CourtListener 9511031•In re S.S. CA1/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/4/24 In re S.S. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISFTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re S.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A167046
S.S.,
(Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. J2100525)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 authorizes a juvenile court to
dismiss a wardship petition and set aside any findings thereon (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 782, subd. (a)(1)(A)).1 Section 782 “requires not just that any
dismissal be in the interest of justice, but also promote ‘the welfare of the
person who is the subject of the petition.’ ” (In re J.P. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
74, 80, quoting § 782, subd. (a)(1), and citing In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th
393, 417.)
The Legislature recently amended section 782 to provide additional
guidance to a juvenile court in exercising its discretion whether to dismiss a
1 All undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
1
petition. (Stats. 2022, ch. 970, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.) As amended, the
statute requires a juvenile court to “consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered . . . to prove mitigating circumstances are present, including
. . . that the underlying offense is connected to mental illness.” (§ 782,
subd. (a)(2)(B).) Proof of a mitigating circumstance “weighs greatly in favor”
of dismissal. (Ibid.)
On January 9, 2023, eight days after the amendment took effect, the
minor in this case—who had admitted two counts of assault by means likely
to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and spent a year
on probation—moved to dismiss the petition and findings in his case. The
juvenile court denied the minor’s motion to dismiss. It found that the minor
had successfully completed probation, but insufficient evidence connected his
offenses to his diagnosed mental disorders. It thus terminated jurisdiction
without dismissing the petition. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
Factual Background2
On December 3, 2021, S.S. was at school talking to his ex-girlfriend
when her new boyfriend Logan G. and his friend Tyrell A. walked by. S.S.
was a 17-year-old football player who weighed 160 pounds; Logan and Tyrell
were 14 years old, and each of them was significantly smaller than S.S. S.S.
and Logan argued. Without physical provocation or warning, S.S. punched
Logan in the face several times. When Logan fell to the ground, S.S. began
punching Tyrell. After Tyrell fell, S.S. continued to punch and kick him as he
lay on the ground. Students tried to stop the beating, but S.S. continued to
2 Because there was no contested jurisdictional hearing, we derive the
facts from probation reports, as did the parties’ briefs.
2
stomp on Tyrell’s face and ribs while shouting, “I’ma kill you!” A student
videorecorded the beating. Afterward, each boy needed surgery to repair
fractures to his face and nose. Logan’s nose could not be fully repaired.
In May 2022, while S.S. was on probation arising from the assault, his
new high school suspended him for three days because he had sexually
harassed a female student. S.S. repeatedly bumped into the girl on purpose
when he walked by her. Once, he put his hands on her throat, forcefully
kissed her while rubbing her throat, then “pulled his penis completely out of
his pants and showed” it to her. On another occasion, he got angry after the
girl said she did not want a relationship with him and, when she tried to
walk away, grabbed her jacket, turned her around, and hugged her. S.S. told
her he would kill himself if “she did not like him back or want to be with him”
and showed her what she believed to be “self-harm scars from cutting
himself.”
II.
Legal Proceedings
The Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Office filed a wardship
petition (§ 602) in December 2021 alleging that S.S. had committed two
felony counts of assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury, with an
enhancement to each count for having caused great bodily injury (Pen. Code,
§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 12022.7, subd. (a)). Later that month, in a negotiated
disposition, S.S. pled no contest to each count, and the juvenile court
dismissed the enhancements. The court found the petition’s allegations true
and found S.S. subject to its jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)).
The juvenile court conducted a contested dispositional hearing in
January 2022. The prosecutor and the victims’ families expressed their
opposition to the probation department’s recommendation that S.S. be
3
declared a ward of the court and placed on probation with 120 days of home
confinement. The court found it a “very difficult case” with “very strong
competing factors on both sides.” Based on its viewing of the “horrible” video,
the court described the beatings as “completely unprovoked, unjustified[,] . . .
ruthless[, and] brutal,” with no dispute as to who had initiated them and
“dominated throughout.” It added that S.S. had a “history of fighting at
school,” usually as the aggressor, for which he had been suspended several
times. The court noted his need for services to address “a severe anger
management problem.” On the other hand, S.S. had no history of arrests,
gang involvement, or substance abuse; had strong support from his family
and community groups; and showed remorse. The court adopted probation’s
recommendation, including an order requiring S.S. to participate in
counseling as directed by his probation officer in order to address “untreated
mental health issues that can be assisted with therapy and other services.”
