People v. Rafael B.D.R.

CourtListener 9502442Calctapp10.04.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/10/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167246
v.
RAFAEL B.D.R., (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 19CR011497)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Rafael B.D.R. was sentenced to a six-year prison term for
committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (a)), and sending or exhibiting harmful matter to a minor (§ 288.2,
subd. (a)(2)).1 He was convicted of committing these crimes against Jane Doe
when she was 11 years old. Jane is defendant’s niece; her mother Janeth is
the sister of defendant’s ex-wife, Elizabeth.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that Elizabeth and
Janeth devised a plan for Jane to falsely accuse defendant of abusing her.
Because we find the trial court prejudicially erred when ruling on the new
trial motion, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

1Statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
indicated. Intending no disrespect, we use given names to refer to many
individuals involved, both for clarity and to protect their privacy.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The incident that gave rise to this case occurred on September 8, 2018
and was first reported to the police on July 23, 2019. Within a week of the
report, a complaint was filed against defendant, he was arrested and then
released on bail. Following the filing of an amended information, a jury trial
was held in November and December 2022. The People called two witnesses,
Jane Doe and her older sister Melissa. Defendant called no witnesses.
Excluded Witnesses
The trial court granted the People’s motions in limine to exclude
testimony by two defense witnesses: defendant’s 12 year-old son, John Doe;
and Victoria, the maternal grandmother of both John Doe and Jane Doe.
The defense had proposed to elicit testimony from these other family
members that Jane’s mother, Janeth, had asked them to lie about defendant
in order to “falsely implicate” him. As an offer of proof, the defense stated
that John would testify that Janeth asked him to tell the police that
defendant touched him in “inappropriate places,” even though that had not
happened. Defense counsel proposed to show that this conversation occurred
before Janeth reported to the police that defendant had abused Jane.
Victoria would testify that on the same day the police were contacted, Janeth
asked her to lie to the police by stating that Jane Doe’s behavior toward
defendant changed after September 2018.
The trial court found that John Doe’s testimony was potentially
relevant to the defense theory that Jane Doe made up a story about
defendant at the behest of Janeth, who harbored personal animus toward
defendant. However, the court excluded John Doe’s testimony under
Evidence Code section 352, finding “no clear nexus” between “the
complaining witness” and conversations Janeth had with John Doe. The

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court reasoned there was no evidence Jane Doe even knew about the
conversation between her mother and her cousin, and since Jane Doe was the
complaining witness, it was her credibility that was at stake, not the
credibility of her mother. Moreover, Janeth was not expected to testify, and
allowing testimony about her lack of credibility would be unduly time-
consuming and potentially prejudicial to Jane Doe. For the same reasons,
the court excluded testimony regarding Victoria’s conversations with Janeth.
The Prosecution Case
The People called Melissa as their first witness, and then Jane. At the
time of trial Melissa was 19, and Jane was 15. In September 2018, they lived
with their parents in an apartment complex in Oakland. Their aunt
Elizabeth lived one floor up in the same complex, in an apartment with
defendant and the couple’s three children. The two families “saw each other
very often” and “were very close.”
Melissa
Melissa testified that on September 9, 2018, Jane asked to speak with
her about something. Jane was nervous and upset, holding back tears.
Melissa took her into the bathroom where she started crying and kept asking
Melissa not to tell anybody about their conversation. Once Melissa calmed
her down, Jane told her defendant had made her “uncomfortable” the
previous night when she was at his apartment, helping to take care of his
kids while their aunt Elizabeth was out with other family members.
Melissa told the jury what she recalled Jane telling her about the
incident with defendant: Jane had gone to sleep in her aunt and uncle’s bed,
while defendant went to take a shower. After he came out of the shower and
“clothed himself,” defendant laid in the bed with Jane. They were talking
and Jane was trying to go to sleep when defendant showed her an

