In re Jayleen P. CA2/7

CourtListener 9483834Calctapp13.03.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/13/24 In re Jayleen P. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re JAYLEEN P., a Person B326771
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County Super.
Court Law. Ct. No. 22CCJP03934)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADRIANA C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________

Adriana C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s
disposition order denying her family reunification services with
respect to 14-year-old Jayleen P. under Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A). Mother contends
there is not substantial evidence to support the court’s finding
she failed to make a reasonable effort to address her 20-year-old
drug abuse problem that led to the removal of Jayleen’s older half
siblings, with whom she failed to reunify. Mother also contends
the court abused its discretion in finding reunification was not in
Jayleen’s best interests. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Prior Dependency Proceedings as to Jayleen and Her Half
Siblings
On October 27, 2004 the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency
petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), on behalf of
two of Mother’s children, then-nine-year-old Jorge C. and then-

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
three-year-old Yazmin C., alleging Mother’s drug use.2 The
juvenile court sustained the petition and removed Jorge and
Yazmin from Mother and the children’s father, Ramon C. Mother
was granted family reunification services and ordered to attend a
drug rehabilitation program with random drug testing, a parent
education program, and individual counseling to address case
issues.
A year later (on October 28, 2005) the Department filed a
dependency petition on behalf of Mother’s then-three-month-old
daughter Joselyn C. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and
(j). The juvenile court sustained the petition under
subdivision (b) and ordered Joselyn removed from Mother and
Ramon, with Mother to receive reunification services.
On May 1, 2006 the juvenile court terminated Mother’s
reunification services as to Jorge and Yazmin, finding Mother
was not in compliance with her case plan. On August 7 the court
likewise terminated reunification services as to Joselyn. In
March 2007 the court appointed the maternal grandmother,
Maria R., as the children’s legal guardian, and the court
subsequently terminated jurisdiction as to the three children.
On May 21, 2008 the Department filed a dependency
petition on behalf of then-one-year-old Jeany C. under

2 The juvenile court’s minute orders for the prior dependency
proceedings are included in the record on appeal, but the October
2004 petition, subsequent petitions, and other court documents
from the prior dependency proceedings are not. Although the
factual allegations are not set forth in the minute orders, the
parties do not dispute that jurisdiction over the children was
based on Mother’s drug use.

3
section 300, subdivision (b). The juvenile court sustained the
petition and ordered Jeany removed from Mother and Jeany’s
alleged father, Lazaro G. The court denied family reunification
services to Mother pursuant to the bypass provisions in
section 361.5, former subdivision (b)(10) and subdivision (b)(13).3
The court instructed Mother to file a section 388 petition “when
appropriate.”
On June 29, 2009 the juvenile court granted Mother’s
section 388 petitions as to Yazmin and Joselyn, reinstated
jurisdiction over Yazmin, terminated maternal grandmother’s
guardianship, and placed the children with Mother under
Department jurisdiction.4 On November 24 the court released

3 Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A) (formerly codified at
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), without subparagraphs),
provides that reunification services need not be provided to a
parent where the juvenile court terminated reunification services
for any sibling (or half sibling) of the dependent child after the
sibling has been removed from the parent, and the parent has not
subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that
led to removal of the sibling. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13),
provides in part that the court may bypass reunification services
if the parent “has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use
of drugs or alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment
for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to
the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court’s
attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of
drug or alcohol treatment . . . on at least two prior occasions . . . .”
4 The juvenile court found then-14-year old Jorge a ward of
the court pursuant to section 602 and ordered that jurisdiction
remain terminated as to him.

4
Jeany to Mother as well and terminated jurisdiction over
Yazmin, Joselyn, and Jeany.
Jayleen was born to Mother and Frederico P. (Father)5 in
December 2008. On March 14, 2011 the Department filed a
dependency petition on behalf of Jayleen pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b), and on behalf of Yazmin, Joselyn, and Jeany
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g).6 On April 27
the juvenile court sustained the allegations under subdivision (b)
that Mother had an “unresolved history of substance abuse
including cocaine, marijuana and alcohol, which periodically
renders [her] incapable of providing for the children”; in February
2011 Mother tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine; and Mother had mental and emotional
problems, including depression, that interfered with her care for
the children and placed them at risk of harm. The court declared
the children dependents of the court and released them to Mother
under Department supervision on the condition Mother live with
maternal grandmother. The court ordered family maintenance
services and Mother to participate in individual counseling to
address case issues, including mental health and relapse
prevention, as well as drug counseling and random testing.

