People v. Page CA2/7

CourtListener 9546232Calctapp13.06.2024

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Filed 6/13/24 P. v. Page CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B329561

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA111507)
v.

RICHARD PAGE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Roger T. Ito, Judge. Affirmed.
Stanley Dale Radtke, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Yun K. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________
INTRODUCTION

In 2010, a jury convicted Richard Page of attempted
murder. In 2022, Page filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code former section 1170.951 (now section 1172.6), alleging
that he was convicted of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine and that he could not now be
convicted under current law.
On appeal, Page contends the trial court erred because it
denied his petition at the prima facie stage without reviewing the
record of conviction. Instead, the trial court based its decision on
its own memory of the trial and the prosecutor and defense
attorney’s description of the case. Because the prosecutor did not
file a response to Page’s petition and neither side presented a
record of conviction to the trial court, Page asserts that the court
engaged in impermissible factfinding and deprived him of his due
process right to an evidentiary hearing.
We conclude that any error in the prima facie procedure
was harmless. The record of conviction shows the jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Instead, the jury necessarily found Page “intended to kill” the
victim. Accordingly, Page was ineligible for relief because he was
convicted on a theory of attempted murder that remains valid.
We affirm.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. A Jury Convicts Page of Attempted Murder and Other
Criminal Offenses

Page attacked his ex-wife in 2009 while she was walking
her dog in the park. Page hit her repeatedly in the head and face
and tried to suffocate her by placing a plastic bag over her head.2
She lost consciousness several times. Several times when she
regained consciousness, the bag was tightly covering her head,
she had trouble breathing, and felt pressure around her neck as if
Page were holding her down. The last time she regained
consciousness, she saw Page riding away on a bicycle. A deputy
sheriff who responded to the scene found a black trash bag in the
area. The ex-wife spent four days in the hospital. She received
stitches on her forehead, right eyebrow, and upper lip. Three of
her teeth were cracked, and one of her thumbs was sprained. She
later required surgery to raise her left eyebrow because a nerve
had been damaged in the attack.
In 2010, a jury convicted Page of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a);
count 1); corporal injury to a spouse, cohabitant, or child’s parent
(§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2); and disobeying a domestic relations
court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 3). As to counts 1 and 2, the

2 We described much of the background of this case in Page’s
direct appeal. (See People v. Page (Nov. 29, 2011, B229182)
[nonpub. opn.].) We provide a brief summary here. We do not
rely on these facts in reaching our conclusion. (See People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [factual summary in prior
opinion cannot establish ineligibility for resentencing at prima
facie stage].)

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jury found the allegations that Page personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon, to wit, a plastic bag,3 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1))
and personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances
involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) to be true.
In November 2010, the court sentenced Page to life with
the possibility of parole, plus six years in state prison.

B. The Trial Court Denies Page’s Section 1172.6 Petition
at the Prima Facie Stage

In May 2022, Page filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95. Checking boxes on a form petition, Page
requested appointment of counsel and alleged the People filed an
information that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, that he was convicted of attempted
murder following a trial, and that he could not now be convicted
of attempted murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189.
At a hearing in July 2022 regarding appointing counsel for
Page, the court stated, “I am intimately familiar with the facts of
the case because it was tried before me. Mr. Page was an
individual who was sort of memorable, but Mr. Page was
convicted of an attempted, willful, premeditated murder of his
ex-wife. I think the facts were he put a bag over her head and
tried to suffocate her, and he was alleging he wasn’t, that she
misidentified him, but it was his ex-wife. In any event, that’s the
facts of the case.” At the hearing, the trial court appointed

3 “A deadly weapon other than a firearm is any object,
instrument, or weapon . . . that is used in such a way that it is
capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily
injury.” (CALCRIM No. 875.)

