In re B.M. CA4/1

CourtListener 9506033Calctapp21.05.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/21/24 In re B.M. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re B.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D083349
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J518843A)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B.M., a Minor, etc.,

Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant A.J.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Minor and Appellant B.M.
Claudia Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

A.J. (Mother) appeals from orders terminating parental rights to her

child, B.M. (Child), after a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26
hearing. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding Child
generally and specifically adoptable by clear and convincing evidence. Child
joins Mother’s opening brief.
We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
court’s adoptability findings. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Child lived with Mother, Mother’s partner (Edward), and her child with
Edward (Sister). On October 12, 2021, Edward was arrested for child
endangerment while caring for Child, who was eight years old. Law
enforcement could not locate Child’s parents and took him into protective
custody.
On October 13, 2021, the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency) filed a Juvenile Dependency Petition on behalf of
Child citing neglect by Mother. At the detention hearing the following day,
the court found the petition satisfied prima facie requirements for detention,
detained Child out of Mother’s care, and ordered reunification services for
Mother.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
Mother had a history of heroin use, including while she was pregnant
with Child. In 2013, Child was removed from Mother shortly after birth, and
Mother later successfully reunified with Child. Child’s father did not
participate in reunification services, which were therefore terminated.
During early interviews, Mother admitted that in the months before
Child’s detention in this case, she had relapsed on heroin and had used it on
October 12, 2021. She explained that Edward was physically abusive to her
and controlling of her. She was in a relationship with him despite also
having a restraining order against him.
Child stated Edward perpetrated domestic violence on Mother. Child
also shared that Edward took photos and videos of Child using the restroom
and showering and watched pornography with Child. Despite these
circumstances, the Agency described Child as a caring, sensitive, sweet child
who loved Mother.
After the Agency filed an amended petition to include exposure to
domestic violence and Mother’s heroin use, the court held a jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing and set the matter for trial. At the January 6, 2022,
contested hearing, the court sustained the amended petition, removed Child
from Mother, ordered reunification services, and confirmed its order for
supervised visitation.
In early 2022, Child struggled with recurring stool accidents and was
later diagnosed with encopresis, a condition preventing him from
ascertaining when he needed to use the bathroom. Child was diagnosed with
ADHD and began taking medication in April 2022. He was doing well in
school and at the home of his initial caregiver, Sarah, but had behavioral
issues during his afterschool program. His therapist reported that he was an

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intelligent, charming, and great kid, but, according to Sarah, he had difficulty
connecting with and maintaining relationships with service providers.
In June 2022, Child’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA)
reported that he was outgoing, energetic, and fun loving, and that he
continued to do well in his placement. However, the CASA reported Child
had made little progress in therapy.
In its July 2022 status report, the Agency reported that Mother did not
participate in substance abuse treatment and was discharged from a
domestic violence victim’s group after ceasing to attend. She failed to appear
for on-demand substance abuse testing requested by the Agency. The Agency
reported difficulty in communicating with Mother to discuss her desire to
participate in the reunification process. Mother had ceased responding to the
Agency’s communication attempts in March 2022. According to Sarah,
Mother frequently canceled visits with Child, and her last visit occurred on
April 18, 2022. Mother subsequently ceased responding to Sarah’s efforts to
schedule visits. The Agency also reported that an investigation had
substantiated allegations that Edward had sexually abused Child. Mother
continued to have contact with Edward.
On July 6, 2022, the court held a six-month review hearing and
maintained Mother’s reunification services and visitation. The court noted
that Mother had made minimal progress in her case plan.
Meanwhile, Sarah gave notice that she no longer wanted to continue
Child’s placement with her, and Child was placed with Matthew (Caregiver)
in July 2022.
In December 2022, Child’s CASA reported that Child was comfortable,
happy, and thriving in his new placement. His encopresis continued to result
in frequent urination and defecation accidents. He was active in his therapy

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sessions, and his teacher stated he was outgoing, social, and athletic, but
struggled with reading, writing, focusing, and maintaining personal space.
As of its December 12, 2022, report, the Agency agreed that Child was
content in his new placement, and Caregiver reported that Child was doing
well at home. Mother had not visited Child since April. She did not respond
to the Agency’s efforts to continue providing reunification services, and her
whereabouts were unknown. The Agency was not optimistic about the
prospect of Mother completing reunification services. While she had
completed a parenting course as part of her services, Mother abandoned her
domestic violence group sessions, did not report completing substance abuse
treatment services, and did not submit to requested drug testing. The
Agency had reason to believe she had contact with Edward despite her
restraining order against him. Thus, the Agency remained concerned about
Mother’s ability to provide an environment for Child that would be free of
substance abuse and exposure to domestic violence. Consequently, the
Agency recommended that the court terminate reunification services and set
a section 366.26 hearing.
Later in December, Mother participated in some video visits with
Child. She did not initiate those visits but appeared to enjoy them. Around
that time, Mother enrolled in outpatient substance abuse services but failed
to participate in the services. The Agency requested a drug test, and Mother
declined.
At the January 30, 2023, contested twelve-month review hearing, the
court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The
court noted that Mother failed to complete domestic violence and substance
abuse services, continued her relationship with Edward despite the
restraining order, and did not maintain consistent visitation with Child.