5 Father is not a party to this appeal.
6 Section 300, subdivision (g), provides for juvenile court
jurisdiction where, among other grounds, “[t]he child has been
left without any provision of support,” “the child’s parent has
been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the
care of the child,” or “the whereabouts of the parent are
unknown, and reasonable efforts to locate the parent have been
unsuccessful.”

5
On July 13, 2011 the juvenile court sustained the allegation
in the petition that Father had a history of substance abuse and
was a current abuser of marijuana and alcohol, removed Jayleen
from Father, and ordered reunification services. Father’s case
plan included individual counseling, drug counseling, and
random drug testing. On November 30, 2011 the court sustained
a section 387 supplemental petition as to Mother,7 terminated the
home-of-parent order, removed the children from Mother, and
denied Mother reunification services under section 361.5, former
subdivision (b)(10). Mother was deported to Mexico in October
2012 and lost contact with Jayleen.
On March 15, 2013 the juvenile court granted sole legal
and physical of custody of Jayleen to Father after finding he was
in compliance with his case plan, and the court terminated
jurisdiction. On April 25, 2014 the court terminated Mother’s
parental rights as to Yazmin, Joselyn, and Jeany, who were
adopted by maternal aunt Daniella J.

B. Jayleen’s Current Dependency Proceeding
1. Referral and Petition
On September 28, 2022 the Department received an
immediate response referral alleging Father sexually abused
then-13-year-old Jayleen. According to the referral, Jayleen
reported that Father had been sexually abusing her for the past
10 years, and in a recent incident Father fondled her breasts and

7 The record does not contain details on the supplemental
petition.

6
penetrated her vagina with his finger and penis.8 The sexual
abuse occurred when Jayleen’s stepmother, Norma D., was not
around.
Norma reported to the social worker that she and Father
had been dating for 12 years, but they were not legally married,
and she did not have any legal rights over Jayleen. However,
Norma had raised Jayleen from infancy, and Jayleen called her
“mom.” Norma stated that on September 27 Jayleen had been
caught at school with drugs and drug paraphernalia and Jayleen
then disclosed Father’s sexual abuse to her. Norma immediately
went to the police, and Father was arrested the following day.
Father reported he never touched Jayleen inappropriately and
denied any form of digital penetration or attempted penile
penetration. He stated he and Jayleen had a misunderstanding a
few weeks earlier, they were not speaking, and Jayleen recently
began acting up. Father admitted he had slapped Jayleen for not
doing her homework correctly two weeks earlier. Father was
released from custody around October 1.
On October 3, 2022 a police detective reported to the
Department that the district attorney declined to prosecute the
sexual abuse case against Father for lack of evidence. A forensic
examination of Jayleen showed no signs of physical abuse,
although in a forensic interview Jayleen provided a consistent

8 Jayleen subsequently told a social worker that Father had
touched her inappropriately since she was three years old, and
Father digitally penetrated her vagina approximately three times
since she had turned 12. On four occasions, beginning when
Jayleen was six, Father either attempted to or penetrated her
vagina with his penis.

7
and detailed account of her abuse. On October 5 the juvenile
court9 removed Jayleen from Father, and she was placed in foster
care.
On October 7, 2022 the Department filed a petition on
behalf of Jayleen under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and
subdivision (d), alleging Father sexually abused Jayleen from
ages three to 13, including incidents in 2019 and 2021 when
Father penetrated Jayleen’s vagina with his penis. The same day
the Department filed a detention report stating Mother’s
whereabouts were unknown, and “[p]er child, she has not seen or
spoken to her mother in over 10 years and does not know her.”
On October 10 the juvenile court10 ordered Jayleen detained from
Father. The court ordered the Department to continue efforts to
locate and contact Mother.

