In re S.B. CA4/2

CourtListener 9546396Calctapp13.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/13/24 In re S.B. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re S.B., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E082019

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J297727)

v. OPINION

E.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,

Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant E.B. (Father) is the father of S.B., a daughter born in July

2016. Father appeals from the juvenile court’s August 15, 2023

jurisdictional/dispositional orders adjudicating S.B. a dependent of the court (Welf. &
1
Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b), (g)), removing S.B. from parental custody (§ 361, subd.

(c)(1)), and ordering Father to complete a domestic violence program, among other
2
services. Father requests this court’s review of only a portion of the jurisdictional

allegation pertaining to his conduct even though independent, unchallenged grounds exist

for the court’s dependency jurisdiction over the child based on Mother’s conduct. Father

claims insufficient evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional finding against him and

that the court abused its discretion in requiring him to complete a domestic violence

program. We conclude insufficient evidence supports the one jurisdictional finding

against Father and reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders as to Father, but

affirm the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders as to Mother.

1
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise stated.
2
K.J. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal.

2
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The family came to the attention of plaintiff and respondent the San Bernardino

County Children and Family Services (CFS) on July 3, 2023, after a referral was received

alleging Mother and A.N., the father of S.B.’s half-sibling, then-one-year-old K.N.,

engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the children. Specifically, Mother and

A.N. were driving with the children in their vehicle when they began arguing and A.N.

punched Mother in the face. A.N. reported this was not the first time the children had

been exposed to domestic violence. At the time, Mother had a no negative contact order

against A.N.

Mother confirmed there had been ongoing domestic violence between her and

A.N., one of which involved a referral to CFS for an incident that occurred in March

2021. CFS’s investigation in 2021 resulted from an incident in which A.N. threw a chair

at Mother that hit S.B. in the face, causing a laceration to the child’s eye. After the 2021

incident, Mother obtained a restraining order against A.N. but subsequently modified the

order to allow peaceful contact. A.N. had previously been required to complete services

to address domestic violence but failed to do so. Mother reported being in a relationship

on and off with A.N. and that law enforcement had been called to the home several times

due to incidents of domestic violence. Mother noted that she and A.N. argued

continuously in the home.

3
Then-six-year-old S.B. reported that she had witnessed the most recent incident of

domestic violence, as well as many of the prior incidents. S.B. noted that she had

attempted to intervene in these incidents by placing herself between Mother and A.N.

during altercations. S.B. desired Mother and A.N. to stop fighting and for A.N. to leave

the home and not return. Father was incarcerated with a projected release date of January

2024. CFS determined S.B. could not safely remain in the home, obtained a protective

custody warrant, detained her, and temporarily placed her in foster care.

On July 6, 2023, CFS filed a petition on behalf of S.B. pursuant to section 300,

subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The petition

alleged that Mother had a history of engaging in domestic violence, placing the child at

risk of physical and emotional harm. Under section 300, subdivision (g), the petition also

alleged that Father was incarcerated in state prison with a release date of January 2024

and could not provide adequate care and support for the child thereby placing the child at

risk of abuse and neglect.

S.B. was formally detained at the July 7, 2023, detention hearing. Mother was

present and noted Father had been in custody for approximately six months to a year.

The court set the matter for a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing.

CFS recommended that the court find true the allegations in the petition, S.B. be

removed from parental custody, and the parents be provided with reunification services.

The recommended case plan for Father included general counseling, parenting education,

and a domestic violence program. Mother reported Father had been in custody since

4
October 2022. She also stated that Father had paid child support for a period of time but

that she had not received any monetary support for S.B.’s care since 2019. S.B. was

again interviewed and described ongoing domestic violence in the home. She noted that

she was “sad” when A.N. hit Mother and reported being afraid of A.N.

The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on August 15, 2023.

Both parents were present. In pertinent part, Father’s counsel objected to the court

sustaining the section 300, subdivision (g) allegation against him. He also objected to the

inclusion of domestic violence services as part of his reunification services plan. Father’s

counsel argued that Father had been incarcerated due to driving under the influence

charge and that domestic violence services were not warranted in his case. Following

argument by all counsel, the juvenile court found true all of the allegations in S.B.’s

petition as pled. The court declared S.B. a dependent of the court, removed her from

parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services and supervised

visitations once a week for two hours. Father’s case plan, which included domestic

violence services, was approved as submitted by CFS. Father’s appeal followed.