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“inappropriate video” that “might have involved people kissing,” or Jane may
have just told Melissa that it was “inappropriate and she felt uncomfortable.”
Jane told Melissa that defendant asked her if she knew what “sex” was, and
when she said “ ‘no’ ” he “pointed out where it happened on her body.”
Defendant also touched Jane’s leg and asked if she wanted to “cuddle.” After
Jane turned him down, defendant went to sleep on the couch.
Melissa testified that she recorded a portion of her conversation with
Jane on her phone. She explained that she recorded only part of the
conversation because she wanted to “listen to her first.” She started
recording once she realized she was going to have to tell someone about the
incident because having the video would make it more likely people would
believe Jane. Melissa acknowledged that Jane had lied to the family before.
The audio recording, which was played for the jury, did not describe abusive
conduct, but it captured Jane crying and sounding very upset as she made
statements such as: “ ‘I am so scared. I don’t know what to do. I don’t want
to see him. I am so upset.’ ”2
Melissa testified that eventually she did tell her mom about the
incident with defendant, during a conversation that occurred about two
months before they called the police in July 2019. At the time, Janeth was
questioning Jane about why she was not doing her chores or going out and
doing things. Melissa interjected that maybe Jane was experiencing mental
health problems and not doing well in school because of personal issues she
was dealing with, and then decided to tell Janeth about what happened with

2 Prior to trial, the court overruled a defense objection to this audio
evidence, admitting it as a spontaneous statement pursuant to Evidence
Code section 1240. This evidence is not included in the appellate record, but
the prosecutor recounted Jane’s statements during the hearing on in limine
motions.

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defendant. When the defense questioned Melissa about Jane’s personal
problems, Melissa acknowledged she had read Jane’s diary, which talked
about how Jane was “suicidal” and felt unloved by her family, but did not
mention defendant or the incident.
Jane Doe
Jane testified that in September 2018 she often spent time with her
aunt and uncle’s family. She used to be close to her cousins, who are younger
than she is, but at the time of trial she was unsure of their ages. She was not
sure or did not remember how old she was or what grade she was in back in
September 2018. She did recall being alone with defendant in his apartment
and feeling scared.
Jane testified that the incident occurred on an evening when she had
gone to defendant’s apartment to help take care of her cousins while her aunt
and parents went out to a casino for the evening. When Jane arrived at the
apartment, her grandfather was there. At around 10:00 p.m., defendant
arrived home, and Jane’s grandfather left. Jane planned to sleep at the
apartment until her aunt got home so that she could help defendant with the
children. She remembered that she went to lie down on her aunt and uncle’s
bed, but she did not recall what she was wearing or if she got under the
covers. She remembered that when defendant came into the room, he was
wearing underwear, but she could not remember if he was wearing anything
else. He laid next to her on the bed, “getting comfortable,” and started asking
her questions and telling her about his life in high school. He asked if Jane
had a boyfriend and if she wanted to cuddle. Jane answered “ ‘no’ ” to both
questions.
Jane recalled that she and defendant were both using their phones
when he asked if she wanted to see a video his friend had sent him that was

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“nasty and weird.” Jane said “ ‘okay,’ ” and defendant played the video,
which showed a car and two naked people. Jane did not understand what the
people were doing when she saw the video, but she later came to understand
that the people in the video were having sex. Jane recalled that defendant
asked her not to tell anyone.
Jane testified that after the video, defendant asked if she “ever wanted
to try that on top of the clothes only,” and Jane told him “ ‘no.’ ” Jane
remembered feeling his hand below her stomach, and that he was making a
tapping motion. He also touched her leg. She did not remember if he
touched the inside or outside of her leg but he did not “ever touch anywhere
in between [her] legs.” Then he said he was going to sleep on the couch. Jane
was really scared and did not move for a long time. When her aunt Elizabeth
got home, Jane did not tell her what had happened because she felt scared.
The next day, she told her sister because she felt comfortable with her sister.
Eventually she told her mom what happened, which “felt good,” because her
mom believed her.
Under cross-examination, Jane acknowledged that on the night of the
September 8 incident, she texted back and forth with her mother about how
the children were doing, and she did not text anything about wanting to
leave. She did not text her sister, who was one floor away, and she did not
attempt to leave the apartment before her aunt got home. Jane identified a
photograph of defendant’s one-bedroom apartment, which showed that his
children’s beds were in the same room and within a foot or two of the adult
bed, where Jane testified the incident with defendant occurred.
Jane testified she was sure that the first time she told her mother
about the incident with defendant was July 23, 2019, the same day they
called the police. The next day, she participated in a videotaped interview.

