CourtListener 9511359•Sail Exit Partners v. Schindler CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/5/24 Sail Exit Partners v. Schindler CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SAIL EXIT PARTNERS, LLC,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062767
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-00994978)
WALTER L. SCHINDLER et al., OPINION
Defendants;
MARILYN WILLIAMS,
Third Party Claimant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Layne H. Melzer, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Alexandria C. Phillips and Alexandria C. Phillips for Third
Party Claimant and Appellant.
Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders, Peter N. Villar, Brian N. Sonksen, and
Elizabeth Holt Andrews for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
SAIL Exit Partners, LLC, (Sail) obtained a fraud judgment against
defendant John A. Severson. Sail’s collection efforts included levying on an automobile
owned by appellant Marilyn Williams, who is Severson’s spouse. After filing a third
party claim to the property with the levying officer, 1 Williams initiated a summary
proceeding in the superior court, which asked the court to determine the validity of her
third party claim or, alternatively, to adjudicate the validity of her claimed exemption
based on the assertion she uses the automobile in her real estate business.
The trial court denied both the third party claim and the exemption claim;
Williams appeals only from the ruling on the exemption claim. She argues the court
erred by (1) concluding she failed to present sufficient evidence to meet the statutory
requirements for the exemption set forth in Code of Civil Procedure2 section 704.060;
(2) sustaining objections Sail never made to her evidence reflecting she used the
automobile to perform her job as a real estate agent; and (3) misinterpreting the
requirements of section 740.060 and another exemption statute. We disagree and affirm
the order.
1
A third party claim is an assertion by a party claiming a security interest or
lien on the property that is entitled to protection in the collection process. (§ 720.210;
Oxford Street Properties, LLC v. Rehabilitation Associates, LLC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
296, 307.) Section 720.210, subdivision (a), provides that “Where personal property has
been levied upon under a writ of attachment, a writ of execution, a prejudgment or
postjudgment writ of possession, or a writ of sale, a third person claiming a security
interest in or lien on the personal property may make a third-party claim under this
chapter if the security interest or lien claimed is superior to the creditor’s lien on the
property.” (Italics added.)
2
All further statutory references are to this code.
2
The court did not specify reasons for its rejection of her exemption claim.
Its minute order states only that after fully considering the arguments from both parties,
as well as the evidence presented, it denied the exemption request for “sound legal
reasons.” The court may have been more forthcoming in its oral remarks at the hearing,
but no transcript of that hearing is included in our record. Consequently, the record does
not support any of Williams’s claims of error.
What Williams does not acknowledge in her opening brief is that Sail
opposed the exemption claim in part because she never filed her claim with the sheriff’s
department, as required by statute; the court’s minute order reflected it also had concerns
about the issue. It was not until Sail featured the issue prominently in its respondent’s
brief that Williams acknowledged the issue in her reply.
Williams does not dispute the claim of noncompliance in her reply brief;
instead, she argues she “substantially complied” with the statutory requirement in two
ways: first, by filing her third party claim with the sheriff; and second, by raising the
exemption issue in her subsequent motion to validate with the court. But even if either of
those claims were accurate, Williams waived them by failing to make them in her
opening brief. She cannot argue that claim of error for the first time in her reply brief.
Consequently, we find no error and affirm the court’s denial of Williams’s exemption
claim.
FACTS
In 2018, Sail filed a lawsuit against Severson, among others, alleging
conversion, breach of contract, and related claims. Sail obtained a judgment against
Severson for approximately $800,000 and began efforts to collect the judgment.
Williams is Severson’s spouse, and although she denies ever being legally
married to him, she acknowledges the court has previously rejected her efforts to
establish the legal invalidity of their marriage. (See SAIL Exit Partners, LLC v. Severson
3
(Jan. 11, 2022, G059275) [nonpub. opn.].) Thus, Sail’s efforts to collect on its judgment
have included assets in Williams’s name that it contends are subject to Severson’s debts.
As relevant here, in March 2023, the Orange County Sheriff’s Department levied on
Williams’s Mercedes Benz automobile.
On March 15, 2023, Williams served the sheriff with a third party claim for
the automobile, relying on sections 720.110, 720.130 and 720.230. Williams’s claim
asserts that Bank of America was the lien holder on the vehicle, and that she was neither a
party to the case nor was she married to Severson.
However, on April 5, 2023, when Williams filed her application for a
hearing with the court, her notice cast a wider net. The application specified she was
seeking “a determination on the validity of the Third Party’s claim of exemption [under]
California Code of Civil Procedure § 720.310,” but also asserted “the alternative theory
should the court find a putative spouse [that] the vehicle is exempt under California Code
of Civil Procedure § 704.010 and § 704.060 as to any unexempt equity in the vehicle.”
