CourtListener 9506697•Dilonell v. Chandler CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/23/24 Dilonell v. Chandler CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
FRIDA DILONELL, B329945
Plaintiff and Respondent (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC677717)
v.
SUZANNE CHANDLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Plotkin, Marutani & Kaufman and Jay J. Plotkin for
Defendant and Appellant.
Peter D. Gordon & Associates and Andrew T. Schoettle for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
This is the second appeal from an action originally begun in
2017 by plaintiff Alice Jackson, who sought partition by sale of a
five-unit residential rental property in Inglewood in which she
owned a 50 percent interest.1 Defendant Suzanne Chandler
owned the other 50 percent interest. In 2018, Jackson
transferred her interest in the property to Frida Dilonell, who
continued to pursue the partition action.
In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
the highest valid offer at the end of the court-ordered listing
period was from a third party, not Dilonell. (Dilonell v. Chandler
(Mar. 23, 2022, B310695) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the third
party cancelled escrow. Following a new listing period, the trial
court found Dilonell made the highest valid offer and ordered
Chandler to sign Dilonell’s purchase agreement and complete the
sale.
Chandler appeals from that order, contending the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering her to sell her interest in
the property to Dilonell, because Dilonell’s purchase offer was not
in compliance with the trial court’s October 2, 2019, order and the
trial court lacked authority to modify that order. We affirm the
trial court’s order.
1 The appeals in this matter were preceded by a contract
dispute between the parties, affirmed by our colleagues in
Division Two (Dilonell v. Chandler (Oct. 24, 2018, B282634)
[nonpub. opn.]), and paralleled by a probate action now itself on
appeal in case No. B330813. Both cases involve disputes about
the ownership of the property.
2
BACKGROUND
In June 2018, after Dilonell substituted in as plaintiff, she
obtained an appraisal of the property at $960,000 and sought to
buy Chandler’s interest at the appraised value. Chandler
brought two motions to have a partition referee appointed to list
and sell the property. Chandler was concerned that a sale price
based on an appraisal alone would not reflect the property’s true
value, which she believed to be about $1.5 million.
As relevant to this appeal, Judge Richard Burdge, Jr.,
sitting in Department 37, denied the motion for a partition
referee and on October 2, 2019, issued the first order directing
the sale of the property and specifying procedures for the sale.
The order directed the parties to select a neutral third party
broker and provided that the listing price would be determined
by that broker. The order specified that “[a]ny written offer for
less than the listing price shall require the written acceptance of
both parties.” The listing period was 90 days, but paragraph 9 of
the order provided that if no offer at the listing price was received
in the first two weeks of the listing, “either party can purchase
the property at the listing price without any right of first offer or
right of first refusal. If one of the parties is the successful
purchaser, then that person need only close the escrow with one
half of the agreed to sales price but all other expenses of the sale
shall be paid equally by the parties.” The trial court directed the
parties to return to court if escrow had not closed in 90 days, for
“purposes of the Court considering and making further orders in
respect to the sale of the Property.”
The broker listed the property for $1.5 million. After an
extended six-month listing period, the highest third party offer
was $1 million. On August 6, 2020, the court ordered the listing
3
period extended again, until January 1, 2021, at the lower price
of $1.295 million. The court’s order also provided: “After January
1, 2021, the highest outstanding valid offer shall be accepted.”
As set forth in more detail in our prior opinion, in January
2021, the trial court determined that the highest valid offer was a
third party offer from Abdul Sherriff (the Sherriff offer) for
$1.050 million. The trial court found Dilonell’s offer to be lower
due to the form of her offer.2 The court ordered the parties to
accept the Sherriff offer. Dilonell appealed. We affirmed the
trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
When the case was returned to the trial court, Judge
Burdge had moved to another courtroom and Judge Killefer had
been assigned to Department 37.
The parties signed the purchase agreement and opened
escrow with Sherriff, but he cancelled the escrow apparently due
to a then-pending probate action which challenged Dilonell’s
interest in the property. Dilonell represented to the trial court
that she offered to buy the property for the same amount as
Sherriff, but Chandler rejected this offer.
