CourtListener 9502563•People v. Velarde CA2/7
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Filed 5/13/24 P. v. Velarde CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B325482
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA104773-02)
v.
THOMAS RUBEN VELARDE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Yun K. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Thomas Ruben Velarde pleaded no contest to
voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder charges, and
admitted gang and firearm allegations. In 2022, Velarde filed a
petition for resentencing under Penal Code former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 The superior court denied
the petition without issuing an order to show cause. We conclude
that the record of conviction does not refute Velarde’s prima facie
case for relief as a matter of law. We reverse and direct the
superior court to vacate its order denying the petition, issue an
order to show cause, and conduct further proceedings in
accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Crimes
In January 2009, deputies from the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department responded to a call regarding a shooting in
Compton.2 When the deputies arrived at the scene, a restaurant
parking lot, they found three victims who appeared to have been
shot. Paramedics pronounced one victim dead upon their arrival.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We describe facts from the preliminary hearing transcript
to provide background and context for the parties’ arguments.
Except where expressly stated, we take no position on whether
evidence from the preliminary hearing is admissible to determine
if Velarde made a prima facie showing. (People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2.)
2
An investigating deputy spoke to two witnesses who were
working security at a nearby party. The witnesses stated they
heard gunshots and ran to the scene where they saw two men
with handguns standing near a car. When one of the men
pointed his gun at one of the witnesses, both witnesses fired at
the man. Amidst the gunfire, the two men got into the car and
drove away.
At the scene, deputies found a key ring with a gym
membership tag belonging to Patricio Michel. Using the tag, law
enforcement officers found the getaway car and arrested Michel.
Michel said he and Velarde were at the scene and Velarde shot
the victims.
Deputies tried but were unable to find Velarde. They later
received information that Velarde had fled to Mexico. In 2013,
Mexican authorities notified the sheriff’s department that they
had detained Velarde. Velarde was eventually extradited from
Mexico to California.
B. The Information, Negotiated Plea, and Sentencing
The People charged Velarde with one count of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), and two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)). With the attempted murder charges, the People
specially alleged that Velarde committed the offenses “willfully,
deliberately and with premeditation.” With the murder and
attempted murder charges, the People specially alleged Velarde
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately
causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). With
3
the assault charges, the People specially alleged Velarde
personally used a firearm during the commission of the offenses
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). For all five charges, the People specially
alleged that a principal personally and intentionally used and
discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)), and that the
offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
In March 2015, the parties appeared in court for a change
of plea hearing. On the People’s motion, the court reduced
Velarde’s murder charge to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd.
(a)). After the prosecutor advised Velarde of the charges and
allegations in the “amended information,” Velarde pleaded no
contest to voluntary manslaughter and two counts of attempted
murder. He also admitted the allegations that he committed
manslaughter for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the
meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), and that he
personally used a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivision (b), in connection with the manslaughter
and one of the attempted murders.3 In joining the plea, Velarde’s
counsel stipulated “to a factual basis for the plea based on the
arrest reports and transcripts.” The superior court dismissed the
remaining charges and allegations, including the allegations that
Velarde committed attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and
3 We recognize the enhancements under section 12022.53 do
not apply to voluntary manslaughter. (§ 12022.53, subd. (a);
People v. Fialho (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395.)
Nonetheless, we decline to further address an issue that was not
raised by either party and does not affect our analysis here.
4
with premeditation. The court sentenced Velarde to an aggregate
prison term of 39 years.
C. Velarde’s Petition for Resentencing
In August 2022, Velarde, representing himself, filed a
petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6). Checking boxes on a form petition, Velarde
requested appointment of counsel and alleged the People filed an
information that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder or murder or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, that he accepted
a plea offer in lieu of trial at which he could have been convicted
of murder or attempted murder, and that he could not now be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
The superior court appointed counsel and ordered briefing.
In their opposition, the People argued Velarde “pled to voluntary
manslaughter and attempted murder with the personal use of a
firearm,” which showed he “was the direct perpetrator” and thus
not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. To support this
argument, the People attached a copy of the minute order from
the plea hearing. Through counsel, Velarde asserted in a written
response that his no contest plea did not render him ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6.
The superior court denied Velarde’s petition without
issuing an order to show cause. The court ruled Velarde was
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because the information
and plea showed he “was prosecuted and pled as being the actual
shooter in this matter.” Velarde timely appealed.
5
DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843) and significantly
narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3),
189, subd. (e); see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449;
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
in section 189, subdivision (e). The latter provision now requires
the People to prove that the defendant was the actual killer
(§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an aider and abettor to murder who had the
intent to kill (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or a major participant in an
underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), who acted
with reckless indifference to human life as described in
subdivision (d) of section 190.2. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at
p. 448; People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Strong, at
p. 708; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
With these changes, the Legislature also provided a
procedure (now codified in section 1172.6) for “[a] person
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural
6
and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter” to petition
the superior court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on
any remaining counts if the person could not now be convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see Sen.