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During that interview, Jane said she had to tell her mother about the
incident because she could not lie to her anymore. When asked at trial if she
believed defendant mistreated his wife Elizabeth, Jane said that she did not
know. She confirmed, however, that she “felt good” because she was helping
to take “away a really bad guy” from her aunt.
Closing Arguments and Verdicts
The prosecutor argued in closing that defendant had committed a lewd
act on a child under the age of 14 and exhibited harmful matter to a minor.
Defendant was guilty of these charges, she argued, because both Jane and
Melissa were credible witnesses. The girls were obviously emotional, nervous
and afraid. But, the prosecutor emphasized, there was no “evidence in this
case” of “any motivation on the part of Jane Doe to lie,” no evidence “to
suggest that she had any reason to lie about what happened.” The prosecutor
also argued that inconsistent testimony about the time that had elapsed
before Jane Doe’s mother reported the incident to police was a “red herring”
because there was no evidence to suggest that “any delay . . . resulted in any
change of story, or any collusion or anything between Miss Doe and her
mother.”
The defense argued defendant did not molest Jane Doe or show her
pornography, and that Jane was not honest about what happened between
them. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution’s case depended on the
credibility of their two witnesses because Jane Doe’s diary from that time
period showed the absence of a crime; her text messages showed the absence
of a crime; and the audio recording from Melissa’s phone contained no
reference to defendant or any incident involving him. Developing this theme,
defense counsel highlighted perceived discrepancies in the prosecution
evidence.

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On December 8, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty of both charges
after deliberating for approximately one court day. After discharging the
jury, the court found true allegations that Jane Doe was a vulnerable victim,
and that defendant took advantage of a position of trust. (§ 1170, subd. (b);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3) and (a)(11).) A sentencing hearing was
set for January 24, 2023. At the People’s request, defendant was ordered to
surrender his passport pending sentencing.
The New Trial Motion
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence. (§ 1181, subd. (8).) According to the motion, on
January 4, defendant’s ex-wife Elizabeth sent defense counsel an unsolicited
email, disclosing critical new facts. In response to this email, defense counsel
obtained a declaration from Elizabeth, which was attached to the motion to
dismiss.
In her declaration, Elizabeth stated that defendant was “always an
upset person,” and was “always yelling” at her, her kids, and her nieces and
nephews. This mistreatment made Elizabeth and Janeth angry at defendant.
One day, Janeth found Elizabeth crying because defendant had mistreated
her again, and Janeth told Elizabeth she had to get a divorce. Elizabeth
agreed, but said she would not do it because she was afraid. Then, the sisters
had an idea: “Janeth and I thought we’re going to say that he committed a
crime so that he would go to jail and be deported. That way I wouldn’t care
about getting divorced and I wouldn’t be with him anymore. He would be far
away where he wouldn’t bother or yell at me anymore.”
According to the declaration, Elizabeth and Janeth decided that the
crime had to be that defendant molested the children. They considered
saying that Elizabeth’s children were the victims, but her children were very

8
young and were not going to lie. Then they decided Melissa would be the
victim because she was older and “would know how to tell the police what we
wanted.” Elizabeth and Janeth spent two months “training” Melissa to say
that defendant molested her and showed her porn because he wanted to have
sex with her, but they felt that would not be “enough” to get him deported.
Then Janeth suggested using Jane Doe as the victim because they had a
recording they could use of an incident when defendant yelled at Jane Doe
and “she ran out of the house,” which Janeth said could be used as “proof he
molested her.”
Elizabeth stated that for two weeks before calling the police, she and
Janeth trained Jane Doe to say that defendant showed her porn and
masturbated on her. But when Jane gave her report she did not say that
defendant masturbated. Defendant was arrested but released the next day
and Elizabeth became concerned the plan was not going to work. She
distanced herself from Janeth so defendant would think she was on his side
and would not find out she was “involved.” At some point, defendant told her
that his lawyer had learned that Melissa told the police that Janeth had a
plan to try to use defendant’s children against him. Then Elizabeth
completely distanced herself from Janeth because she was very afraid
defendant would find out that Elizabeth was “part of that plan.”
In explaining her reasons for coming forward, Elizabeth stated that she
did not care about the outcome of defendant’s case after obtaining a divorce,
but she could not live with the “burden of guilt” on her conscience, that she
needed to “tell the truth,” and that she could not “overcome the fault” she had
“in planning this case” with Janeth.

