People v. Roberts CA2/8

CourtListener 9511334Calctapp05.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/5/24 P. v. Roberts CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B317060

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA271564)
v.

ANGELO JEFFREY ROBERTS,

Defendant and Appellant.

In re B327586

ANGELO JEFFREY ROBERTS

On Habeas Corpus.

Petition for habeas corpus and appeal from an order of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. H. Clay Jacke II, Judge.
Habeas petition granted and remanded with directions; appeal
dismissed as moot.
Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant, Appellant, and Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, William H. Shin and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Petitioner Angelo Jeffrey Roberts filed a petition for habeas
corpus and a direct appeal from the trial court’s denial, following an
evidentiary hearing, of his petition for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).
We conclude petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is cognizable and that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance at the evidentiary hearing. We therefore grant the
petition for habeas corpus and remand for a new evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
We dismiss as moot petitioner’s direct appeal in case No. B317060.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts
We take judicial notice of the appellate record in case
No. B193068 (petitioner’s direct appeal from his 2006 trial). We use
this record to summarize the pertinent facts.
In March 2003, petitioner and two of his fellow Rolling 20’s
gang members (Triyon Jones and Anthony Zelaya) participated in a
crime spree involving the theft of three cars and multiple other
felonies. Testimony at trial revealed there was a fourth accomplice
during at least part of the crime spree.
The first car was stolen in South Los Angeles sometime after
6:30 p.m. on March 30, 2003. It was a Saturn, reportedly the type
of car Jones favored. Almost three hours later, that Saturn was
used in an attempted carjacking of a Lincoln Navigator that
resulted in the shooting death of the driver, Isaiah Cain.
The shooting was witnessed by J.S. who was stopped at a red
light on Crenshaw Boulevard behind the stolen Saturn. He saw two
African-American men simultaneously get out of the Saturn, one
from the front passenger seat and the other from the back

2
passenger seat. The driver remained in the Saturn. J.S. was not
asked whether he saw any other passengers in the Saturn, and no
other evidence clarified that issue.
After alighting from the passenger side of the Saturn, both
men approached the Lincoln that was also stopped at the red light
in the lane to the right of them. Each had a handgun. They raised
their arms level with the driver-side windows and started shooting
toward the front seat of the Lincoln. J.S. heard “four to five”
gunshots. The two men then returned to the Saturn and it drove off
as the Lincoln “veer[ed]” or “drift[ed]” to the side of the street and
came to a stop. The driver, Mr. Cain, later died from multiple
gunshot wounds.
J.S. did not identify petitioner as one of the shooters.
After fleeing South Los Angeles, the men drove to West
Hollywood. They found another Saturn parked on Hayvenhurst
Avenue and stole it, abandoning the first Saturn at that location
where it was later recovered.
Sometime after midnight, the men arrived at a gas station in
the second Saturn where they confronted and robbed two victims.
L.B. and R.T. had stopped to put gas in R.T.’s car. The Saturn
pulled up next to the front of their car and stopped. The driver of
the Saturn did not get out. R.T. recalled four men in total being
inside the Saturn. L.B. also said the driver remained in the car and
that there were three, maybe four, men.
L.B. identified Zelaya as the man who confronted him and
took his shoes, jewelry, wallet and cell phone, and identified
petitioner as the man who confronted R.T. He recalled hearing
petitioner threaten to shoot R.T. but did not see any gun. R.T. also
identified petitioner. He said petitioner flashed a handgun at him,
said they were from Rolling 20’s, and asked him “where you from?”
– a common question asked by gang members regarding gang

3
affiliation. Petitioner threatened to shoot R.T. and then took his
wallet and cell phone. The men returned to the Saturn. Petitioner
got into the back seat behind the driver. The Saturn then fled.
About an hour later, the second Saturn was involved in a hit-
and-run collision on Santa Monica Boulevard--a rear-end collision
with a woman in her Toyota. The Saturn sped off after the accident
and the woman briefly followed. The Saturn eventually crashed
into a pole and the woman saw three, perhaps four, men get out of
the Saturn and flee.
Later that morning, the owner of a third Saturn reported it
stolen from a residential neighborhood in the Mid-Wilshire area of
Los Angeles. Police officers spotted the Saturn and gave chase.
Petitioner was driving and Zelaya was a passenger. After engaging
in various evasive maneuvers, petitioner slowed down and Zelaya
jumped out and tried to flee. Petitioner stopped the car and also
attempted to flee. Both petitioner and Zelaya were eventually
detained. Petitioner was found in possession of cocaine. Jones was
detained on a separate occasion.
During the investigation that followed, three used cartridge
casings were found and recovered at the scene of the shooting, three
bullets were discovered lodged in the Lincoln, and three bullets
were recovered from Mr. Cain’s body. The bullets and casings were
determined to all be from one semi-automatic handgun. At trial,
the prosecution stipulated to that fact and also that the murder
weapon had been recovered about two months after the shooting
during the search of a home where an individual named Roland
Pleasant had been staying (Pleasant was apparently another gang
member).
Other evidence linked petitioner, Jones and Zelaya to the first
stolen Saturn used in the shooting. The evidence relating to
petitioner was a single hair lifted from the back passenger seat that

