People v. Aguilera CA2/1

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Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Aguilera CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B325498

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA070638)
v.

OSCAR AGUILERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Vacated in part
and affirmed in part.
Eileen Manning-Villar, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
In January 2012, after a gang confrontation, defendant
Oscar Aguilera shot and killed rival gang member Samuel
Guerra. In 2017, a jury convicted defendant of first degree
murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury
found true the gang and firearm enhancements.
This is defendant’s second appeal. He argues, respondent
concedes, and we agree that based on legislation subsequent to
his trial, the gang enhancements connected to both counts must
be reversed. Defendant also argues he is entitled to a new trial
on the murder count because the gang enhancements were tried
jointly with the murder count. We disagree. Even assuming
retroactivity of Penal Code1 section 1109, which requires if
requested, bifurcated trials of gang enhancements and the
underlying charged crimes, defendant was not prejudiced by the
joint trial of the gang enhancements and murder count under
either the federal or state standard of prejudice.2 Finally,
defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to strike or reduce the firearm enhancement attached to the
murder count because the court did not properly consider
mitigating circumstances under posttrial amendments to
section 1385.3 This argument fails because defendant has not
shown a mitigating circumstance described in these amendments.
We reverse the gang enhancements and otherwise affirm the
judgment.

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 See Discussion, part B, post.
3 See Discussion, part C, post.

2
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was jointly tried with Jeffrey Martinez. The
jury convicted defendant of first degree murder of Guerra and
found a gang enhancement true. The jury also found true that
defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing Guerra’s death. The jury found defendant guilty of being
a felon in possession of a firearm and found true the gang
enhancement attached to that offense. The jury acquitted
Martinez.
The court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life on the
murder count but stayed the three-year sentence for the
possession count and four-year gang enhancement sentence on
that count. The murder sentence consisted of 25 years to life for
the murder and an additional 25 years for the firearm
enhancement. The gang enhancement did not augment
defendant’s murder sentence.
In his prior appeal in 2019, we rejected defendant’s
argument there was no evidence he was a felon; defendant
admitted that fact. We also found substantial evidence supported
the gang enhancement in effect at that time; the definition of
gang enhancement has since been modified. We remanded the
case to the trial court to exercise its discretion pursuant to the
then newly enacted section 12022.53 to decide whether to strike
the firearm enhancement and to conduct a youth offender parole
hearing pursuant to the then newly enacted section 3051,
subdivision (a)(1). (People v. Aguilera (Feb. 26, 2019, B282381)
[nonpub. opn.].)
Upon remand, defendant filed a motion for resentencing
and presented additional evidence (described in our Discussion)
in support of his request that the trial court strike or reduce the

3
firearm enhancement and resentence him accordingly. After a
hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

1. The murder
Defendant describes the murder as follows: After his
confederates announced they were from the Vineland Boyz gang
[Vineland] they “surrounded” Guerra “demanding to know where
he was from.” “After Guerra responded that he was from MS [a
rival gang], appellant walk[ed] over to a grey car, walk[ed] back
to where Guerra was standing and sho[t] him in the head.
[Citations.] When Guerra fell to the ground, appellant shot him
several more times.”
Defendant’s description of the murder is supported by the
record. Guerra’s girlfriend testified she was with Guerra outside
a nightclub. Martinez approached her and asked for a cigarette.
Four males, including defendant, were together. Martinez and
another male made signs indicating their Vineland membership.
Martinez asked Guerra where he was from, meaning whether he
was “gang-related.” After Guerra identified himself as MS
(La Mara Salvatrucha gang), defendant shot him multiple times.
On the night of the incident, Guerra’s girlfriend told a police
officer that three or four males surrounded Guerra’s truck and
one made a gesture indicating he was from Vineland gang. She
told the officer that after Guerra fell to the ground, the shooter
shot two or three more times.
Guerra died of multiple gunshot wounds.

4 We summarize only the facts and procedural history
relevant to the current appeal.

4
Prosecution witness David Fonseca (a Vineland gang
member), testified that when interviewed in February 2012, he
reported he saw defendant dismantle a gun; thereafter,
defendant fled to Mexico.5 From Mexico, defendant asked
Fonseca if “the heat was away already” so he could return from
Mexico. Defendant told Fonseca to exercise his Fifth Amendment
right to refuse to testify.