In June 2022, the probation department filed a notice of violation based
on S.S.’s above-described harassment of a classmate. The notice (as
amended) alleged he had “failed to obey school authorities and was
suspended . . . for harassment.” S.S. admitted the allegation. In November
2022, the juvenile court accepted the department’s recommendation to
reinstate probation. The court said it had “struggled with” the decision and
reminded S.S. that placing him on probation had been “a close call.”
In a report for the November 2022 hearing, the probation department
noted S.S. had been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder (IED) and
depressive disorder; he had been prescribed medication and begun psychiatric
treatment for the latter condition. In its order reinstating probation, the
court directed S.S., among other things, to take all prescribed psychotropic
4
medications and to participate in any recommended “support services,
evaluation, or medication management.”
On January 9, 2023, the juvenile court held a probation review hearing.
The probation department recommended the court successfully terminate
S.S.’s probation and vacate his wardship. At the outset of the hearing, S.S.’s
counsel acknowledged that S.S.’s offenses were among those listed in
section 707, subdivision (b), so he was not “eligible for automatic sealing
under section 786.” Counsel orally moved to reduce the felonies to
misdemeanors (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)) and to dismiss the petition
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782.
S.S.’s counsel noted that an amendment to section 782, which had
taken effect eight days earlier, provided that when a juvenile court “is
terminating its jurisdiction, the court is required to consider and afford great
weight to mitigating circumstances. And if any one of those mitigating
circumstances are present, then the court is required to afford [it] great weight
when considering a dismissal under that section.” (See Stats. 2022, ch. 970,
§ 1.) Citing section 782, subdivision (a)(2)(A), counsel claimed three
mitigating circumstances warranted dismissal: S.S. had completed a term of
probation successfully; his underlying offense was “connected to mental
illness”; and dismissal would not endanger public safety. The People agreed
S.S. had “earned . . . a successful termination of his probation” but opposed
reducing the offenses or dismissing the petition.
The juvenile court began its ruling by acknowledging S.S. had written
“heartfelt” letters of apology, completed 80 hours of community service, and
abided by his mother’s household rules, and was taking his medication and
participating in services and medication management. But the court noted
the severity of the assaults, his violation of probation while on home
5
supervision, and his absences from and troubles at school. It ruled that it
therefore would not reduce the offenses to misdemeanors or dismiss the
petition under section 782. The court terminated S.S.’s probation
successfully and vacated his wardship.
The court asked if there was “anything further to place on the record.”
S.S.’s counsel noted that “the recent amendments to [s]ection 782 require the
court to make factual determinations,” but it had not determined, among
other things, “whether the underlying offense was connected to mental
illness.” The court then stated that, while S.S. had been diagnosed with IED
and depressive disorder, “I do not have sufficient information to connect that
particular diagnosis with the incident.”3
DISCUSSION
I.
Statutory Framework
Section 782, subdivision (a)(1) has long given a juvenile court discretion
to dismiss a wardship petition, or to set aside its findings and dismiss the
petition, “if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the
person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if it finds
that they are not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” (§ 782, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 782 affords jurisdiction to order such a dismissal even if the subject of
the petition is no longer a ward of the court. (See In re David T.(2017)
13 Cal.App. 5th 866, 869 [order granting section 782 dismissal over 20 years
3 As to the other mitigating circumstances S.S. raised, the court saw
“enough problems while he was on probation” to bar a finding of “satisfactory
completion of a term of probation” (§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(A)), and it ruled that
his probation violation precluded a finding that “dismissal of the petition
would not endanger public safety” (ibid.). S.S. does not challenge those
rulings on appeal.
6
after petition sustained], superseded in other part by statute as noted in In re
Taylor C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 492.)4
In 2022, the Legislature amended section 782 to give juvenile courts
guidance in exercising their discretion whether to dismiss a petition, and to
require them to give “great weight” to certain mitigating circumstances.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 970, § 1, adding subd. (a)(2)(B); see Sen. Rules Com., Off. of
Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2629 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 16, 2022, Background, ¶¶ 1–2.) The amended
statute states that, “When exercising its discretion . . . at the time the court
terminates jurisdiction or at any time thereafter, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating
circumstances are present, including, but not limited to, . . . that the
underlying offense is connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or
childhood trauma. Proof of the presence of one or more mitigating
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the petition.” (§ 782,
subd. (a)(2)(A).) “The reasons for a decision under this section shall be stated
orally on the record.” (Id., subd. (b).) The legislative history of Assembly Bill
No. 2629 (Assembly Bill 2629) shows that its purposes included furthering
the juvenile justice system’s goal of rehabilitation by enabling those involved
in the system to secure dismissals to clear their records of adjudications that
can impair their future ability to enlist in the military, secure employment,
or qualify for occupational licenses. (See Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis
of Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 23, 2022,
Comments, ¶¶ 1–4.)
