CourtListener 9506461•People v. Samayoa CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/22/24 P. v. Samayoa CA6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H047865
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. F1554476)
v.
JOSE LUIS SAMAYOA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jose Luis Samayoa seeks resentencing under Penal Code section 654 as
amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 and Penal Code section 1385 as amended by Senate
Bill No. 81.1 In our prior unpublished opinion in this matter, we concluded Samayoa was
not entitled to resentencing.2 After Samayoa petitioned for review, the California
Supreme Court granted it and deferred the matter pending the finality of its opinion in
People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 (Salazar). The Court subsequently transferred
the matter back to this Court with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider
the cause in light of Salazar.
For the reasons below, we conclude Salazar compels a different conclusion than
that of our prior decision. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and remand the
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
People v. Samayoa (Sept. 25, 2023, H047865) [nonpub. opn.].
matter to the trial court to give it the opportunity to exercise its discretion whether to
resentence Samayoa.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, a jury found defendant Jose Luis Samayoa guilty of first degree robbery
in concert (§§ 211-213, subd. (a)(1)(A)); first degree residential burglary (§§ 459-460,
subd. (a)); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); and criminal threats (§ 422).3 The
jury also found Samayoa personally used a handgun in the commission of two of the
offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)
The trial court imposed an aggregate term of 30 years four months in prison,
calculated as follows: the middle term of six years doubled to 12 years for the robbery
conviction; a 10-year term for the firearm enhancement; one-third the middle term of
one year doubled to two years for the assault conviction; one-third the middle term of
eight months doubled to 16 months for the criminal threats conviction; and five years for
the prior serious felony conviction. The court ordered the terms for the assault and
criminal threats convictions to run consecutively, and the court stayed the term for the
burglary conviction under section 654.
On direct appeal, we remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose
of allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion to resentence Samayoa based on the
retroactive application of ameliorative changes in the applicable sentencing laws. On
remand, the trial court had the discretion to strike the firearm enhancement and the prior
serious felony conviction. At the resentencing hearing in January 2020, the court
declined to exercise its discretion as to either term and reinstated the original judgment.
Samayoa timely filed the appeal at issue here. We appointed counsel, who filed an
opening brief stating the case and the facts but raising no specific issues. Counsel
3
The facts are set forth in this Court’s unpublished opinion on direct appeal.
(People v. Samayoa (Aug. 26, 2019, H044346) [nonpub. opn.].) We granted Samayoa’s
request to take judicial notice of the record in that appeal.
2
requested that we independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25
Cal.3d 436. We treated counsel’s filing as a brief filed under People v. Serrano (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 496, and we notified Samayoa of his right to respond with a
supplemental brief within 30 days. After Samayoa failed to respond, we dismissed the
appeal as abandoned.
Samayoa then petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, whereupon
the court granted review and deferred briefing pending the resolution of People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). After resolving Delgadillo, the Court
transferred the matter back to us in June 2023 with directions to vacate our order of
dismissal and reconsider whether to exercise our discretion to conduct an independent
review of the record or provide any other relief in light of Delgadillo and Assembly Bill
No. 518 (Assembly Bill 518). Accordingly, we vacated our prior order of dismissal and
reconsidered the matter. Appointed counsel for Samayoa then filed a supplemental brief
arguing that remand was required for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to
resentence Samayoa in light of Assembly Bill 518 and Senate Bill No. 81 (Senate Bill
81). Based on our retroactive application of Assembly Bill 518, we concluded the record
as a whole showed the trial court would not exercise its discretion to impose a lesser term
for the robbery and burglary offenses if we remanded for resentencing. We further held
that because Senate Bill 81 only applied to sentencing hearings occurring after its
effective date of January 1, 2022, Samayoa would not be entitled to relief under that
legislation. We affirmed the judgment in a nonpublished opinion on September 25, 2023.
Samayoa again petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, which
granted the petition and deferred the matter pending the finality of the opinion in Salazar,
supra, 15 Cal.5th 416. After the Salazar opinion became final, the California Supreme
Court transferred Samayoa’s matter back to this Court with directions to vacate our prior
decision and reconsider the matter in light of Salazar. Both parties have filed
supplemental briefing, and we now reconsider the matter.