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counsel for Page. In September 2022, Page filed a “motion to
disqualify appointed counsel” under People v. Marsden (1970)
2 Cal.3d 118.
In February 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Page’s
petition. The People did not file a response to Page’s petition.
There was no record of conviction before the trial court beyond
what the court had in its own file. It is unclear if the trial court
reviewed any of the documents in its own file before ruling on
Page’s petition.
After taking Page’s Marsden motion off calendar as moot
because Page had waived his presence at the hearing, the trial
court addressed the petition for resentencing. After confirming
that the prosecutor and defense counsel were the attorneys who
tried the case before the court, the court stated that it had “a
distinct recollection” of Page’s case. The court recounted, “[T]his
was the incident wherein he put a bag so as to attempt to
asphyxiate his ex-wife in the park, and this is after having
committed various acts of vandalism and assault on her
previously, and his argument was that it was not him, right? She
was in the park having walked her dog, was sitting there either
smoking a cigarette or resting on a park bench. She was
approached from behind by Mr. Page according to the evidence
presented, was covered—her head was covered by a plastic bag so
as to asphyxiate her. Mr. Page’s attempt was unsuccessful, and
that is my recollection of the facts of this case. Either of you
want to add anything else to that?”
In response, defense counsel stated, “No, Judge, that is
correct,” and then went on to recite additional facts of the case.
Defense counsel stated the victim told law enforcement that Page
hit her with his fist, twice choked her with a black trash bag, and

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battered her. Defense counsel added the victim passed out twice
and attempted unsuccessfully to fight Page off, and the injuries
to the victim’s face (pictures of which were shown to the jurors)
were traumatic. The prosecutor added Page was identified by
DNA evidence from the victim’s blood on Page’s shoes when he
reported the next day for community service work on a previous
domestic violence sentence.
The trial court denied Page’s petition. The court stated
there was insufficient “prima facie evidence to set it for an order
to show cause on the . . . 1172.6 petition. This defendant does not
fall within the purview of that code section. He is the actual
perpetrator of the attempted murder. That’s what the jury found
him guilty of, but this court finds for purposes of the prima facie
determination that there has been . . . an inadequate showing by
Mr. Page that he is eligible for this relief.” Page timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6

Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984) and
significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule
(§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis)).
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on one’s participation in a crime and requires proof
of malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the

6
revised felony-murder rule in section 189, subdivision (e). The
latter provision now requires the People to prove that the
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an aider and
abettor to murder who had the intent to kill (§ 189, subd. (e)(2));
or a major participant in an underlying felony listed in section
189, subdivision (a), who acted with reckless indifference to
human life as described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2.
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448; People v. Wilson (2023)
14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Strong, at p. 708.)
With these changes, the Legislature also provided a
procedure (codified in section 1172.6) for “[a] person convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter” to petition the superior
court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts if the petitioner could not now be convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see Sen.
Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) [extending Senate Bill 1437’s
ameliorative changes and procedure for potential relief to
individuals convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter].)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(b)(3); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.) The
prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie

7
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes that showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971; see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) The
court may consider the record of conviction, which will
“necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at
p. 971; see Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any part of the
record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972;
see People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘“[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’”’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52; see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; Lewis,

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supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “We review de novo whether the
trial court conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6,
subdivision (c).” (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1251.)

B. Any Errors in the Trial Court Proceedings Were
Harmless

Page asserts the trial court proceedings denied him
procedural due process because the court engaged in
impermissible factfinding and based its decision on its
recollections and statements from counsel, as opposed to on a
record of conviction. Page also argues his federal and state
constitutional rights were violated because “section 1172.6
creates an entitlement to an evidentiary hearing upon filing of a
facially valid petition, unless the prosecutor presented
information from the record of conviction that establishes
appellant was ineligible as a matter of law.” Because the
prosecutor did not file a response to Page’s petition, and therefore
did not demonstrate ineligibility, Page argues the proceedings
violated his procedural due process rights.
We agree there were errors in the process in the trial court.
For example, upon the filing of a facially valid section 1172.6
petition, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3); see
also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.) The prosecutor
must then file a response to the petition, the petitioner may file a
reply, and the court must hold a hearing to determine whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner
is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) But the prosecutor here
failed to file a response brief, contrary to the procedure outlined

9
by the statute. (See ibid. [“Within 60 days after service of a
petition that meets the requirements set forth in subdivision (b),
the prosecutor shall file and serve a response”], italics added.)
Any errors in the procedure in the trial court, however,
were harmless. Page is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