2. Department reports and jurisdiction hearing
In the December 1, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition report,
the Department stated it had been unable to locate Mother, who
could not be found at her last known addresses. Father said he
knew Mother was a drug addict who used methamphetamine
when he first met her, and when Jayleen was an infant he
brought Mother to an inpatient rehabilitation center, where she
stayed for six months.
Jayleen told the social worker she had not seen Mother
since she was three years old and had only “faint” memories of
Mother and the maternal relatives. She considered Norma to be

9 Judge Debra R. Archuleta.
10 Juvenile Court Referee Robin R. Kesler.

8
her “mom” and Norma’s older daughter Vanessa to be her
“sister.” Jayleen did not want to have visits with Father because
she was angry at him for denying her allegations of abuse, but
she hoped to have visits with Norma and Vanessa.
On January 4, 2023 the Department filed an addendum
report stating that in December 2022 it located Mother through
maternal relatives, and a social worker interviewed Mother by
telephone on December 28. Mother reported she was
undocumented and had been living in Bell Gardens for less than
a year. Mother was born in Mexico and first emigrated to the
United States around 2001. Mother began using drugs when she
was 17 years old, and she used marijuana, alcohol,
methamphetamine, and cocaine to escape her problems, including
childhood sexual abuse.
Mother reported that in 2008, when she became pregnant
with Jayleen, she enrolled in a two-year treatment program that
she completed in 2011. Mother was homeless after leaving the
treatment program and left her five children with maternal
grandmother so they would not be homeless. Around this time,
she was arrested while staying at a house that was possibly used
for drug or human trafficking. She claimed that although she
was not involved in criminal activity, she could not afford a
lawyer and was incarcerated for six months. Mother did not
know how to contact Father for visits with Jayleen and lost
touch.
Mother was deported to Mexico in 2012, and she lived in
Tijuana until 2017. Mother stated that during this period she
stopped using all substances and focused on returning to the
United States to be near her children. However, by the time she
returned to California in 2017, Father and Jayleen had moved,

9
and Mother was afraid to contact law enforcement to find them.
Mother reported she had remained sober since 2011 and she
occasionally attended 12-step meetings. Mother wanted Jayleen
to have an opportunity to know her and the maternal relatives,
she hoped to have monitored visitation with Jayleen soon, and
she said she would comply with any court orders to reunify. The
Department scheduled Mother for an on-demand drug test to
take place in January 2023.
When the Department informed Jayleen it had made
contact with Mother and maternal relatives, Jayleen became
emotional and expressed that she was upset with Father for
keeping the maternal family away from her; Jayleen wanted to
meet Mother as soon as possible. The Department recommended
Mother have monitored visitation with Jayleen and be provided
with reunification services, including drug and alcohol testing,
counseling, and a full treatment program if she tested positive.
In the January 10, 2023 last minute information for the
court, the Department reported that on January 3 Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana.
The Department expressed concern that Mother had not been
forthcoming about her current substance abuse, having reported
she had been sober for over a decade. After reviewing the record
of Mother’s prior dependency proceedings, the Department
recommended against reunification services based on Mother’s
recent test results, her long-term history of substance abuse, and
her failure to reunify with Jayleen’s half siblings. However,
Mother’s first in-person, monitored visit with Jayleen “went
well,” Jayleen had an opportunity to meet some of her half
siblings, and the Department was exploring maternal aunt
Daniella as a possible placement.

10
At the January 11, 2023 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile
court11 sustained the petition as alleged, finding Jayleen’s
allegations of sexual abuse were consistent and credible. The
court took judicial notice of the minute orders of the prior
dependency proceedings involving Jayleen and her half siblings.
The Department recommended based on Mother’s dependency
history that the court bypass reunification services. The court
ordered the Department to provide Mother with referrals for
weekly, random, and on-demand drug testing and for Mother to
have monitored visits with Jayleen for at least two hours per
week. The court continued the disposition hearing to February 3.

