CourtListener 9502458•Sam v. Kwan
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/19/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ANTHONY SAM, individually B314426 and B315773
and as Managing Manager of
Chino Americana Concepts Los Angeles County
2013303 LLC, Super. Ct. No. BC721121
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
RENEE KWAN et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hon. Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Berding & Weil, Anne L. Rauch and Trinette S. Sachrison
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney and Miguel
Bahamon; Best Best & Krieger, Christopher E. Deal and Bao
Pham for Defendant and Respondent Board of Fire and Police
Pension Commissioners for the City of Los Angeles.
Anderson, McPharlin & Conners, Vanessa H. Widener and
Motunrayo D. Akinmurele for Defendant and Respondent First
American Title Insurance Company.
Saiki Law Group and Eric H. Saiki for Defendants and
Respondents Renee K. Kwan, Vibrant Developments LLC, Asset
Management 328 LLC, CAC 600 LLC, Chino Americana
Holdings, LLC, and Fidelity Surety & Investments Inc.
____________________
Anthony Sam and Renee Kwan formed a limited liability
company and bought a parking lot. Unbeknownst to Sam, Kwan
used their company the next year to sell the lot for millions in
profit. Sam eventually found out and accused her of fabricating
documents, pocketing the money, and giving Sam nothing. Sam
sued Kwan and her entities, as well as the company providing
title and escrow services for the sale. Sam also sued the parking
lot buyer.
The trial court experience was unhappy for Sam. Pretrial
rulings put him out of court without a remedy. We affirm some of
these rulings, but reverse others, including a summary judgment
ruling that the parking lot buyer was a bona fide purchaser for
value. We remand.
I
When reviewing pleading challenges, we take the pleaded
facts as true. Review of summary judgment rulings requires
inferences in favor of the party losing its right to a jury trial.
These familiar rules pack a hefty punch here.
A
Kwan and Sam had worked together on various deals since
about 2011. In 2014, they got interested in a parking lot in
2
downtown Los Angeles. They decided to buy it and redevelop it
into a restaurant.
To proceed with the venture, Sam and Kwan formed a
limited liability company.
On October 13, 2013, they signed an operating agreement
for their new company: Chino Americana Concepts 2013303
LLC.
We refer to Chino Americana Concepts 2013303 LLC
simply as 2013 LLC.
2013 LLC had four members. Each member was,
individually, also a limited liability company. Some had lengthy
but similar names. This makes for a potentially confusing cast,
but the cast is vital here: we emphasize it is important to keep
these four straight. So we list these four members, give them
shorthand names, and note their percentage interest in 2013
LLC:
1. Vibrant Developments LLC (“Vibrant”) owned 49% of
2013 LLC,
2. Chino Americana Concepts CGW LLC (“CGW”) had a
14.78% interest,
3. CAC 600 LLC (“600 LLC”) had a 18.48% interest, and
4. Chino Americana Concepts W LLC (“W LLC”) held a
17.74% interest.
In sum, the four members of 2013 LLC were Vibrant, CGW,
600 LLC, and W LLC.
Vibrant owned 49%. The combined share of CGW, 600
LLC, and W LLC was 51%, which will prove significant.
Vibrant was Kwan’s entity. She controlled it, although
Sam allegedly held a minority position. Kwan, however, owned
no part of the other three members.
3
Sam alleged he owned a controlling interest in these other
three.
As between Sam and Kwan, then, Sam had—or thought he
had—more ultimate control over 2013 LLC than Kwan did.
2013 LLC’s operating agreement designated Sam as the
managing manager, appointed Kwan and Sam as directors, and
specified Vibrant would handle 2013 LLC’s day-to-day
operations. The signature blocks for CGW, 600 LLC, and W LLC
listed Sam as the signatory as the managing manager of each
entity. Kwan signed on behalf of her entity Vibrant.
2013 LLC bought the parking lot in August 2014 for $1.6
million. Half the purchase money came from a bank loan Sam
obtained and guaranteed. The other half came from foreign
investors Kwan procured. Kwan herself put no money into the
deal.
To effectuate the parking lot transaction, Sam signed the
deed of trust and the assignment of rents, which were recorded
documents in the lot’s chain of title.
Sam’s signatures on these two recorded documents will
assume significance in our analysis. Sam signed both documents
as “Anthony Sam, Manager of Chino Americana Concepts
2013303 LLC.”
In other words, recorded documents in the parking lot’s
chain of title announced that, in 2014, the manager of 2013 LLC
was Sam. Kwan’s name does not appear in these documents.