2. Gang evidence
Officer Henry Garay testified as a gang expert. Garay
opined defendant was a Vineland member. Defendant had a
gang tattoo on his back, wrist, arm, leg, and face. Officer Garay
further opined Fonseca and Martinez were Vineland gang
members and noted Martinez had admitted his gang
membership.
Garay testified Vineland had between 300 and
450 members. Garay stated Vineland members wrote graffiti,
committed vandalism, carjacking, robberies, and attempted
murder, as well as the murder of a police officer. According to
Garay, Vineland members often used firearms in committing
these crimes. Garay also testified Vineland member Jose
Guttierez committed a carjacking in 2010. A detective testified
that Vineland member Juan Huezo committed murder in 2009.
When asked about the significance of territory to gangs,
Garay testified that gangs use territory as their place for selling
narcotics and committing other crimes. Garay testified the

5 During cross-examination, Fonseca testified he did not
see defendant dismantle the gun but was told defendant
dismantled the gun.

5
nightclub where Guerra was shot was located in territory claimed
by Vineland.
Garay further opined gang members enhance respect
within the gang by committing crimes. Gang signs and tattoos
identify a person’s gang. The question “where are you from” asks
about a person’s gang membership. Asking that question often
leads to an altercation involving firearms. Garay testified
Vineland and MS are rival gangs except inside prison where they
were aligned.
When asked a hypothetical question based on the facts of
this case, Garay opined the murder was committed for the benefit
of, or in association with, a criminal street gang. Garay also
testified the gang benefits because it continues a “pattern of fear”
instilled in the community and other gang members. Garay
testified that Vineland would “look weak” if a member would not
respond to the “where are you from” challenge after the
questioner identified himself as a rival gang member.
During cross-examination by defendant’s attorney, Garay
testified he personally investigated about 20 to 25 cases annually
involving Vineland members.
During cross-examination by Martinez’s attorney, Garay
confirmed Vineland was a large gang with about 500 members.
Garay confirmed he investigated approximately 25 crimes in the
prior year committed by Vineland gang members. Garay testified
not all these crimes involved murder; to the contrary, “[v]ery few”
cases involved murder.
During redirect, Officer Garay stated the question, “Where
are you from?” often results in gang violence, possibly murder.
During recross-examination, Martinez’s attorney asked Garay
how many murders were included in last year’s 25 cases; Garay

6
testified only an attempted murder. Garay further testified that
a fist fight is more likely the product of a “where are you from”
inquiry than a murder.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion on appeal, the court ruled
Fonseca could not testify as a gang expert. The court allowed
him to testify about the structure and role of gangs. Fonseca
testified the defendant’s chin tattoo indicates being a “frontline
soldier.” During cross-examination by Martinez’s counsel,
Fonseca also described Vineland as a large gang. During
redirect, Fonseca testified he did not want to be a “snitch”
because snitches get beaten up.

3. Closing argument
Defendant’s counsel argued the prosecution did not “meet
his burden.” Counsel questioned Guerra’s girlfriend’s eyewitness
identification. Counsel contended the gang evidence was to
“scare the crap out of everybody,” but co-counsel “did a very good
job at pointing something out. Hundreds, thousands of these hit-
ups that they call, ‘Where you from?’ ” do not result in a murder.
Defendant’s counsel emphasized Garay’s testimony that of the
25 gang cases he investigated in the last year, none was a
murder. Counsel argued the prosecution wanted to “get gang
members” and that “they’re . . . asking you to judge them because
of their characters, not because of what they did.” Counsel
argued that there was a reasonable doubt that defendant pulled
the trigger.
Among other things, the prosecutor countered: “You know,
defense counsel for Mr. Martinez brought up the fact that
Mr. Martinez has a job. And I’m sure alone, one to one,
personally, may be a very nice guy, may be a hardworking
person. You heard evidence also that Mr. Aguilera [defendant]

7
also had a job. One on one, they may be fine people. [¶] The
question is: What happens when they get together? What
happens when these Vineland gang members come together?
Something else happens. They try to out-macho each other.
They kind of feed on each other. They support each other. That’s
why you need a gang of more than one. When they get together,
they start puffing out each other’s chest. They get bigger, bigger,
bigger. They become more arrogant. They start throwing their
signs, calling out their gang. Telling the MS gang member:
Who’s this 17-year-old little kid? Get out of our territory. This is
Vineland. Where are you from? [¶] The one nice guy becomes
four thugs, four bullies. They become something else. And they
become the murderous men that you see today.”

