Taleb v. Thurman Interim Cal. CA2/3

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Filed 5/23/24 Taleb v. Thurman Interim Cal. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LILI TALEB et al., B320269

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV21671)
v.

THURMAN INTERIM CALIFORNIA,
LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment and postjudgment orders of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Barbara Scheper, Judge.
Affirmed.
Lili Taleb and Knarik Taleb, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Travis M. Poteat for Plaintiff and Appellant Lili Taleb.
Wilke Fleury, George A. Guthrie and Kathryne E. Baldwin
for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
Lili Taleb and her mother Knarik Taleb (collectively, the
Talebs)1 lived in an apartment in a complex owned by Thurman
Interim California, Inc. (Thurman). Based on allegations that
someone was stealing their electricity, the Talebs sued Thurman.
But when an inspection of the property revealed that nobody was
stealing electricity, the Talebs sought leave to amend their
complaint to allege that their high electricity bills were instead
due to a stray current and that their apartment was
uninhabitable due to, for example, mold and infestation. The
trial court denied leave to amend, finding that the proposed
amendment was untimely and would prejudice Thurman. The
trial court then granted summary judgment for Thurman because
the Talebs failed to submit a timely separate statement. On
appeal, the Talebs make numerous contentions: the trial court
abused its discretion by denying them leave to amend the
complaint, erred in granting summary judgment, improperly
sanctioned them, and should have disqualified itself. We reject
all contentions.2

1
We sometimes refer to plaintiffs by their first names to
avoid confusion.

2
The Talebs have filed motions on appeal, all of which we
deny as follows.
On November 14, 2022, the Talebs filed a motion for
reconsideration of this court’s November 9, 2022 order denying
them leave to file an amended civil case information statement.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
On January 31, 2024, the Talebs filed a motion to augment
the record and request for judicial notice. Because the motion
requests augmentation and judicial notice of matters not before
the trial court, we deny the motion. The same day the Talebs
filed that motion, they attempted to file a motion to augment the

2
BACKGROUND
I. The first lawsuit, Taleb I
The Talebs moved into an apartment at Wyvernwood
Gardens in 2015. Lili complained that her electricity bill was
abnormally high, and on July 10, 2017, Thurman sent an
electrician who found two cables attached to the Talebs’ electric
meter that did not feed into their apartment. Three days later,
the electrician returned but refused to investigate further
because Lili was recording the events. That very day, Lili, self-
represented, sued the property management company, FPI
Management, Inc., for “overcharged electrical bills.” (Taleb v.
Wyvernwood Garden Apartments/FPI Management Residential
Property Management (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, 2017,
No. BC668258) (Taleb I).) The complaint did not allege a cause of
action but instead was a handwritten paragraph alleging that an
electrician discovered “unknown cables” that did not belong to
Lili’s apartment, and that the apartment had a damaged wood
floor and was infested.3

record with a 23rd volume of the appellant’s appendix. We
received the motion but did not file it. Because the proposed
appellant’s appendix contains matters not before the trial court,
we do not file or consider it.
On February 2, 2024, the Talebs filed a motion to file a
corrected reply brief. The motion is denied.
3
The trial court struck two subsequent pleadings Lili filed:
a first amended complaint that alleged the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (DWP) overcharged her, and a
second amended complaint for overcharges to her electrical bill
and damages for an uninhabitable unit.

3
Just weeks before trial was scheduled to begin in June
2019, the trial court heard Lili’s motion to delay trial and to
reopen discovery. Lili argued that as a self-represented litigant,
she had difficulty participating in discovery, and service on
defendant had been delayed. The trial court denied the motion,
and that same day, Lili dismissed Taleb I without prejudice.
II. The second action, Taleb II
A week after dismissing Taleb I, the Talebs filed the
present action in July 2019 against Thurman, FPI Management,
Inc., the DWP, and Marcelo Gigena and Rosie Casas, both of
whom worked at the apartment complex. (Taleb v. Thurman
Interim California, LLC, et al. (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County,
2019, No. 19STCV21671 (Taleb II).) The complaint generally
alleged a neighbor was “ ‘bootlegging’ ” electricity from the
Talebs’ meter, and it stated causes of action for breach of lease,
specific performance,4 and conversion. The Talebs subsequently
amended their complaint in November 2019, misnaming the
amended pleading the “second” (rather than the first) amended
complaint. That pleading alleged the same causes of action as
the original complaint and continued to allege that neighbors
were bootlegging the Talebs’ “power feed.”
Pursuant to a demurrer, the trial court dismissed with
prejudice the conversion cause of action, thereby also dismissing
FPI Management, Gigena, and Casas, as they were named only
in that cause of action.
III. The Talebs move to amend the complaint