During the purchase of the parking lot, Kwan submitted a
2013 LLC operating agreement, dated October 13, 2013, listing
Sam as the managing manager.
4
As we shall see, another version of this document, bearing
the same date but Kwan’s name and not Sam’s, will appear in
this litigation.
B
2013 LLC successfully bought the parking lot.
Relations between Sam and Kwan, however, then soured.
Sam alleged that, in June 2015, he and Kwan butted heads on a
different deal. Sam claimed that, as a result, Kwan asked him to
“sign over his interest” in 2013 LLC, but that he refused her
request. He suggests the breakdown motivated her to do him
wrong.
According to Sam, Kwan then “fabricated” and “forged”
documents to shut Sam out of 2013 LLC and to sell the lot
without Sam’s knowledge. Sam swore he never relinquished his
rights in any company to Kwan, and he told Kwan he would not
transfer his rights.
A contrary and anodyne version of past events was that the
members of 2013 LLC properly and legitimately replaced Sam
with Kwan as the LLC’s manager.
These opposing accounts presented a dispute of fact,
unresolved to this day. In the face of this conflicting evidence,
however, the trial court would embrace the latter anodyne
version as the undisputed truth.
C
The 2015 parking lot buyer was the Board of Fire and
Police Pension Commissioners for the City of Los Angeles
(“Board”).
The Board contacted Kwan and began negotiating with her
to buy the lot.
5
In December 2015, Kwan agreed, without informing Sam,
to sell the parking lot to the Board. The Board paid $3.8 million
for the lot in 2015.
In other words, the property turnaround reaped more than
two million in profit in less than a year and a half.
To help buy the lot from Kwan, the Board retained a law
firm as outside counsel. The firm drafted a Purchase and Sale
Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions for the Board.
The Board and Kwan engaged First American Title
Insurance Company (“First American”) to perform the dual roles
of title insurer and escrow agent.
First American prepared a preliminary report, dated
November 23, 2015, which it sent to the Board’s attorney.
This report referred to and, in its electronic form,
hyperlinked the recorded deed of trust and the recorded
assignment of rents that Sam had signed in 2014 as the manager
of 2013 LLC.
As noted, these recorded documents were in the lot’s chain
of title. And as noted, only Sam had signed these documents.
Kwan’s name was not in them.
The Board’s attorney devoted only limited attention to First
American’s report. She clicked on hyperlinks to get the recorded
deed of trust and the recorded assignment of rents.
The attorney testified she “looked at,” but did not “review,”
the deed of trust and the assignment of rents.
Interpreted in a light favorable to Sam, this measured
phrasing means the attorney did not carefully study the two
documents in the chain of title identifying Sam as the 2014
manager of 2013 LLC.
6
Corroborating this interpretation is the attorney’s
testimony she did not know, and did not ask, “who Anthony Sam
was.” The attorney also testified she did not review a particular
portion of the preliminary report called the “informational notes.”
This unreviewed portion of the report set forth what documents
were important to examine when a land deal involved a limited
liability company. This portion highlighted the need to examine
the operating agreement of a limited liability company and to
obtain proof the limited liability company was properly operating
through its manager.
The attorney testified she did not review this portion and
explained, “The informational notes have to do with what my
client has to provide, not with what the seller has to provide.
And I didn’t represent the seller in this transaction.”
The Board’s attorney thus suggested she lacked interest in
“what the seller has to provide.”
This incurious stance is important. We will discuss the
limited scope of the attorney’s review in our analysis of the
motion for summary judgment, where we will conclude the
Board’s title research was deficient. For now, however, we
continue with the facts.
D
The 2015 sale of the parking lot proceeded.
The Board and 2013 LLC signed a Purchase and Sale
Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions. Kwan signed on
behalf of 2013 LLC as its “owner representative and manager.”
The transaction between Kwan and the Board was to close
on December 31, 2015.
The closing day of December 31 was hectic.
7
At 9:24 a.m., the escrow officer announced the buyer had
yet to receive seven essential closing documents from the seller.
The officer stressed the importance of closing on time to avoid
accruing additional interest. The documents the escrow officer
needed that day included the operating agreement for 2013 LLC
and a “[s]ignoff to their exchange agreement.”