4 The termination of S.S.’s wardship thus will not prevent him from
filing a future motion pursuant to section 782 to seek dismissal of the petition
and findings. (§ 782, subd. (a)(1).) We express no opinion as to what effect, if
any, the denial of the present motion might have on such a motion.
7
Section 782 specifies that “mental illness” and other terms related to
mitigating circumstances “have the same meanings as defined in Penal Code
section 1385.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(F).) Subdivision (c) of
that Penal Code provision states that, when a trial court considers whether to
strike a sentencing enhancement, it must give “great weight” to specified
mitigating circumstances, including a connection between the offense and a
mental illness. (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c).) The statute defines a “mental
illness” for that purpose as “a mental disorder as identified in the most recent
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM)
(with certain irrelevant exclusions). (Id., subd. (c)(5).)
II.
Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s decision under section 782 for abuse of
discretion, while using the substantial evidence standard to review any
factual findings underlying its decision. (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 417; In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154.) The abuse of
discretion standard “ ‘asks in substance whether the ruling in question “falls
outside the bounds of reason” under the applicable law and the relevant
facts.’ ” (In re Tony R. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 395, 414.) In applying that
standard, we “ ‘ “ ‘indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of
the juvenile court.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 414.)
S.S. contends on appeal that “Substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s finding that [his] mental illness diagnosis did not qualify as a
mitigating circumstance under section 782.” Where, as here, an appellant
challenges a trial court’s failure to make a factual finding in his favor on an
8
issue as to which he bore the burden of proof,5 the question on appeal
becomes “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as
a matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved
on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010,
fn. 7.) “Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528, quoting Roesch v.
De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 571.) That standard is extremely daunting.
(See, e.g., Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 734 [“ ‘it is
almost impossible for [the party who had the burden of proof below] to prevail
on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor’ ”].) That
5 The parties have not briefed the issue of who bears the burden of
proof as to the existence of a mitigating circumstance under section 782,
subdivision (a)(2)(A). Absent such argument, we assume without deciding
that the juvenile, as the party seeking relief, bears the burden. (See Simpson
Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 24 [“the ‘general principle’ of
Evid. Code, § 500 is ‘that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears
the burden of persuasion thereon’ ”].) By requiring a court to consider
“evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present”
(§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(A)), the statute strongly implies that the person offering
such evidence bears the burden of proof. In construing the similar language
of Penal Code section 1385, which requires a court to give “great weight” to
mitigating circumstances in deciding whether to strike an enhancement, the
Sixth District held that a defendant bears the burden of proving the existence
of such a circumstance. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1095,
fn. 5, review granted, Apr. 12, 2023, S278894.) Accordingly, if a defendant
appeals from a trial court’s failure to find that an offense was “connected to
mental illness” (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)), the question becomes
“whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of [the defendant] as a
matter of law.” (Ortiz, at p. 1095, fn. 5.) Here, absent a contrary argument,
we assume the same principle applies to section 782. (See In re J.P., supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 78 [courts construing section 782 often look for guidance
to the “closely analogous” Pen. Code, § 1385].)
9
principle applies with even greater force here, for the disputed factual issue is
subsidiary to an ultimate determination that we review under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. (See In re Tony R., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 414 [noting deferential review of section 782 ruling].)
III.
The Mere Submission of Evidence of a Mitigating Circumstance Under
Section 782 Does Not Trigger a Rebuttable Presumption
S.S. contends that by directing a juvenile court to “consider and afford
great weight to evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating
circumstances are present,” subdivision (a)(2)(A) of section 782 “creat[es] a
presumption-like burden that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is
evidence of such a circumstance.” His argument disregards the legislative
history of Assembly Bill 2629, which was amended to eliminate language
creating a presumption, and relies on inapposite authority. We conclude the
statute means what it says: a juvenile court must “afford great weight” to
certain evidence, not treat it as creating a presumption in favor of a finding.
The legislative history of Assembly Bill 2629 shows that, in the first
version relevant here,6 the bill would have amended section 782 to provide
that, “When exercising its discretion under paragraph (1), at the time the
court terminates jurisdiction, or at any time thereafter, there shall be a
presumption that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is
the subject of the petition favor that dismissal. This presumption shall not be
overcome unless there is clear and convincing evidence that dismissal of the
6 As introduced, the bill merely changed the phrase “he or she” in
section 782 to “they.” (Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced, Feb. 18, 2022.) It was then amended to add the new
subdivision (a)(2), regarding a decision to dismiss a petition, quoted in text.
(Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended, Mar. 24, 2022.)
10
petition would endanger public safety.” (Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) as amended, Mar. 24, 2022.) Two months later, the bill’s author
amended the paragraph to read as it did when enacted: “When exercising its
discretion under paragraph (1) at the time the court terminates jurisdiction
or at any time thereafter, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present,
including, but not limited to, . . . that dismissal of the petition would not
endanger public safety, or that the underlying offense is connected to mental
illness, prior victimization, or childhood trauma. Proof of the presence of one
or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
petition.” (Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 23,
2022.)
The amendment of Assembly Bill 2629 undermines S.S.’s claim that the
Legislature intended to create a presumption in favor of finding a mitigating
circumstance so long as a juvenile offers any evidence thereof. S.S. does not
cite anything in the bill’s history to suggest that, despite eliminating the
explicit “presumption” language in a prior version of the bill, the Legislature
intended the “great weight” phrase to create a presumption by implication.
S.S. also relies on two inapposite decisions concerning a trial court’s
duty to defer to expert determinations about sentencing made by nonjudicial
bodies. Neither involved a statute using the phrase “great weight,” and
neither is relevant here. The first concerned a statute that barred a court
from sentencing a minor to state prison “unless . . . the court finds after
having read and considered the report submitted by the Youth Authority that
the minor is not a suitable subject for commitment to the Youth Authority.”
(Former § 707.2, quoted in People v. Javier A. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 811, 815,
superseded by statute as noted in People v. Martinez (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
11
1372, 1386–1387.) The court applied a judicially created standard construing
the provision to mean that “great weight [is] to be given to the Youth
Authority’s recommendation,” which “should ‘be followed in the absence of
substantial countervailing considerations’ [citation], . . . of sufficient weight
to overcome the recommendation.” (Javier A., at p. 819.) Similarly, in People
v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437 (Martin), the court applied a judicially created
standard requiring a trial court to give “great weight” to a determination by
the Board of Prison Terms that a sentence was “ ‘disparate in comparison
with the sentences imposed in similar cases.’ ” (Martin, at pp. 441, 446 &
fn. 2.)
Those decisions involved statutes requiring trial courts to defer to the
judgments of bodies in another branch of government—the Youth Authority
and the Board of Prison Terms—about matters within those bodies’ expertise.
In People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 399, review granted, Mar. 22,
2023, S278309, the Second District explained that Martin’s discussion of the
judicially created “great weight” standard is thus inapplicable to analysis of
Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), which is the statute requiring a trial
court to give “great weight” to mitigating circumstances in deciding whether
to strike an enhancement, and the statute from which section 782
incorporates its definition of “mental illness.” (Ibid.) Here, as in Walker, the
“great weight” standard is set forth in a statute, section 782, that does not
involve deference to a nonjudicial body. Rather, the disputed provision of
section 782 concerns a juvenile court’s independent performance of a core
judicial function—assessing whether evidence supports a requested factual
finding.
S.S.’s arguments thus fail to show that section 782’s direction to a
juvenile court to “consider and afford great weight to evidence offered . . . to
12
prove mitigating circumstances are present” (§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(A)) requires
the court to apply a presumption that such circumstances are present
whenever the record contains any evidence of such a circumstance.
IV.
The Evidence Did Not Compel a Finding in S.S.’s Favor
The evidence that S.S.’s offenses were connected to mental illness
consists of statements by S.S. and his mother recounted in probation reports,
and a letter from a medical social worker. As set forth below, the minor’s
evidence was not “ ‘ “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and . . . ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support a finding” ’ ” that S.S.’s offenses were connected to
mental illness. (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1164; In re
I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)
According to the report for the January 2022 disposition hearing, S.S.
told a probation officer, “I lost my temper, blacked out.” Asked if anger had
ever previously made him black out, he replied, “This has happened many
times, especially during football. I have an anger problem.” S.S. had told his
mother that he wanted to kill himself after witnessing a shooting at school.
He struggled to deal with bullying on social media and teasing by peers on
the football team. S.S.’s mother said he started therapy in May 2019 because
she saw signs of depression and anxiety. At the time of the offenses, he had
an appointment scheduled to be assessed for medication for depression and
impulse control. The probation report stated S.S. was “clearly in need of
significant anger management treatment,” could benefit from therapy, and
should have a medication assessment as soon as possible.
