People v. Bedford CA2/4

CourtListener 9509593Calctapp31.05.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/31/24 P. v. Bedford CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B327789

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA451647)
v.

WELDON RASHAWN BEDFORD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2015 appellant Weldon Rashawn Bedford drove his
truck, with admitted gang member Andrew Campbell as a
passenger, into rival gang territory. After appellant stopped on
West 68th Street, Campbell got out of the truck, and then shot
and killed victim Cedric Horne. A jury found appellant guilty of
second degree murder, with true findings that a principal used a
gun and that the shooting was committed for the benefit of a
gang.
In 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under
former Penal Code section 1170.95.1 The superior court
summarily denied appellant’s petition, finding that appellant was
not entitled to relief as a matter of law because the jury was not
instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. On appeal, appellant contends he was
entitled to a prima facie hearing and that the jury instructions
given at trial allowed for the possibility that he was convicted of
murder under another theory of imputed malice. Respondent
Attorney General concedes that summary denial was in error, but
argues it was harmless because the record of conviction
establishes appellant’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter
of law. We agree that any error was harmless. The jury was not
instructed on either natural and probable consequences or felony
murder. Moreover, the jury instructions as a whole required the
jury to find that appellant personally harbored malice in order to

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. All further
references to the statute will be to the new section number.

2
convict appellant of second degree murder as an aider and
abettor. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We draw the following facts from the reporter’s transcript
of appellant’s trial. We granted respondent’s request for judicial
notice of the record in the direct appeal, including the trial
transcripts and jury instructions.
In the late afternoon of October 30, 2015, Cedric Horne was
working as a landscaper on West 68th Street. This location was
in territory claimed by the 65 Menlo Gangster Crips. At some
point after he finished his work, Horne was standing near the
corner of Vermont Avenue and West 68th Street when he was
shot seven times with a nine-millimeter handgun. Two of the
shots proved fatal.
A gang expert testified at trial regarding an alliance
between two gangs, the 67 Neighborhood Crips and the 65 Menlo
Gangster Crips, and their feud with a third gang, the Avalons.
Appellant admitted to police several times that he was a member
of the Avalons gang. He was aware of several gang-related
killings in the month prior to Horne’s shooting. In one incident,
the Menlos held a funeral in the Avalons’ territory and a shootout
broke out between the gangs, resulting in the death of a Menlos
member. Shortly after that incident, two Avalons gang members
were killed. The prosecution’s theory at trial was that appellant
planned the shooting as retaliation for the earlier Avalons
shootings, scouted the location, and as a senior gang member,
accompanied the younger shooter (Campbell) to validate the
killing on behalf of the gang.
One month after Horne’s murder, the Los Angeles Police
Department stopped appellant’s Chevrolet Avalanche truck.

3
Appellant was with two admitted Avalons gang members at the
time. Police searched the truck and found a kit for cleaning the
barrel of a nine-millimeter gun.
After appellant was arrested, he eventually admitted that
he was driving his Avalanche truck when it was used in the
shooting, but asserted he had no idea the shooter—whom he
identified as Campbell—was going to shoot Horne. Appellant told
police that he, Campbell and two friends were headed to a
marijuana dispensary on Florence Avenue, slightly west of
Vermont. He was taking side streets to avoid the traffic on
Florence when Campbell suddenly told him to stop the truck.
Appellant did so. Campbell exited, shot Horne, and got back in
the truck; appellant then sped off. Appellant claimed he did not
know Campbell was carrying a gun.
Surveillance camera video from the streets surrounding the
crime scene established that appellant’s black Avalanche truck
traveled south on Menlo Avenue, and turned right (west) on West
68th, toward Vermont. It then turned right (north) on Vermont
and parked just north of West 68th. Appellant exited from the
driver’s seat and walked toward the rear of the vehicle. A police
witness testified that from this location, appellant would have
had a clear and direct view to where Horne was shot. A minute
later, appellant re-entered the Avalanche. The vehicle proceeded
north on Vermont, then drove around the block. As it traveled
south on Menlo for a second time, it stopped and someone got out
of the rear passenger door. The person walked toward the cargo
bays in the back of the truck and then got back into the truck.2

2 The prosecution argued at trial that this individual was
Campbell, who retrieved a gun from the truck’s cargo bay in
preparation for the shooting.