The escrow officer copied the Board’s attorney on this 9:24
a.m. email.
At 12:30 p.m., Kwan emailed the escrow officer, attaching a
version of the 2013 LLC operating agreement.
Kwan’s version of this operating agreement was identical to
the one used earlier for 2013 LLC to buy the parking lot, except
Kwan’s version deleted Sam as manager and put her name where
Sam’s name used to be in the slots for manager and director and
in the signature blocks for the member entities.
Both versions of the operating agreements, however, bore
the same date: “October 13, 2013.”
It would take some explaining to rationalize two
agreements with the same date naming different managers.
Sam and Kwan developed conflicting explanations.
Kwan said it was a simple and innocent “mistake.”
Sam, however, charged Kwan forged her version by altering
the names, but then she carelessly neglected to change the date.
Kwan’s goal, Sam alleged, was to make it appear, falsely, that
Kwan had authority to sell the parking lot.
We return to the minute-by-minute developments on the
day of closing.
At 2:04 p.m., title officer Anthony Rivera emailed Kwan
that “we have determined a written consent will be required from
the members . . . .” Rivera explained section 4.03(b) of the 2013
8
LLC operating agreement prompted his request. Section 4.03(b)
allowed 2013 LLC’s manager to sell company assets, but only
upon an “affirmative vote of a Majority of [LLC] Members . . . .”
At 2:21 p.m., Kwan responded by email, attaching a one-
page document.
Kwan’s 2:21 p.m. document is central to this case. The
document’s title was “CORPORATE RESOLUTION.” It was
dated December 31, 2015. It purported to speak for the four
members of 2013 LLC. It recited, with our italics, that Kwan did
“hereby certify that at a meeting of the Board of Members” of
2013 LLC the members resolved (1) to sell the parking lot to the
Board for $3.8 million and (2) to authorize Kwan as 2013 LLC’s
manager to take all necessary actions relating to this sale.
On its face, this 2:21 p.m. document posed many questions.
1. Had 2013 LLC truly held a members’ “meeting” in
the 17 minutes between 2:04 and 2:21 p.m. on
December 31, 2015? Had different people been
notified, and had they communicated and voted, and
had the document been prepared in this short time?
Or was Kwan saying the “meeting” had been her with
herself?
2. Kwan signed for CGW as “Managing Manager, Chino
Americana Holdings.” She signed for 600 LLC and
for W LLC as “Manager, Chino Americana Holdings.”
But what was this new Chino Americana Holdings
entity, and why did its manager, or managing
manager, have authority to sign on behalf of three
entities comprising 2013 LLC?
9
3. Could a document signed only by Kwan constitute
independent evidence Kwan had authority to transact
on behalf of 2013 LLC?
Sam alleged Kwan “forged” this “fabricated” document. He
claimed Kwan fraudulently created it to make it look like she had
authority she did not possess.
According to Sam, discrepancies in the closing documents
were blatant enough to put the Board on inquiry notice that
Kwan lacked authority to sell the lot.
At 2:33 p.m. on December 31, 2015, the deal closed. Kwan
signed the grant deed as manager of 2013 LLC.
Kwan instructed First American to transfer $190,000 of the
purchase price to Fidelity Surety & Investments Inc. (Fidelity) as
a “finder’s fee.” Kwan owned Fidelity.
First American wired the remainder of the funds to an
“exchange company” that was going to assist in procuring
another piece of property.
Kwan testified the monies from the parking lot sale
ultimately went to fund unrelated litigation, against Sam.
D
Sam filed this lawsuit.
At the time of the parking lot negotiations and sale, Sam
knew nothing about the transfer of the lot. Kwan had not shared
this information with him. Some time later, however, Sam asked
Kwan for an accounting of the parking lot rents, but she did not
respond. Sam investigated and discovered the sale.
Sam sued Kwan. He filed suit as an individual and as the
managing member of 2013 LLC. He sued Kwan personally and
also First American, the title and escrow company on the
deal. His first amended complaint added Vibrant, Asset
10
Management 328, LLC (“Asset”), 600 LLC, Chino Americana
Holdings, LLC (“Holdings”), the Board, and the escrow officer as
defendants, later amending to substitute Hertzberg Holdings,
LLC (“Hertzberg”) and Fidelity in for Does 1 and 2. Asset and
Hertzberg are members of Vibrant.