The probation department also submitted a report in November 2022
for the disposition hearing on S.S.’s probation violation. It stated that, after
13
his probation began in January 2022, S.S. was diagnosed with IED and
depressive disorder. An attached September 2022 letter from medical social
worker Mara Binkov stated: “[S.S.] was recently involved in a fight at his
school, which was a result of being targeted and literally cornered by his
classmates. [S.S.’s] mental health diagnosis can also result in blacking out
when triggered. [S.S.] was punished through school suspension and legal
action with no proof as to who instigated the fight and only video footage
showing [S.S.] defending himself.” The probation report also stated S.S. had
completed a medication assessment, begun psychiatric treatment for
depressive disorder, and been prescribed medication for depression. His
mother stated he took the medication regularly and found it somewhat
helpful.
On appeal, S.S. contends the juvenile court erred in ruling that it
lacked sufficient information to connect the offenses to his diagnosed IED and
depressive disorder. While he claims that “extensive evidence” showed he
displayed symptoms of the disorders near the time of the beatings, he fails to
cite persuasive evidence to that effect offered below.
The first pieces of asserted evidence S.S. cites are lists from the DSM of
diagnostic criteria for IED and features of depressive disorder. But as the
Attorney General notes, S.S. did not cite or submit any part of the DSM to
the juvenile court, so we may not consider the material on appeal. (In re
Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“ ‘an appeal reviews the correctness of a
judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were
before the trial court for its consideration’ ”].)
In reply, S.S. asserts that Penal Code section 1385, as incorporated by
section 782, “directs the court, not the defendant, to refer[ to] the most recent
edition of the DSM to identify [qualifying] mental disorders.” He is incorrect.
14
While the statute defines a mental illness for its purposes as “a mental
disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the [DSM]” (Pen. Code,
§ 1385, subd. (c)(5)), it does not require a juvenile court to sua sponte consult
the DSM to identify the symptoms of a disorder and try to correlate them to a
juvenile’s offenses. Instead, Penal Code section 1385 states that a court “may
conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense . . .
after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence.” (Ibid., italics added.)
The statute presumes, in other words, that a court will take the usual
approach of American law: reviewing evidence submitted by the parties, not
conducting factual research to gather evidence on its own.
More importantly, the pertinent question is not whether IED and
depressive disorder are identified in the DSM, but whether S.S. offered
evidence compelling the juvenile court to find his offenses were connected to
one of those disorders. The main evidence to that effect was the letter by
social worker Mara Binkov. As noted, Binkov described S.S. as having been
“involved in a fight” as “a result of being targeted and literally cornered by
classmates,” and stated there was “no proof as to who instigated the fight and
only video footage showing [S.S.] defending himself.” Her account is
irreconcilable with the juvenile court’s findings that S.S. had engaged in an
unprovoked, unjustified, and brutal beating of two smaller boys, which he
initiated and “dominated throughout.” Because Binkov’s account was
inconsistent with the juvenile court’s prior findings, it could have declined to
credit her implication that S.S.’s actions were connected to his disorders.
On appeal, recognizing that Binkov’s account of the “fight” cannot be
reconciled with the juvenile court’s explicit findings of a brutal, unprovoked
beating, S.S. contends that the only relevant statement in her letter was that
his “diagnosis” can cause him to “black[] out when triggered.” But Binkov did
15
not state that S.S.’s offenses were in fact connected to IED or in fact resulted
from his blacking out during the incident; she merely noted that his “mental
health diagnosis can also result in blacking out when triggered.” That
general statement of possibility did not compel the court to find that that is
what happened in this case.
S.S. also cites his own statement, recounted in the January 2022
probation report, that he “lost [his] temper, blacked out”; that such blackouts
had “happened many times”; and that he has “an anger problem.” He adds
that the facts of the encounter themselves show that he responded to an
argument with disproportionate violence. But while his self-serving
statement and the facts of the beating may constitute some evidence that the
offenses were connected to mental illness, we cannot say that the evidence
was “ ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient’ ” to prove a mitigating circumstance.
(In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) The evidence could have
supported such a finding, but it did not compel one.
S.S. also contends that the probation department’s and juvenile court’s
observations that he could benefit from anger management, medication
assessment, and counseling, and the court’s imposition of related probation
terms, constitute evidence that his offenses were connected to his IED and/or
depressive disorder. They do not. They represent forward-looking
assessments of how to maximize S.S.’s chances of rehabilitation, not evidence
about why he committed the past offenses that brought him within the
court’s jurisdiction. To the extent the cited statements and orders rested on
evidence, it was the same evidence that, as discussed above, is insufficient to
compel a finding that the offenses were connected to mental illness.