4
The truck again made a right turn onto West 68th. After the
shooting, the truck turned right onto Vermont Avenue from West
68th, and then right again onto West 66th, driving at a high
speed.3
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Charges and Conviction
An information filed August 10, 2017 charged appellant
with the murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) of Horne. The information
further alleged that a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, a handgun, causing great bodily injury and
death to Horne (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1)), and
that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction
of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific
intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang
members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). It also alleged that appellant
suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1)
and (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
At appellant’s trial, the jury was instructed on first and
second degree murder, express and implied malice, and aiding
and abetting. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
On November 14, 2018, the jury found appellant guilty of
second degree murder and found true the firearm and gang
enhancement allegations. Appellant subsequently admitted his
prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. The court
sentenced appellant to a term of 60 years to life: 15 years to life

3 There was testimony at trial that a person heading to a
marijuana dispensary on Florence Avenue, as appellant claimed,
would have turned left onto Vermont from West 68th, instead of
turning right.

5
for the murder conviction, doubled to 30 years under section
1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), for the previous strike, another 25
years to life for the section 12022.53 enhancement, and plus five
years for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1), enhancement. A
different panel of this division affirmed appellant’s conviction on
direct appeal, holding that substantial evidence supported the
finding that appellant knew Campbell intended to shoot Horne.
(People v. Bedford (July 9, 2020, B295327) [nonpub. opn.]
(Bedford I).) The court remanded the matter to the trial court for
its consideration of several sentencing issues. On remand, the
trial court struck the prior strike conviction, reducing appellant’s
total sentence to 45 years to life.
II. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
Appellant filed a section 1172.6 petition on April 5, 2022.
The superior court appointed counsel for appellant and ordered
the prosecution to file a response.
In its opposition to the petition, the prosecution argued
that appellant was ineligible for resentencing because his jury
was not instructed on either the felony murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Without any
citation to the record, the prosecution asserted that the “factual
record cited by the Court of Appeal” in its prior opinion
established that appellant acted as a direct aider and abettor to
the murder with malice aforethought. The prosecution attached
a copy of the opinion in Bedford I to the opposition, but did not
attach trial transcripts or other records from the trial. Appellant,
through counsel, filed a reply, submitting on the prosecution’s
response to the petition.
The court summarily denied appellant’s petition on
December 14, 2022, finding that appellant was not prosecuted

6
under the theories of felony murder or natural and probable
consequences and that he was “a direct aider and abettor who
acted with malice aforethought.” Accordingly, the court found
that appellant was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Principles
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which became
effective January 1, 2019, “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel), quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1(f).) Under this new framework, a person’s culpability for
murder must be premised upon his or her own actions and
subjective mens rea. (Ibid.) Outside the felony murder context, a
person must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of
murder; “‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely
on his or her participation in a crime.’” (Id. at p. 449, quoting §
188, subd. (a)(3).)
A person may still be convicted of murder as an aider and
abettor. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990.) Indeed,
“‘an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a
killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
another and acts with conscious disregard for life,’” thus acting
with implied malice. (Ibid., quoting People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 850.) To be liable for an implied malice murder, a

7
direct aider and abettor must aid the commission of the life-
endangering act, with the knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, the knowledge that the act is
dangerous to human life, the intent to aid in its commission, and
with conscious disregard for human life. (Id. at p. 991.)
An individual convicted of murder under a now-invalid
theory may petition the superior court under section 1172.6 to
vacate his or her conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Section 1172.6,
subdivision (c) requires the court to appoint counsel when
requested upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 963, 966.)
The court must allow further briefing by the parties and must
then “hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The
court may consider the record of conviction in determining
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief
under section 1170.95. Although the court should not engage in
factfinding at the prima facie stage, “‘if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
If the petition states a prima facie claim for relief, the
superior court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution
has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (d)(1), (d)(3).) If the prosecution fails to meet this burden,