4
The complaint alleged two causes of action for specific
performance, one against Thurman and a second against DWP.

4
The parties formally inspected the property in
November 2020, and a supplemental inspection occurred on
January 14, 2021. The Talebs then designated their expert
witnesses, both of whom testified at deposition that neighbors
were not stealing the Talebs’ electricity. Lili also testified at her
deposition that she no longer believed her electricity was being
stolen.
On February 5, 2021, the Talebs moved for leave to file a
“third” amended complaint to add a negligence cause of action
against Thurman and previously-dismissed FPI Management,
and to reallege the previously dismissed conversion cause of
action against FPI Management, Gigena, and Casas. The
proposed pleading alleged that although the Talebs had initially
suspected a neighbor was bootlegging their power, they had
“since changed their position based on new information
discovered on January 14, 2021” at the site inspection; that is,
“[e]lectrical leakage” and degraded wiring were discovered. The
proposed negligence cause of action further alleged that Thurman
and its management company owed the Talebs a duty to provide
habitable living conditions and to avoid “continuing electrical
leakage or old and degraded wiring,” and breached their duties
by failing to thoroughly inspect the electrical system and to
provide habitable housing free from cockroaches, mold, mice,
blood, and holes in the floor.
In their motion, the Talebs said they were raising the
negligence cause of action to trigger their insurance policy. Their
new counsel, Michael Long, supported the motion with his
declaration, stating he could not file the motion sooner because
he had just substituted in on January 4, 2021, defense counsel

5
had refused to “grant extensions early on,” and he had a heavy
calendar.5
Thurman opposed the motion, arguing that the Talebs had
pursued the bootlegging theory for four years (since filing
Taleb I), they were attempting to reallege the dismissed
conversion cause of action and to bring back in previously
dismissed defendants, the amendment was untimely, and the
proposed negligence cause of action was time-barred. Also, the
Talebs had admitted in discovery that they were not making
habitability claims, including ones based on flooring or
infestation.
On March 3, 2021, the trial court heard and denied the
motion. The trial court noted it had sustained a demurrer
without leave to amend the conversion cause of action, and the
Talebs were trying to circumvent that ruling by realleging
conversion and bringing back in the dismissed defendants. The
Talebs also cited no authority for their position that a desire to
involve their insurance company was a ground to amend the
complaint. More importantly, the Talebs had failed to explain
when the facts giving rise to the amendment were discovered or
why the amendment was not proposed earlier. Despite referring
to the inspection on January 14, 2021, it was unclear how that
inspection related to the “supposed uninhabitable conditions
upon which their negligence claim” was based. The trial court

5
The Talebs represented themselves until October 2019
when an attorney substituted in on a limited basis. In March
2020, Stanley Wade substituted in as counsel for the Talebs.
Long then substituted in as counsel on January 4, 2021. He
substituted out of the case in December 2021.

6
observed that the Talebs had said in discovery that they were not
making habitability, bodily injury, or property claims, apart from
conversion of their electricity. Long’s explanations did not
provide valid excuses for the delay. The evidence showed that
the Talebs had known about the facts underlying their case for
six years, as early as 2015, and could have raised them in Taleb I.
Finally, the trial court found that amendment “at this late date”
would prejudice defendants, as FPI Management had already
been dismissed from the action.
IV. Thurman moves for summary judgment
In August 2021, Thurman moved for summary judgment
or, alternatively, for summary adjudication, of the two causes of
action alleged against it: breach of lease and specific
performance.6 Both causes of action were based on the alleged
theft of electricity from the Talebs. To support its motion,
Thurman submitted Lili’s January 2021 deposition testimony
admitting she did not “think that anyone is stealing electricity”;
Knarik’s February 2021 deposition at which her counsel
stipulated that nobody was stealing electricity from her
apartment; and the deposition testimony of the Talebs’ two
experts, both of whom had ruled out electricity theft as a cause of
any high bills. Thurman argued that these admissions precluded
the Talebs from establishing that Thurman breached the lease by
failing to keep the electrical meter box secure from tampering,
that Thurman caused the Talebs any harm, or that the Talebs
were entitled to specific performance, which, in any event, was a
remedy and not a cause of action.