4
matched his DNA profile. Cross-examination of the prosecution
expert revealed that the hair lifted from the back seat was
considered to be in the “telogen” or end phase, meaning it was no
longer growing and was at the stage where it would naturally be
shed from the body. The expert acknowledged generally that hairs
may be shed in one location and transferred by “secondary” transfer
to another location. The expert did not express an opinion about
how or when the hair lifted from the back seat was deposited there.
2. Procedure
In 2006, petitioner was jointly tried with Jones and Zelaya
before separate juries. The jury was instructed on direct aiding and
abetting principles and the felony murder rule.
Petitioner was convicted of one count of first degree murder
committed during an attempted carjacking (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a), § 215, subd. (a), § 664), attempted robbery (§ 211, § 664),
two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211), possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), three counts of unlawful taking of
a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), evading a police officer
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and possession of cocaine for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). The jury found true gang
enhancement allegations and firearm allegations. (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), § 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e).) Jones
and Zelaya were also found guilty.
Before sentencing, petitioner moved for a new trial. His
motion was supported by a declaration from Zelaya who stated he
had previously been unwilling to testify on the advice of counsel.
He said that in light of his conviction, he was now willing to testify
that petitioner had not been with them during the shooting of
Mr. Cain. Zelaya said he had been the one seated in the back
passenger seat of the first stolen Saturn. Petitioner’s motion for
new trial was denied.

5
In 2008, this court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and
remanded for resentencing. (People v. Jones (May 15, 2008,
B193068) [nonpub. opn.].) The court resentenced petitioner to
50 years to life for the murder plus the firearm enhancement and a
consecutive determinate term of 33 years four months for the other
crimes and enhancements. Petitioner appealed and we affirmed.
(People v. Zelaya (Jan. 27, 2010, B213482) [nonpub. opn.].)
Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at Folsom State Prison.
After the passage of Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.),
petitioner filed in propria persona a petition for resentencing on the
murder count pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. Petitioner
declared under penalty of perjury that he was not the actual killer,
that he had been convicted of murder as an accomplice under the
felony murder rule and that he could not now be convicted under
the amended murder statutes. The resentencing petition was
summarily denied. We reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. (People v. Roberts (July 16, 2020, B297705)
[nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court appointed counsel for petitioner
(Richard Sternfeld, alternate public defender). Petitioner later
replaced appointed counsel with privately retained counsel (Aaron
Spolin of Spolin Law). The parties filed briefs on the question of
whether petitioner had made a prima facie showing of eligibility for
sentencing relief. The court found petitioner had established a
prima facie case, issued an order to show cause and set an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3).
The prosecution filed an evidentiary hearing brief citing to
the evidentiary record and arguing why petitioner remained guilty
under current law. Petitioner’s counsel did not file any brief. The
evidentiary hearing was held on October 1, 2021, before the

6
Honorable H. Clay Jacke II, who did not preside over the 2006 trial.
Petitioner was present and represented by Donald Nguyen of Spolin
Law. Neither petitioner nor the People offered any new evidence.
The court entertained argument from counsel and then continued
the matter so it could review the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts
from the 2006 trial.
On November 19, 2021, the trial court denied the petition,
explaining that petitioner “was one of two shooters” and that DNA
evidence put petitioner at the scene of the murder. The court found
petitioner was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt as a
direct aider and abettor or as a major participant in the carjacking
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Petitioner filed an appeal (case No. B317060) from the denial
arguing that substantial evidence did not support the court’s order
and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the
evidentiary hearing. Petitioner also filed this petition for habeas
corpus (case No. B327586) expounding upon his ineffective
assistance claim.
Attorney Joanna Rehm, petitioner’s current appointed
counsel, submitted a declaration in support of the habeas petition.
She recounted her efforts to speak with the Spolin firm about their
representation of petitioner and to obtain their file. Ms. Rehm said
she received what she was told was the entire file, and it consisted
only of the clerk’s transcript and volumes 3 and 8 of the reporter’s
transcript from the 2006 trial, a copy of Zelaya’s signed declaration
from the motion for new trial, a copy of witness J.S.’s statement,
and some file notes, including one documenting a call with Attorney
Sternfeld. The note reflects that Mr. Sternfeld told the Spolin firm
it was unclear who the shooter was, how many were in the car, or
even if petitioner was with them at that time, or whether he was
picked up later and participated only in the later crimes. The note