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II. DISCUSSION
Samayoa argues we must remand to the trial court for possible resentencing based
on Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th 416, and because the California Supreme Court transferred
this matter back to this Court for reconsideration in light of Salazar. He argues that the
Supreme Court would not have granted review and transferred the matter back to us if the
Court had found our prior opinion was properly decided.
The Attorney General argues that Salazar confirms this Court applied the proper
legal standard in our prior decision because the Supreme Court in Salazar simply
reiterated the same standard we had previously applied. (See Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 419, quoting People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 (Gutierrez) [the
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicates” the
trial court would have reached the same conclusion if it had been aware of its
discretion].) The Attorney General contends we properly applied that standard to the
record in our prior decision, and that nothing in Salazar supports a different outcome.
Samayoa concedes we stated the proper standard in our prior opinion, but he
argues we misapplied it. He further contends he would be entitled to resentencing under
Senate Bill 81 on remand.
A. Legal Principles
“ ‘ “Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the
‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of
the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than
one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material
aspect of a defendant’s record.” [Citation.]’ ” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 424.)
“[W]hen a sentencing court was not aware of the full scope of its discretionary powers at
the time the defendant was sentenced, ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for
resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have
4
reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 419.)
Remand is the default disposition. “[U]nless there is a clear indication from the
sentencing court that it would be idle to do so, remand for resentencing is required.
When the applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence has substantively changed
after sentencing, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the
sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at
the time of sentencing. Mere reliance on the length of the original sentence and attendant
decisions, such as imposing consecutive sentences, imposing middle or upper term
sentences, or declining to strike enhancements, is not sufficient to provide a clear
indication of what a sentencing court might do on remand if it had been fully aware of the
scope of its discretionary powers.” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431.)
B. Remand for Resentencing Under Assembly Bill 518
As an initial matter, we reject Samayoa’s assertion that the Supreme Court, by
granting review and transferring the case back to this Court for reconsideration, intended
to indicate that remand is required. “In granting a petition for review, the court decides
only to accept the case and to address one or more of the issues tendered for review—this
is not a decision on the merits of any issue as to which the court grants review.”
(Rittiman v. Public Utilities Com. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1018, 1030.) “The grant and
transfer procedure is commonly used, and it is not a merits decision.” (Ibid.)
Accordingly, we will reconsider the matter only as ordered by the Supreme Court—that
is, in light of the Court’s application of the standard for remand in Salazar, supra.
At the time of the January 2020 sentencing hearing, section 654 required the
sentencing court to punish a defendant convicted for the same act under multiple
provisions of law based on the provision of law that provided for the longest potential
term of imprisonment. Consistent with the law then in effect, the trial court in January
2020 reinstated the previous judgment, imposing a 12-year term for the robbery
5
conviction while staying an unspecified term for the burglary conviction under section
654.
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill 518 amended section 654 to give trial
courts the discretion to punish such an act under either provision of law. (People v. Mani
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 350.) The Attorney General has conceded that Assembly
Bill 518 applies retroactively to Samayoa under the doctrine of In re Estrada (1965) 63
Cal.2d 740. Because Assembly Bill 518 constitutes an ameliorative change in the
sentencing laws, and Samayoa’s judgment of conviction is not yet final, this concession
is well-taken. Under Assembly Bill 518, the court on remand would have the discretion
to stay the term for the robbery conviction and impose a lower term for the burglary
conviction instead.
In our prior opinion affirming the judgment, we considered the trial court’s
statements at the prior sentencing hearing, when the court declined to strike either the 10-
year term for the firearm enhancement or the five-year term for the prior serious felony
conviction. The court cited, among other factors: the seriousness of the offense, which
the court described as “horrible” and “horrifying”; the increasing seriousness of the
offenses committed as part of Samayoa’s criminal history; his failure to accept
responsibility for his actions; the injury suffered by the victim; and the possibility that
multiple deaths could have occurred during the commission of the offense. Based on
these statements, we concluded the court would not exercise its discretion to impose a
lesser sentence.