6
The other remaining defendant, DWP, separately moved for
summary judgment.

7
The Talebs did not submit a timely memorandum of points
and authorities or separate statement of disputed material facts
in opposition. Instead, they submitted counsel Long’s declaration
asserting that Thurman’s requested relief was “moot to the
extent” the Talebs had already stipulated no theft occurred. At
the same time, the Talebs submitted a request to dismiss
Thurman without prejudice7 and yet filed a third lawsuit naming
Thurman and FPI Management as defendants.8 Also, the day
before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the
Talebs moved ex parte for leave to file an opposition and
withdrew Long’s declaration.
On November 24, 2021, the trial court ruled on three
matters: (1) whether to dismiss Thurman, (2) the Talebs’ ex
parte application for leave to file opposing papers, and
(3) Thurman’s motion for summary judgment. First, the trial
court rejected the Talebs’ voluntary dismissal of Thurman,
finding it to be an improper litigation tactic. Second, the trial
court found that the Talebs had not shown good cause to file late
opposition papers, noting that the Talebs were taking
contradictory positions: the summary judgment motion was moot
and they should be allowed leave to file opposing papers. Finally,
the trial court exercised its discretion under Code of Civil

7
Via an ex parte application, Thurman opposed the
dismissal on the ground its summary judgment was pending.

8
The trial court ordered the Talebs to file a notice of related
case and later deemed the new action related to this one.

8
Procedure9 section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), to grant Thurman’s
unopposed motion for summary judgment.
V. Thurman moves for sanctions against the Talebs and their
counsel
After obtaining summary judgment, Thurman moved for
sanctions against the Talebs and Long in the amount of
$150,061.50 under section 128.5. In its motion, Thurman argued
that the Talebs lacked a factual basis to initiate litigation, as Lili
filed Taleb I just weeks after complaining to property
management about her high electrical bills. Then, about a year
and half after filing Taleb II, the Talebs tried to change their
theory of the case after the January 14, 2021 inspection but did
not dismiss their complaint when the trial court denied leave to
amend, thereby forcing Thurman to file its motion for summary
judgment. Only after Thurman filed that motion did the Talebs
improperly seek to dismiss the action and to file a third action
against Thurman.
Thurman also based its request for sanctions on the Talebs’
“unprofessional and insulting” conduct throughout the litigation,
which included disparaging defense counsel for where she went to
law school, Knarik raising her voice in a threatening manner to
counsel, Lili’s threats to file criminal charges against counsel,
discovery abuses, Knarik watching television while being deposed
remotely, and Knarik intimidating the interpreter during
deposition. Thurman also submitted statements Lili made in an
October 2019 declaration instructing Thurman’s counsel to drop
objections to discovery and to consider asking a criminal defense

9
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

9
attorney “what an aggressive prosecutor might do, armed with
information that a party hindered the ability of a victim of a
property crime to prove the cause of a theft, and the identity of
the perpetrators. I know what would have happened in the
former Soviet Union, and what does still happen in present-day
Russia.” She made further statements in that declaration
denigrating people of various backgrounds as “ ‘culturally
inferior’ ” and “less intelligent.”
In opposition to the motion, the Talebs argued that they did
not act in bad faith and Thurman failed to comply with
section 128.5’s safe harbor provision. The Talebs argued that
from the time they moved into the apartment, the DWP had been
overcharging for electricity. In July 2017, an electrician
confirmed that there were strange wires coming out of their
meter, and this supported Lili’s initial belief that someone was
stealing her electricity. When the January 2021 inspection
revealed that there was a stray current, the Talebs moved to
amend their complaint. Thus, at all times, the Talebs acted in
good faith, with a basis for their claims.
On February 10, 2022, the trial court granted the motion
for sanctions, detailing its reasons in a six-page minute order.
After describing the action’s procedural history, the trial court
first found that section 128.5’s safe harbor provision did not apply
because Thurman sought sanctions for the Talebs’ bad faith
conduct occurring over three-and-a-half years and not for filing
any pleading. Second, the trial court found that sanctions were
warranted, but only for a portion of the action. Because the
Talebs’ electrical box had unusual wiring, their initial suspicions
of theft were not “wholly frivolous.” But once they learned on