3. Last minute information and disposition hearing
In the February 2, 2023 last minute information for the
court, the Department reported that Mother visited with Jayleen
twice in January, in addition to telephone calls. The social
worker stated the visits had gone very well, and Mother “engages
with Jayleen appropriately and Jayleen appears happy to visit
with Mother.” The social worker and caregiver both noted that
Jayleen appeared to be in better spirits, making improvements to
her appearance and mood, since meeting with Mother. Jayleen
did not want any visitation or contact with Father, although she
continued to want to have visitation with Norma. The social
worker informed Jayleen the Department was evaluating
prospective placement in the home of maternal grandmother, and
Jayleen reported she would be happy to live with her maternal

11 Judge Daniel Zeke Zeidler presided over the jurisdiction
and disposition hearings.

11
relatives. Mother had a second drug test on January 26, and she
tested negative.
With respect to her January 3 positive drug test, Mother
admitted she used methamphetamine, stating the sudden news
and prospect of having Jayleen back in her life gave her mixed
feelings. Mother did not believe she relapsed into drug addiction,
but she accepted the need for treatment and planned to enroll in
a treatment program and submit to drug testing. The
Department provided Mother with referrals for parenting, sexual
abuse awareness, substance abuse counseling, and individual
counseling.
At the February 3, 2023 disposition hearing, Mother’s
attorney requested the juvenile court grant Mother reunification
services, noting that recent visits had been going well, Jayleen
was happy to visit with Mother, and both the caretaker and social
worker observed that Jayleen’s mood and spirits had improved.
Mother tested negative for drugs on January 26 and was going to
enroll in recommended services. Minor’s counsel argued that
although Mother’s presence in Jayleen’s life was important and
having a positive impact—and the attorney favored continued
visitation—she was concerned Jayleen’s nascent relationship
with Mother would be set up for failure if Mother failed to
reunify, especially because Mother had only one clean drug test.
The attorney argued Mother was not ready to reunify and it
would not be in Jayleen’s best interest to start the reunification
process without being able to maintain consistency. Once Mother
stabilized her life and began the services referred by the
Department, she could file a section 388 petition seeking
reunification services.

12
After hearing argument, the juvenile court declared
Jayleen a dependent of the court and removed her from Father’s
custody. The court denied Mother reunification services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A), finding by clear and
convincing evidence Mother’s reunification services as to
Jayleen’s half siblings had been terminated, and Mother had not
made reasonable efforts to address the issues that led to the
siblings’ removal. The court further stated it “cannot find by
clear and convincing evidence that it’s in the best interest of the
child, after all of these years, to have the mother not being in her
life, to grant . . . the mother reunification services.” The court
ordered supervised visitation for Mother a minimum of four
hours per week with Department discretion to liberalize. The
court ordered reunification services for Father, but denied
visitation for either Father or Norma outside of conjoint therapy
with Jayleen.
Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“A juvenile court is generally required to order
reunification services for a parent ‘whenever a child is removed’
from that parent’s custody.” (In re Jayden M. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271 (Jayden M.), quoting § 361.5,
subd. (a); see Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
1113, 1120 (Jennifer S.) [“The purpose of reunification efforts is
to ‘eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and
facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal
of preservation of family, whenever possible.’”].) However, “in

13
certain statutorily enumerated situations”—known as “bypass
provisions”—the Legislature has “granted juvenile courts
discretion to decide whether reunification services are ‘in the best
interest of the child.’” (Jayden M., at p. 1271, citing § 361.5,
subds. (b) & (c)(2); accord, Jennifer S., at p. 1121; see In re A.E.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141 [Section 361.5, subdivision (b),
provides that “‘[r]eunification services need not be provided’ if the
court finds ‘by clear and convincing evidence’ that any of
17 enumerated bypass provisions apply.”].)
“Consonant with the general presumption in favor of
mandatory reunification services, the bypass provisions are
‘narrow in scope’ and reach situations where ‘“the likelihood of
reunification”’ is ‘“so slim”’ due to a parent’s past failures that
‘expend[ing]’ the Department’s ‘“scarce”’ resources on
reunification services is likely to be ‘fruitless,’ or when ‘attempts
to facilitate reunification’ would otherwise not ‘serve and protect
the child’s interest.’” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1271; accord, Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1120-
1121; In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.) “By
making the grant of reunification services discretionary in these
situations, the bypass provisions aim to ‘focus reunification
efforts’ and resources on the cases ‘most likely to succeed’ with
reunification.” (Jayden M., at p. 1271; accord, In re Joshua M.
(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 471.)
Here, the juvenile court denied Mother’s reunification
services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A), which
provides, “Reunification services need not be provided to a
parent” if the juvenile court “finds, by clear and convincing
evidence,” that “the parent . . . failed to reunify with [a] sibling or
half sibling” of the dependent child; the juvenile court in the prior

