not change their
6
minds. The social worker continued to request that visits not be
forced. Because all three of the eldest children continued to
indicate they were unwilling to live with their parents or even
visit, the Department recommended continuing their placement
in foster care and Mother’s reunification services.
In an addendum report, the Department noted that L.V.
would be assigned to a therapist soon. However, B.V. had
recently ended his therapy.
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found
Mother made “significant progress” and ordered R.V. into a
family maintenance plan while continuing the out of home
placements for the other children and providing Mother with an
additional six months of reunification services. The court found
that visitation with Mother would not be detrimental to L.V.,
A.V., and B.V. but stated that “[v]isits are not to be forced.”
Mother’s counsel expressed concern about the fact that the
eldest children were still refusing contact but did not object or
ask for any changes to be made to the case plan, the proposed
findings and orders, or the visitation language.
E.
The Department’s 12-month review report indicated that
Mother had maintained her sobriety; graduated from a substance
use disorder treatment program; complied with drug testing;
remained in stable housing; enrolled in a parenting class; and
recently “graduated” from individual domestic violence therapy.
Mother continued to see a second therapist, who reported she was
“engaged” but “ ‘struggling being away from her older kids.’ ”
Mother was also provided with a cell phone, phone cards, and
food vouchers.
L.V. was excelling in high school and engaged in therapy.
B.V. had recently reengaged in therapy and verbalized he did not
trust his parents. When they both attended his little brother’s
7
birthday party, B.V. ignored his Mother. A.V. had several
behavioral incidents during the prior six-month period that were
concerning, but he assured social workers that he was not
currently self-harming or experiencing suicidal ideation. A.V.
continued to refuse therapy and the Department believed it could
only encourage his participation. A.V. still refused to visit with
Mother but was aware that he could change his mind about
visitation and communicate his desire to see Mother to the social
worker.
The Department recommended terminating Father’s
reunification services due to his failure to make substantial
progress in mitigating the issues underlying the dependency.
Although Mother had made “exceptional” progress, made positive
behavioral changes, and now reunified with her three youngest
children, the three eldest minors continued to refuse her visits
and were adamant that they did not want to live with her. Due
to their steadfast refusal to visit Mother, the Department
believed the probability of B.V., A.V., and L.V. returning to her
care was low. Nonetheless, the Department felt an additional six
months of services would be helpful given Mother’s substantial
progress and because alternative plans for the three eldest
minors had not solidified.
At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court
terminated Father’s reunification services. The court found
Mother had made “significant” progress and followed the
Department’s recommendation to order continued out of home
placement for L.V., A.V., and B.V., and reunification services for
an additional six months. The court adopted the Department’s
recommended visitation order—providing Mother with a
minimum of one-hour supervised visits every week but also
noting that visits not be forced. At no time during this hearing
did Mother’s counsel object to the proposed reasonable services
8
finding or the proposed visitation order. Nor did she ask to alter
or amend the proposed case plan.
F.
Ultimately, the Department recommended terminating
Mother’s reunification services in its 18-month review report.
Mother continued to maintain her sobriety and strong
commitment to improving herself. She remained engaged in
therapy and joined a woman’s empowerment group. B.V., A.V.,
and L.V. continued to do well academically and in their
placements. As they had done throughout the entirety of the
case, B.V., A.V., and L.V. had refused all visits with Mother since
the 12-month hearing and continued to reject reunification. The
Department believed it would be detrimental to their emotional
well-being to be forced to live with Mother.
Acknowledging Mother’s progress and ability to safely care
for her three youngest children, the Department recommended
dismissal of the dependency as to E.V., Z.V., and R.V., and that
she be awarded sole physical and legal custody. The Department
reported that placement of B.V., A.V., and L.V. in foster care
remained necessary as they did not want to reunify, adoption was
inappropriate, and legal guardians were not yet available.
G.