DISCUSSION

A. The Gang Enhancements on Both Counts Must Be
Vacated Because There Was No Evidence That the
Gang Benefited From the Predicate Offenses Beyond
in Reputation or of Any Link Between the Predicate
Offenses and the Gang as an Organized Collective
Enterprise
Section 186.22 permits a gang enhancement if, among
other criteria, the prosecution proves the underlying offense was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with, a criminal street gang. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1205–1206 (Tran).) Effective January 1, 2022, the
Legislature amended section 186.22 to redefine “criminal street

8
gang”6 and a “pattern of criminal gang activity.”7 (People v.
Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749 (Clark).) One change altered
the requirements for proving a predicate offense, a prerequisite to
establishing the existence of a criminal street gang. (Id. at
p. 749.) “As amended by Assembly Bill 333,[8] section 186.22
defines the term ‘ “criminal street gang” ’ to mean ‘an ongoing,
organized association or group of three or more persons, . . .
whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a
pattern of criminal gang activity.’ (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics
added.)” (Clark, at p. 749.)

6 Section 186.22, subdivision (f) provides: “ ‘criminal street
gang’ means an ongoing, organized association or group of three
or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its
primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal
acts enumerated in subdivision (e), having a common name or
common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
gang activity.”
7 Section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1) provides in part:
“ ‘[P]attern of criminal gang activity’ means the commission of,
attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of,
sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of, two or more of the
following offenses, provided at least one of these offenses occurred
after the effective date of this chapter, and the last of those
offenses occurred within three years of the prior offense and
within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to
have been committed, the offenses were committed on separate
occasions or by two or more members, the offenses commonly
benefited a criminal street gang, and the common benefit from
the offenses is more than reputational . . . .”
8 Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) was signed
into law in 2021 (see Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3).

9
The amended statute defines the “ ‘ “pattern of criminal
gang activity,” ’ in turn, to mean, in pertinent part, the
commission of (or other specified forms of involvement in) two
offenses enumerated in the statute, ‘provided . . . [they] were
committed on separate occasions or by two or more members’ of
the gang and the offenses provided a benefit to the gang that is
more than reputational.” (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 749,
italics omitted.) The statute as revised after defendant’s trial
requires a “showing that links the two predicate offenses to the
gang as an organized collective enterprise.” (Id. at p. 761; see id.
at p. 749 [“This organizational nexus requirement is satisfied by
showing a connection between the predicate offenses and the
organizational structure, primary activities, or common goals and
principles of the gang.”].)
The amendments to the definitions in the gang
enhancement are retroactive. (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 753;
Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) The record reveals no
evidence (1) the predicate offenses—Huezo’s murder and
Gutierrez’s carjacking—benefited the gang in a manner that was
more than reputational; or (2) of any link between those offenses
and the gang as an organized collective enterprise. (Clark, at
p. 761 [“The change was made in service of the Legislature’s
broader goal of differentiating between the threat posed by
organized groups collectively engaged in criminal activity, versus
the threat posed by individual, loosely connected persons who
happen to commit crimes. That differentiation, we now conclude,
requires a showing that links the two predicate offenses to the
gang as an organized, collective enterprise.”]; see People v. E.H.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 479, 481 [reversing gang
enhancements where prosecution did not show new element that

10
predicate offenses provided more than reputational benefit to
gang].) Upon remand the People may elect to retry the gang
enhancements.9 (Clark, at pp. 764–765.)