10
January 14, 2021 that no theft had occurred, any reasonable
attorney would agree that the Talebs’ claim was without merit.
The trial court noted that the Talebs did try to change the
theory of the case by moving to amend the complaint. However,
after the trial court denied that motion on March 3, 2021, the
Talebs “did nothing.” As of March 3, 2021, the Talebs knew their
“existing claim was without merit, yet they continued with the
case.” Further, following the inspection and the investigations of
their experts, the Talebs delayed dismissing the action, waiting
until after Thurman moved for summary judgment to seek
dismissal. The history of the case therefore demonstrated that
the Talebs or their counsel engaged in “a scorched earth litigation
campaign that frequently included personal insults, as well as
threats of further litigation and/or criminal prosecution. . . . .
And clearly [the Talebs] are not finished with Defendants[,]
having filed yet a third action against them. The series of
lawsuits, the abject failure to conduct any investigation into their
theory of electricity theft until over three years after they first
sued [Thurman], the failure to dismiss [Thurman] at any time
before [Thurman] filed its motion for summary judgment, [the
Talebs’] assertion that the motion was moot and subsequent
reversal all combine to satisfy the Court that” the Talebs and
counsel Long acted in bad faith.
Accordingly, the trial court granted sanctions against the
Talebs and Long, jointly and severally, in the amount of $36,444,
which represented the fees Thurman incurred after March 3,
2021.
VI. The Talebs seek to disqualify Judge Scheper
On March 15, 2022, the Talebs and their former counsel
Long each filed a statement to disqualify Judge Scheper under

11
section 170.3, citing as evidence of the judge’s alleged bias the
history of the case and the judge’s rulings. On March 17, 2022,
Judge Scheper issued an order striking the statements of
disqualification. (§ 170.4, subd. (b).)
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
The Talebs purport to appeal from four matters: (1) the
order denying them leave to amend the complaint, (2) the order
granting Thurman summary judgment, (3) the section 128.5
sanctions order, and (4) the disqualification order. Although
neither party raised any appealability issue, we have a duty to
consider it in every case. (Winger v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d
679, 682.)
Relevant to the first and second matters,10 the trial court
issued judgment in Thurman’s favor on April 27, 2022. On May
2, 2022, the Talebs filed notices of appeal purporting to appeal
from a judgment entered January 6, 2022. January 6, 2022,
however, is merely the date the trial court issued its order
granting summary judgment. An order granting summary
judgment is not an appealable order. (Champlin/GEI Wind
Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 223.) Rather,
appeal must be taken from the judgment. Therefore, the Talebs’
notices of appeal do not correctly identify the appealable
judgment and instead identify the nonappealable order.

10
An appeal from an order denying leave to amend the
complaint is encompassed in an appeal from the judgment.
(§ 906; Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College
District (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 852.)

12
Even so, we generally “must liberally construe a notice of
appeal in favor of its sufficiency. [Citation.] A notice of appeal
shall be ‘ “liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if
it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal
from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been
misled or prejudiced.” ’ ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70,
75.) It is reasonably clear that the Talebs were appealing the
judgment entered after the trial court granted Thurman’s
summary judgment motion. (Wilkin v. Community Hospital of
Monterey Peninsula (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 806, 820 [appeal from
summary judgment order construed to be from judgment];
Mukthar v. Latin American Security Service (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 284, 288 [same]; see Yolo County Dept. of Child
Support Services v. Lowery (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1246
[notice of appeal misidentifying date judgment entered liberally
construed].) Thurman was not misled or prejudiced by the error
in the notice of appeal, because Thurman has never raised any
appealability issue, and it has defended the judgment in its
respondent’s brief. Accordingly, we liberally construe the notice
of appeal to be from the judgment entered on April 27, 2022.
As to the third matter on appeal, on April 8, 2022, the
Talebs filed timely notices of appeal from the February 10, 2022
sanctions order. (See generally § 904.1, subd. (a)(12) [sanctions
order over $5,000 is separately appealable].)
Finally, Judge Scheper’s March 17, 2022 order striking the
Talebs’ statement of disqualification is not appealable. (§ 170.3,
subd. (d).) Review may only be obtained by seeking a writ of
mandate in the appellate court within 10 days of service of notice
of entry of the decision, with an additional five days for service by