14
dependency case “ordered termination of reunification services”;
and the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to
treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half
sibling . . . from that parent.”
“A ‘reasonable effort to treat’ a problem means just that.
The question is not whether the parent has ‘“‘cure[d]’”’ or
‘“abolished”’ the problem [citations], or whether the parent has
‘attained’ a ‘“certain level of progress.”’ [Citation.] Instead, the
focus is on the parent’s effort. It is not enough to show ‘any’
effort, even a genuine one. [Citation.] ‘[L]ackadaisical or half-
hearted efforts’ will also not do.” (Jayden M., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, italics and fn. omitted; accord, Jennifer
S. supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.) “Instead, the effort must be
reasonable, and reasonableness is assessed by looking to (1) the
duration of the parent’s effort, (2) the ‘extent and context’ of the
parent’s effort, and (3) other factors related to the ‘quality and
quantity of those efforts.’ [Citation.] The parent’s progress, or
lack thereof, ‘both in the short and long term’—while not
dispositive—is nevertheless relevant ‘to the extent it bears on the
reasonableness of the effort made.’” (Jayden M., at p. 1276,
italics omitted; accord, Jennifer S., at p. 1121; R.T. v. Superior
Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 915.)
The court’s inquiry under section 361.5 does not end
there: “[O]nce the juvenile court determines that a parent is
described by subdivision (b)(10) of that statute, it shall not order
reunification services for that parent ‘unless the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best
interest of the child.’ (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)” (Jennifer S., supra,
15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.) “In the second step, which
presupposes the Department has carried its initial burden, the

15
burden shifts to the parent to prove that it is in the child’s best
interest for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to provide
reunification services in this case.” (Jayden M., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272; accord, In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
19, 24.)
“In exercising this discretion, the court may consider a
variety of factors relevant to the child’s best interest, including
(1) the parent’s ‘“‘current efforts and fitness,’”’ (2) the parent’s
‘“‘history,’”’ (3) the ‘“‘gravity of the problem’”’ that led to the
assertion of dependency, (4) the ‘“strength of the bonds”’ between
the child and the parent and between the child and the current
caregiver, and (5) the ‘“‘child’s need for stability and
continuity.’”’” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272-
1273; accord, In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164
(G.L.).) “‘[A]t least part of the best interest analysis must be a
finding that further reunification services have a likelihood of
success. In other words, there must be some “reasonable basis to
conclude” that reunification is possible before services are offered
to a parent who need not be provided them.’” (G.L., at p. 1164;
accord, In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228-1229.)
“We review a juvenile court’s determination that the
Department has carried its initial burden in the first step for
substantial evidence.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1273; accord, Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)
“In so doing, we ask whether there is sufficient evidence in the
record that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—when
viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
determination—for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the
Department carried its burden by clear and convincing evidence.”
(Jayden M., at p. 1273; accord, Jennifer S., at pp. 1121-1122

16
[“[W]e do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the
evidence. . . . Rather, we ‘review the entire record in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s findings to determine if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.’”];
see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 [“[W]hen
presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole,
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by
this standard of proof.”].) However, we review the juvenile
court’s ultimate determination as to whether ordering or
bypassing reunification services is in the child’s best interest for
abuse of discretion. (Jayden M., at p. 1273; In re A.E., supra,
38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140-1141; Jennifer S., at pp. 1124-1125.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding Mother Did Not
Make a Reasonable Effort To Treat Her Substance Abuse
Mother concedes the first requirement of section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10)(A), has been met: Mother previously failed to
reunify with Jayleen’s four half siblings. Nor does Mother
dispute the half siblings were removed from her in the prior
dependency proceedings because of her substance abuse. Rather,
Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s finding she failed to make reasonable efforts to
treat her substance abuse problem. Specifically, she argues she
completed a drug treatment program and court-ordered services
in 2008, and after 2011 she remained sober for more than a
decade. Although Mother used methamphetamine once due to
the stress of rediscovering Jayleen and learning of Father’s

