CourtListener 9509581•People v. de Leon CA1/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/31/24 P. v. de Leon CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166057
v. (Marin County Super. Ct.
JUAN MANUEL CALDERON DE No. SC208457A)
LEON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Juan Manuel Calderon de Leon appeals a final judgment
following a jury trial in which he was convicted of multiple sex crimes against
John Doe, who was six years old at the time of the offenses. Calderon de
Leon argues that reversal is warranted because he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel during critical stages of his trial to the point where
prejudice should be presumed under United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S.
648 (Cronic). We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2019, an information charged Calderon de Leon with:
(1) lewd acts upon a child (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a); counts 1, 2, and 5);
(2) oral copulation with a child (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1); counts 3 and 6); and
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
(3) sodomy of a child (§ 286, subd. (c)(1); counts 4 and 7). As to counts 4 and
7, the information alleged that the offenses were violent felonies within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(4). As to all counts, the information
alleged that Calderon de Leon engaged in substantial sexual conduct within
the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8).
Following trial, the jury found Calderon de Leon guilty of all counts.
The trial court sentenced Calderon de Leon to a total of 15 years in prison,
consisting of three years on count 4 and consecutive terms of two years on
each of the remaining six counts. Calderon de Leon timely appealed.
A. John Doe’s Testimony
John Doe was 23 years old at the time he testified at the trial.
Calderon de Leon is his half-brother and is 12 years older than him. When
John Doe was six years old, Calderon de Leon moved in with him, their
mother, and his younger sister. Calderon de Leon was 18 years old at the
time and was often left in charge of watching John Doe and his sister while
their mother was at work.
John Doe testified that on one occasion when he was six years old, he
was playing a video game in the master bedroom when Calderon de Leon
came in and asked if he wanted to play a different game. John Doe’s sister
also came into the room but Calderon de Leon “shooed her away.” Calderon
de Leon told John Doe to take off his clothes and proceeded to take off his
own clothes. After they were both naked, Calderon de Leon kissed John Doe
on the mouth and instructed John Doe to perform oral copulation, which
John Doe did. Calderon de Leon then told John Doe to get under the bed
sheets with him. Once they were both under the sheets, Calderon de Leon
anally penetrated John Doe with his penis. Calderon de Leon then led John
Doe into the bathroom, and the two got into the shower together. Calderon
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de Leon bathed John Doe while touching his penis and “behind.”
Afterwards, Calderon de Leon told John Doe not to tell anyone about what
they did, and “that God was going to forgive [them].”
On another day when John Doe was six years old, Calderon de Leon
came into the master bedroom while John Doe was on the bed, shut the door,
and asked if he wanted to play the game again. John Doe responded yes.
After Calderon de Leon instructed him to take his clothes off, John Doe
recalled the sequence of events as similar to the first incident: “Kissing, oral
copulation, and then penetration.” But there was one main difference: This
time, Calderon de Leon instructed John Doe to get “on [his] hands and
knees[] with [his] behind in the air” before Calderon de Leon anally
penetrated him. Afterwards, Calderon de Leon again told John Doe not to
tell anyone about what had happened.
When John Doe was seven or eight years old, Calderon de Leon moved
out to live with his wife. When John Doe was a junior in high school,
Calderon de Leon moved back in with him and their mother. This was a
difficult time for John Doe because he “was scared that it was going to
happen again” and found excuses not to be at home. Later that same year,
John Doe asked his best friend, C.L., to go on a drive with him. After
driving for a bit, John Doe parked the car and told C.L. that Calderon de
Leon had sexually assaulted him when he was six years old. John Doe cried
and told C.L. not to tell anyone. Calderon de Leon moved out again during
John Doe’s senior year in high school.
The next year in September 2018, John Doe told his mother about the
sexual abuse after she commented that it broke her heart that her two sons
no longer spoke to one another. John Doe soon realized that his family did
not “have the capacity to solve these problems on their own” and reported
3
the abuse to law enforcement in November 2018. The police asked John Doe
to participate in a recorded “ ‘pretext phone call’ ” with Calderon de Leon.2
During two calls which were made by John Doe on the same day, Calderon
de Leon admitted to what he did when John Doe was younger and expressed
regret.
Defense counsel did not cross-examine John Doe. Outside the presence
of the jury, the trial court asked counsel why she did not cross-examine him.
Counsel responded that she had discussed it with her client and that they
“made a strategic decision” not to cross-examine John Doe because they
believed “any further examination of the witness would actually hurt
[Calderon de Leon], as opposed to support his case” given their strategy.
B. C.L.’s Testimony
C.L. testified that he and John Doe became best friends in high school.
During their sophomore year, John Doe invited C.L. to go on a hike. Instead
of hiking, however, John Doe drove them to a nearby parking lot and said
that he wanted to tell C.L. about something that happened to him when he
was very young. John Doe then shared that when he was six years old, he
was sexually assaulted by Calderon de Leon. John Doe was emotional and
had trouble getting his words out. Afterwards, John Doe asked C.L. to “not
talk about it ever again.” During their senior year in high school, John Doe
had a brief conversation with C.L. about potentially reporting the incident to
the police. The two otherwise did not discuss the details of the incident
again. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked C.L. whether John
Doe had shared any details about what happened. C.L. testified that John
Doe mentioned the sexual assault occurred during a “family gathering at
their place” in “a side room” and that Calderon de Leon had been drinking.