13
mail.11 (Ibid.) As the order is not appealable, this issue is not
properly before us.
II. Denial of leave to amend complaint
The Talebs contend that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying their motion for leave to amend the
complaint. As we now explain, we disagree.
We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend a
complaint for abuse of discretion. (Foroudi v. Aerospace Corp.
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1000.) Although such motions are
generally liberally granted and may even be made during trial,
leave to amend should be denied where amendment would be
futile or where allowing amendment would prejudice the
opposing party. (Id. at pp. 1000–1001; Melican v. Regents of
University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 175
(Melican).) A trial court may also consider unwarranted delay in
seeking leave to amend, and a reviewing court is less likely to
find an abuse of discretion where the amendment is offered after
a long, unexplained delay or an absence of diligence. (Falcon v.
Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.)
Here, the Talebs characterize their proposed amendment as
primarily seeking to change their general theory from theft of
electricity to a stray current theory. That is not a complete
picture of what they sought to do. They also sought to reallege
the dismissed conversion cause of action, which was a blatant
violation of the trial court’s dismissal order. And their new
negligence cause of action alleged that Thurman and previously
dismissed FPI Management breached a duty of care to provide

11
Judge Scheper’s order advised the Talebs that review had
to be sought via a writ of mandate.

14
safe electrical wiring and habitable housing free of mold, holes in
the floor, and infestation. The proposed cause of action therefore
did two essential things: (1) it added a claim of habitability that
the Talebs had not previously pursued and had expressly
disavowed in discovery responses, and (2) it changed the
electrical theory from theft to bad wiring.
As to the first claim, this litigation began in 2017, when Lili
filed Taleb I. Although that complaint referred to a damaged
floor and infestation in the apartment, Lili dismissed that action
without prejudice in June 2019 when the trial court refused her
request to continue the discovery deadline. When the Talebs filed
Taleb II just weeks later, they did not reallege that the
apartment was uninhabitable, alleging only that neighbors were
stealing their electricity. Significantly, in discovery responses
dated September 2019, the Talebs represented they were not
pursuing any claim or damages based on habitability related to
conditions in their apartment. The litigation therefore proceeded
for years on the understanding that habitability claims were not
at issue. As to the second claim, since filing Taleb I in 2017, the
Talebs had pursed a theory that neighbors were stealing or
bootlegging their electricity. The amendment sought to change
that theft theory to a stray-current theory.
Where a new cause of action would change “the tenor and
complexity of the complaint from its original focus” and would
require, for example, additional discovery and a continuance of
trial, denying leave to amend cannot be an abuse of discretion.
(Magpali v. Farmers Group (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.)
Here, allowing the amendment would have prejudiced Thurman
by requiring additional discovery to allow it and the newly added
defendant FPI Management to gather evidence, particularly

15
regarding the new habitability theory. This in turn would have
necessitated pushing back trial in litigation that had been
ongoing since 2017. Given this, the amendment would have
prejudiced Thurman. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 487–488 [leave to
amend complaint appropriately denied where defendant would
have to marshal evidence to counter new allegations].)
The Talebs counter that Thurman was not prejudiced
because a trial date had not been set. That is not wholly
accurate. Trial had been scheduled for March 1, 2021. But in
January 2021, the parties agreed to vacate the trial date and to
set a trial setting conference for March 3, 2021, the same day the
motion for leave to amend the complaint was to be heard.
Therefore, when the Talebs’ motion for leave to amend the
complaint was heard, a trial date had been set but vacated, and
the trial court was going to set a new trial date. Also, although
Taleb II had been pending for about a year and a half, litigation
on this matter had been pending for almost four years, since
Taleb I was filed in July 2017. Thus, the matter had been
ongoing for over five years.
Moreover, the Talebs failed to offer a valid explanation for
the delay in seeking amendment in 2021 for a habitability claim
they had known about for four years, since 2017, when Lili filed
Taleb I. (See, e.g., Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 176
[plaintiff’s five-year delay was “clearly unreasonable”].) Instead,
they claim their delay was due to excusable neglect. (See § 473,
subd. (a)(1) [court has discretion to allow amendment to any
pleading].) The Talebs base their claim of excusable neglect
primarily on their self-represented status from the filing of
Taleb I to March 2020, when Stanley Wade substituted in as
counsel. However, their pro per status did not constitute