B. Assuming Section 1109 Is Retroactive, the Alleged
Error In Failing To Bifurcate Trial of the Gang
Enhancements Was Not Prejudicial Under Either the
State or Federal Standard of Prejudice
Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial on the
murder count because the trial court jointly tried that count with
trial of the gang enhancements. Section 1109, enacted after
defendant’s trial, requires, if requested, bifurcation of trial of
gang enhancements and underlying offenses.10 (Tran, supra,

9 Because we vacate the gang enhancements, we do not
address defendant’s arguments that other prerequisites under
the amended statute were not satisfied.
10 Section 1109 provides: “(a) If requested by the defense,
a case in which a gang enhancement is charged under
subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22 shall be tried in separate
phases as follows:
“(1) The question of the defendant’s guilt of the underlying
offense shall be first determined.
“(2) If the defendant is found guilty of the underlying
offense and there is an allegation of an enhancement under
subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22, there shall be further
proceedings to the trier of fact on the question of the truth of the
enhancement. Allegations that the underlying offense was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with, a criminal street gang and that the underlying offense was
committed with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist

11
13 Cal.5th at p. 1208.) We assume for purposes of this appeal,
defendant did not forfeit this challenge notwithstanding he
did not request bifurcation of the gang enhancement at trial and
did not request it on remand from the first appeal.
We assume arguendo that section 1109 is retroactive, an
issue currently pending in the Supreme Court. (See Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1208; People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550,
review granted July 13, 2022, S274743.) Notwithstanding these
favorable assumptions, defendant has failed to show prejudice
from any error in failing to bifurcate trial of the gang
enhancements.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, failure to bifurcate trial
of a gang enhancement is not structural error. (Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1208.) As for prejudice, defendant appears to
concede some gang evidence would have been admissible even in
a bifurcated murder trial because it was probative of motive
when he argues on appeal, “[w]hile some gang evidence might be
allowed in as evidence of motive even in a bifurcated trial, it is
inconceivable that . . . anything like the evidence here would be
admitted.”
The thrust of defendant’s prejudice argument is that the
gang evidence constituted “propensity evidence that suggests to

in criminal conduct by gang members shall be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence.
“(b) If a defendant is charged with a violation of
subdivision (a) of Section 186.22, this count shall be tried
separately from all other counts that do not otherwise require
gang evidence as an element of the crime. This charge may be
tried in the same proceeding with an allegation of an
enhancement under subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22.”

12
the jury that if you are a member of a gang, you are very likely to
commit crimes like the one of which you are accused.” Defendant
cites Garay’s testimony in asserting it “suggest[ed] to the jury
that if you are a member of a gang, you are very likely to commit
crimes like the one of which you are accused.” Defendant further
argues the gang evidence allowed the prosecutor to argue
defendant and his fellow gang members “feed on each other” and
“support each other” leading them to “become the murderous men
that you see today.”
We conclude the purported error in failing to bifurcate trial
of the gang enhancements was harmless under either Chapman
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18) or Watson (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818). First, the trial court instructed the
jury: “You may not conclude from this evidence [of gang activity]
that the defendant or any defendant is a person of bad character,
that he has a disposition to commit crime.”11 The court’s
instruction, which we must presume the jury followed (People v.
Wilson (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1014), indicates the jury
could not have convicted defendant based merely on gang
membership or any propensity to commit crimes.
Second, the jury’s acquittal of co-defendant Martinez,
despite evidence that he too was a Vineland member and that his
trial included the same gang evidence, provides further support
that neither the gang evidence nor the prosecutor’s argument

11 When Officer Garay testified about the crimes, the court
told the jury: “A criminal street gang has a legal technical
definition. In order to satisfy that legal technical definition, the
prosecution gets to ask about other crimes committed allegedly
by the same gang. All right. So this is going to the legal
definition of what’s a criminal street gang.”

13
motivated the jury to convict defendant. Finally, the jury
deliberated for less than one day with respect to both defendants,
which suggests, contrary to defendant’s characterization of the
evidence, that the jury did not view the case as close. (See People
v. Houston (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 279, 300 [jury deliberations
over four days did not show case was close but instead showed
jury’s “ ‘conscientious performance of its civic duty’ ”]; compare
In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 51 [22-hour deliberation supports
inference that jury believed case was close].)