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Denial of New Trial Motion
On January 24, 2023, prior to conducting the sentencing hearing, the
court heard argument and ruled on defendant’s new trial motion.
The defense argued that Elizabeth’s declaration constitutes significant
new evidence, as it shows that she orchestrated a fraud in order to have
defendant wrongfully arrested so that he would be deported rather than
Elizabeth having to go through a divorce. Defense counsel argued further,
that when they investigated whether Jane Doe was lying about the event in
question, they found nothing to suggest that Elizabeth was against their
client. She had facilitated defendant’s arrest by telling the police where to
find him, but her explanation for calling the police was that she did not want
defendant arrested in front of the children. They asked her “if she thought
there were any reasons why [Jane Doe] would lie and she said, ‘no.’ ” During
their investigation, the defense did discover evidence that Janeth had
attempted to get other family members to lie, but the court excluded that
evidence from trial. Defense counsel argued that although the court’s ruling
was arguably correct when made—because at that time there was no link
between the misconduct and Jane Doe’s credibility—Elizabeth’s revelation
now provided that link and constituted new evidence that defendant was
falsely accused.
The prosecution argued the defense had not been diligent in
investigating the matter, which was relevant but not dispositive, as the
ultimate question was whether the new evidence was significant. The
prosecutor urged the court to exercise its wide discretion to deny the new
trial motion on the ground that Elizabeth’s declaration was not significant
because it was “simply just not credible.”

10
After the matter was submitted, the court made an initial ruling not to
conduct an evidentiary hearing, stating: “I assume for purposes of your
motion that if [Elizabeth] was brought to Court that she would testify
consistently [with] what she put in that declaration. . . . So I am not in need
of witness testimony and a motion for new trial doesn’t require an
evidentiary hearing. So I am confident that I have the information I need to
make a ruling here.”
As to the merits, the court denied the new trial motion for three
reasons. First, it concluded Elizabeth’s declaration did not constitute new
evidence. The court reasoned that when the trial started, the defense sought
to introduce evidence that Jane Doe and her sister were “somehow falsifying
evidence” due to “some family disputes,” so the fact that Elizabeth was now
putting “in writing what had been already suggested by the defense” did not
“necessarily” constitute new evidence.
Next, the court found that if the evidence was presented at a retrial, a
different outcome was not “probable.” The court reasoned that the People’s
witnesses were compelling, and the audio recording also likely had an impact.
Given the fact that Jane Doe’s “testimony is the key,” the court concluded
that whether or not Elizabeth and Janeth “had some animus and were trying
to have [defendant] deported . . . would not be sufficient to overcome the
People’s evidence and would not likely lead to a different outcome.”
Finally, the court found that this evidence could have been discovered
sooner. Taking defense counsel at his word that his office had not previously
known about Elizabeth’s involvement, the court nevertheless believed that “if
her statement were true,” it would have come out sooner, given that
Elizabeth had been present in court, had been identified as a potential
witness, and was married to defendant.

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DISCUSSION
The trial court may grant a new trial motion “[w]hen new evidence is
discovered material to the defendant, and which he [or she] could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.” (§ 1181,
subd. (8).) “The central question in the determination of whether a new trial
should be granted on the ground of ‘newly discovered evidence’ is whether
that evidence would probably result in a different verdict upon retrial.
[Citation.] That is a question which normally can best be answered by the
trial judge, who has been witness to the presentation of all the evidence at
trial. Consequently, the trial court’s determination that a new trial should
not be granted may be disturbed only where it is shown that there had been
an abuse of discretion—as, for example, where the ‘newly discovered
evidence’ contradicts the strongest evidence introduced against the
defendant.” (People v. Cooper (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 844, 852 (Cooper).)
In ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence,
courts consider the following factors: (1) whether the evidence, not just its
materiality, is “ ‘ “newly discovered” ’ ”; (2) whether the evidence is
“ ‘ “cumulative” ’ ” as to the factual issue; (3) if admitting the evidence at a
retrial would “ ‘ “render a different result probable” ’ ”; (4) if the moving
party, with “ ‘ “reasonable diligence,” ’ ” could have discovered and produced
the evidence at trial; and (5) whether the facts are “ ‘ “shown by the best
evidence of which the case admits.” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th
312, 328 (Delgado).)
In the present case, the trial court addressed each of these factors in
denying the new trial motion. However, the court’s analysis was short on
facts and in some places inconsistent with the record. For example, in
concluding that Elizabeth’s declaration does not constitute new evidence, the