Bill No. 775, ch. 551 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) § 1 [extending Senate
Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes and procedure for potential
relief to individuals convicted of attempted murder or voluntary
manslaughter].)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963; see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3).)
The prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes such a showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 460.) The court may consider the record of conviction, which
7
will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry
under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.”
(Lewis, at p. 971; see Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any
part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a
trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at
p. 972; see People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
“Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition
at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. ‘“[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’”’ thereby deeming the
petitioner ineligible.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52; see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “We review de novo whether
the trial court conducted a proper inquiry under section 1172.6,
subdivision (c).” (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1251.)
B. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Velarde’s
Petition Without Issuing an Order To Show Cause
1. Velarde made a prima facie case for relief
Velarde made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6. He averred in his petition for resentencing
that he pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and
attempted murder in lieu of going to trial, that the People could
have proceeded at trial under the felony-murder rule or the
8
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that he could
not now be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
the changes to sections 188 and 189. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-
(3).) We accept these allegations as true, unless the record of
conviction establishes Velarde is ineligible for relief as a matter
of law. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
2. The record of conviction does not establish that
Velarde is ineligible for relief as a matter of law
The portions of the record of conviction on which the
superior court relied, the information and plea, do not establish
Velarde is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The People
originally charged Velarde with committing murder and
attempted murder “unlawfully and with malice aforethought.”
These generic charges allowed the People to prosecute Velarde
under a theory of imputed malice, including the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1);
People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 337-338 [“Because
the crime of attempted murder was generically charged, the
complaint allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”]; People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 484
[“‘The allegation that a murder was committed “‘willfully,
unlawfully, and with malice aforethought’” is a well-recognized
way of charging murder in [a] generic sense,’” which “does ‘not
limit the People to prosecuting [defendant] on any particular
theories’”].)
Likewise, in pleading no contest to charges of voluntary
manslaughter and attempted murder, Velarde did not admit to
9
any specific theory of guilt. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(2); People v.
Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 338 [petitioner was not
ineligible for relief where he “did not admit he harbored an intent
to kill” in pleading to voluntary manslaughter and attempted
murder charges]; People v. Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 987
[petitioner was not ineligible for relief where, “[i]n entering his
plea, petitioner did not admit to or stipulate to any particular
theory of murder”]; People v. Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p. 977 [petitioner was not ineligible for relief where, in entering
his plea, the petitioner “did not admit facts supporting liability on
any particular theory, and the generic pleading encompassed
theories—such as natural and probable consequences and felony
murder—that did not require [him] to have acted with malice”].)
Nor for that matter did Velarde admit as part of the factual basis
for his plea that he shot the victims. (See People v. Rivera (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 217, 234 [while “[i]n some cases, the record may
reveal that a defendant admitted more than the elements of the
offense charged, and such additional admissions may preclude
relief,” the defendant was not ineligible for relief where he “made
no admissions related to the murder other than pleading no
contest to the count as charged”].)
The People try to distinguish this case from Rivera and
Eynon by emphasizing that here, unlike in those decisions, the
prosecution “did not charge a codefendant or suggest that anyone
other than [Velarde] was involved in the commission of the
crime.” This argument is not persuasive because the record
indicates another defendant was convicted of charges related to
Velarde’s. (See also People v. Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 339 [rejecting similar argument, noting “a charging decision
does not establish any facts as a matter of law” and “we are
10
aware of no authority requiring prosecutors to try all
codefendants together”].) Specifically, at Velarde’s sentencing
hearing, the court referred to Patricio Michel as a codefendant
who stipulated with Velarde to an amount owed in victim
restitution. Moreover, the People provide further context for
Michel’s involvement in and arrest following the incident that led
to Velarde’s charges by citing the preliminary hearing transcript
in their brief.4
3. The firearm enhancement does not establish
that Velarde is ineligible for relief
Velarde did admit that in committing manslaughter and
attempted murder he “personally used a firearm” within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). Relying on that
admission, the People contend the word “personally” functions to
limit liability to the direct perpetrator and not an aider and
abettor. (See People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579 [use of
“personally” under section 12022.7 limits the category of persons
subject to the enhancement to those who directly inflict great
4 The existence of a codefendant also distinguishes this case
from the recent decision in People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1158, 1167-1169, review granted May 1, 2024, S284232, where
the court considered dispositive at the prima facie stage an
absence of any evidence in the record to support the petitioner’s
contention that he was not the actual killer but instead an
accomplice to a murder committed by some other person.
Because we distinguish this case on that ground, we need not
take a position on the Mares court’s consideration of the
preliminary hearing transcript to determine the petitioner had
failed to state a prima facie case under section 1172.6. (Mares, at
pp. 1167-1168.)
11
bodily injury]; People v. Balbuena (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1136,
1139 [use of “personally” under section 12022, subdivision (c),
eliminates vicarious liability and requires that the “defendant
himself be armed”], disapproved on another ground in People v.
Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1001, fn. 4.)
However, under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), the word
“personally” modifies the word “use,” and courts have
consistently stated that a “finding of personal use [of a firearm]
. . . [does] not in itself prove [a] defendant was the actual killer.”