At a September 13, 2022, hearing, Judge Killefer directed
the parties to follow the October 2, 2019, order, but added the
condition that the parties could not select the same broker as
before. The parties agreed to a neutral listing broker, who
ultimately agreed that the listing price would be $1.125 million.
The parties subsequently stipulated that the listing broker would
2 Briefly, the offer was from “Frida Dilonell on behalf of The
Wood Property LLC” in the amount of $527,500 and read,
intentionally or not, as an offer for the whole property.
4
have 60 days to market the property before either party could
purchase the property by making a full price offer.
The highest offer received during the initial 60-day
marketing period was $1,102,500. Although the listing broker
repeatedly urged Chandler to accept the offer, she refused. The
offer was withdrawn.
After the 60-day marketing period expired but before the
90-day listing period ended, Dilonell offered to buy Chandler’s
interest in the property for a price of $1.005 million for the whole
property. (Chandler would receive half that amount for her 50
percent share.) The offer stated that escrow would close upon
deposit of half the purchase price ($502,500) plus $16,000 due
under a separate settlement agreement, for a total deposit of
$518,500.
By the end of the listing period, there was only one third
party offer, for a firm $1 million. The listing broker suggested
that the price be reduced to $1.1 million and the property
continue to be marketed. Chandler stated she did not want to
reduce the listing price.
In her statement for the February 16, 2023, status
conference, Chandler asked the trial court to continue the matter
to allow the probate trial to conclude. In her statement, Dilonell
asked the trial court to deem her offer of $1.005 million the
highest offer and to order Chandler to sign Dilonell’s purchase
agreement and complete the sale.
The court continued the status conference to April 5, 2023,
to allow the probate trial to conclude. At the same time, the court
issued a tentative ruling granting Dilonell’s request that
Chandler be ordered to execute Dilonell’s purchase agreement
and complete the sale to Dilonell. Before that hearing could take
5
place, Chandler filed a brief to which she attached a new third
party offer for $1.049 million which she herself had obtained.
Chandler asked the court to reconsider its tentative ruling and
either order Dilonell to pay $1.049 million for the property or
order the property be sold to the third party.
The probate action concluded on April 11, 2023, in favor of
Dilonell. At the hearing on April 20, 2023, the trial court adopted
its previously announced tentative decision and ordered Chandler
to execute Dilonell’s purchase agreement and complete the sale to
Dilonell. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Chandler contends that Judge Killefer could not change
Judge Burdge’s October 2, 2019, order permitting Dilonell to
close escrow with a deposit of 50 percent of the purchase price
because, in the absence of a full price offer, “one trial court judge
may not reconsider and overrule a ruling of another judge.”3 This
is contrary to Chandler’s position in the trial court, where she
3 To the extent Chandler contends in her reply brief that the
order permitted the parties to purchase the property only for the
full list price, we disagree. We do not consider claims made for
the first time in a reply brief. Further, Chandler has not cited
any language from the order imposing such a restriction. The
order in essence gives a party the right to purchase the property
at full price if no full price offers are made in the marketing
period, but the order in no way requires such an offer.
6
argued that Judge Killefer did have authority to change the
order.4
We agree that, as a general rule, “the power of one judge to
vacate an order made by another judge is limited.” (In re Alberto
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 427.) We review a trial court’s order
to reconsider and vacate the ruling of another judge for an abuse
of discretion. (See In re Marriage of Oliverez (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 1242, 1247.) We see no abuse of discretion because
we understand an exception to that rule, identified by Chandler
in the trial court, to be applicable here: “[W]here the trial court’s
Order governs future events and circumstances render
modification of the Order necessary or appropriate, the Court has
the power to modify its Order. Specifically in a circumstance in
which the trial court issues a judgment or order governing future
actions and there exists a possibility of an unfor[e]seen change in
circumstances over which the Court has no control, the Court
retains the inherent authority to modify the judgment or Order
(Restat.2d Judgments, section 73, com.b.).” We also agree with
Chandler that “[b]ecause of the change of circumstances in this
case by Mr. Sher[r]iff’s cancellation of the escrow, and the
passage of time since January[] 2021, and changes in market
conditions, this is an appropriate case for the trial court to
exercise its authority to modify its previous orders concerning the
sale of the Property.”