At the 18-month review hearing, Mother’s counsel objected
to the Department’s recommendation with respect to L.V., A.V.,
and B.V. She argued that reasonable services had not been
provided and should, accordingly, be extended an additional six
months. She also argued, for the first time, that the not-to-be-
forced visitation order was an unconstitutional delegation of the
court’s power.
Mother’s counsel made an offer of proof that Mother would
testify she had, since the minors were detained, repeatedly
requested child therapy, family therapy, zoom visits, phone calls,
9
in-person visitation, and letters, but that these services had not
been provided because the Department believed forcing anything
would prove counterproductive. Mother would also testify that
she saw A.V., B.V., and L.V. when they arrived for a sibling visit
the day before and A.V. responded to a compliment she gave by
looking down and “kind of grin[ning].” When L.V. and B.V.
walked up, neither of them engaged with Mother, but they did
not appear afraid.
County counsel made an offer of proof that the social
worker would testify the Department exceeded the minimum
ordered sibling visitation and had offered L.V., B.V., and A.V. the
opportunity to visit the younger minors in Mother’s home, which
the eldest children declined. The social worker had not been
present when A.V. encountered Mother the day before, but B.V.
later asked, “ ‘[w]hy is my mother here?’ ”
Minors’ counsel supported the Department’s
recommendation to terminate reunification services and to find
reasonable services were provided. Minors’ counsel noted that
she could not “say enough” about how much work the social
worker had done on visitation and that it was a “constant
discussion point.” Minors’ counsel was adamant that L.V., A.V.,
and B.V. were “not ready,” and that parental visitation was “just
not going to happen” in the time available. There was nothing
the Department could have done that they “haven’t already
done.”
The juvenile court found Mother “substantial[ly]” met her
case plan objectives but that return of L.V., A.V., and B.V. to
Mother’s custody would be detrimental to their psychological or
emotional well-being because they had been “extremely
traumatized” in the family home. The juvenile court found that
the Department provided reasonable reunification services and
that no exceptional circumstances justified further services. The
court conceded Mother had done a “stellar job” in complying with
10
her case plan, but noted the minors had been offered therapy,
and had a social worker who urged visitation. The court stated
there was simply nothing else to be done about visitation absent
use of physical force. The court assumed it had authority to
extend services to 24 months, either under section 366.22,
subdivision (b), or section 352, but stated it would not do so
because “it would be detrimental to [the three eldest children’s]
emotional wellbeing.”
With respect to the three youngest children, the juvenile
court dismissed the dependency and granted Mother sole custody.
With respect to the three eldest, the court terminated
reunification services but did not set a section 366.26 hearing.
The court did not find visitation between Mother and her three
eldest children would be detrimental. The court ordered
supervised visits with Mother on a minimum one-hour weekly
schedule but also ordered that the children “shall not be forced”
to visit.
DISCUSSION
A.
Mother maintains, and the Department concedes, that the
juvenile court, at the 18-month hearing, impermissibly delegated
(to L.V., A.V., and B.V.) its judicial authority to decide whether
visitation with Mother should occur. Mother makes a related
argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the court’s final reasonable services finding. She contends the
Department did not do enough, in the six months preceding the
18-month hearing, to facilitate visitation. Assuming reasonable
services were not provided, Mother insists that the court abused
its discretion in not extending reunification services pursuant to
section 352. Apart from the conceded claim regarding the final
visitation order, Mother’s claims lack merit.
11
1.
The fundamental purpose of dependency law is to protect
the welfare and best interests of children who are at risk of being
neglected, or physically, sexually, or emotionally abused.
(§ 300.2, subd. (a); Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th
609, 623 (Michael G.).) “[O]nce dependency jurisdiction is
acquired because of the custodial parent’s conduct, the court’s
inquiry shifts to a focus on the child’s best interests, albeit with a
preference towards parental reunification.” (In re Luke M. (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.)
Visitation is a critical component of a reunification plan.
