CourtListener 9502572•People v. Massie CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/13/24 P. v. Massie CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086740
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF183483A)
v.
LUIS JESUS MASSIE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D.
Oglesby, Judge.
David W. Beaudreau, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Catherine
Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.
Following a jury trial, defendant Luis Jesus Massie was convicted of receiving a
stolen vehicle, driving or taking another’s vehicle, evading a peace officer, bringing a
controlled substance into jail (count 6), and possessing a controlled substance (count 7).
The trial court stayed defendant’s sentence on count 7 pursuant to Penal Code1 former
section 654 in light of its sentence on count 6. In his first appeal, we remanded for a full
resentencing under section 654, amended after defendant was sentenced by Assembly Bill
No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518), to permit the trial court to exercise
its new found discretion to decide which drug sentence to stay. (People v. Massie
(Jan. 17, 2023, F083624) [nonpub. opn.].)2 On remand, the trial court stated that it
intended to resentence defendant to the sentence originally imposed but, as both parties
agree, failed to stay either of the sentences on counts 6 and 7 during its oral
pronouncement.
Defendant requests that we remand for resentencing because the trial court failed
to stay punishment on count 7 and order the trial court to correct the resentencing minute
order and amended abstract of judgment to remove a $10 crime prevention fine imposed
pursuant to section 1202.5 ($10 fine) that was not included in the trial court’s oral
pronouncement. The People argue that the trial court expressed its intention to
resentence defendant as it had originally, and the resentencing minute order reflects that
the trial court stayed the sentence on count 7. The People request that we order the trial
court’s minute order to prevail over any contrary statement in the reporter’s transcript.
We agree with the People that the minute order prevails over contrary statements in the
reporter’s transcript but order the amended abstract of judgment be amended to include
the sentence on count 7. In addition, the resentencing minute order and amended abstract
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 On December 29, 2023, defendant filed a request that we take judicial notice of our
records in People v. Massie, supra, F083624. We grant this request. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452,
459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252.)
2.
of judgment shall be amended to remove the $10 fine that was not included the in the trial
court’s oral pronouncement. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
By second amended information filed on November 1, 2021, the District Attorney
of Kern County charged defendant with two counts of receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d,
subd. (a); counts 1, 2), driving or taking another’s vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a);
count 3), evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 4), possession of
ammunition as a previous offender (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 5), bringing a controlled
substance into jail (§ 4573; count 6), and misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 7). The second amended
information further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior “strike” conviction within
the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d))
and had committed the felony offenses charged in counts 2 through 6 while on pretrial
release for the felony charge in count 1 (§ 12022.1).
Following a trial, on November 5, 2021, the jury acquitted defendant on count 2
(the second stolen vehicle count) and count 5 (possession of ammunition) but found him
guilty on all remaining charges. In a bifurcated proceeding after defendant waived his
right to a jury trial, the trial court found true the strike and pretrial release allegations.
On December 7, 2021, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
15 years and four months in prison as follows: eight years on count 1; two years, plus a
two-year enhancement for commission of the offense while on pretrial release
(§ 12022.1), on count 3; 16 months on count 4; two years on count 6 (all terms to be
served consecutively to count 1); and 180 days in jail on count 7, stayed pursuant to
section 654. In addition, the trial court ordered defendant to pay victim restitution
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a suspended $300
3.
parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), $200 in court operations assessments
(§ 1465.8), and $150 in criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373).3
On the same day, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging his drug
convictions based on claims of sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant also requested a full resentencing under
the new discretion afforded to the trial court by the amendments to section 654 effective
January 1, 2022 (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1). We remanded for full sentencing but
otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Massie, supra, F083624.)
After the remittitur was filed in the trial court, probation conducted a new
evaluation of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances and concluded that no
changes were warranted to the prior probation report sentencing recommendation.
Defendant filed a sentencing memorandum that requested the court strike or dismiss the
prior strike conviction as to one or more counts, stay the sentence on the felony charge of
bringing drugs into a jail (count 6), and impose sentence on the misdemeanor offense of
possession of a controlled substance (count 7), arguing for a total sentence between eight
and 10 years.
At the August 14, 2023 resentencing hearing, defense counsel argued the same
points raised in his sentencing memorandum. The trial court recognized that the matter
had been remanded for resentencing “based upon changes in the law giving the Court
discretion to impose a different sentence” and because at the time of the original
sentencing, the trial court “did not include the language in its sentencing statement that it
would not … impose any leniency … despite giving the defendant the maximum
sentence.” The trial court then noted that any one of the factors in aggravation would
3 The trial court orally pronounced imposition of $40 court operations assessments
(§ 1465.8) and $30 criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373) as to all five counts,
but the December 7, 2021 abstract of judgment erroneously provided for only $160 in court
operations assessments (§ 1465.8) and $120 in criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code,
§ 70373).