III.

DISCUSSION

Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional finding

regarding his conduct. He also asserts that if this court finds substantial evidence

supported the jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (g), his case plan

should be modified to delete the domestic violence component.

5
CFS argues that Father’s appeal is nonjusticiable because Father does not

challenge the jurisdictional findings regarding Mother’s conduct and, therefore, any

decision we might render would not deprive the juvenile court of its authority to assert

jurisdiction over S.B. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490 (I.A.) [“An

important requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the

prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or

legal status.”].)

A. Justiciability

Justiciability refers to whether an issue is an existing controversy and not a moot

question or abstract proposition. An important requirement of justiciability is a court’s

ability to grant “effective” relief—that is, a remedy that can have a practical, tangible

impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status. It is our duty to decide actual controversies

by a judgment that can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot

questions or abstract propositions. (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-

329; I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490.)

The purpose of dependency law is the protection of the child. (In re Joshua G.

(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202.) In accordance with the law’s purpose, the juvenile

court overseeing a dependency proceeding takes jurisdiction over the child whenever one

of the statutory prerequisites in section 300 has been satisfied. (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51

Cal.App.4th 393, 397.) Because a finding that one parent’s conduct has created

circumstances triggering section 300 is sufficient to assert jurisdiction over the child, an

6
appellate court may decline to review jurisdictional findings based on the other parent’s

conduct. (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491-1492.)

Nonetheless, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to reach the merits of

an otherwise nonjusticiable challenge to a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding if the

finding: (1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal;

(2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future

dependency proceedings; or (3) could have consequences for the appellant beyond

jurisdiction. (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763 (Drake M.).)

In this case, Father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings based on

Mother’s conduct, and there is more than substantial evidence to support jurisdiction of

S.B. based on Mother’s conduct alone. (See I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491-

1492.) Father, nonetheless, requests that we reach the merits of the jurisdictional findings

against him because they are prejudicial to him in this case and any future dependency

proceedings as he was a nonoffending parent. Father also argues that we should reach the

issue because the court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (g), as it related to him,

formed the basis for the dispositional order.

In Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754, the court exercised its discretion to

consider the custodial father’s challenge to jurisdiction because he was seeking custody

of the child and the outcome of the appeal would mean the difference between the father

being an “offending” versus a “non-offending” parent (id. at p. 763), a distinction that

could affect the father’s custody rights under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), when there

7
is clear and convincing evidence that a child would be in substantial danger if returned

home, the “court shall consider, as a reasonable means to protect the minor . . . [¶] . . .

[¶] [a]llowing a nonoffending parent [or] guardian . . . to retain physical custody.”

(§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)

We conclude that there is at least a colorable claim that the jurisdictional finding

against Father have already impacted Father in these proceedings, as evidenced by the

juvenile court’s orders removing S.B. from Father’s custody. In addition, Father is

correct in that if there is insufficient evidence to support the section 300, subdivision (g)

allegation against him, “the outcome of this appeal is the difference between [F]ather’s

being an ‘offending’ parent versus a ‘non-offending’ parent.” (Drake M., supra, 211

Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) “Such a distinction may have far-reaching implications with

respect to future dependency proceedings in this case and [F]ather’s parental rights.”

(Ibid.; see In re D.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 911, 917 [“[T]he finding on the section 300,

subdivision (c) allegation could potentially affect future dependency proceedings.”].)

Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Father’s challenge

to the jurisdictional findings against him. (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 763;

In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 638-639 [exercising discretion to decide merits

of appeal challenging jurisdictional findings involving one of two parents].)

8
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Jurisdictional Finding Against Father

Father argues the juvenile court erred in sustaining the petition against him on the

ground that he was incarcerated without finding he was mentally or physically incapable

of arranging for S.B.’s care by a relative.

“‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In

making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to

support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light

most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and

credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th

622, 633.) However, we note that CFS had the burden of proof as to each fact necessary

to sustain the jurisdictional petition, and that Father “was not required to demonstrate

anything” and could prevail “without making any factual showing at all.” (In re S.D.

(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078 (S.D.).)

Additionally, “‘[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its

assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing

court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the [child] if any one of

the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by

substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any

or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the

evidence.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773-774.)