(In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.) “Without
visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible for a parent to
achieve reunification.” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481,
1491–1492.) The power to determine the right and extent of a
parent’s visitation in a dependency case resides with the court
and may not be delegated to other parties. (In re Donnovan J.
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476.) The court may delegate the
responsibility for managing the details of visits, including their
time, place, and manner (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th
1367, 1374), so long as “the ultimate supervision and control over
this discretion” remains with the court. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 41, 51 (Julie M.).)
Although a dependent child’s desires regarding visitation
may be a dominant factor, visitation may not be dictated solely by
the child. (In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138;
Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48-51.) Because the court
must focus on the child’s best interests and eliminating the
conditions leading to its jurisdiction, visitation may be denied if it
threatens the child’s physical or emotional well-being. (In re
Matthew C. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1101-1104; Julie M., at p.
50.)
12
“To balance the interest in family preservation with the
child’s interest in the prompt resolution of her custody status and
long-term placement, the dependency law establishes a detailed
timeline for reunification. . . . Parents of children three or older
are presumptively eligible for at least 12 months of services.
([§ 361.5], subd. (a)(1)(A).) Reunification services are ordinarily
provided for a maximum of 18 months after a child has been
removed from parental custody.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 625.) At the six- and 12-month review hearings, if the
dependent child is not returned to their parent’s custody, the
juvenile court is required to consider whether reasonable
services—designed to aid the parent in overcoming the
underlying problems—have been provided and, if not, extend
reunification services for another six months. (§ 366.21, subds.
(e), (g); Michael G., at p. 625.)
However, the statute governing the 18-month review
hearing is different. (§ 366.22, subd. (a); Michael G., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 626.) Section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), provides
that if the child cannot be returned to the parents at the 18-
month review hearing, the court shall order a section 366.26
hearing—regardless of whether reasonable reunification services
have been provided—except in certain limited circumstances.
(Michael G., at p. 628.) If the court finds the child should not be
returned to the parent or legal guardian, it must schedule a
hearing to select a permanent plan under section 366.26 unless
“the court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that there is
a compelling reason . . . for determining that a hearing held
under Section 366.26 is not in the best interests of the child
because the child is not a proper subject for adoption and has no
one willing to accept legal guardianship as of the hearing date.”
(§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) “The court shall also order termination of
reunification services to the parent,” “shall continue to permit the
parent . . . to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would
be detrimental,” and “shall determine by clear and convincing
13
evidence whether reasonable services have been offered or
provided to the parent.” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court may extend services beyond the 18-
month review hearing for three narrowly defined categories of
parents who have faced specified obstacles to reunification if the
court “determines by clear and convincing evidence that the best
interests of the child would be met by the provision of additional
reunification services.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(1); accord, Michael G.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 628.) In addition, “California courts have
also long recognized an ‘ “emergency escape valve” ’ under section
352, . . . [which] is available to all parents in exceptional
situations in which the court determines that extending services
and continuing reunification efforts beyond 18 months is not
contrary to the child’s interests.” (Michael G., at p. 632.)
2.
Turning first to the visitation order entered at the 18-
month review, we accept the Department’s concession that the
juvenile court erred by giving L.V., A.V., and B.V. an effective
veto power over future visits. (See In re S.H. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 310, 317-318; Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp.
48-52; but see In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227,
1233, 1237-1239.) Accordingly, we will remand so that the
juvenile court may consider whether to make a finding that
visitation would be detrimental and, if it does not, to fashion an
appropriate order that permits input from the children, but
which recognizes that “ultimate supervision and control . . . must
remain with the court.” (Julie M., at p. 51.)
3.
In her challenge to the reasonable services finding, Mother
maintains that the Department did not do enough to facilitate
visitation in the face of the older children’s resistance. She
recognizes that the social worker had repeatedly encouraged the
14
three oldest children to visit in the first 12 months. But she
argues that the Department was required to make new efforts
because, once the 12-month mark passed without any visitation,
it should have realized that its previous efforts to facilitate
visitation had failed. We conclude that any error was harmless.