4.
justify the court’s decision to reimpose the original sentence in light of defendant’s
“significant criminal history” over the last 15 years since he was a juvenile, declined to
give significant weight to defendant’s attempts to rehabilitate while in prison, and found
that any circumstances in mitigation were outweighed by the circumstances in
aggravation.
The trial court concluded, “As such, the Court is simply going to reimpose the
previous sentence. I’ll summarize it, and I’ll invite a stipulation that the Court need not
read the fines and fees into the record and will rely on what’s in the probation report.”
The trial court then resentenced defendant to “a total fixed term of 16 years,
four months”4 as follows: eight years on count 1; two years, plus a two-year
enhancement for commission of the offense while on pretrial release (§ 12022.1), on to
count 3; 16 months on count 4; and two years on count 6 (all terms to be served
consecutively to count 1). The trial court continued, “Count 7, the [Health and Safety
Code section ]11350, the defendant is given credit to 180 days in custody; that sentence
having been served.” The court’s resentencing minute order, however, provides:
“COUNT 7 STAYED PURSUANT TO [SECTION] 654.” The trial court then
commented, “I failed to indicate previously that the defendant was undeserving of
leniency. The Court wishes to make that clear at this time.”
Both the August 14, 2023 resentencing minute order and amended abstract of
judgment reflect that the trial court also ordered defendant to pay victim restitution
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a suspended
$300 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), $200 in court operations assessments
(§ 1465.8), and $150 in criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373) as set
forth in the probation report and updated evaluation. However, those records also reflect
4 We note that the total sentence orally pronounced by the court at defendant’s
December 7, 2021 sentencing hearing was actually 15 years and four months.
5.
that the trial court ordered defendant to pay a $10 fine as to count 7 that was not
recommended in the probation report, included in the court’s oral pronouncement during
resentencing, or ordered as part of defendant’s original sentence.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court’s August 14, 2023 resentencing minute order, indicating that
the court stayed count 7 pursuant to section 654, is deemed to prevail over the
reporter’s transcript.
The general rule is that the court’s oral pronouncement is presumed correct. (See
People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) However, our Supreme Court has held that
when the reporter’s transcript of the court’s oral pronouncement and the clerk’s
transcripts are in conflict, the inconsistency need not always be resolved in favor of the
reporter’s transcript. (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 (Smith).) Our high
court explained, “ ‘It may be said … as a general rule that when, as in this case, the
record is in conflict it will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not possible that
part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is
entitled to greater credence [citation]. Therefore whether the recitals in the clerk’s
minutes should prevail as against contrary statements in the reporter’s transcript, must
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.’ ” (Ibid.)
In People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, the Supreme Court followed the
rule articulated in Smith, giving credence to the minute order and abstract of judgment
over the reporter’s transcript from the sentencing hearing. There, the reporter’s transcript
reflected that the trial court had sentenced Cleveland to a five-year enhancement for a
prior felony under section 667 and a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term
pursuant to section 667.5. (Cleveland, at p. 768.) The record, however, established that
Cleveland had been charged with and admitted only a prior serious felony conviction
under section 667 and not a prior prison term under section 667.5. (Cleveland, at p. 768.)
In affirming the validity of the sentence as reflected in the abstract of judgment, the court
6.
explained: “Thus, the reference in the reporter’s transcript to a one-year term under
section 667.5 is incorrect. However, the minute order and abstract of judgment in the
clerk’s transcript are correct. Neither mentions a prior prison term or section 667.5.
Under the circumstances, we will deem the minute order and abstract of judgment to
prevail over the reporter’s transcript. [Citations.] The erroneous statement in the
reporter’s transcript is of no effect.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Thompson (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 974, 977–978 [deeming minute order and abstract of judgment
reflecting correct calculation of sentence to prevail over court’s oral pronouncement
where court erroneously calculated length of one-third the middle term].)
In this case, the trial court’s comments indicate that it was aware we ordered
defendant resentenced to permit the court to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to
stay the sentence on count 6 or count 7 pursuant to section 654, as amended by Assembly
Bill 518. The trial court clearly indicated its intent to sentence defendant as it had
originally and to stay the sentence on count 7 rather than lessen defendant’s custodial
time by staying the lengthier sentence on count 6 when it (1) recognized that its original
sentencing comments did not adequately express its intent to sentence defendant to the
maximum sentence, (2) stated that it would not give significant weight to defendant’s
attempts to rehabilitate while in prison and any circumstances in mitigation were not
outweighed by aggravating circumstances, (3) announced it would “simply … reimpose
the previous sentence” and would “summarize it,” and (4) concluded the hearing by
clearly stating that defendant was “underserving of leniency.”