Sam alleged claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, quiet title, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, violations of Business and Professions Code section
17200 et seq. (Unfair Competition Law), escrow negligence,
fraud, civil conspiracy, and declaratory relief. Various parties
cross-complained against each other.
The trial court denied First American’s motion for
summary judgment.
The court granted the Board’s motion for summary
judgment.
The remaining defendants launched pleading challenges.
Fidelity demurred to the first amended complaint. The trial
court sustained the demurrer in part with leave to amend and in
part without leave to amend. Sam filed a second amended
complaint alleging the same causes of action against the same
defendants. Fidelity filed a demurrer to the second amended
complaint. First American, Kwan, Vibrant, Asset, 600 LLC, and
Holdings all filed motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Sam lodged a proposed third amended complaint in
connection with his oppositions to the motions for judgment on
the pleadings. The trial court overruled as moot part of Fidelity’s
demurrer and, as to the remaining causes of action, sustained it
without leave to amend. The trial court granted the motions for
judgment on the pleadings of First American, Kwan, Vibrant,
Asset, 600 LLC, and Holdings without leave to amend.
11
In short, Sam’s lawsuit met total defeat. He appealed.
II
We summarize our rulings.
● We reverse the denial of Sam’s leave to amend his claims
on behalf of 2013 LLC. We remand to permit Sam to bring
these claims on behalf of the member entities, as reflected
in his proposed third amended complaint.
● We reverse the remainder of the grants of judgment on the
pleadings, except as to the breach of contract claims based
on the operating agreements of 600 LLC and Holdings
against 600 LLC and Holdings.
● We affirm the ruling that the breach of contract claims
based on the operating agreements of 600 LLC and
Holdings against 600 LLC and Holdings cannot be
amended to state viable claims.
● We reverse the sustaining of Fidelity’s demurrer as to the
civil conspiracy cause of action.
● We reverse the grant of the Board’s summary judgment
motion.
A
We begin with the motions for judgment on the pleadings.
1
Our first issue is whether Sam had standing to claim on
behalf of 2013 LLC. Based on Sam’s supposed lack of standing,
the court granted the motions for judgment on the pleadings as to
his claims on behalf of 2013 LLC. Sam originally sued as the
“managing member” of the LLC. Various defendants argued, and
the trial court agreed, that only a member could bring a claim on
behalf of 2013 LLC.
12
The trial court ruled Sam, as a non-member manager,
could not bring claims on behalf of 2013 LLC. This is especially
true as the 2013 LLC operating agreement specifically required
approval by a majority of the members to commence “any”
litigation.
On this point, the trial court was right.
Sam, however, was not merely a non-member manager. He
alleged he owned a controlling interest in CGW, 600 LLC, and W
LLC, which were three of the four LLC members of 2013
LLC. Indeed, Sam submitted a proposed third amended
complaint bringing the claims on behalf of 2013 LLC in the name
of these three member entities. He attached operating
agreements demonstrating his control of the controlling member
of these three entities.
The proposed third amended complaint and attached
documents established Sam could amend to allege these claims
through appropriate entities with standing. It was an abuse of
discretion to deny leave to amend when Sam had so clearly laid
out a viable fix for his pleading.
Kwan argues Sam waived his right to file derivative claims
because, by filing his second amended complaint, he conceded his
first amended complaint was deficient. Sam included the claims
involved here in his second amended complaint, and so Kwan’s
argument fails.
To summarize, we reverse the order denying Sam leave to
amend his claims to bring them in the name of the member
entities.
2
The court correctly ruled Sam lacked standing as an
individual to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty and escrow
13
negligence against First American. Because Sam was not a party
to the escrow instructions upon which he based his claims, we
affirm. (Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers
Title Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 705, 710 [escrow holder owes no duty
to strangers to the escrow].)
First American argues 2013 LLC’s claims against it also
fail because its conduct caused 2013 LLC no damages. 2013 LLC
received the proceeds of the sale, and First American cannot be
blamed if Kwan later improperly took the funds. This is true, but
Sam did not limit the claims to the missing funds. He also
alleged First American’s conduct allowed Kwan to take
unauthorized action and to bypass 2013 LLC’s proper
decisionmaking process as well. On behalf of 2013 LLC, these
allegations sufficed to show damages.
3
As to Sam’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court
granted Kwan’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Citing
Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 691, the court ruled
Sam sufficiently alleged Kwan owed him a fiduciary duty as a
joint venturer in 2013 LLC. The court reasoned, however, that
Sam had not alleged how Kwan’s breach had harmed him.