1. The procedural errors were not state or federal
constitutional violations

Page argues because the proceedings violated his
constitutional rights, the errors in the trial court are reversible
per se and not subject to the harmless error doctrine. We
disagree. “In some contexts, a court’s failure to comply with a
statutory procedure will constitute a denial of due process.”
(People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 892.) “But a trial
court’s statutory omissions at the first step of the section 1172.6
process are not state or federal constitutional violations.” (Ibid.)
In Lewis, the California Supreme Court rejected the
defendant’s argument that “a trial court’s ‘consideration of the
record of conviction in connection with a section [1172.6] petition
is a “critical stage” of the criminal process’ such that the
deprivation of counsel during such consideration, whether viewed
as a state statutory violation or as a federal or state
constitutional violation, is structural error requiring automatic
reversal.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) The court held,
“There is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to
counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction.”
(Ibid.) At the outset of the section 1172.6 petitioning process,
“the petitioner has not yet ‘stated facts sufficient to satisfy the
court that a hearing is required,’ but merely endeavors to do so.”
(Lewis, at p. 973.) Because the failure to appoint counsel was

10
state law error only, the court applied the People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 harmless error test. (Lewis, at p. 973.)
Page attempts to distinguish Lewis because Lewis
addressed the appointment of counsel, whereas he complains
about the absence of a record of conviction and the prosecutor’s
failure to establish his ineligibility for relief. We do not read
Lewis’s holding as applicable only to the failure to appoint
counsel. We agree with other courts that have held it applies to
errors in the statutory procedure at the outset of the
section 1172.6 petitioning process. (See People v. Bratton (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1104-1105 [trial court’s reliance on facts
stated in an appellate opinion was harmless where the record
demonstrated the defendant was the actual shooter who acted
with intent to kill and was not convicted under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed
malice]; People v. Hurtado, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 892
[analyzing the Legislature’s treatment of Lewis, and applying its
reasoning to find the failure to appoint counsel, set a briefing
schedule, or hold a hearing before deciding the defendant did not
make a prima facie showing for resentencing were not
constitutional errors and were subject to harmless error review];
People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 613 [“‘a petitioner
“whose petition is denied before an order to show cause issues
has the burden of showing ‘it is reasonably probable that if [not
for the error] . . . his [or her] petition would not have been
summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing”””]; cf. People
v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 396 [“structural errors not
susceptible to harmless error analysis are those that go to the
very construction of the trial mechanism—a biased judge, total

11
absence of counsel, the failure of a jury to reach any verdict on an
essential element”].)

2. Any error was harmless because Page was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law

The record of conviction shows any error was harmless
because Page was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We have
reviewed the relevant record of conviction, including the charging
document, the jury instructions, and the verdict minute order.4
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-972 [examining the
record, including the court’s own documents, “allow[s] the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless”]; People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924,
935 [record of conviction includes “the charging document, verdict
forms, closing arguments, and jury instructions”].)
The record of conviction establishes that the trial court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 600 (on attempted
murder) and 601 (on the allegation the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated). CALCRIM No. 600 stated
that in order to find Page guilty of attempted murder, the People
must prove that Page “intended to kill.” CALCRIM No. 601
detailed, “The defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill
when he acted. The defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed
the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant premeditated if he
decided to kill before acting.”

4 As part of this appeal, the People sought judicial notice of
the jury instructions the trial court gave in Page’s case, which we
granted.

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The trial court did not instruct the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, aiding and abetting principles,
or any other theory of imputed malice. Page is therefore
ineligible for relief because he was convicted on a theory of
attempted murder that remains valid after the amendments to
sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
698 at p. 708 [“If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition”]; People v. Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52 [“if the record shows that the jury was not
instructed on either the natural and probable consequences or
felony-murder doctrines, then the petitioner is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law”]; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539,
548 [section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”]; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [“As
Cortes concedes, the jury was not instructed on any theory of
liability for murder or attempted murder that required that
malice be imputed to him. He is therefore ineligible for
resentencing”].)
Page argues we should disregard the records the People
sought judicial notice of on appeal because we would usurp the
trial court’s role as factfinder. We disagree. A denial at the
prima facie stage is appropriate only if the record of conviction
demonstrates the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law, which is “‘a purely legal conclusion.’” (People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101; see also People v. Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
In sum, although there were errors in the proceedings at
the prima facie stage, we conclude the errors were harmless

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because Page was ineligible for relief as a matter of law under
section 1172.6.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Page’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

RAPHAEL, J.*

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice under article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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