Williams’s declaration in support of her application acknowledged the court
previously found her to be the spouse of the judgment debtor, John A. Severson. She
stated she was seeking exemptions from collection under both section 704.010—the
general exemption for a motor vehicle—and section 704.060, which she characterized as
allowing an additional exemption of $8,725 for a vehicle used as a tool of the debtor’s
trade. Williams also stated, in conclusory terms, “this is a vehicle used . . . as a tool of
my trade as a real estate agent.”
Williams sought to establish the automobile’s value by relying upon a
Cars.com listing of a vehicle with similar make and model for $34,885. She also
provided evidence that Bank of America held a lien on her vehicle with a balance of
$34,655.15.
Sail filed opposition to Williams’s application noting Williams filed no
exemption claim with the sheriff’s department, and arguing Williams failed to provide the
4
court with evidence the vehicle was necessary to her business. Sail’s opposition also
demonstrated Williams’s factual claims related to the vehicle were inconsistent with
earlier statements she made under oath, in 2019, wherein she declared she “married John
Severson in 2004.”
Williams filed a supplemental declaration in support of her reply brief,
which offered detailed information about her use of the vehicle for work, Although Sail
moved to strike the untimely declaration, the court stated it would consider the document.
The court’s minute order is lengthy. It summarizes the law applicable to
third party claims and explains that Williams’s application to determine the validity of her
third party claim was untimely, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction to decide it.
The court then turned to the exemption claim, noting that while Williams
“asserts she filed a claim of exemption on 3/15/23[,] [s]he appears to be treating her third
party claims as a claim of exemption. No other document titled claim of exemption has
been submitted.” The court’s order noted the statutory requirement that a claim of
exemption must be filed with the levying officer, and it set forth the required content of
that claim. The court found Williams’s third party claim did not comply with the
statutory requirements, including the requirement that it cite the statutes relied upon to
support the exemptions.
The court’s ruling followed argument by counsel: “The Court having fully
considered the arguments of all parties, both written and oral, as well as the evidence
presented, now confirms the tentative ruling and for sound legal reasons, denies both
motions.” (Boldface and underscoring omitted/italics added.)
DISCUSSION
1. Claims of Error
Williams contends the court erred by (1) concluding she failed to present
sufficient evidence to meet the statutory requirements for the exemption set forth in
5
section 704.060; (2) sustaining objections Sail never made to her evidence reflecting she
used the automobile to perform her job as a real estate agent; and (3) misinterpreting the
requirements of section 740.060 and another exemption statute.
The record does not support any of those claims. The court’s ruling does not
reveal the basis for its denial, and we will not presume the court erred in its reasoning in
the absence of a clear record, which establishes error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general
principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible
error’”].)
Williams’s assertion that the court “erroneously sustained evidentiary
objections that [Sail] never made to Williams’ testimony and documentary evidence, to
wit, that she used the Car to perform her job as a full-time real estate agent in order to
support herself and her family,” likewise fails. Williams does not support her contention
with any citation to the record, and we find nothing to support it. The court’s ruling on
Sail’s objections to Williams’s declaration are included in the minute order reflecting the
court’s ruling on the merits of the exemption. The reference is brief: “Plaintiff’s
evidentiary objections are sustained as to nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9; they are otherwise
overruled.”
Williams also asserts the court “failed to apply the mandatory requirements set
forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 703.560 to [Sail]’s opposition to Williams’
Claim of Exemption as [Sail] did not present the required evidence establishing that
section 704.060 did not apply to Williams’ as a real estate agent who relies on her Car do
[sic] perform her work . . . .” (Boldface/underscoring/italics omitted.) This claim borders
on the frivolous.
6
Williams argues she provided the court with “undisputed evidence” that (1) she
“completely relies on her vehicle to perform her job including but not limited to picking
up her clients and showing them homes, putting up signs for homes that she is listing for
sale, drive to the real estate office to conduct meetings and the fact that over a period of
eight weeks she drives her Car approximately 300 miles per week to perform her job,
thereby meeting section 704.060(a) requirement; and (2) the equity calculations Williams
made establish that her Car’s equity did not exceed $8,725 and that the Car is ‘reasonably
necessary to and actually used by’ Williams ‘in the exercise of the trade, business, or
profession by which’ she ‘earns a livelihood’ thereby meeting [the] section 704.060(a)(2)
requirement.”
Williams claims that as a consequence, under section 703.560, Sail was
required to produce rebuttal “evidence under oath establishing that . . . section 704.060
did not apply to Williams as a real estate agent who relies on her Car to perform her job
including but not limited to picking up her clients and showing them homes, putting up
signs for homes that she is listing for sale, drive to the real estate office to conduct
meetings and that in over a period of eight weeks she drives her Car approximately 300
miles per week to perform her job.”