Sam adequately alleged harm: according to his complaint,
Kwan deceitfully removed him as managing manager, prevented
him from exercising his right as controlling member of three
members of 2013 LLC, barred him from participating in the
decision to sell the property, and cut him off from the sales
profits.
We thus reverse this ruling.
14
4
The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to
Vibrant, Asset, 600 LLC, and Holdings on Sam’s breach of
contract claims. The court found Sam had not alleged the
existence of contracts with these defendants.
We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to the claims relating
to the operating agreements of 600 LLC and Holdings. The
operating agreement for 600 LLC shows Sam was not a
party. Holdings is a single-member limited liability company
with Sam as the only member. Therefore, Sam is the only party
to the Holdings operating agreement.
Sam was, however, a party to the operating agreement for
Vibrant. The members of Vibrant were Asset, Hertzberg, and
Sam. Vibrant and Asset incorrectly argue the provided operating
agreement is invalid because it is unsigned. (Vita Planning &
Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc. (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 763, 773 [lack of signature does not necessarily
vitiate contract].) Sam alleged the existence of a contract, and
the agreement identified him as a party.
Vibrant and Asset also argue that, even if a contract did
exist, Sam failed to allege a breach. This argument falters: Sam
alleged Vibrant and Asset divested him of his membership shares
in contravention of the requirements laid out in the operating
agreement. This alleged breach.
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting
judgment on the pleading as to the claims for breach of the 600
LLC and Holdings operating agreement against 600 LLC and
Holdings, and reverse as to the claim for breach of the Vibrant
operating agreement against Vibrant and Asset.
15
5
The court granted Kwan judgment on the pleadings on
Sam’s fraud claim. The court found Sam did not allege Kwan
knowingly made a false representation to Sam with the intention
of deceiving him, or that Sam justifiably relied on any false
representation by Kwan. This ruling was erroneous.
Sam based his fraud claim on concealment. A claim for
fraud based on concealment will lie where the defendant
concealed a material fact; the defendant was under a duty to
disclose the fact to the plaintiff; the defendant concealed the fact
with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; the plaintiff was unaware
of the fact and would have acted differently if plaintiff knew; and
the concealment harmed the plaintiff. (Kaldenbach v. Mutual of
Omaha Life Insurance Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 830, 850.)
The trial court found Kwan did owe Sam a fiduciary
duty. Sam alleged that Kwan, as his fiduciary, was under a duty
to disclose material facts that she concealed: namely, her
fabrication of a false operating agreement, her sale of the
property without proper approval, and her failure properly to
account for the funds. By means of his detailed charges of
“forgery” and “fabrication,” Sam alleged Kwan’s scienter with
particularity.
Sam adequately alleged a claim for fraud based on
concealment.
6
The trial court granted Kwan judgment on the pleadings as
to the conspiracy claim because the court found the fraud claim
formed the basis for the conspiracy claim. Thus, because the
court had granted judgment on the pleadings on the fraud claim,
the court found the conspiracy claim also would fail. We are
16
reversing the trial court’s ruling on the fraud claim. We
concomitantly reverse its conspiracy claim ruling.
7
The trial court granted Kwan judgment on the pleadings as
to the Unfair Competition Law claim because it found the fraud
and conspiracy claims insufficient, and these constituted the
Unfair Competition Law claim. Thus, the court held, the Unfair
Competition Law claim was also deficient. We reverse the ruling
as to the Unfair Competition Law claim because we have
reversed the rulings about fraud and conspiracy.
B
We turn to the order sustaining Fidelity’s demurrer. The
trial court sustained this demurrer as to Sam’s claims for civil
conspiracy. The court found the underlying conspiracy claim was
fraud, and the allegations were insufficient because Sam did not
name Fidelity in his claim for fraud.
In his cause of action for civil conspiracy against Fidelity,
Sam alleged Kwan and Fidelity conspired to transfer $190,000
from the escrow to Fidelity as a “finder’s fee.” Sam alleged
Fidelity performed no services to earn this fee, and the funds
rightfully belonged to 2013 LLC. Although Sam omitted these
allegations from his cause of action for fraud, the basis of his
claim against Fidelity was plain. (AREI II Cases (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022 [allegations of conspiracy suffice if they
apprise defendant of character and types of facts plaintiff will
rely on to establish conspiracy].) Sam is entitled to amend to
state claims on behalf of 2013 LLC through the member entities.