16
excusable neglect for any failure to conduct discovery or
otherwise to litigate their case. Rather, self-represented litigants
are held to the same standard of care as attorneys. (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985.)
The other reasons their counsel gave for the delay in
seeking amendment neither demonstrated excusable neglect nor
were reasonable. Counsel merely noted he had just substituted
in on January 4, 2021 and had a heavy calendar. But the Talebs
cite no authority for the proposition that a late substitution or
heavy calendar are valid grounds to permit amendment under
those circumstances, and the trial court clearly acted within its
discretion to disregard these excuses.
To the extent the Talebs suggest they could not have moved
to amend their complaint until after the January 14, 2021
inspection revealed their electricity was not being stolen, we
disagree. The inspection was irrelevant to the habitability claims
based on damaged floors, mold, and infestation. As to the
inspection revealing the new stray current theory, the Talebs did
not explain to the trial court why the inspections did not occur
until November 2020 and January 2021. Instead, in their moving
papers below, the Talebs vaguely alluded to discovery issues
which they claimed inhibited discovery, but they did not explain
how Thurman prohibited them from doing the inspection earlier
or conducting other discovery that might have shown that
neighbors were not stealing electricity. Similarly, on appeal, the
Talebs vaguely say in their opening brief that they were at the
mercy of Thurman and other defendants in scheduling and that
defendants obstructed discovery of the stray current issue, but
they fail to offer details until their reply brief. Because this
argument was not fully presented until the reply brief, Thurman

17
did not have a fair opportunity to respond. (See, e.g., Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 592 [tardy arguments
made in reply are forfeited because appellants must give other
side fair notice and opportunity to respond].) More importantly,
the Talebs did not argue in the trial court that Thurman
improperly prevented the inspection. The failure to raise this
issue adequately in the trial court also constitutes a forfeiture on
appeal. (K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology &
Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 949–950; see, e.g.,
Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Santa Cruz
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 985, 1008.)
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint because the
Talebs failed to give a valid excuse for the delay in alleging the
negligence cause of action, allowing the amendment would have
brought back in a previously-dismissed conversion cause of action
and FP Management, and the amendment would have prejudiced
Thurman.
III. Grant of summary judgment
The Talebs next contend that the trial court erred by
granting Thurman’s motion for summary judgment. We
disagree.
Summary judgment is designed to cut through the parties’
pleadings to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is
necessary to resolve the dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) The moving party bears the
burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(§ 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar, at p. 850.) A moving defendant must
show that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of

18
the cause of action. (Aguilar, at p. 853.) A defendant meets its
burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an
essential element of a plaintiff’s claim. (Guz v. Bechtel National,
Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) If the moving defendant meets
its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing plaintiff to raise a
triable issue of material fact. The opposition shall include a
separate statement that responds to each material fact the
moving party contends is undisputed and cites supporting
evidence. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(3).) “Failure to comply with this
requirement of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient
ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the motion.” (Ibid.)
We review the record de novo and independently determine
whether triable issues of material fact exist. (Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767; Guz v. Bechtel
National, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 334.) “In performing an
independent review of the granting of summary judgment, we
conduct the same procedure employed by the trial court. We
examine (1) the pleadings to determine the elements of the claim,
(2) the motion to determine if it establishes facts justifying
judgment in the moving party’s favor, and (3) the opposition—
assuming movant has met its initial burden—to ‘decide whether
the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable,
material fact issue.’ ” (Oakland Raiders v. National Football
League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) However, we review a
ruling granting summary judgment based on failure to comply
with the separate statement requirement of section 437c,
subdivision (b)(3), for abuse of discretion, even though the moving
party still must meet its initial moving burden. (Rush v. White
Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1097.)