9
In the present matter, the juvenile court sustained the petition under section 300,

subdivisions (b)(1) against Mother and (g) relating to Father. Subdivision (b)(1)

provides, in pertinent part, that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court

if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious

physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child. [¶] (B) The willful or

negligent failure of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child

from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left. [¶] (C) The willful

or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing,

shelter, or medical treatment. [¶] (D) The inability of the parent or guardian to provide

regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness, developmental disability,

or substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Neither Father nor Mother have challenged

the court’s jurisdiction over S.B. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and we find

substantial evidence to support the court’s jurisdiction over S.B. pursuant to section 300,

subdivision (b)(1).

“Section 300, subdivision (g), authorizes the juvenile court to adjudge a minor a

dependent child of the court where ‘the minor’s parent has been incarcerated or

institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care of the minor . . . .’ [Citation.] The

careful analysis found in In re Aaron S. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 202 . . . provides an

authoritative interpretation of the statutory language. The court concluded that ‘[t]he use

of the present tense verb in the statute, “cannot arrange,” indicates that the circumstances

10
justifying the dependency must exist at the time of the hearing. [Citations.] Accordingly,

section 300, subdivision (g) applies when, at the time of the [jurisdictional] hearing, a

parent has been incarcerated and does not know how to make, or is physically or mentally

incapable of making, preparations or plans for the care of his or her child.’ [Citation.]”

(In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 304-305.) “Put another way, ‘neither

incarceration alone nor the failure to make an appropriate advance plan for the child’s

ongoing care and supervision is sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction under

subdivision (g).’ [Citation.] Moreover, ‘[n]othing in section 300, subdivision (g) even

requires an incarcerated parent . . . to prove affirmatively the suitability of [his or] her

caretaking arrangements. It requires only that [he or] she be able to make the

arrangements.’ [Citation.]” (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 897 (M.R.).)

Without more, a parent’s inability to care for or financially support a child

personally due to incarceration is not grounds for dependency jurisdiction under section

300, subdivisions (b)(1) or (g). (See, e.g., In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 366

[finding under subdivision (b), that “incarceration, without more, cannot provide a basis

for jurisdiction”]; In re Monica C., supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 305 [subdivision (g)

“requires only that an incarcerated parent arrange adequately for the care of the child

during the period of his or her incarceration”]; S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077

[“[t]here is no ‘Go to jail, lose your child’ rule in California”]; In re Andrew S. (2016) 2

Cal.App.5th 536, 542 [“Neither [section 300, subdivision (b) nor subdivision (g)] justifies

11
the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an otherwise well-cared-for child

simply because an absent parent has not provided support.”].)

S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, is instructive and supports reversal. In S.D., the

mother left her two-year-old child with a relative when she went out to dinner. (Id. at p.

1071.) The relative was arrested and police took the child into custody. (Id. at p. 1072.)

The next day the mother was arrested. (Ibid.) The petition alleged the mother was

incarcerated and neither parent was available to care for the child, but there was no

allegation or evidence that the mother was unable to arrange for the child’s care during

her incarceration. (Id. at p. 1071.) In fact, the record “strongly suggest[ed] that [the

mother] had several options for care of [the minor] during her incarceration.” (Ibid.) The

child was placed with a maternal aunt after the detention hearing and again after the 12-

month review hearing. (Id. at pp. 1072-1073, 1075-1076.) The juvenile court dismissed

the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations, leaving section 300, subdivision (g) as the

sole basis for jurisdiction. (S.D., supra, at p. 1074.)

In assessing the mother’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to

assert a defense to section 300, subdivision (g), the Court of Appeal found it was

“irrelevant that [the mother] had not already arranged for [the child]’s care at the time of

her incarceration.” (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) The court held that the

issue under section 300, subdivision (g), is whether the parent could arrange for care, not

whether the parent had done so, and that the agency had the burden of proof and was

required to establish that the parent could not arrange for care. (S.D., supra, at p. 1078.)

12
On the record before it, the court had “no problem concluding that [the agency] failed to

sustain its factual burden.” (Ibid.) The court emphasized that, under the statute, the

parent is not required to affirmatively prove the caretaking arrangements are suitable.

(Id. at p. 1079.) The statute requires only that the parent is able to make the arrangements

and, if the agency wishes to challenge the suitability of the arrangement, it must proceed

under another of the clauses in section 300, subdivision (g). (S.D., supra, at p. 1079.)