It was an abuse of discretion to deny Sam leave to amend his civil
conspiracy claim.
17
C
The court erroneously granted the Board’s motion for
summary judgment.
The ruling was that the Board was a bona fide purchaser
for value, which gave the Board title to the parking lot free and
clear of Sam’s claims. The court held that “[u]ndisputed
evidence” demonstrated the Board purchased without notice of
Sam’s alleged interest in the lot.
Factual disputes, however, precluded summary judgment.
1
The bona fide purchaser doctrine enables a buyer to keep
the purchased property if it can show it bought for value and
lacked knowledge or notice of another’s claim. When the buyer
has actual or constructive notice of a prior interest, however, the
buyer takes the property subject to those other interests. (In re
Marriage of Cloney (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 429, 437 (Cloney).)
For a buyer to establish it was a bona fide purchaser for
value, it must demonstrate it conducted research with due
diligence to see if the title it was planning to buy would be good.
California’s quiet title laws put this duty of inquiry on
buyers of real estate. They must inquire into the validity of their
prospective ownership claim. A contrary incentive would
encourage deliberate blindness and would be “inimical to the
entire system of real property law in California.” (Tsasu LLC v.
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 704, 720 (Tsasu).)
Due diligence requires prospective buyers to heed warning
signs. (Tsasu, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)
The buyer is not entitled to interpret ambiguities in its own
favor. Neither may it ignore reasonable warning signs in the
recorded documents. (Triple A Management Co. v. Frisone (1999)
18
69 Cal.App.4th 520, 530–531.) Nor is the buyer “entitled to
ignore information that comes to it from outside the recorded
chain of title, to the extent such information puts [it] on notice of
information that reasonably brings into question the state of title
reflected in the recorded chain of title.” (Id. at p. 531; see also
612 South LLC v. Laconic Ltd. Partnership (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 1270, 1280; Cloney, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp.
441–442.)
2
Two factors in this case highlighted the importance of
investigating whether Kwan actually had the sale authority she
claimed.
First, the preliminary report notes required proof the
manager had duly executed authority to act on behalf of the
limited liability company.
Second, title officer Rivera testified to industry practice.
Recall Rivera was a key participant in this closing. Rivera had
served as a title officer some 120,000 times in his 38 years of
experience. About 80 percent of the time, the sellers were limited
liability companies.
Rivera testified that a preliminary report is not a
representation of the condition of title, but is done to evaluate
risk solely for the benefit of the title insurer.
In accord with the notes in the preliminary report—the
very notes the Board’s attorney did not review—Rivera testified
that, when a limited liability company is involved, it was
“standard procedure” to review that organization’s documents:
“You’re supposed to get down to who actually can sign.”
Rivera therefore demanded and reviewed the operating
agreement for 2013 LLC. Based on his review, he determined he
19
needed proof the members of the limited liability company
actually were consenting to the sale.
This is why, at 2:04 p.m. on the day of closing, Rivera
emailed Kwan for proof of the members’ consent.
These two factors underlined the importance of ensuring
Kwan actually had authority to sell on behalf of 2013 LLC.
3
At the summary judgment stage, the Board’s inadequate
diligence flunked the test. Reading the record in Sam’s favor, the
Board and its outside legal counsel did not question why 2013
LLC, when buying the lot, had one manager but, the next year
when selling the lot, it had a different manager. The lawyer
entirely skipped the portion of the preliminary report that
stressed the need, in the case of a limited liability company, to
examine the company’s operating agreement and to obtain proof
the company was properly operating through its manager. Her
rationale was that “[t]he informational notes have to do with
what my client has to provide, not with what the seller has to
provide. And I didn’t represent the seller in this transaction.”
This rationale was mistaken. The buyer should have demanded
these documents from the seller, as Rivera in fact did for his
employer. The attorney’s conception of the buyer’s duty of due
diligence in this situation was flawed.
The Board’s attorney also failed to review the deed of trust
and the assignment of rents.
As the Tsasu decision aptly noted, real estate buyers must
inquire into the validity of their prospective ownership claim.
(Tsasu, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 720.)