7
states Mr. Sternfeld urged the Spolin firm to interview Zelaya.
Ms. Rehm said there was nothing in the file documenting any
efforts to contact or speak with Zelaya and determine whether to
present him as a witness at the hearing, nor any documentation
showing any investigation regarding the possibility of a secondary
transfer of the hair found in the first Saturn.
We issued an order to show cause on the habeas petition. The
parties filed a return and traverse.
At oral argument on the appeal, petitioner’s counsel drew our
attention to the fact that argument had not been concurrently
noticed on the habeas petition. We vacated our submission of the
appeal. We ordered the appeal and habeas petition coordinated for
purposes of argument and decision. We now grant relief on the
habeas petition and remand to the superior court for a new
evidentiary hearing on the resentencing petition. We find no error
on the part of the prosecution or the court at the resentencing
hearing. But we find petitioner was denied the effective assistance
of counsel at the resentencing hearing, as a consequence of which
we grant of the habeas petition and necessarily reverse the order
denying resentencing.
DISCUSSION
1. Relief on the Merits Is Appropriate Without Ordering
an Evidentiary Hearing on the Habeas Petition
Respondent’s return admits certain facts and generally denies
petitioner’s ineffective assistance allegations without pleading any
additional facts raising a factual dispute. The return focuses
instead on arguing the legal significance of the facts in the trial
record, primarily on the issue of prejudice. Where, as here, “ ‘there
are no disputed factual questions as to matters outside the trial
record, the merits of a habeas corpus petition can be decided
without an evidentiary hearing.’ ” (People v. Duvall (1995)

8
9 Cal.4th 464, 478; accord, In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1252
[when the return states general denials without pleading facts to
dispute the petitioner’s material factual allegations, thus
“effectively” admitting those allegations, the court may resolve the
issue without ordering an evidentiary hearing].) We turn to the
merits of petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance.
2. Petitioner’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance Is
Cognizable
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, there ordinarily
“ ‘is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in
state postconviction proceedings.” (People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 226.) Nevertheless, due process has been relied
upon to provide a right to the assistance of counsel once a defendant
establishes a prima facie case for postconviction relief. (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [when a defendant seeking relief
on habeas corpus “ ‘states a prima facie case leading to issuance of
an order to show cause, the appointment of counsel is demanded by
due process concerns’ ”]; People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226,
232-233 [same in coram nobis proceedings]; People v. Fryhaat (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 969, 980–983 [same where the defendant
establishes right to hearing on motion to vacate conviction under
§ 1473.7].)
In People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 300, this court
recognized that “due process requires an incarcerated defendant be
afforded the right to counsel in various circumstances where the
Sixth Amendment does not.” We concluded there that a defendant
who established his eligibility for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.18 was entitled to the appointment of counsel. (Rouse,
at p. 300.)
Just last year, People v. Foley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 653
acknowledged a constitutional right to conflict-free counsel under

9
Penal Code section 1172.6, “at least where the trial court issues an
order to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing.” (Foley, at
p. 659.) Foley explained that an evidentiary hearing is not held
under section 1172.6 “unless the defendant has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief. The situation is therefore similar
to a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding where the
appointment of counsel is demanded by due process concerns if the
petition attacking a judgment’s validity states a prima facie case
leading to an order to show cause.” (Foley, at pp. 659-660.)
It is well established that once the state creates a substantial
right, due process applies to ensure the right is not arbitrarily
abrogated. (Wilson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1978)
21 Cal.3d 816, 823.) A right to counsel created by state statute has
been held, in numerous contexts, to necessarily encompass a
cognizable right to effective assistance of counsel protected by due
process. (See e.g., In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 248 [right of
party in dependency proceeding to “ ‘competent counsel’ ” under
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317.5 “ ‘must include the right to seek review
of claims of incompetence’ ”]; People v. Hill (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
646, 652 [a defendant’s statutory right to counsel under the
Sexually Violent Predator Act includes right to effective
representation protected by due process considerations]; People v.
Williams (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1591 [a defendant in
mentally disordered offender proceeding has a statutory right to
counsel “protected by due process principles”].)
The statute at issue here, Penal Code section 1172.6, grants
petitioner the right to appointed counsel upon the submission of a
facially sufficient petition. (Id., subd. (b)(3).) If the court finds the
petitioner has stated a prima facie claim for sentencing relief, then
an order to show cause issues and the petitioner is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) At the hearing, both parties