(People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120; People v. Granado
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317, 325 [“if the defendant is found on
substantial evidence to have displayed a firearm in order to
facilitate the commission of an underlying crime, a use of the gun
has occurred both as a matter of plain English and of carrying
out the intent” of the sentencing enhancements].) As the
Supreme Court explained in Jones, “[i]f two robbers display guns
to intimidate robbery victims and one shoots and kills a victim,
both robbers could be found to have personally used a gun in the
robbery and the felony murder, even though only one is the
actual killer.” (Jones, at p. 1120.) It is possible that in
committing his crimes Velarde personally used a firearm by
brandishing it as an accomplice to an assault by a perpetrator
who shot the victims as a natural and probable consequence of
the assault. (See People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598
[defendant’s sentence enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), for personally and intentionally discharging a
firearm and proximately causing great bodily injury or death did
not preclude him from relief under section 1172.6 because the
enhancement “does not require the prosecution to prove that the
12
defendant harbored a particular mental state as to the victim’s
injury or death”].)
Thus, contrary to the superior court’s ruling on Velarde’s
petition, the information and plea do not demonstrate as a matter
of law that Velarde was convicted under a theory that is still
valid after the amendments to sections 188 and 189.
4. Hearsay evidence from the preliminary hearing
may not be used to refute Velarde’s prima facie
showing
For the first time on appeal, the People argue the
transcript of the preliminary hearing shows “the prosecutor’s only
theory of liability was that [Velarde] personally shot the victims.”
There is a split of authority on whether a court may consider a
preliminary hearing transcript to determine if the petitioner has
stated a prima facie case under section 1172.6. (See People v.
Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 989.) To that end, the
Supreme Court granted review in People v. Patton (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June 28, 2023, S279670, to
determine whether a court engages in impermissible judicial
factfinding by relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to
deny a petition under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage.
We do not have to take a side in this dispute here. The
People base their argument solely on an investigating deputy’s
testimony about statements from witnesses who identified
Velarde as the shooter. All of this testimony is hearsay evidence
that was admitted at the preliminary hearing pursuant to
section 872, subdivision (b). (§ 872, subd. (b) [permitting a
finding of probable cause following a preliminary hearing “in
whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement
13
officer or honorably retired law enforcement officer relating the
statements of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of
the matter asserted”].)
Unless another exception to the hearsay rule applies,
hearsay evidence admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to
section 872, subdivision (b), may not be used at an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) While
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), only applies to the admission of
evidence at the evidentiary hearing, we “fail to see how evidence
that cannot establish a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for
resentencing could establish a petitioner’s ineligibility for
resentencing at the prima facie stage.” (People v. Flores, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 988, fn. 9; see also People v. Patton, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 652, fn. 2, review granted [disregarding at
the prima facie stage testimony admitted at the preliminary
hearing under section 872, subdivision (b)].) The People do not
argue the investigating deputy’s testimony is admissible under a
different exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, we will not
consider the evidence for purposes of Velarde’s prima facie
showing.
We are not persuaded otherwise by People v. Pickett (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 982, review granted October 11, 2023, S281643,
and People v. Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted.
These two cases, which the People cite for support, determined
the trial court did not err in its consideration of uncontroverted
preliminary hearing evidence. (Pickett, at p. 990; Patton, at
pp. 657-658.) But they are distinguishable because neither
involved only hearsay evidence admitted pursuant to section 872,
subdivision (b). (Pickett, at p. 989 [eyewitness testimony
identifying the defendant as the shooter and stipulation that the
14
medical examiner who performed the autopsy would testify that
the victim died from a gunshot wound]; Patton, at p. 657 [“Police
officers testified at the preliminary hearing that they had
watched the surveillance video and they knew and recognized
[the defendant] as the sole perpetrator, who approached [the
victim] as he stood at the motel clerk’s desk and fired several
rounds at him”].)5
In sum, Velarde alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima
facie case for relief under section 1172.6, and the record of
conviction does not conclusively refute those facts. The superior
court thus erred in failing to issue an order to show cause and
setting the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
5 The decisions are also distinguishable insofar as they—like
the decision in People v. Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 1158,
review granted—are based on a complete absence of argument
and evidence in the record supporting a theory that the petitioner
was only an accomplice and not the actual killer. (People v.
Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 990, 993, review granted
[“there is no allegation or evidence of an accomplice in the killing
of [the victim]; the uncontradicted evidence shows that
[petitioner] acted alone”]; People v. Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th
at p. 657, review granted [“In the trial court, Patton never offered
any theory to support his implicit contention now that he was an
accomplice and not the person who actually shot Jackson. Nor,
on appeal, has Patton even suggested what facts he has to
demonstrate that someone else shot Jackson and he was merely
an accomplice”].) As discussed, contrary to these cases, the
record here shows a codefendant was involved in the underlying
incident, thus lending support to a theory that Velarde was
prosecuted as an accomplice.
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying Velarde’s petition for resentencing is
reversed. On remand, the superior court is directed to vacate its
order denying the petition, issue an order to show cause, and
conduct further proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).
RAPHAEL, J.*
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
16
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