2 Audio recordings of the two pretext calls were played for the jury.
4
C. Defense’s Opening and Closing Arguments
After the prosecution rested, defense counsel gave a brief opening
statement and argued that “the evidence will show that [Calderon de Leon]
is not guilty [and] that there is reasonable doubt in this case.” Defense
counsel then rested without presenting any evidence.
During closing argument, defense counsel attacked the reliability of the
audio recordings of the pretext calls and emphasized that they needed to be
corroborated by other evidence. Defense counsel then highlighted the
inconsistencies between C.L.’s testimony and John Doe’s testimony about
the details of the abuse and argued that John Doe lied to C.L. about what
happened and was therefore a dishonest witness. Based on these
inconsistencies, defense counsel asked the jury to return a verdict of not
guilty.
II. DISCUSSION
Calderon de Leon contends that he was so denied effective assistance of
counsel that it constituted structural Sixth Amendment error under Cronic.3
Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show deficient performance and prejudice; that “but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland).)
In Cronic, however, the high court carved out three exceptions where
prejudice is presumed and need not be shown. (Cronic, 466 U.S. at pp. 658–
659.) “First and ‘[m]ost obvious’ was the ‘complete denial of counsel.’
[Citation.] A trial would be presumptively unfair [] where the accused is
3 Calderon de Leon does not argue error under Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. 668, and concedes that any prejudice resulting from counsel’s
performance would be difficult to show on direct appeal based on the
uncontradicted evidence at trial.
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denied the presence of counsel at ‘a critical stage,’ . . . Second, . . . a similar
presumption was warranted if ‘counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ [Citation.] Finally . . .
where counsel is called upon to render assistance under circumstances where
competent counsel very likely could not, the defendant need not show that
the proceedings were affected.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 695–696
(Cone).)
Calderon de Leon argues that the first and second Cronic exceptions
apply here because defense counsel failed to cross-examine John Doe and
gave an improper opening statement before resting her case without
presenting any evidence. We disagree.
The first Cronic exception requires “the complete denial of counsel,”
which occurs “when counsel is either totally absent, or prevented from
assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.” (Cronic,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659 & fn. 25, italics added.) Calderon de Leon contends
that he was “effectively deprived of the assistance of counsel” during John
Doe’s testimony and the defense’s opening statement. But there is no
question that defense counsel was present during these stages of trial, and
what Calderon de Leon really takes issue with is defense counsel’s
performance—which falls under the second Cronic exception and cannot be
conflated with the first exception. Calderon de Leon cites to cases in which
courts have held that cross-examination and an opening statement are
considered “critical stages” of trial. These cases, however, do not support that
the first Cronic exception can be met where counsel was present during these
stages.4
4 Calderon de Leon’s reliance on Glasser v. United States (1942) 315
U.S. 60, 75–76 is inapposite as Glasser involved prejudice stemming from
6
The second Cronic exception—when “counsel entirely fails to subject
the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”—is also inapplicable
here. (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659.) For this exception to apply, “the
attorney’s failure must be complete.” (Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 697.) As
such, it “occurs so rarely as to be almost nonexistent.” (People v. Ruiz (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 324, 331.) In Cone, the defendant argued that the second
Cronic exception applied based on his counsel’s “failure to adduce mitigating
evidence and [the] waiver of closing argument” during sentencing. (Cone,
supra, 535 U.S. at p. 697.) The high court disagreed and held that Strickland
applied to the defendant’s claims because his “argument is not that his
counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the sentencing
proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points.
For purposes of distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of
Cronic, this difference is not of degree but of kind.” (Ibid.)
Here, defense counsel subjected the prosecution’s case to “meaningful
adversarial testing” at trial. (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659.) Although
counsel did not cross-examine John Doe, she later explained to the trial court
that this was a “strategic decision” that she and her client discussed and
made together as they believed any further examination of John Doe would
hurt their case. This made sense given the defense’s strategy of using C.L.’s
testimony to attack John Doe’s credibility. (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12
Cal.4th 415, 436–437 [“Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical
decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel”].)
Further, defense counsel did cross-examine C.L. regarding the details
John Doe had shared with him about the sexual abuse. In her closing
appointed counsel’s conflict of interest and not any presumption of prejudice
under a Cronic exception.
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argument, counsel emphasized the inconsistencies between C.L.’s testimony
and John Doe’s testimony about these details to create doubt as to whether
John Doe was a truthful witness. Defense counsel then asked the jury to
return a verdict of not guilty. Although counsel’s opening statement may
have been unusual given that she immediately rested her case after giving
the statement, this does not mean that she failed to oppose the prosecution’s
case such that prejudice should be presumed under Cronic.5
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
5 United States v. Swanson (9th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1070, a case
Calderon de Leon relies on in his reply brief, is easily distinguishable. There,
the court held that defense counsel’s conduct “caused a breakdown in our
adversarial system of justice” compelling the application of Cronic after
counsel conceded during closing argument that there was no reasonable
doubt his client committed the bank robbery in question. (Id. at p. 1074.)
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CHOU, J.
We concur.
SIMONS, Acting P. J.
BURNS, J.
People v. Calderon De Leon / A166057
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