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court clearly expressed its intent to stay the
sentence on count 7 pursuant to section 654, but in pronouncing sentence, erroneously
stated that defendant would be “given credit to 180 days in custody; that sentence having
been served.” Based upon the trial court’s comments, we conclude that the conflict in the
record is not irreconcilable as it is clear that the court intended to stay the sentence on
count 7 pursuant to section 654 as it had originally, and we may infer that the court
7.
misspoke in giving credit of 180 days for serving that sentence. (See Smith, supra,
33 Cal.3d at p. 599.) Considering all the circumstances, we conclude the minute order
reflects the court’s “true” sentence and the erroneous statement in the reporter’s transcript
is of no effect.
Defendant argues that such a remedy cannot be implemented where the trial
court’s failure to stay the sentence on count 7 pursuant to section 654 results in a legally
unauthorized sentence. However, defendant’s authority for this proposition relies upon
cases discussing the “unauthorized sentence” concept as a narrow exception to the
general requirement that only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties
are reviewable on appeal (see People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17
[recognizing that a defendant’s failure to raise issue in trial court does not forfeit
argument on appeal that their sentence was imposed in violation of section 654]) and
cases analyzing whether a defendant who successfully attacks a judgment in excess of the
court’s jurisdiction is entitled to claim the protection of the invalid judgment as an
absolute limitation on what the court may do thereafter (see People v. Serrato (1973)
9 Cal.3d 753, 756, 765 [remanding to trial court for new trial where court exceeded its
authority when reducing charge after jury verdict to one that was not a lesser included
charge], disapproved on another ground in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572,
583, fn. 1).
We do not find defendant’s authorities applicable to the instant case. Neither case
either addressed or established a rule that requires an appellate court to remand a legally
unauthorized sentence to the trial court for resentencing where such sentence is
correctable on appeal. We find no authority prevents applicability of Smith, supra,
33 Cal.3d 596 in these circumstances. In People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873,
abrogated on other grounds as in stated in People v. Oates (2004)32 Cal.4th 1048, 1067,
footnote 8, the Supreme Court recognized that an appellate court may correct a sentence
that is invalid pursuant to section 654 on appeal. In that case, the trial court had ordered
8.
the first two counts to be merged and ordered the sentence on the third count to run
concurrent to the merged counts. After holding that the merger of such counts violated
section 654, the Supreme Court modified the judgment itself to order that the sentence as
to the third count “be stayed pending the finality of this judgment and service of sentence
as to count two, such stay to become permanent when service of sentence is completed.”
(Miller, at p. 888.)
Therefore, in this case, we deem that the resentencing minute order prevails over
the reporter’s transcript and the erroneous statement in the reporter’s transcript as to the
sentence on count 7 is of no effect. (See People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 768.) We will further order that the clerk of the superior court shall prepare an
amended abstract of judgment that sets forth the trial court’s sentence as to count 7 in
paragraph 13.
II. The amended abstract of judgment shall be amended to remove the $10 fine,
which was not orally pronounced by the trial court nor part of the parties’
stipulation as to applicable fines.
The parties agree that the amended abstract of judgment reflects a $10 fine that
was not recommended in the probation report and, therefore, not included in the parties’
stipulation that waived the trial court’s recitation of fines and assessments applicable in
the case. When a discrepancy exists between a trial court’s oral pronouncement of
judgment, minute order, and abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls and
we may correct error. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [appellate court
may correct abstract of judgments that do not accurately reflect the oral pronouncements
of sentencing courts].) We shall order the clerk of the court to amend the resentencing
minute order and amended abstract of judgment to remove the $10 fine.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment as to count 7 is modified to provide that defendant is
sentenced to a term of 180 days in custody, stayed pursuant to section 654 pending the
9.
finality of this judgment and completion of the sentence imposed on counts 1, 3, 4, and 6,
such stay to become permanent when service of sentence is completed. The clerk of the
superior court is directed to (1) correct the August 14, 2023 resentencing minute order by
removing the $10 crime prevention fine (§ 1202.5); (2) amend the August 14, 2023
amended abstract of judgment at paragraph 13 to include the sentence as to count 7 and,
at paragraph 9.c., to remove the $10 crime prevention fine (§ 1202.5); and (3) forward the
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The judgment is affirmed as modified.
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