8
the trial court must grant the petition and vacate the murder
conviction. (§ 1172.6., subd. (d)(3).)
We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to
show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545;
People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437 [whether court
conducted a proper inquiry about whether a prima facie case for
relief had been established under section 1172.6 is reviewed de
novo].)
II. Analysis
A. Summary denial was error
Appellant contends the superior court erred in summarily
denying his petition without a hearing and in apparently relying
only on this court’s prior opinion as the basis for its denial. The
Attorney General concedes that the failure to hold a hearing, as
required by section 1172.6, subdivision (c), was error.
Respondent argues, however, that “[n]othing in the court’s ruling
showed that it relied on this Court’s opinion in Bedford I.”
We agree that the court erred in denying appellant’s
petition without holding a hearing. Additionally, while the
superior court did not expressly rely on the prior appellate
opinion, neither party supplied the court with the jury
instructions given at appellant’s trial, verdict forms, or any other
part of the record of conviction, and neither party requested
judicial notice of those documents. As such, it is unclear what the
superior court relied upon in denying the petition, other than this
court’s prior opinion. Assuming that the court relied on the
factual background in Bedford I, this was error. (See § 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3) [admissible portion of a prior appellate opinion is

9
limited to “the procedural history of the case”]; People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988, fn. 9 (Flores).)
These errors are subject to harmless error analysis under
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 957–958 [failure to appoint counsel under § 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3) is “state law error only, tested for prejudice under
[Watson]”], 974; Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 986.) Thus,
the error requires reversal in this case only if appellant can show
a reasonable probability that, absent the error, his petition would
not have been summarily denied. ( Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th
at p. 986; see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972–974; People
v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 676.) The error is harmless
if the record of conviction, which includes the jury instructions
and verdict, refutes appellant’s prima facie showing and
establishes as a matter of law that he is not entitled to relief.
(See Lewis, supra, at pp. 971-974; People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 47-48; People v. Daniel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 676 [“‘[J]ury instructions given at a petitioner’s trial may
provide “readily ascertainable facts from the record” that refute
[a petitioner’s prima facie showing]’ permitting a trial court to
determine that a petitioner is not entitled to relief”].) The
Attorney General contends that the errors here were harmless,
because the record of conviction established appellant’s
ineligibility as a matter of law. We now turn to an assessment of
that claim.
B. The error was harmless
Appellant acknowledges that the jury was not instructed on
the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine in this case. Nevertheless, he contends that the jury
instructions on aiding and abetting and second degree murder

10
created an ambiguity that could have allowed the jury to find him
guilty of murder by imputing the shooter’s malice to him, rather
than by finding appellant personally harbored the requisite
mental state. We disagree.
The only theories on which appellant’s jury was instructed
were first or second degree murder, either as a direct perpetrator
or as an aider and abettor. These theories remain valid and do
not qualify for section 1172.6 relief. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 990.) Specifically, the trial court gave CALCRIM No. 400,
which instructs that appellant could be convicted as either a
direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor. The court further
instructed on aiding and abetting liability with CALCRIM No.
401, requiring proof that “1. The perpetrator committed the
crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to
commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the commission of the
crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or
conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator's commission of
the crime. [¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows
of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically
intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator's commission of that crime.”
The court also instructed the jury on malice with
CALCRIM No. 520. As given, the instruction provided, “To prove
that a defendant is guilty of this crime [murder], the People must
prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant committed an act that caused the
death of another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. When the defendant
acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought. [¶]
There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and
implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state

11
of mind required for murder. [¶] The defendant acted with
express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] The
defendant acted with implied malice if: [¶] 1. He intentionally
committed an act; [¶] 2. The natural and probable consequences
of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the time he
acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; [¶] AND [¶]
4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
Appellant contends that if the jury convicted him based on
a finding of implied malice, the combination of these instructions
left open the possibility that he was convicted based on his
participation in the crime and the imputed malice of the shooter,
rather than finding that he personally harbored the required
intent. Appellant relies for this contention on People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi).
In Powell, on direct appeal, the court found that the
standard aiding and abetting instruction, CALCRIM No. 401, is
“not tailored for” aiding and abetting an implied malice murder.
(Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) Specifically, the
instruction “couches direct aiding and abetting liability in terms
of the aider and abettor knowing the perpetrator intended to
commit the crime, the aider and abettor intending to aid and abet
the perpetrator in committing the crime, and that, by words or
conduct, the aider and abettor in fact aided the perpetrator’s
commission of the crime.” (Ibid.) But in the context of implied
malice murder, the relevant intent is that the aider and abettor
“intend[s] the commission of the perpetrator’s act [that
proximately causes death], the natural and probable
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally
aid[s] in the commission of that act and do[es] so with conscious