12
court emphasized that the defense theory had always been that Jane Doe was
lying because of a family dispute. But the pertinent question is whether the
evidence is new, not whether it supports a new theory. (See § 1181, subd. (8)
[requiring “new evidence” to be material merely “to the defendant”].) The
trial court did not address that Elizabeth’s declaration stated, unequivocally
and for the first time, that she and Janeth made up a story about defendant
molesting Jane Doe and coached Jane to tell that false story to the police for
the purpose of getting defendant deported. This was undeniably new
evidence of different facts than those presented at trial, and the trial court
took defense counsel at his word that this evidence was not known to the
defense at the time of trial.
The trial court’s finding that this evidence could have been discovered
sooner is, for similar reasons, unsupported by the record, as it ignores
Elizabeth’s statement under penalty of perjury that she pretended to be on
defendant’s side during the court proceedings. In light of this ruse, which is
consistent with defense counsel’s account of what Elizabeth told them during
their pretrial investigation, we fail to see how any lack of diligence on
counsel’s part can be blamed for not prompting Elizabeth to confess that she
and her sister caused defendant to face false allegations of felony conduct.
The trial court’s determination that this evidence would likely not have
rendered a different result raises additional concerns. The court viewed the
prosecution’s evidence as compelling and dismissed Elizabeth’s declaration as
an expression of animus toward defendant, again failing to recognize the
ways in which Elizabeth’s declaration contradicts the prosecution’s case and
potentially undermines the credibility of both Jane Doe and Melissa. Under
the trial court’s view, the fact that defendant presented to the jury a defense
that the witnesses were lying somehow weighs against granting him a new

13
trial, but the opposite is true. “Numerous cases hold that a motion for a new
trial should be granted when the newly discovered evidence contradicts the
strongest evidence introduced against the defendant.” (People v. Martinez
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 816, 823; see e.g. People v. Gilbert (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 933,
938; People v. Randle (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 286, 293–294.) On its face,
Elizabeth’s declaration contradicts the strongest evidence against defendant,
the testimony of Jane Doe, as well as the ostensibly corroborating testimony
of her older sister. The declaration also provides an explanation for the audio
recording that is inconsistent with the prosecution’s case. Moreover, defense
evidence that Janeth attempted to get family members to lie about defendant
was excluded at trial precisely because of the absence of evidence linking
Janeth’s animus to Jane Doe, and Elizabeth’s testimony could potentially
provide that link.
On appeal, the People discount Elizabeth’s declaration as impeachment
evidence, invoking the general rule that a new trial should not be granted
“where the only value of the newly discovered testimony is as impeaching
evidence or to contradict a witness of the opposing party.” (People v. Hall
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 282, 299.) In Hall, the defendant moved for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence offered to impeach the credibility of
a medical expert who testified at the defendant’s murder trial. Finding no
legal basis to grant the motion, the trial court reasoned that the issue was
“ ‘not a big part of this case’ ” and that the proffered evidence contradicted the
defendant’s own testimony. (Id. at p. 298.) The ruling was affirmed on
multiple grounds, including that its primary value was to impeach a
prosecution expert, and that the expert’s testimony was “not the strongest
evidence” against the defendant. (Id. at pp. 298–299.) By contrast, in the
present case Elizabeth’s declaration does contradict the strongest evidence

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against defendant. At a retrial, Elizabeth’s testimony could potentially raise
grave doubts about the veracity and credibility of the only witnesses who
testified against defendant, while providing an innocent explanation for the
recorded statement the prosecution relied upon to corroborate their
testimony. (See People v. Huskins (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 862–863.)
To its credit, the trial court found that Elizabeth’s declaration was not
cumulative, and that if she testified at a retrial, her testimony would be the
best evidence of her version of events. The court acknowledged these as
relevant factors. (See Delgado, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 328.) Yet it did not
conduct an evidentiary hearing, taking the view that it did not need to
consider Elizabeth’s actual testimony to reach a fair disposition of the motion,
instead “assum[ing]” any testimony from Elizabeth would be consistent with
her declaration. In another case, where the proffered testimony is less
damaging to the prosecution’s trial evidence, such an approach might be
proper. But here, testimony consistent with Elizabeth’s declaration, if at all
credible, would have required the trial court to grant defendant a new trial
because it would have rendered probable a different result at trial. (See
Cooper, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 852.) Our reading of the transcript
suggests that the trial court denied the motion here because it did not, in
fact, find Elizabeth’s sworn declaration credible. “[I]t is difficult for the Court
to believe that if her statement were true, it would not have come” to light
earlier, the court explained.
Although a defendant does not have a right to an evidentiary hearing
on a new trial motion, the court has authority to order one. (People v.
Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 415, 417, 419; People v. Hayes (1999) 21
Cal.4th 1211, 1255.) Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged the value
of an evidentiary hearing when material facts are in dispute. (Ibid.) Here,