C. The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion In
Imposing the Firearm Enhancement
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion
when, on remand, the court reimposed the 50-year-to-life
sentence instead of striking or reducing the firearm enhancement
and resentencing him. Specifically, defendant contends there is a
reasonable probability the trial court would not have sentenced
him to 50 years to life if it had properly understood its discretion
under amendments to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), effective on
January 1, 2022—10 months before the hearing on defendant’s
resentencing motion. We begin with additional background and
then turn to defendant’s arguments.

1. Additional Background
Defendant filed a motion for resentencing requesting the
trial court to strike or reduce the firearm enhancement.
Defendant is correct that neither his trial counsel nor the
prosecutor referred the trial court to the new provisions in
section 1385.
In support of his motion, defendant attached Dr. Ronette
Goodwin’s April 14, 2021 report in which Goodwin described

14
defendant’s difficult upbringing. Defendant’s mother died when
he was 12 years old, and defendant described “feeling lost and
abandoned after his mother’s death.” Defendant reported that
after his mother’s death, his grades declined as did his interest in
extracurricular activities. Defendant told Goodwin he joined
Vineland at age 14, when he also dropped out of school and began
abusing cocaine and methamphetamine. Defendant reported
that before his mother’s death, his father hit him with belts and
cables, but his father stopped after defendant’s mother died.
Defendant stated he was charged with multiple crimes prior to
the current offense and served one year in state prison where he
was involved with gangs; he “ ‘wasn’t afraid of going back’ ” to
prison.
According to Goodwin, defendant told him that on the day
of the incident underlying his convictions, defendant used heroin
and felt “challenged” when the victim indicated his MS gang
membership. Defendant said he “ ‘pulled the trigger’ because he
believed that by ‘stepping up’ he could gain a respectable name.”
While in prison, defendant was not active in the gang although
he did not “drop[ ] out.” Defendant also told Goodwin that in
prison, he received his GED and had enrolled in a college
program. Goodwin opined defendant’s mother’s death “impacted
his psychological development.” Goodwin determined defendant
had a moderate to high risk for general recidivism.
A later report by an investigator described communications
with defendant’s family members. Maternal aunt reported no
abuse in defendant’s family. According to defendant’s aunt, his
mother’s death affected defendant, but defendant’s father “was
very caring and took good care of [Defendant] after” his mother’s
death. Defendant’s father reported defendant’s family was “close-

15
knit”; there was no abuse in the home. According to defendant’s
father, defendant stopped attending school when defendant
turned 16 and started working. Paternal uncle, who lived with
defendant, reported no abuse in the home and indicated
defendant had a good relationship with his father after
defendant’s mother died. Defendant’s brother also reported no
abuse in the family home.
At a hearing on November 10, 2022, the People opposed
striking the firearm enhancement. The People cited the cruel
nature of the murder, which was committed at close range on an
unarmed victim. At the hearing, defendant denied he was the
shooter, and emphasized his difficulties after his mother died.
Defendant also argued he “changed” during his incarceration.
The parties discussed when defendant would be eligible for
parole and the court noted his eligibility would be the same
regardless of whether the court struck or imposed the firearm
enhancement.
The court explained it was mindful of defendant’s mother’s
death, as well as his efforts to educate himself while incarcerated.
The court described defendant’s childhood as a “mixed bag,”
“wasn’t bad. Wasn’t good.” The court explained, “[The] bottom
line is this; . . . the crime was extremely callous.”

2. Analysis
We review the trial court’s decision not to strike or reduce
the firearm enhancement for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) Defendant argues the
trial court did not understand the boundaries of its discretion in
recent amendments to section 1385, and thus abused that
discretion when it refused to strike or reduce the 25-year firearm
enhancement. Given the centrality of these amendments to

16
defendant’s argument, we set forth below the pertinent
provisions of amended section 1385.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “Notwithstanding
any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” The statute
dictates in subsection (c)(2): “In exercising its discretion under
this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight
to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Italics added.)
The mitigating factors referenced in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) are:
“(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a
discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (a) of Section 745.
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.
In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
“(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization
or childhood trauma.