19
Here, Thurman met its initial burden of producing evidence
showing that there was no material issue of fact that the Talebs’
neighbors were not stealing or bootlegging the Talebs’ electricity,
which was the sole theory underlying the breach of lease and
specific performance causes of action. Thurman submitted Lili’s
January 2021 deposition testimony admitting that she did not
“think anyone is stealing electricity,” Knarik’s February 2021
deposition at which her counsel stipulated that nobody was
stealing electricity from her apartment, and the deposition
testimony of the Talebs’ two experts stating they had ruled out
electricity theft from the Talebs as a cause of their high bills.
This evidence shifted the burden of producing evidence sufficient
to create a disputed material fact to the Talebs.12
The Talebs, however, did not file a timely opposing
separate statement or memorandum of points and authorities.
Instead, they filed their counsel’s declaration conceding that “the
requested relief is moot to the extent” the Talebs had already
stipulated “that no theft occurred.” Although the Talebs later
withdrew this declaration, it nonetheless was a concession the
motion was meritorious. The trial court, after denying the Talebs
leave to file a late separate statement, exercised its discretion
under section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), and appropriately granted
the motion.
In their opening brief on appeal, the Talebs do not directly
address the trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 437c,
subdivision (b)(3). But in their reply brief on appeal, the Talebs
state that the trial court “instructed” or “invited” them to file an

12
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the
Talebs’ counsel again conceded that third-party theft of electricity
was moot but argued that other issues remained.

20
opposition and separate statement, implying that the trial court
allowed the untimely opposing papers to be filed and considered
them. This is wrong. The trial court expressly found “no basis”
or good cause to allow the late briefing. Therefore, Thurman’s
motion was unopposed, except by Long’s declaration conceding its
merit.
Otherwise, the Talebs appear to make two arguments why
the motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
First, they argue that they submitted evidence from their experts
supporting the stray current theory and showing they had
“electrical damages.” However, that evidence was in the
untimely opposing papers which the trial court denied leave to
file. Moreover, the evidence went to a theory not at issue because
the trial court had denied leave to file the amended complaint.
(See generally Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health
Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 74 [pleading determines the
scope of summary judgment]; Hutton v. Fidelity National Title
Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 [moving party need not
refute liability on theories not included in pleadings].)
Second, the Talebs argue that the trial court improperly
rejected their attempt to dismiss Thurman without prejudice,
which would have rendered Thurman’s motion for summary
judgment moot. Although a plaintiff generally has the right to
dismiss a defendant or an action without prejudice before trial
commences (§ 581, subds. (b), (c)), there are exceptions to the
general right to dismiss. (Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 538, 542.) One exception is where the action has
reached a determinative adjudication by way of a summary
judgment motion. (Id. at p. 543; see, e.g., Mary Morgan, Inc. v.

21
Melzark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 765, 770–771 [dismissal properly
rejected where summary judgment motions were pending].)
Cravens v. State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
253 applied that exception. In that case, the plaintiff did not
oppose the defendant’s summary judgment motion and instead
filed a request for dismissal without prejudice the day before the
hearing on the motion. Unaware of the dismissal, the defendant
appeared at the hearing, where the trial court exercised its
discretion under section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), and granted the
motion. Cravens, at page 257, affirmed the judgment, stating
that the plaintiff could not avoid judgment “by the stratagem of
filing a last minute request for dismissal without prejudice.”
Similarly here, the record shows that the Talebs tried to
avoid the consequences of a concededly meritorious summary
judgment motion by filing a dismissal without prejudice. This
was an improper attempt to avoid the consequences of summary
judgment and, accordingly, the trial court properly rejected the
dismissal. There being no triable issue of material fact, the trial
court properly granted summary judgment in Thurman’s favor.
IV. Sanctions
Next, the Talebs contend that the trial court’s sanctions
order issued under section 128.5 must be reversed. We conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning the
Talebs under section 128.5.
Section 128.5, subdivision (a), allows a trial court to order a
party, the party’s attorney, or both to pay the other party’s
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result
of “actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or
solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” “ ‘Actions or
tactics’ ” include making or opposing motions and filing

