People v. Atchley CA2/7

CourtListener 9475056Calctapp14.02.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 2/14/24 P. v. Atchley CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B331472

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA081616)
v.

RUFUS ATCHLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
S.R. Balash, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
Rufus Atchley appeals from a postjudgment order
summarily denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 No arguable issues have been identified by
Atchley’s appointed appellate counsel following his review of the
record or by Atchley in his supplemental letter brief to this court.
We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jessica Romero was Atchley’s on-again-off-again girlfriend
for two years.2 They were friends with Robert Banes. Atchley
suspected something intimate happened between Romero and
Banes, which caused Atchley to become jealous and angry. A
witness who had been driving behind Atchley’s vehicle testified
that the vehicle Atchley was in stopped in the middle lane,
Atchley exited the passenger side, walked over to the other side
of the street, and approached a man (Banes) standing on the
sidewalk. They began talking, and the witness saw in her
rearview mirror Atchley pointing a gun at Banes. The witness
heard a gunshot, and Banes fell to the ground.
In 2011 a jury convicted Atchley of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true that Atchley personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, which caused great bodily
injury or death to the victim (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We include a brief summary of the facts taken from
Atchley’s direct appeal for background purposes. (People v.
Atchley (Feb. 28, 2023, B231086) [nonpub. opn.].) We do not rely
on the facts in resolving the issues presented in this appeal.

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court sentenced Atchley to 25 years to life for the murder
conviction consecutive with 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement. We affirmed Atchley’s conviction on appeal.
(People v. Atchley (Feb. 28, 2023, B231086) [nonpub. opn.].)
On August 29, 2022 Atchley filed a form petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6). After appointing counsel and considering the
People’s response to the petition, as well as the jury instructions
and verdict forms from the underlying appeal, the superior court
summarily denied the petition for resentencing, finding Atchley
ineligible for relief because he was “found guilty of 1st degree,
willful, deliberate and premeditated murder as a direct shooter.
The jury was never instructed on felony murder or natural and
probably consequences.”
Atchley timely appealed. We appointed counsel to
represent Atchley in this appeal. After a review of the record,
Atchley’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 stating he did not identify any
arguable issues and advised Atchley he could submit a
supplemental brief identifying contentions this court should
consider.3 On December 11, 2023 Atchley filed a supplemental
brief.

3 We previously granted Atchley’s request to augment the
record on appeal with the record from his direct appeal.

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DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), 957; People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 984.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
as set forth in section 189, subdivision (e). (Reyes, at p. 986;
Gentile, at pp. 842-843.) Section 189, subdivision (e), now
requires the People to prove specific facts relating to the
defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant was the actual
killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the
defendant, with the intent to kill, assisted in the commission of
murder in the first degree (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant
was a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference
to human life as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d) (the
felony-murder special-circumstance provision) (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong, at p. 708.)
Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure in
section 1170.95, now codified in section 1172.6, for an individual
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to

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vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts if the individual could not have been convicted of murder
under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 847.)
If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Further, upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition, the court must determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the
requisite prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the
provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) &
(d)(1).)

B. Atchley is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Atchley raises three arguments in his supplemental letter
brief. First, he argues he had a right to be present at his
resentencing hearing. Second, and also related to resentencing,
Atchley argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have
the superior court consider postconviction factors during
resentencing. Third, Atchley, citing section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(1), argues he should have been given an

5
opportunity to introduce evidence, including about his mental
state at the time of the murder, to establish a prima facie case for
relief.
Atchley’s arguments about resentencing both fail because
his sentence was not recalled, and he was not resentenced. A
sentence may be recalled, and a defendant may be resentenced,
only after the superior court issues an order to show cause and
holds a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) Here, because the court
denied Atchley’s petition at the prima facie stage, there was no
resentencing hearing.
Similarly, Atchley’s argument that he should have been
allowed to introduce new evidence to establish a prima facie case
fails. Section 1172.6 does not expressly allow for new evidence to
be introduced at the prima facie stage. (Cf., § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)
[new evidence may be introduced at the evidentiary hearing].)
Further, at the prima facie stage, the superior court focuses on
the threshold requirements for relief, including whether the
defendant could have been convicted under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or other theory of imputed malice. Here, the record of
conviction establishes as a matter of law that the jury did not
convict Atchley under one of the now impermissible theories of
murder. The jury was not instructed on felony murder, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
of imputed malice. Our review of the record confirms the only
instructions given were for first degree murder and second degree
murder. Atchley was the sole defendant and the actual killer.
No cognizable legal issues have been raised by Atchley’s
appellate counsel or by Atchley. Further, we have independently

6
reviewed the record and are satisfied no arguable issue exists.
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition must be affirmed.
(See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232; see
generally People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order denying Atchley’s petition is
affirmed.

MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

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