Here, at the time of Father’s incarceration, S.B. was in Mother’s custody. Thus,

there was no reason for Father to make any appropriate arrangements for the child’s care

at the time he was incarcerated. After S.B. was detained, the record does not indicate

whether Father had any opportunity to attempt to arrange for S.B.’s care with any

relatives, such as with the paternal grandmother or the paternal aunt before CFS
3
intervened. As in S.D., the record establishes that Father had family members who may

have been willing to assume care of S.B., including the paternal grandmother and the
4
paternal aunt. (See S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071 [finding that the mother had

ineffective assistance of counsel where her attorney agreed that section 300, subdivision

3
CFS had inquired of the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt regarding
the family’s Native American ancestry, but there is no indication in the record whether
Father had made arrangements for S.B.’s care once the child was detained due to
Mother’s ongoing domestic violence incidents with A.N.
4
While CFS assessed the maternal grandparents for relative placement of the
children, it is unknown whether CFS inquired of the paternal relatives concerning
placement of S.B.

13
(g) applied even though “the record . . . strongly suggest[ed] that [the mother] had several

options for care of [the child] during her incarceration”].)

Further, as in S.D., CFS “pleaded and proved only that [Father] had been

incarcerated, but not that []he was unable to arrange for care of” S.B. (S.D., supra, 99

Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) The petition here alleged, with respect to section 300,

subdivision (g), that Father “is currently incarcerated at the Corcoran, California State

prison with a January 2024 projected release date, thus, preventing him from providing

adequate care and support to the child, [S.B.]. Such status leaves the child at risk of

abuse and neglect.” CFS did not allege that Father was incapable of arranging for the

provision of care, supervision, and the necessities of life for S.B. We have been unable to

find evidence in the record supporting that Father was physically or mentally unable to

make appropriate custody arrangements for S.B., nor does CFS identify any such

evidence on appeal. In fact, at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, CFS noted that it

had not interviewed Father as he was in custody. However, Father had attended several

of the hearings and also requested supervised phone visits with S.B. while incarcerated.

Relying on In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470 (James C.), CFS asserts,

“[w]hile Father is correct that merely being incarcerated is not a sufficient basis for

jurisdiction under [s]ection 300, subdivision (g), Father ignores his own culpability in the

child’s status as a [d]ependent child.” CFS further asserts that Father’s “disinterest” in

S.B’s “well-being demonstrates that he has no ability to provide for her care.” CFS’s

reliance on James C. is misplaced and that case is distinguishable. First, as explained

14
above, Father does not have to prove the allegation. Second, in James C., the petition

alleged that the father was incarcerated and unable to provide the children with the basic

necessities of life. And, unlike here, substantial evidence in that case showed the

children were living in squalid, filth-infested conditions that jeopardized their health and

safety. (James C., supra, at pp. 482-483.) It is unknown here whether Father was

disinterested in S.B. as CFS claims, because CFS never interviewed Father, despite

having opportunities to do so. In any event, the record indicates that Father was not

disinterested in his child, as CFS suggests. He recognized S.B. as his child. He had

provided child support for S.B. from 2016 to 2017, with the most recent in 2019. He was

present at several hearings, albeit telephonically while in custody, and requested phone

visits with S.B. The above circumstances undermines any inference that Father was

uninterested in his child or unwilling or unable to arrange for her care. (Compare M.R.,

supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [no substantial evidence supported finding that

incarcerated father did not or could not plan for the care of children under section 300,

subdivision (g), where “he took an interest in them, and attempted to provide for them to

some degree from prison”] with James C., supra, at p. 484 [upholding jurisdiction under

section 300, subdivision (g), and finding lack of evidence incarcerated father ever showed

interest in or attempted to care for children sufficient for juvenile court to infer that he

was unable or unwilling to arrange for care].)

The law provides that “‘neither incarceration alone nor the failure to make an

appropriate advance plan for the child’s ongoing care and supervision is sufficient to

15
permit the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (g).’ [Citation.]” (M.R., supra, 7

Cal.App.5th at p. 897; accord, S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077 [that the mother had

not already arranged for the minor’s care at the time of her incarceration was “irrelevant”

to determining whether exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g) was

appropriate].)

We conclude CFS did not carry its burden below of demonstrating that something

more than the mere fact of Father’s incarceration supported jurisdiction under section

300, subdivision (g). We will therefore reverse the juvenile court’s true finding with

respect to the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g) against Father,

and the dispositional order as to Father.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional finding and dispositional orders against Father are reversed.

The jurisdictional and dispositional orders as to Mother are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

MILLER
J.

16

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.