12
disregard for human life.” (Ibid.) The court therefore concluded
that the instructions were erroneous, although it ultimately
found that the error was harmless. (Ibid.)
In Langi, the same issue arose in the context of a section
1172.6 resentencing petition. The defendant was part of a group
who beat and robbed the victim. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 975.) During the confrontation, the victim was killed when he
fell and hit his head after he was punched by someone in the
group. (Ibid.) Langi contended that he did not throw the fatal
punch. The jury convicted him of robbery, battery, and second
degree murder. (Id. at p. 977.)
The superior court summarily denied Langi’s resentencing
petition, concluding that the jury had found him guilty as the
actual killer. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 977.) On
appeal, the court rejected that finding and assumed that the jury
had convicted Langi as an aider and abettor. (Id. at p. 980.) The
court then found that, although the jury had not been instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the standard
instructions were ambiguous and permitted the jury to find Langi
guilty on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based
solely on his participation in the crime. (Ibid.) The court
observed that while the aiding and abetting instruction stated
that a person aids and abets a crime if the person acts with
knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and with the
intent to commit or encourage that crime, “the second-degree-
murder instruction specified that the direct perpetrator of that
crime need not act with the unlawful intent of causing death.”
(Ibid.) The perpetrator’s unlawful purpose did not need to be
killing the victim, but could have been “only to strike or to injure,
or conceivably only to embarrass, the victim.” (Ibid.) Thus, the

13
court reasoned that “the aider and abettor’s knowledge of that
purpose similarly need not have been knowledge that the
perpetrator aimed to kill.” (Id. at p. 982.) Because the aiding
and abetting instruction did not require the defendant to act with
conscious disregard for human life, the court concluded that the
jury could have convicted Langi as an aider and abettor simply
for intending to aid the perpetrator’s act, without personally
acting with express or implied malice. (Id. at p. 983.)
We are not persuaded that the ambiguity identified in
Powell and Langi is present in the context of this case.
CALCRIM No. 401 required the aider and abettor to know that
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime. The only crime
charged here was murder, either first or second degree. By
contrast, in Langi, the defendant was also charged with and
found guilty of the crimes of robbery and battery. (Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) Thus, the ambiguity in the jury
instructions in Langi allowed for the possibility that the
defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting murder based on
a finding that he intended to aid and abet a non-murder battery
or other crime. But here, the only crime charged, murder,
required one of two different intents: either intent to kill (express
malice) or conscious disregard for human life (implied malice).
We see no reasonable possibility that the jury could have found
that appellant as an aider and abettor could know that the
perpetrator intended to commit a specific crime and help the
perpetrator commit that crime—here defined in CALCRIM No.
520 as requiring intent to kill or a conscious disregard for human
life—and yet not personally harbor the requisite mens rea. As
our Supreme Court said, where the only unlawful purpose
charged is an unlawful killing, “one cannot knowingly and

14
intentionally help another commit an unlawful killing without
acting with malice.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,
1123.)
We also reject appellant’s contention that the prosecution’s
closing arguments at trial exacerbated any potential ambiguity.
Appellant asserts that the prosecution’s discussion of implied
malice “purely relied on a theory of imputed malice, arguing only
the shooter’s mens rea.” The record does not support appellant’s
contention. The prosecution asserted throughout closing
arguments that appellant was liable as an aider and abettor who
knew that Campbell was going to shoot Horne and intended to
aid that act. The prosecutor told the jury that although appellant
“did not pull the trigger,” he was liable as an aider and abettor of
the murder because he “knows that it’s going to happen, [ ]
intend[s] that it happen and [ ] help[s] bring it about.” The
prosecutor did not contend that the shooter’s intent should be
imputed to appellant; rather, his closing argument focused
almost exclusively on appellant’s knowledge and intent.
The jury instructions given here required the jury to find
that appellant personally harbored express or implied malice
either as the shooter or a direct aider and abettor. He
accordingly is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law, and any error in denying his petition without
issuing an order to show cause was harmless.4

4 We need not and do not reach respondent’s alternative
argument that appellant’s claim of instructional error should
have been asserted on direct appeal rather than in a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6, citing People v. Berry-
Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921.

15
DISPOSTION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

16

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.