Nonetheless, Samayoa argues the trial court also made statements at the January
2020 hearing that show the court might exercise its discretion to resentence him under
version of section 654 as revised by Assembly Bill 518. As noted above, the trial court at
that hearing had the discretion to strike a 10-year firearm enhancement and a five-year
term for a prior serious felony conviction. Although the court declined to strike either,
the court stated that the decision whether to strike the five-year term was a “closer case.”
6
The court also took note of Samayoa’s “hard work” and “good work” to improve his
conduct record while in custody, adding, “you pretty have much done everything we
could possibly expect of you to do since you left the county [jail].”
The Attorney General is correct that our prior decision applied the “clearly
indicates” standard of Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at page 1391, and that the Supreme
Court in Salazar cited the same standard. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 419.) But
Salazar did not simply repeat the Court’s prior holdings; the Court provided further
guidance on the proper application of the standard. The Court emphasized that “remand
is the default,” and “it is almost always speculative” for a reviewing court to say what the
sentencing court would have done. The Court further added, “Mere reliance on the
length of the original sentence and attendant decisions, such as imposing consecutive
sentences, imposing middle or upper term sentences, or declining to strike enhancements,
is not sufficient to provide a clear indication of what a sentencing court might do on
remand if it had been fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers.” (Id. at
p. 431.)
We therefore agree with Samayoa that remand is proper given Salazar’s clarified
application of the “clearly indicates” standard. On remand, the trial court would have the
discretion under section 654 to impose a term for the first degree burglary conviction in
place of the term for the first degree robbery conviction. The court had originally
imposed a 12-year term for the robbery conviction (the six-year middle term doubled for
the strike prior). If the court on remand were to stay that term and impose an eight-year
term for the burglary conviction (double the four-year middle term under section 461,
subdivision (a)), that would reduce Samayoa’s aggregate sentence by four years.
Looking to the record as a whole, and in light of the court’s prior statement that it was a
“close[] case” whether to strike a five-year term, we conclude the record does not clearly
indicate the court would decline to exercise its discretion to resentence Samayoa.
7
Accordingly, we will remand the matter for resentencing under section 654 as
revised by Assembly Bill 518. We express no opinion on how the trial court should
exercise its sentencing discretion.
C. Resentencing Under Senate Bill 81
Samayoa contends he is also entitled to resentencing under Senate Bill 81 on
remand. The Attorney General does not respond to this claim.
“In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 81, which amended section 1385
to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike
enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1.)” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674 (Sek).) Section 1385 as
amended provides in part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) further provides, “In exercising its discretion
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Subdivision
(c)(2)(C) of section 1385 provides that if “[t]he application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years,” the trial court “shall . . . dismiss[ ]” the
enhancement.” Subdivision (c)(2)(H) further provides for dismissal of an enhancement
that is “based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.”
Samayoa argues he is entitled to resentencing under each of the mitigating
circumstances set forth in subdivisions (c)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(H) of section 1385. He points
8
out that the trial court imposed a five-year term under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for
a prior serious felony conviction in March 2011. He further argues his sentence was over
20 years in length as a result of the five-year strike prior.
We note that several courts of appeal have rejected the applicability of Senate Bill
81 with respect to strike priors. (People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399 [Senate Bill
81 does not apply to prior strike convictions]; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60
[the term “enhancement” in section 1385, subdivision (c) does not include prior strikes];
People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244 [same].) However, in the absence of a
trial court ruling on these issues, they are not ripe for our consideration on appeal.
We hold only that the applicability of Senate Bill 81 is not foreclosed by the
timing of the sentencing hearing on remand. The requirements of section 1385 as
amended “ ‘shall apply to sentencings occurring after the effective date of’ Senate Bill
No. 81. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1, enacting § 1385, subd. (c)(7).)” (Sek, supra, 74
Cal.App.5th at p. 674.) Such a sentencing hearing will be held on remand. Accordingly,
Samayoa may present argument to the trial court concerning the applicability of any
mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 1385.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for the
limited purpose of resentencing. Upon remand, the court shall hold a resentencing
hearing at which it may exercise its discretion to resentence Samayoa under section 654
as amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 and section 1385 as amended by Senate Bill
No. 81. If the trial court declines to modify Samayoa’s sentence, it shall reinstate the
judgment.
9
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_______________________________
Grover, J.
_______________________________
Danner, J.
H047865
People v. Samayoa
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