16
S.S. contends it is “not clear” the juvenile court understood the scope of
its discretion under section 782, as amended, when it assessed whether his
offenses were connected to mental illness. But “[a]bsent evidence to the
contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing
law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) We also presume,
absent “an affirmative record to the contrary,” that it “considered all of the
relevant factors.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) That
settled rule is “an aspect of the presumption that judicial duty is properly
performed.” (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644, overruled on
other ground by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)
The record here reflects no comment by the juvenile court misstating the law.
To the contrary, it shows that S.S.’s counsel accurately summarized and
quoted the amended provisions of section 782 at the hearing, ensuring the
court was not only presumptively but actually aware of the applicable law.
Finally, in a related argument, S.S. briefly asserts that the juvenile
court may not have “considered the correct standard” in determining whether
his offenses were connected to mental illness. As he recognizes, section 782
does not define the phrase “connected to” as used to identify the mitigating
circumstance that an offense was “connected to mental illness.” (§ 782,
subd. (a)(2)(A), italics added.) But Penal Code section 1385, whose definition
of “mental illness” section 782 incorporates by reference, states that a court
“may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense
if . . . the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the
defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1385, subd. (c)(5), italics added.) S.S. contends the use of the phrase
“substantially contributed” in Penal Code section 1385, as incorporated by
reference in section 782, adopts the “substantial factor” test of causation used
17
in tort law and in some criminal contexts. (See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 969 [discussing “substantial factor” test of but-for
causation in tort, which excludes “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’
or ‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury”]; People v. Caldwell (1984)
36 Cal.3d 210, 220 [similarly defining “substantial factor” test for whether
criminal act caused death].) But as set forth below, S.S. offers no support for
his theory, and persuasive authority rejects it.
S.S. cites nothing in the legislative history of Assembly Bill 2629, or of
the 2021 bill amending Penal Code section 1385 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 2022), to suggest the Legislature intended the phrase
“substantially contributed” to integrate the distinct legal term of art
“substantial factor.” Nor does he cite any authority construing Penal Code
section 1385, or section 782, in that way. Most importantly, he does not
explain why, if the Legislature meant to impose a “substantial factor” test, it
did not simply use that phrase. It could have enacted a provision stating,
“the defendant’s mental illness was a substantial factor in the defendant’s
involvement in the commission of the offense,” but it did not. “ ‘ “[W]hen the
Legislature uses a term of art, a court construing that use must assume that
the Legislature was aware of the ramifications of its choice of language.” ’ ”
(People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 871.) By the same token, we may
assume that, if the Legislature intends a statute to have the meaning and
effect of a legal term of art, it will use that term of art in the text of the
statute.
S.S.’s argument also overlooks the broader history of the phrase
“substantially contributed” as used in Penal Code section 1385. As a leading
treatise explains, the Legislature likely intended the term to impose a fairly
demanding standard. (Couzens, et al., Sentencing California Crimes
18
(The Rutter Group 2023) § 12:11.) “The use of the phrase ‘substantially
contributed’ is unclear. Likely it is the intent of the Legislature that the
factor plays some significant role in the commission of the crime or the
defendant’s involvement. In other circumstances, the Legislature used the
phrase ‘a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.’ (See, e.g.,
[Pen. Code,] § 1170, subd. (b)(6) [Factor affecting imposition of the low term
of imprisonment].) While ‘contributing factor’ suggests the court must find
the factor to have some connection, however slight, [to] the commission or
circumstances of the crime, the phrase ‘substantially contributed’ clearly
implies a factor more significant in weight from that of ‘contributing factor.’ ”
(Ibid.) As Couzens notes, the same Legislature enacted both the amendment
adding the “substantially contributed” test to Penal Code section 1385 and
the amendment adding the “contributing factor” test to Penal Code section
1170. (Ibid.) That circumstance strengthens the inference that it intended
“substantially contributed” to mean something more than “contributing
factor.” (Ibid.) We thus reject S.S.’s unsupported speculation that the
Legislature intended the phrase to impose a “substantial factor” test.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the minor’s section 782 motion is affirmed.
19
_________________________
Mayfield, J.*
We concur:
_________________________
Stewart, P.J.
_________________________
Miller, J.
In re S.S. (A167046)
* Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
20
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.