Williams fails to acknowledge she provided none of the required
information in her original declaration to support her exemption claim; Williams’s
original declaration contained only a conclusory claim that she used her automobile in
her work as a real estate agent. It was in response to Sail’s opposition, pointing out that
her evidence was insufficient, that Williams offered her “supplemental” declaration
offering the detailed facts she now claims Sail was required to respond to in its
opposition. Sail had no obligation to rebut evidence offered after its opposition was filed.
2. Validity of Williams’s Exemption Claim
An exemption from collection refers to the debtor’s right to protect
specified assets from creditors. (See § 703.010 et seq.) Exemptions can be claimed by
7
the debtor or by the debtor’s spouse or domestic partner in the case of community
property. (§ 703.020, subd. (b)(2)-(3).) An exemption “may be claimed within the time
and in the manner prescribed in the applicable enforcement procedure. If the exemption
is not so claimed, the exemption is waived and the property is subject to enforcement of a
money judgment.” (§ 703.030, subd. (a).)
The exemptions Williams seeks to validate are section 704.010,
subdivision (a)(1), which protects the equity in motor vehicles up to an aggregate amount
of $7,500; and section 704.060, subdivision (a)(2), which protects “[t]ools, implements,
instruments, materials, uniforms, furnishings, books, equipment, one commercial motor
vehicle, one vessel, and other personal property” if “reasonably necessary to and actually
used by the spouse of the judgment debtor in the exercise of the trade, business, or
profession by which the spouse earns a livelihood.” (Italics added.)3
Section 703.520 specifies that, like a third party claim, an exemption claim
must be filed with the levying officer within 15 days of the date the claimant was
personally served with the notice of levy, and within 20 days if the notice was served by
mail. (§ 703.520, subd. (a).) The exemption claim must state the “provision of this
chapter or other statute upon which the claim is based.” (§ 703.520, subd. (b)(5).)
When the claim is filed, the levying officer must notify the creditor of the
filing, stating that the officer will release the property unless within 15 days the creditor
files a copy of a notice of opposition and a copy of a notice of motion filed with the court
for an order determining the claim of exemption. (§ 703.540; see § 703.550.) The
hearing on the motion shall be held within 30 days of the filing of the notice of motion.
(§ 703.570.) “The claim of exemption and notice of opposition . . . constitute the
pleadings, subject to the power of the court to permit amendments . . . .” (§ 703.580,
3
In its minute order, the trial court also emphasized the phrase “commercial
motor vehicle” when summarizing the language of section 704.060.
8
subd. (a).) “At the conclusion of hearing, the court shall determine by order whether or
not the property is exempt in whole or in part. . . . [T]he order is determinative of the
right of the judgment creditor to apply the property to the satisfaction of the judgment.
No findings are required in a proceeding under the section.” (§ 703.580, subd. (d).)
Here, Williams filed no exemption claim with the sheriff’s department.
Instead, she filed a third party claim and then sought to initiate an exemption claim by
asserting it as an “alternative” argument in her motion to validate the third party claim.
This does not satisfy the statutory requirements.
In her reply brief, Williams argues she “substantially” complied with the
exemption claim statutes when she filed her third party claim. We disagree. Williams’s
third party claim expressly claims she is not married to the debtor, Severson, which is
wholly inconsistent with the assertion of an exemption claim based on her status as
spouse. Moreover, as the trial court noted in its minute order, section 703.520 requires
the claimant to specify the statutory basis for the claim. Williams made no reference to
the exemption statutes in the third party claim she filed with the sheriff.
Williams’s reply brief also claims her substantial compliance can be found
in the fact she filed a copy of her broader motion to the court, entitled “‘Application for a
Hearing to Determine the Validity of Third-party Marilyn L. Williams’ Third-party Claim,
or in the Alternative Theory of Vehicle Is Exemption,”’ with the sheriff’s department on
April 10, 2023.
Again, we disagree. Section 703.520 requires the exemption claim to be
filed with the sheriff’s department within 15 days of the notice of levy, or 20 days if that
notice was served by mail. Williams did not meet that deadline with her broader motion.
There was no substantial compliance.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court could have denied
Williams’s exemption claim based on her failure to comply with the statutory procedures
for asserting it. Williams’s failure to acknowledge that issue and address it in her opening
9
brief resulted in a waiver of the point on appeal. We affirm the court’s order denying
Williams’s exemption claim.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed. Sail is to recover its costs on appeal.
GOETHALS, J.
WE CONCUR:
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
MOORE, J.
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