10
are allowed to offer new and additional evidence, and the
prosecution bears the burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, to
demonstrate the defendant can still be found guilty under current
law. (Ibid.) If the prosecution fails to meet that burden, the
petitioner’s conviction “shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)
The statutory scheme unequivocally provides for the
appointment of counsel and an adversarial proceeding at which
factfinding as to the defendant’s guilt is undertaken anew. While
the evidentiary hearing under Penal Code section 1172.6 is not the
equivalent of a jury trial, the defendant’s interests are nonetheless
significant. The effective assistance of counsel at such a hearing is
necessary to ensure a petitioner’s right to a fair, adversarial process
of the type called for by the statute.
Respondent acknowledges that the statutory right to counsel
provided by Penal Code section 1172.6 would be a “hollow right”
unless appointed counsel is held to “some standard of competency.”
We agree and find that due process principles apply in this context
to ensure that a defendant receives the effective assistance of
counsel.
3. Petitioner Is Entitled to a New Evidentiary Hearing on
His Resentencing Petition
Petitioner contends his counsel’s representation at the
evidentiary hearing constituted a total denial of counsel within the
meaning of U.S. v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 and that prejudice
therefore need not be affirmatively shown. Alternatively, he
contends the record establishes that counsel’s representation was
prejudicially deficient under Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668 (Strickland). We believe the Strickland standard is
more appropriately applied in the circumstances presented here.

11
Under Strickland, petitioner must demonstrate that
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688.) Petitioner
must also demonstrate prejudice attributed to counsel’s errors.
Strickland instructs that “a defendant need not show that counsel’s
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the
case.” (Id. at p. 693.) Rather, “[t]he defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Id. at p. 694.) We conclude
petitioner has established both prongs of Strickland.
The representation provided by petitioner’s counsel (Attorney
Donald Nguyen of Spolin Law) fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Mr. Nguyen failed to adequately prepare—or to
prepare at all—for the evidentiary hearing. “[C]ounsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” (Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 602
[“before counsel undertakes to act, or not to act, counsel must make
a rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded
upon adequate investigation and preparation”].)
Counsel did not obtain and review the complete record of the
2006 trial. He received only the clerk’s transcript and volumes 3
and 8 of the reporter’s transcript and apparently did not try to get
the rest of the record. There is no record of counsel contacting
codefendant Zelaya to assess his exculpatory testimony regarding
petitioner not being at the scene of the shooting. Counsel did not
file a brief. At the hearing, counsel failed to make any argument
based on the evidentiary record. Counsel argued only in a
conclusory fashion there was no proof petitioner was the actual

12
killer, the evidence showed only that he participated in a robbery
and the prosecution had failed to meet its burden.
Counsel’s failure to properly investigate and review the trial
record and seek other relevant materials meant he was necessarily
incapable of marshalling the evidence and fleshing out the
argument for the court that petitioner could not be convicted of
murder under current law because he had been picked up by his
accomplices after the shooting to continue on with their crime spree
begun several hours earlier. The crucial evidence supportive of
petitioner’s theory, including the testimony from three of the later
victims that there were four individuals in the Saturn when the
later crimes were committed, and not three as attested to by J.S.
when describing the shooting, was contained in volumes 4 through
7 of the reporter’s transcript, which counsel did not obtain. Without
being familiar with the entire record, counsel was also unable to
effectively respond to the prosecutor’s theory of guilt which was
largely based on inferences arising from circumstantial evidence.
None of these errors can be said to be based on a reasoned
tactical decision by counsel. Failing to prepare is not a tactical
decision.
Respondent says petitioner has not shown prejudice because
the evidence and inferences not argued by counsel were already in
the record, which the court said it reviewed, and that evidence did
not sway the judge to rule in petitioner’s favor.
We disagree. Simply because the court had the underlying
record available for review does not mean the well-informed
arguments of defense counsel would have been immaterial. There
was no meaningful argument presented by defense counsel, in
writing or orally at the hearing, because of a failure to undertake a
reasonable investigation of the issues and properly prepare for the

13
hearing. There was no adversarial testing of the factual and legal
issues in dispute.
Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus is granted. The
order denying petitioner’s resentencing petition is reversed and the
matter remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a
new evidentiary hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). We express no opinion on the merits of the
resentencing petition or whether petitioner is entitled to sentencing
relief.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The order
denying Angelo Roberts’s petition for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6 is reversed. The matter is remanded to
the superior court for a new evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). Petitioner is entitled to be
present at the hearing and is entitled to the appointment of counsel
if he is unable to retain private counsel.
Petitioner’s appeal in case No. B317060 is dismissed as moot.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

14

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.