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The Agency’s section 366.26 report indicated that Child was in overall
good health, although he continued to struggle with encopresis and ADHD.
He also appeared developmentally on track, was doing well academically, and
“present[ed] as a funny, smart, friendly and energetic child” as well as “happy
and well adjusted.” Child expressed the desire to live with Mother, and,
while Caregiver was open to either adoption or guardianship, he wanted to be
sure of what Child wanted and what the team thought was best for him.
The report also noted that Edward and Mother had placed Child
between them during sexual intercourse, and Edward forced Child to have
sexual intercourse with Sister.
In May 2023, the CASA reported that Child was an active, outgoing,
social child but demonstrated challenging behaviors at times. He appeared
comfortable with Caregiver, who provided a supportive and stable
environment and remained open to either adoption or guardianship. Mother
still had not completed services, and her whereabouts were unknown.
The Agency requested that the section 366.26 hearing be continued to
determine the most appropriate permanent plan for Child. In its September
2023 addendum report, the Agency recommended adoption. The Agency had
not been able to locate Mother after a diligent search beginning in March
2023. Caregiver expressed the desire to adopt Child as long as he agrees,
rendering him specifically adoptable. The Agency stated that Child was
generally adoptable due to Child’s “general good health, high intelligence,
friendly personality and on-track development.”
Child told the Agency that things were “good” at home and with
Caregiver, and he “was in agreement with” living with Caregiver until he is
an adult. When asked how he would feel about being adopted by Caregiver,
Child stated “he would want to be adopted by his mom.” At a preliminary

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hearing, Child’s counsel explained that he was comfortable and doing well in
his placement and had all of his needs met but would prefer a lesser
permanent plan than adoption.
On December 21, 2023, the court held the contested section 366.26
hearing. At the hearing, the protective services worker (PSW) testified that
Child was generally adoptable due to being in good health, developmentally
on track, intelligent, active, engaging, and generally well-behaved. She
explained Caregiver was willing to adopt Child or act as his legal guardian.
Caregiver’s home study had been completed and there was no reason he
would not be approved for adoption. Child was doing well in the home, and
Caregiver would provide continued stability and thus reduce anxiety.
The PSW testified that the Agency had been unable to get in touch with
Mother after February of 2023, and Mother had not visited with Child, even
virtually, since before then. The PSW acknowledged that Mother’s visits,
when they had occurred, were positive for Child, and he continued talking
about wanting to live with Mother despite the cessation of visits. She further
acknowledged that Child understood to some level what adoption is, and he
stated he does not want to be adopted because he was worried he would no
longer be able to see Mother. However, the PSW explained that Caregiver
was “very supportive in keeping [Child] connected to . . . any birth family,” as
shown by his arranging regular visits with Sister and communication with
his grandmother. In sum, the PSW believed adoption was in Child’s best
interest.
Child testified he knows what the term “adoption” means. He stated he
did not want to be adopted by Caregiver, but he did not know why. He
preferred legal guardianship to adoption “[b]ecause if my mom got her rights

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back, I could have her.” On the other hand, he would want to be adopted by
Sarah, whom he continued to visit regularly.
The court concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, Child was
generally adoptable as “a highly intelligent, friendly 10-year-old who is
overall healthy and on track developmentally” and adoption is in his best
interest. The court noted that Caregiver was willing to adopt Child and
found him specifically adoptable. Because no exception applied, the court
terminated parental rights and ordered adoption as the permanent plan. In
so holding, the court stated that it had considered Child’s wishes even though
he was under the age of 12, noting that Child was opposed to adoption by his
current Caregiver, but not opposed to adoption by his former caregiver.
DISCUSSION
Mother appeals the court’s adoptability finding and orders terminating
parental rights. She contends Child’s opposition to adoption by Caregiver
prevented him from being specifically adoptable, and that the Agency failed
to present substantial evidence that Child was generally adoptable due to his
opposition to adoption. Rather, according to Mother, legal guardianship
would be in Child’s best interests. We conclude the record contains
substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding of adoptability. As no
statutory exception applies, the court properly selected the default
permanent plan of adoption.
Section 366.26 hearings take place after reunification efforts have
failed and services have been terminated. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630.) At a section 366.26 hearing, the court selects and implements a
permanent plan for the child. (Ibid.) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)
provides: “If the court determines, . . . by a clear and convincing standard,
that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental

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rights and order the child placed for adoption.” (Italics added.) If the court
makes the adoptability determination, it may only select a permanent plan
other than adoption when a “specifically enumerated” statutory exception
applies. (In re Caden C., at pp. 630–631.) As one court explained: “Indeed,
the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of
parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a
compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child. The specified statutory circumstances—actually,
exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where
possible—‘must be considered in view of the legislative preference for
adoption when reunification efforts have failed.’ . . . The statutory exceptions
merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an
option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Those statutory exceptions are enumerated in section
366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi).
Adoptability falls into two different categories: specific adoptability
and general adoptability. (In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803, 817; In re
J.W. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 263, 267.) A child is specifically adoptable when
there is a prospective adoptive parent willing to adopt the child and able to
meet the child’s needs, and there are no legal impediments to adoption. (In re
B.D., at p. 817; In re J.W., at p. 268.) General adoptability depends on
“whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it
difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor.” (In re Sarah M. (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) The existence of a prospective adoptive parent
who is willing to adopt a child indicates that the child would likely otherwise
be adopted by some other family. (Id. at pp. 1649–1650.) Even if there is no
prospective adoptive parent, a “child who is happy, healthy and young, with

9
no discernable developmental problems” is generally adoptable. (In re B.D.,
at p. 817.) The existence of some problems or potential future problems does
not prevent a finding of general adoptability. (In re J.W., at p. 268; In re R.C.
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 492 [“[Child’s] positive characteristics make him
adoptable despite his in utero exposure to heroin, slight speech delays and
the absence of an identified father.”].)
We review the juvenile court’s holding on adoptability for “substantial
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing
evidence” that the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.
(In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400.) On this record, we conclude
substantial evidence exists to support the court’s clear and convincing finding
that Child is both specifically and generally adoptable.
The substantial evidence in the record that supports the court’s specific
adoptability finding is that Caregiver expressed willingness to adopt Child,
demonstrated the ability to provide for Child’s needs during the placement,
and completed a home study. The PSW testified there was no reason
Caregiver would not be approved for adoption. Mother does not dispute these
points but argues Child is not specifically adoptable because he opposed
adoption due to a strong attachment to Mother. We disagree that Child’s
wishes affected specific adoptability. There is no indication in the record that
Caregiver would become unwilling to adopt Child once the court followed the
Agency’s recommendation. Although Caregiver cared about Child’s wishes
regarding a permanent plan, Caregiver also wanted to know what “the team”
thought was best for Child, which was adoption. Thus, from a specific
adoptability perspective, substantial evidence exists that Child is likely to be
adopted.

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Likewise, the Agency’s and CASA’s reports throughout this case and
the PSW’s testimony at the section 366.26 hearing provide substantial
evidence to support the court’s general adoptability finding. Child was
consistently described as smart, friendly, generally healthy, developmentally
on track, funny, happy, and energetic. He generally did well in his
placements and at school. Additionally, the willingness of Caregiver to adopt
Child indicates that other parents would similarly be interested in adopting
Child.
Mother acknowledges Child’s “favorable characteristics” supporting
general adoptability; she further concedes “[Child]’s history of trauma,
anxiety, ADHD, encopresis, multiple placements, and exposure to substance
abuse, sexual abuse, and domestic violence did not render him unadoptable.”
Nevertheless, Mother argues the court erred by finding Child generally
adoptable because there was insufficient evidence that other families would
have interest in adopting a child with his emotional and behavioral issues
who opposed adoption. We disagree that Child’s hesitation to be adopted by
Caregiver or the existence of some issues undermine Child’s many positive
characteristics that render him generally adoptable. This is particularly true
given that Child supported living with Caregiver until he was 18 and because
Child was not adamantly opposed to being adopted, as demonstrated by his
non-opposition to the hypothetical scenario of Sarah adopting him.
Furthermore, Mother has not cited to any cases in which a court determined
that a child’s desire to be with a parent, while understandable, made an
otherwise adoptable child unadoptable.
Finally, Mother argues “the juvenile court’s adoptability finding and
decision to terminate mother’s parental rights were contrary to [Child’s] best
interests.” Rather, “the lesser permanent plan of legal guardianship” was

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preferred by Child, acceptable to Caregiver, and in the best interest of Child.
Mother cites to section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1), which states, “the court
shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the
child.” Mother acknowledges the court was aware of and considered Child’s
wishes, as stated in the record. Contrary to Mother’s argument, however, the
court could not have merely “selected the lesser permanent plan of legal
guardianship.” Adoption, when possible, is deemed to be in the child’s best
interest, except if a statutory exception applies: “The Legislature has
decreed, however, that guardianship is not in the best interests of children
who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the
best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing
them in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded
them. In decreeing adoption to be the preferred permanent plan, the
Legislature recognized that, ‘Although guardianship may be a more stable
solution than foster care, it is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the
secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature.’ ” (In re
Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419.)
Once the court determined by clear and convincing evidence that Child
was adoptable, the court was required to order adoption unless a specific
statutory exception applied. Mother does not contend any statutory
exception applies. Mother concedes that section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii), providing an exception when a child objects to
adoption, does not apply because child is under the age of 12, and Mother did
not maintain regular visitation, which is required for the section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parent-child relationship exception. Absent
any applicable exception, we must affirm.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.

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