“[T]o make the requisite findings, the record should show
that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to
the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those
problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during
the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to
assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult
(such as helping to provide transportation and offering more
intensive rehabilitation services where others have failed).” (In
re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.) “The
standard is not whether the services provided were the best that
might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services
were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R.
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) “[A parent’s] difficulty meeting
the case plan’s requirements does not excuse the agency from
continuing its effort to bring [the parent] into compliance with
the court’s orders.” (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446,
1451.)
Our review is limited to the period following the 12-month
review hearing because the juvenile court’s preceding reasonable
services findings (made at the six- and 12-month reviews) went
unchallenged and are now final and binding. (See Serena M. v.
Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 675.) We review the
juvenile court’s finding at the 18-month hearing for substantial
evidence, bearing in mind the clear and convincing evidence
burden of proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
995–996; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229,
1238, disapproved on other grounds by Michael G., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 631, fn. 8.)
15
Mother argues the Department failed to provide reasonable
services because it did not do more to facilitate individual or
family therapy for the oldest children (L.V., B.V., and A.V.).
Here, neither family therapy nor individual child therapy was
ordered as part of the case plan. To the extent Mother is
belatedly challenging the adequacy of the reunification plan
itself, including the juvenile court’s visitation orders made at any
hearing before the 18-month review, she has forfeited her right to
raise such arguments on appeal by failing to appeal from the
dispositional and intervening appealable orders. (See Julie M.,
supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 [parent’s failure to challenge
service plan requirements, either by direct appeal from
dispositional order or by filing petition to modify (§ 388), operates
as acquiescence]; Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
798, 811 [parent challenging most recent order cannot challenge
prior appealable orders for which statutory time to appeal has
passed].)2 Whether the department made reasonable efforts to
implement and facilitate the approved plan, however, remains an
ongoing issue that must be addressed by the juvenile court at
each review hearing. (See Julie M., at pp. 47-48.)
Here, the Department recognized early on that healing the
interfamilial trauma would be key to reunification. Despite the
social worker’s previous efforts at encouraging all three of the
older children to engage (or reengage) in individual therapy and
to visit with Mother, the 18-month review report indicates that,
during the relevant six-month period, L.V., B.V., and A.V.
persisted in adamantly opposing visitation or reunification with
Mother. True, the 18-month report does not detail any new
efforts the social worker made to encourage the children to
engage in visitation or therapy. But the Department made an
2In her reply brief, Mother clarifies that she is “not
complain[ing] that the order made at the time of the 12-month
review, that visits were not to be forced, constituted an unlawful
delegation.” (Italics added.)
16
offer of proof at the 18-month hearing that the social worker
proposed holding sibling visitation, which had gone well, in
Mother’s home. This offer of proof was received without
objection.
It might not seem like much. And the social worker’s
apparent final effort to establish comfort and induce contact with
Mother was unsuccessful. But this effort to facilitate visits came
long after the Department referred L.V., A.V., and B.V. to
individual therapy (before the disposition hearing), repeatedly
encouraged them to visit, and made them aware of Mother’s
progress and change.
We are mindful that Mother’s three older children are all
teenagers and were (understandably due to their age) the most
traumatized by the significant and long-term abuse and neglect
in the family home. Thus, we cannot say it was unreasonable for
the Department to decide that doing anything more would both
further traumatize the older children and be unlikely to improve
the situation. (See In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343,
1356 [“ ‘child’s input and refusal and the possible adverse
consequences if a visit is forced against the child’s will are factors
to be considered in administering visitation’ ”]; Julie M., supra,
69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 47-48, 51.) Although Mother’s progress is
commendable, the record suggests there was simply nothing more
that could be done in the face of the older children’s strong
resistance to visitation and reunification. On this record, a
reasonable fact finder could find it highly probable that the
Department provided reasonable services.