17
sexual abuse, Mother tested negative for drugs after a single
positive test in January 2023. Mother asserts that although her
efforts to address her substance abuse were “not perfect,” they
were “reasonable.” However, substantial evidence supports the
court’s contrary finding that her efforts were not sufficient to
warrant the granting of reunification services.
The record shows Mother abused drugs for decades, she
cycled between treatment, sobriety, and relapse, and her efforts
to care for and reunify with her children repeatedly faltered due
to her relapses. Mother began using drugs, including
methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana when she was
17 years old. In 2004 and 2005 the juvenile court removed Jorge,
Yazmin, and Joselyn from Mother, and in 2006 it terminated her
reunification services after finding she was noncompliant with a
case plan that included drug treatment and testing. Although
Mother completed a 12-step treatment program, participated in
services between 2006 and 2008, and reunified with her children
in 2009, by 2011 Mother relapsed again, and the court took
jurisdiction and later removed then-three-year-old Jayleen and
her half sisters, sustaining allegations that Mother had a positive
test for methamphetamine and an “unresolved history of
substance abuse.”
Mother asserts that notwithstanding her unsuccessful
efforts to address her substance abuse in the prior dependency
proceedings, she remained sober from 2011 until December 2022.
But this assertion is supported only by Mother’s statement to the
social worker. There is no corroborating evidence Mother
maintained her sobriety or participated in recovery programs
either in Mexico (from 2012 to 2017) or after she returned to the
United States (from 2017 to 2022). And Mother’s positive test for

18
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana on January 3,
2023—just weeks after the Department located her and she
promised to do whatever necessary to reunify—cast doubt on
Mother’s assertion that she maintained her sobriety. Further, a
single clean test on January 26 and a promise to enroll in
services do not establish reasonable efforts to address her drug
problem at the time of the February 3 disposition hearing.
Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, relied on by the
Department, is instructive. In that case, as here, the mother
struggled with addiction for more than two decades, leading to
dependency jurisdiction, removal of her children, and a failure to
reunify with Jayden’s five half siblings. (Id. at p. 1268.) The
mother made “sporadic effort[s]” to treat her addiction, including
a rehabilitation program, classes, and 12-step meetings, but she
“repeatedly relapsed.” (Id. at pp. 1268-1269.) After Jayden was
born with opiates in his blood and signs of neonatal exposure to
morphine and amphetamine, the mother made an “intermittent
effort” to address her addiction, attending classes and programs,
but she failed to complete any program successfully at the time of
the disposition hearing; however, the mother consistently tested
negative for the four months leading up to the hearing. (Id. at
p. 1269.)
Affirming the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification
services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10)(A) and
(b)(11)(A),12 the Court of Appeal held there was substantial

12 Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11)(A), provides that the
juvenile court may bypass reunification services where parental
rights over a sibling or half sibling were permanently severed,

19
evidence the mother’s efforts were “not reasonable against the
backdrop of her entire drug history.” (Id. at p. 1276.) First,
although the mother’s recovery efforts after the dependency
petition had been filed as to Jayden were “a commendable start,”
her attendance in programs had been spotty and she “only
started ‘making great strides staying committed to long term
recovery’” in the final few weeks before the disposition hearing.
(Ibid.) Further, “mother’s four months of uneven effort [was] a
drop in the bucket when viewed in the larger context of a 20-year
history of serious and consistent drug abuse.” (Id. at p. 1276; see
Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124 [where father had a
“long-term substance abuse issue,” his “minimal efforts” in
treatment “mere weeks” before the disposition hearing, including
participation in outpatient treatment, parenting classes, and two
negative tests, did not constitute reasonable efforts under
section 361.5, former subdivision (b)(10)].) Moreover, the juvenile
court’s finding in Jayden M., as here, was supported by evidence
the mother had “repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or
periods of sobriety in the past,” consistent with the “conventional
wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of
sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of
use and relapse.” (Jayden M., at p. 1277.)
Mother argues that Jayden M. is inapposite because in this
case the Department “proved only a single use [of drugs] during
the preceding eleven years.” Although the Department had the
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s
effort to address her drug problem was not reasonable, we defer

and the parent failed to make a reasonable effort to address the
problem that led to the sibling’s removal.