The Board argues, with our emphasis, that “Sam points to
no statute that holds that operating agreements are proper proof
20
of his ownership rights . . . .” No statute was needed here. As
Rivera testified, reviewing operating agreements is standard, and
crucial, in real estate transactions involving limited liability
companies. The Board relies heavily on what it terms Kwan’s
“ostensible authority” to act on behalf of 2013 LLC. But the
Board’s observations of Kwan are no substitute for the written
documentation Rivera testified was necessary to this crucial
determination.
Title officer Rivera therefore asked Kwan to prove the
members of 2013 LLC consented to her actions, but Kwan’s 2:21
p.m. response was suspect on its face. Earlier we noted the many
ways in which this document raised more questions than it
answered. This suspect document asked readers to believe the
members of the limited liability company were notified, gathered,
voted, and typed up their corporate resolution in the 17 minutes
between the 2:04 p.m. demand from Rivera and the 2:21 p.m.
delivery by Kwan. Alternatively, the document might be
interpreted as Kwan’s claim that she controlled everything and
the “meeting” happened when she “met” with herself.
A reasonably prudent buyer would have questions about
either story. Gathering people together, communicating, voting,
and recording the event in 17 minutes beggars belief.
Alternatively, if Kwan was claiming she held a “meeting” with
herself alone and that created sufficient authority to her to
transact the sale, a reasonable buyer would wonder what, in this
short time, had become of Sam, who the year before had been
signing everything for the limited liability company. And is it
even sensible to speak of meeting with yourself?
Moreover, Kwan purported to be signing for three of the
member entities as the “Managing Manager,” or, alternatively
21
but without explanation, as the “Manager,” of a different entity,
unmentioned in the 2013 LLC operating agreement.
The 2:21 p.m. document likewise bore the earmarks of self-
justification: the document was supposed to be independent
validation of Kwan’s status, but it contained only Kwan’s
signatures.
The fact Kwan signed her own name four times did not
strengthen the apparent force of her supposed proof. The
repetition merely emphasized its circular nature.
This suspect claim of authority would have caused a
reasonable and prudent buyer to inquire further. But instead of
pausing to get to the bottom of the situation, the Board went
ahead and closed the deal 12 minutes later, at 2:33 p.m.
Haste makes waste.
4
Perhaps all Kwan’s documents were valid and she truly
enjoyed full authority to sell the lot on behalf of 2013 LLC. But
Sam’s factual claim was sharply to the contrary: that Kwan had
forged and fabricated these instruments and that he, not Kwan,
retained authority to manage 2013 LLC. This factual dispute
was the heart of the case.
Another factual dispute also doomed the summary
judgment motion. With its motion, the Board submitted a 2013
LLC operating agreement as an exhibit to a declaration. As Sam
gleefully pointed out in opposition, the Board’s submitted version
of the operating agreement listed Sam as the manager, not
Kwan. Yet the Board was moving for summary judgment on the
ground that Kwan and not Sam was the manager. By presenting
an account factually at odds with itself, the Board’s moving
22
papers spotlighted the central fact in controversy: who truly was
authorized to manage 2013 LLC in 2015, anyway?
Further to this point, Sam’s complaint appended the two
contradictory versions of this operating agreement. These
versions are identical in every respect, except the second
substitutes Kwan’s name for Sam’s in every instance. One
version names Sam as the manager. The other names Kwan.
Perplexingly, both bear the same date: “October 13, 2013.”
How can two operating agreements for the same company
with the same date name different managers? When Kwan was
asked to explain, Kwan testified this was an innocent “mistake.”
Sam alleged, however, that Kwan “fabricated” this “unauthorized
version” of the agreement and falsified another document titled
“WRITTEN CONSENT OF MEMBERS”—another Kwan
invention that, Sam claimed, on its face was flawed and
unbelievable. Sam said the only “mistake” was to believe Kwan
at all.
A fact finder must decide who is telling the truth. We
reverse the summary judgment ruling.
D
We deny Sam’s request for judicial notice as moot.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Sam leave to amend his
claims brought on behalf of 2013 LLC, and we remand with
instructions to permit Sam to bring these claims on behalf of the
member entities as reflected in his proposed third amended
complaint. We reverse the remainder of the court’s grant of
judgment on the pleadings except as to the breach of contract
claims based on the operating agreements of 600 LLC and
Holdings against 600 LLC and Holdings. We reverse the trial
23
court’s sustaining of Fidelity’s demurrer as to the civil conspiracy
cause of action. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Board. We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion and award costs to Sam.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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