22
pleadings. (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(1).) “ ‘Frivolous’ means totally and
completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an
opposing party.” (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2).) The party moving for
sanctions must meet its burden of proving that the opposing
party’s action or tactic was (1) totally and completely without
merit, measured by an objective, reasonable attorney standard,
or (2) motivated solely by an intention to harass or cause
unnecessary delay, measured by a subjective standard. (Wallis v.
PHL Associates, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 882, 893.) Whether
sanctions are warranted depends on evaluating all the
circumstances surrounding the questioned action. (Ibid.)
We review section 128.5 sanctions orders for an abuse of
discretion. (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
1205, 1225.) “Accordingly, we will overturn such an order only if,
considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its
support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no
judge could reasonably make the order. [Citations.] ‘We review
any findings of fact that formed the basis for the award of
sanctions under a substantial evidence standard of review.’ ” (Id.
at pp. 1225–1226.)
Here, the trial court did not sanction the Talebs for filing
the complaint or for any specific pleading or motion. It instead
found that as of March 3, 2021, when the trial court denied leave
to amend the complaint, the Talebs pursued a frivolous action,
forcing Thurman to file a motion for summary judgment. The
trial court further based sanctions on the Talebs’ bad faith
litigation conduct, as exemplified in Knarik’s behavior during her
deposition, Lili’s threats and inappropriate comments in her
declaration, and the Talebs’ attempts to dismiss Thurman to
avoid an adverse ruling on the summary judgment motion.

23
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion, the
Talebs do not directly address the trial court’s reasons for
sanctioning them. They instead appear to make two arguments.
First, they argue that Thurman failed to comply with
section 128.5’s safe harbor provision. The provision states: “If
the alleged action or tactic is the making or opposing of a written
motion or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint,
answer, or other responsive pleading that can be withdrawn or
appropriately corrected, a notice of motion shall be served as
provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented
to the court, unless 21 days after service of the motion or any
other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged action or
tactic is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” (§ 128.5,
subd. (f)(1)(B).) On its face, the safe harbor provision applies
where sanctions are sought for frivolous pleadings that could be
withdrawn or corrected. It does not apply where, as here, a court
awards sanctions for past bad faith conduct and tactics. (See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 124, 147 [safe harbor provision inapplicable where
sanctions based on appellant’s misrepresentation to court and
delay in seeking trial continuance].)
Second, the Talebs repeat their argument that they
brought the action in good faith, based on the electrician’s
July 2017 report that stray wires were coming out of their meter,
and they properly sought leave to amend when they discovered at
the January 2021 inspection that neighbors were not bootlegging

24
their electricity.13 However, this was not the conduct the trial
court found sanctionable. Rather, the trial court agreed that the
Talebs initially had cause to believe their electricity was being
stolen based on the stray wires and acknowledged that they
moved to amend their complaint to allege the new stray current
theory after discovering that electricity was not being stolen.
This is why the trial court sanctioned the Talebs and their
counsel only for conduct after March 3, 2021, the day the court
denied leave to amend. At that point, the Talebs had no viable
theory that Thurman was breaching the lease by allowing
neighbors to steal their electricity. (See, e.g., West Coast
Development v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 704 [once
“substance of litigation became insubstantial in the extreme,” no
reasonable attorney would continue claim].) Nonetheless, the
Talebs did not take any action until months later, when Thurman
had already incurred the expense of filing its motion for summary
judgment. The trial court was within its discretion to find that
waiting to file the dismissal request until just before Thurman’s
motion for summary judgment was to be heard was a tactic solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay. (§ 128.5, subd. (a).)
The Talebs ignore the other basis for the trial court’s order,
that the Talebs’ litigation campaign included personal insults
and threats of criminal prosecution. Such conduct is clearly
abusive and done in bad faith. (See, e.g., California Casualty
Management Co. v. Martocchio (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1537
[threatening to kill witness was sanctionable, bad faith conduct];

13
The Talebs also appear to argue that the trial court found
their motions to compel were sanctionable. The trial court made
no such finding in its section 128.5 sanctions order.

25
Dwyer v. Crocker National Bank (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1418,
1435 [sanctions based partly on counsel’s use of “inflammatory,
vulgar and racist testimony through trial witnesses”].)
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by sanctioning the Talebs.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and postjudgment orders are affirmed.
Thurman Interim California, LLC is awarded its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.

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