20
to the juvenile court’s credibility determinations and weighing of
the evidence. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1273;
Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1122.) The court
impliedly discounted Mother’s uncorroborated statement she was
sober for 11 years, leaving just two data points regarding her
current drug use: a positive test on January 3, 2023 and a
negative test on January 26. Moreover, as of the February 2023
disposition hearing, Mother had not enrolled in any treatment
program. In light of Mother’s admitted decades-long cycle of
relapse and recovery, her failure to enroll in any treatment
program despite her promise to do so, and only one negative test
less than two weeks before the disposition hearing, Mother’s
efforts, while commendable, were not reasonable. (Jayden M., at
p. 1277; Jennifer S., at p. 1124.)

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding
Mother Failed To Show Reunification Was in Jayleen’s Best
Interests
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
denying services under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), because
Mother had “quickly become a positive force in [Jayleen’s] life.”
Although the record shows Mother’s reconnection had a positive
emotional and physical impact on Jayleen, and Jayleen wished to
develop a relationship with Mother, it does not follow, as Mother
contends, that it would “only serve [Jayleen’s] interests to
attempt reunification with Mother.” Considering the relevant
factors, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding
reunification was not in Jayleen’s best interests.
With respect to the first two factors discussed in
Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pages 1272 to 1273 and G.L.,

21
supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at page 1164—Mother’s history and her
current efforts and fitness—as discussed, Mother had a long
history of drug abuse, relapse, removal of her children, and
failures to reunify; and Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine within weeks of reconnecting with Jayleen
and promising to do whatever was necessary to reunify. Her
single negative drug test and unfulfilled promise to enroll in
services did not establish her fitness as a parent at the time of
the disposition hearing. The third factor, the gravity of the
problem that led to the assertion of dependency (Jayden M., at
pp. 1272-1273), is not relevant here: the court asserted
dependency jurisdiction based on the severe sexual abuse by
Father, but those allegations do not affect our analysis whether
Jayleen should reunify with Mother.13 As to the fourth factor, the
strength of the bond between Jayleen and Mother, although
Jayleen was eager to develop a relationship with Mother, there
was no preexisting bond—prior to December 2022 Jayleen had no
memory of Mother and thought of Norma as the only mother she
had ever known.
The final and paramount factor here is Jayleen’s “‘“‘need for
stability and continuity.’”’” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1272-1273.) Jayleen’s life has been deeply destabilized by

13 Cases that discuss the third factor are ones where the
grounds for the current dependency are related to the grounds for
the prior dependency proceedings and involve the same parent or
parents. (See, e.g., In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 65-
66 [where death of sibling due to mother’s drug abuse and neglect
was the basis for dependency jurisdiction, the gravity of mother’s
drug problem weighed against a finding that reunification was in
child’s best interests].)

22
Father’s abuse and her removal from Father and Norma. It was
too early to know whether Mother would bring stability and
continuity to Jayleen’s life, or destabilize it further, which will
depend in large part on Mother’s ability to achieve sobriety.
(G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164 [“there must be some
‘reasonable basis to conclude’ that reunification is possible before
services are offered”].) The juvenile court charted a reasonable
course to protect Jayleen’s interests with a disposition order that
authorized expanded visitation so that Jayleen could build a bond
with Mother and the maternal relatives, while bypassing
reunification services given the lack of a reasonable basis to
believe reunification would succeed. The Department provided
Mother with referrals for drug treatment and counseling, and
Mother can bring a section 388 petition to restore reunification
services if she establishes stability and sobriety in her own life.14

14 Mother contends the fact that permanency planning would
not commence immediately because Father was granted
reunification services weighs in favor of granting Mother
reunification services because the provision of services would not
delay Jayleen’s adoption. However, the juvenile court in moving
slowly and bypassing reunification services did not abuse its
discretion because any delay in permanency planning during
Father’s reunification period also means Mother will have
additional time to establish grounds to file a section 388 petition
seeking reunification services.

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DISPOSITION

The February 3, 2023 disposition order denying Mother
reunification services is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

MARTINEZ, J.

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