17
“(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.
“(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed
the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.
“(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that
is over five years old.
“(I) Though a firearm was used in the current offense, it
was inoperable or unloaded.” (Italics added.)
Finally, section 1385, subdivision (c )(6)(A) defines
“ ‘[c]hildhood trauma’ ” as “physical, emotional, or sexual abuse,
physical or emotional neglect” experienced by a minor. The same
subsection lists what evidence would demonstrate such trauma:
“A court may conclude that a defendant’s childhood trauma was
connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and
credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports,
preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, medical
records, or records or reports by qualified medical experts, the
court concludes that the defendant’s childhood trauma
substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the
commission of the offense.”
In his opening brief, defendant relies on the following
mitigating factors: discriminatory racial impact (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(A)), multiple enhancements (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)), and
childhood trauma (id., subd. (c)(2)(E)). In his reply brief, he
limits his argument to the childhood trauma mitigating factor.
We observe defendant provided no evidence of discriminatory
racial impact, and although the jury found true the gang and
firearm enhancements, the gang enhancement did not increase

18
defendant’s sentence and must be reversed for the reasons set
forth in the preceding section of our Discussion.
Defendant asserts, “[T]he crime was connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma— is, without question, present
in this case.” He identifies the childhood trauma as “death of his
mother, lack of education, alienation from family home, gang
ties” and his addictions to various substances. Defendant
assumes these are mitigating circumstances without identifying
evidence that the alleged “trauma[s]” constituted “physical,
emotional, or sexual abuse, physical or emotional neglect.”
Defendant fails to identify any records or reports showing abuse
or neglect that “substantially contributed to the defendant’s
involvement in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1385,
subd. (6)(A).) Defendant further ignores the trial court’s finding
that his childhood was “not good” and “not bad,” a finding
supported by evidence that notwithstanding defendant’s mother’s
death, his remaining close-knit family cared for him. He thus
fails to demonstrate the mitigating circumstance of childhood
trauma on which he relies.
We recognize our Supreme Court currently is considering
whether section 1385, subdivision (c) creates a rebuttal
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement where
mitigating circumstances exist.12 We need not consider whether

12 (See People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233,
review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v. Walker (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 386, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309.)
Walker involves the following issue: “Does the amendment to
Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c) that requires trial courts
to ‘afford great weight’ to enumerated mitigating circumstances
(Stats. 2021, ch. 721) create a rebuttable presumption in favor of
dismissing an enhancement unless the trial court finds dismissal

19
there is such a presumption because defendant has failed to
demonstrate any mitigating circumstance.13 Because defendant
identified no such circumstance, the trial court was not required
to consider whether defendant posed a danger to public safety.
Finally, defendant argues that the fact the timing of his
parole eligibility is the same regardless of whether the firearm
enhancement is stricken does not “justify” the trial court’s
decision to impose the enhancement. According to defendant,
although the enhancement may currently not affect his parole
eligibility, in the future, the Legislature could modify the Penal
Code. Defendant’s argument does not assist him because he fails
to identify a mitigating circumstance supported by evidence. For
that reason, the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing
the firearm enhancement. Put differently, there is no error
regardless of whether the firearm enhancement ultimately could
affect defendant’s parole eligibility.14

would endanger public safety?” (Supreme Ct. Mins., Mar. 22,
2023.)
13 We observe, as does defendant, that the trial court
did not analyze, or make any findings as to whether defendant
posed a danger to public safety. Any such failure does not mask
the fatal flaw in defendant’s argument, that is, he did not
demonstrate any mitigating circumstance to be evaluated against
danger to public safety.
14 Defendant contends if we conclude he forfeited his
challenges to the gang enhancements and murder conviction,
then his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. He
similarly argues that if we conclude his challenge to the trial
court’s refusal to strike or reduce the firearm enhancement is
forfeited, then he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

20
DISPOSITION
We vacate the gang enhancements attached to the murder
and felon in possession of firearm conviction. We affirm the
judgment in all other respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.

Because we have addressed these challenges on their merits, we
do not address his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

21

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