But even if we assume the trial court’s finding is not
supported by substantial evidence, Mother cannot demonstrate
prejudice. Mother previously received 12 months of services—for
which the reasonable services findings are now final. (See Serena
M. v. Superior Court, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 675.)
Regardless of whether reasonable reunification services were
17
provided in the most recent (12- to 18-month) period, she would
not be entitled to an additional six months of reunification
services, as she suggests, because “the statutory provision
governing the 18-month hearing contains no provision requiring
the court to extend services if it concludes that reasonable
services have not been offered or provided.” (See Michael G.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 628.)
The narrow exception to that rule—giving the juvenile
court discretion to order 24 months of services—does not apply
because Mother was not in a residential substance abuse
treatment program, she was not a minor or nonminor dependent
at detention, and she had not been recently incarcerated or
institutionalized. (§ 366.22, subd. (b); Michael G., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 628.) Furthermore, the juvenile court expressly
found it would not be in L.V.’s, B.V.’s, or A.V.’s best interests to
provide additional reunification services. And Mother forfeited
any challenge to this finding by failing to press it in her opening
brief on appeal. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 56.)
The unchallenged best interests finding is fatal both to
Mother’s eligibility for continued services under section 366.22,
subdivision (b) (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 628-629),
and to her argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by declining to order continued services under section 352.
(Michael G., at p. 632.)
B.
Finally, the parties agree that the juvenile court erred in
finding ICWA does not apply without fulfilling its duty (and
requiring the Department to fulfill its own duty) to inquire into
the children’s possible Native American lineage.
ICWA establishes minimum standards for courts to follow
before removing Indian children from their families and placing
18
them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (D.S.).) Under California’s implementing
legislation and rules of court, the juvenile court and the child
welfare agency have “an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire” of all involved persons whether a child for whom a
dependency petition has been filed is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a); D.S., at
p. 1052.) This duty “includes, but is not limited to, asking the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b), italics added; accord, Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)
California law also imposes on the court and social worker
a duty to make “further inquiry” regarding the possible Indian
status of a child if there is “reason to believe that an Indian child
is involved in a [dependency] proceeding.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e);
D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.) A “reason to believe”
exists if the agency or the juvenile court “has information
suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (§
224.2, subd. (e)(1).) “[F]urther inquiry” includes, but is not
limited to, interviewing “ ‘extended family members,’ ” contacting
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and contacting “the tribes and any
other person who reasonably can be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership status or eligibility.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).)
The Department concedes it violated its duties of initial
and further inquiry by failing to ask the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
the State Department of Social Services, the three tribes
identified by Mother, or Mother’s second cousin (Emily)—who the
original social worker contacted in early January 2022—about
19
the children’s possible Native American ancestry. (§ 224.2,
subds. (b), (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).)
The appellate courts are presently divided on what showing
of prejudice warrants reversal for ICWA inquiry errors. (See In
re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 152-155; In re A.R. (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 197, 205-208; In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
421, 433-435.) That issue is currently pending before our
Supreme Court. (See In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769,
review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) We need not resolve
this issue because the Department agrees with Mother that
remand for ICWA compliance is required.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating Mother’s reunification services are
reversed only to the extent the orders provide for visitation with
Mother that “shall not be forced.” In all other respects, the
challenged findings and orders are conditionally affirmed. The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purposes
of (1) ensuring compliance with the inquiry provisions of section
224.2 and, if necessary, the notice provisions of section 224.3; and
(2) reconsidering the visitation orders. The juvenile court shall
order that within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur, the
Department complete an inquiry investigation into the children’s
Indian ancestry. If, on remand, the juvenile court determines
that ICWA does not apply, the challenged orders (excepting the
challenged visitation order) and ICWA inapplicability findings
shall remain in effect. If the court determines ICWA applies, it
shall vacate the challenged orders and ICWA inapplicability
findings and proceed in accordance with ICWA, related state law,
and this opinion.
20
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
In re L.V., A.V., and B.V. / Mendocino County Department of Social Services v. J.V.
(A168327)
21
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