People v. Allen CA3

CourtListener 9484551Calctapp15.03.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Allen CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C098359

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE006983)

v.

CHARLES E. ALLEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

In September 2020, defendant Charles E. Allen was convicted of making criminal
threats and sentenced to state prison (the 2020 conviction is not at issue in this appeal).
(Pen. Code, § 422.)1 In March 2022, while he was in prison on the 2020 conviction, he

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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exposed himself to a prison psychiatric technician. Defendant completed his prison term
for the 2020 conviction in November 2022.
In February 2023, a jury found defendant guilty of unlawful indecent exposure.
(§ 314, subd. (1).) The jury also found true two aggravating sentencing factors and that
defendant had a prior strike. (§§ 1170, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12; Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 4.421(b)(3), 4.421(b)(5).) Later that month, the trial court sentenced defendant to
state prison for the middle term of two years, doubled due to the prior strike.
During the sentencing hearing, the court noted that, had defendant pleaded guilty
to the current crime while he was still in prison for the 2020 conviction, he only would
have been sentenced to one-third of the middle term doubled due to the strike, or 16
months. But, defendant was now subject to the full term for the current crime. The court
opined the government was not at fault for any delay, given that it had filed charges
against defendant less than two months after the exposure incident.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to a
full term for the conviction instead of applying the one-third of the middle term rule
under section 1170.1, subdivision (a). We will affirm.

DISCUSSION
Generally, when an individual is convicted of multiple felonies and a trial court
imposes consecutive terms, the aggregate sentence is the sum of the longest term (the
principal term) plus one-third of the middle term of the remaining counts (subordinate
terms). (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) This rule applies whether the defendant has been convicted
of multiple felonies in the same proceeding or court, or in different proceedings or courts.
(Ibid.)
However, the rule is different for in-custody felonies: “In the case of any person
convicted of one or more felonies committed while the person is confined in the state
prison . . . and . . . the court imposes consecutive terms, the term of imprisonment for all

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the convictions that the person is required to serve consecutively shall commence from
the time the person would otherwise have been released from prison. If the new offenses
are consecutive with each other, the principal and subordinate terms shall be calculated as
provided in subdivision (a). This subdivision shall be applicable in cases of convictions
of more than one offense in the same or different proceedings.” (§ 1170.1, subd. (c),
italics added.)
As courts have explained, “ ‘ “The statutory scheme makes clear that such
felonies, i.e., those felonies committed in prison, are exempt from the general sentencing
scheme. [Citation.] A sentence under [section 1170.1,] subdivision (c) is longer than a
sentence imposed under subdivision (a) because the in-prison offenses are fully
consecutive to the sentence for the offense for which the defendant was in prison. Using
sentencing jargon ‘the in-prison offense is treated as a new principal term rather than as a
subordinate term to the out-of-prison offense.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Brantley (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 917, 922.)
We find no merit in defendant’s contention that the trial court should have treated
the sentence for the conviction at issue here as a subordinate term to his 2020 conviction
(and therefore imposed a 16-month sentence instead of four years). As the People
correctly note, defendant was ineligible because he had completed his prison term for his
2020 conviction when he was sentenced for the 2023 conviction. (People v. Brantley,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 922 [“a reading of the plain language of [section 1170.1,]
subdivision (c) makes apparent that this provision does not apply once the prisoner has
completed the sentence he or she was serving when the in-prison crime was
committed”].) In addition, defendant was ineligible because his 2020 conviction was for
an out-of-prison offense, while his 2023 conviction was for an in-prison offense. As
such, his 2023 conviction must be treated as a new principal term rather than subordinate
to the 2020 conviction. (§ 1170.1, subd. (c); Brantley, at p. 922.) The trial court did not
err in sentencing defendant to four years for the 2023 conviction.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MAURO, J.

RENNER, J.

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