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had Elizabeth been examined about her statement, the parties could have
probed her account for strengths and weaknesses, which might have clarified
whether the new evidence was sufficiently credible to warrant a new trial.
(See Hedgecock, at p. 417 [“when compared to the use of affidavits, a hearing
at which witnesses testify and are subject to cross-examination is a more
reliable means of determining whether misconduct occurred”].) At an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court could have assessed whether Elizabeth
was indeed willing to testify consistently with her declaration, and it could
have observed her demeanor in evaluating whether a jury could find her
credible.
The People analogize Elizabeth to a witness who gave testimony and
then retracted it, positing that her declaration must be “ ‘viewed with
suspicion.’ ” (Quoting In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 704.) The People’s
analogy does not hold, as the jury heard nothing from Elizabeth; they only
heard from Jane Doe and Melissa. In any event, even when a new trial is
based on a witness’s recantation, the role of the trial court “is to determine
whether the new evidence is credible, i.e., worthy of belief by the jury. That
determination is made after a consideration of all the facts pertinent to the
particular issue. The trial court is not the final arbiter of the truth or falsity
of the new evidence.” (People v. Minnick (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1478, 1482,
italics added.)
In the similar though not identical situation of a witness who comes
forward to confess to a crime for which the defendant was convicted, it has
been held that a trial court ruling on a new trial motion should take
“advantage of what purport[s] to be critical new evidence” by taking
“affirmative action” to call the declarant as a witness and examine him or her
under oath, thus allowing the witness to be questioned fully about the

16
contents of the declaration. (People v. Hairgrove (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 606,
610.) If the court had followed that course here, Elizabeth’s testimony could
potentially have established that there was substantial merit to the new trial
motion or, alternatively, that Elizabeth had clearly perjured herself to help
defendant. “Either outcome would have contributed positively to the
administration of justice,” and even if Elizabeth’s testimony turned out to be
inconclusive, “at least the court would have had all available information
before it in ruling on the motion for a new trial.” (Hairgrove, at pp. 610–611.)
Our Supreme Court has held that a ruling on a new trial motion will
not be disturbed on appeal “ ‘ “unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of
discretion clearly appears.” ’ ” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114,
1210.) However, the Court has also recognized that such an abuse can occur
where affidavits produced by the moving party constitute material evidence
that the defendant may have been falsely convicted. (People v. Williams
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 263, 275.) To be sure, Williams involved unique facts;
unbiased affiants who came forward with new evidence that undermined the
uncorroborated testimony of a single prosecution witness and provided the
defendant with a complete defense. (Id. at pp. 270–271.) Nevertheless, in
concluding that it was “an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to have
granted defendant’s motion for a new trial,” the Court emphasized that
where “affidavits . . . disclose a deliberate scheme to produce false evidence
and to abuse and subvert the process of the court for the purpose of bringing
about the conviction of an innocent man,” courts “must be particularly
sensitive to prevent such a criminal perversion of their proper functions.”
(Id. at p. 275; see also In re Sagin (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 570 [vacating
conviction on petition for habeas corpus in light of newly discovered DNA
evidence].)

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On the record presented to us, we conclude Elizabeth’s declaration does
constitute new evidence, and the trial court’s first error was in concluding
otherwise. It also failed properly to evaluate the credibility and force of this
evidence. The court appears to have surmised that Elizabeth’s account was
not true based primarily, if not solely, on the timing of her disclosure. And
the court’s ultimate conclusion that granting the new trial motion would not
likely change the outcome of this case was based on its determination that
the two witnesses who were allowed to testify were compelling, without
considering how the jury might have evaluated their testimony differently if
Elizabeth’s testimony also proved to be compelling in its own right and if, as
a result of Elizabeth’s testimony, the jury had heard from John Doe and his
grandmother.
We will not attempt to assess Elizabeth’s credibility based on her sworn
declaration alone, and for that reason do not decide whether defendant is
actually entitled to a new trial. We do, however, conclude that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion in denying defendant’s new trial motion without
first holding an evidentiary hearing that would enable it more clearly to
assess the new evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying the new trial motion are vacated,
and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to rehear the
motion for a new trial.
TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Raphael B.D.R. (A167246)

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Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Delia Trevino

Counsel: Beles & Beles, Robert J. Beles, and Micah Reyner, for
Defendant and Appellant

Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E.
Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan
Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney General
for Plaintiff and Respondent

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