4 We recognize Chandler does not agree with the specific
“modifications” made by Judge Killefer, but that has no bearing
on whether the trial court had the authority to modify the order.
7
Even if the exception were inapplicable, we would find that
permitting Dilonell to close escrow with a 50 percent deposit did
not amount to reconsidering, overruling, or vacating the October
2, 2019, order. The interpretation of a court order is a question of
law which we review de novo. (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co.
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 308, 326.) As we noted in our opinion in
the first appeal, the 50 percent escrow deposit provision expressly
applies to a full listing price offer by a party. The order is silent
on escrow requirements when a party has made the highest offer
for the property, but the offer is for less than the full listing price.
As we explained: “If we were to extrapolate from the court’s order
to other offers, we would find the most reasonable understanding
would be that a party who makes an offer for the property need
only deposit half the purchase price to close escrow.” (Dilonell v.
Chandler, supra, B310695.) Thus, such a provision would be
consistent with the October 2, 2019, order. We previously noted
that the trial court could make an order permitting a party to
close escrow by depositing 50 percent of the purchase price, when
the purchase price was less than the full listing price. That, in
effect, is what happened here. The trial court ordered Chandler
to accept Dilonell’s offer, which included a provision allowing an
escrow deposit of 50 percent of the purchase price.
Further, and perhaps more importantly, the October 2,
2019, order expressly contemplated that further orders would be
necessary if escrow did not close within the specified 90-day
listing period. The October 2, 2019, order did not limit what
additional orders might be needed. Such a provision was just
common sense in this case: if the property did not sell when
marketed using the timeline and procedures in the order, an
entirely different approach to the sale might well be necessary.
8
As Chandler acknowledged in the trial court, an order may
properly contain such an express provision for future
modifications.
When Judge Killefer took active control of the case on
remand after Sherriff cancelled escrow, she had authority to
devise a new approach to the sale under the further orders
provision of the October 2, 2019, order. The fact that she initially
directed the parties to follow the October 2, 2019, order did not
negate that provision. Thus, her order permitting a 50 percent
escrow deposit by Dilonell was actually authorized by the October
2, 2019, order, not contrary to it.
To the extent Chandler argues Judge Killefer abused her
discretion in permitting a 50 percent deposit of the purchase
price, we disagree. (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
589, 597 [standard of review for interlocutory partition order is
abuse of discretion].)
The goal of a partition sale is to actually sell the property
for a fair price in a limited period of time. In this case, the trial
court’s order that the parties use a neutral broker and list the
property for sale was designed to ensure that the property was
sold at a price determined by the market (and not an appraiser);
this was done largely done in response to Chandler’s concerns.
There have now been two extended and impartial listing periods,
and Dilonell was ultimately the high bidder for the property in
both periods. She offered to match the Sherriff offer from the
first listing period after Sherriff cancelled escrow. Chandler
refused. Dilonell again emerged as the high bidder at the end of
the second listing period, after Chandler refused a higher third
party offer. At this point, the market has spoken. Facilitating
the completion of the sale at this fair market price by requiring a
9
deposit of only 50 percent of the purchase price (the amount due
to Chandler) is consistent with the goals of a partition action and
the trial court’s October 2, 2019, order, and is in both parties’ best
interests at this point.
Placing obstacles in the way of Dilonell’s purchase is not in
either party’s best interest. Chandler expressly claims on appeal
that requiring a deposit of the full purchase price would prevent
Dilonell from purchasing the property, and that the late third
party offer she somehow found would then become the high offer.
She contends that the third party offer represents the true
market value and it is only fair that the property be sold for this
price. This is wishful thinking. The trial court rejected this late
third party offer when it ordered Chandler to sign the purchase
agreement for the Dilonell offer. We see no abuse of discretion in
this decision, as the late third party offer clearly did not comply
with the trial court’s orders. Thus, if the Dilonell offer is
withdrawn due to a pointless requirement that she deposit money
owed to herself in escrow, the listing process will start all over
again. There is absolutely no guarantee that a third listing
period will result in a higher final offer than the current Dilonell
offer as borne out by the fact that, so far, successive listings have
resulted in lower final offers.
10
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Appellant Chandler to
bear costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
GRIMES, J.
WILEY, J.
11
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