People v. Soltero CA4/1

CourtListener 9454382Calctapp21.12.2023

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/21/23 P. v. Soltero CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082016

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD119584)

VICTOR DANIEL SOLTERO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed.
Victor D. Soltero, in pro. per.; and Siri Shetty, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Victor D. Soltero appeals from an order denying his petition to vacate
his 1996 first-degree murder conviction and for resentencing under Penal

Code section 1172.6.1 His appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief

1 Soltero brought his petition under former section 1170.95, which was
amended effective January 1, 2022, and then renumbered as section 1172.6
without substantive change on June 30, 2022. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10
stating that she had been unable to identify any arguable issues for reversal
on appeal. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo).) After we
issued a Delgadillo order notifying Soltero of his right to file a supplemental
brief, he did so. We now conclude that Soltero has failed to identify any
arguably meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order
denying his section 1172.6 petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1996, Soltero was charged by information with murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)) with personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)).
Soltero was the only defendant charged in the information.
In a jury trial, the court did not give any instructions on felony murder,
aiding and abetting, or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The
court gave CALJIC Nos. 8.10 and 8.11 on the elements of murder and
CALJIC No. 8.20 on deliberate and premeditated murder. The only theory of
first-degree murder included in the jury instructions was deliberate and
premeditated murder.
The jury convicted Soltero of first-degree murder and found that he
personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. The court
sentenced him to 25 years to life plus a one-year term for the deadly weapon
enhancement.
In December 2022, Soltero filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. In their initial response, the People argued that Soltero was
ineligible for relief because he was convicted as the actual killer, and the trial
court did not give any jury instructions on aiding and abetting, felony

(Assem. Bill No. 200).) We refer to the statute by its current number
throughout this opinion. All further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
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murder, or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People
submitted exhibits including the information, jury verdict, and jury
instructions from the underlying prosecution. After Soltero’s court-appointed
counsel submitted a reply brief, the court granted Soltero’s request to
represent himself at the prima facie hearing. Soltero represented himself
appearing by Zoom from prison at the prima facie hearing.
The court denied the section 1172.6 petition for failure to make a prima
facie showing. The court concluded that Soltero was ineligible for relief
because he was convicted as the actual killer; the jury found he personally
used a deadly weapon to commit the murder; the only theory of first-degree
murder at trial was premeditation and deliberation; and no aiding and
abetting instructions were given.
Soltero timely appealed the court’s order denying his section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. On appeal, his appointed counsel filed a no-
issues brief under Delgadillo. We issued an order advising Soltero of his
right to file a supplemental brief. In response, Soltero filed a supplemental
brief, an amendment to his supplemental brief, and a letter regarding a
change in his inmate status.
DISCUSSION
In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court clarified the procedures required in
an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition where counsel finds no
arguable issues. In such circumstances, “(1) counsel should file a brief
informing the court of that determination, including a concise recitation of
the facts bearing on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send,
with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no
letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.”

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(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231–232.) “If the defendant
subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is
required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to
issue a written opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not
compel an independent review of the entire record to identify unraised
issues.” (Id. at p. 232.)
We have followed the procedures set forth in Delgadillo—and Soltero
responded to our Delgadillo notice by filing supplemental briefing identifying
potential issues. Under Delgadillo, we must therefore evaluate the issues
presented by Soltero. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
Section 1172.6 allows those previously convicted of felony murder, or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or murder
based on any other theory of imputed malice, to petition the court to have
their convictions vacated and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if they
could not presently be convicted of murder because of changes to the law
made effective in January 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) After appointment of
counsel, the trial court is permitted to examine the record of conviction to
assess whether it refutes the petitioner’s claim of eligibility. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–972 (Lewis).) The court may deny the petition at
the prima facie stage if the record of conviction discloses that the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 971.)
In this case, the record of conviction establishes as a matter of law that
Soltero was not convicted under a felony murder theory, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice. At
trial, the court did not give jury instructions on any of these theories. The
only theory of liability presented to the jury was that Soltero himself was the
actual killer who acted with premeditation and deliberation. By finding

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Soltero guilty of first-degree murder under these instructions, the jury
necessarily found that he was the actual killer. “As a matter of law,
resentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an ‘actual killer.’ ”
(People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973.) Thus, the trial court
correctly ruled that Soltero was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
In his supplemental briefing, Soltero challenges the validity of his
murder conviction. He contends that he is factually innocent, that the
prosecutor knowingly concealed or withheld exonerating forensic test results
and other exculpatory evidence, that the prosecutor presented false testimony
and an altered video recording at his trial, that he was misidentified as the
actual perpetrator, and that the prosecutor and a detective subjected him to
false prosecution based on racial animus. In a proceeding under section
1172.6, however, Soltero may not claim factual innocence or challenge the
validity of his murder conviction unless he first meets the threshold
requirements for relief at the prima facie stage. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) As we have explained, the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that Soltero is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 because he was convicted as the actual perpetrator of the murder.
Soltero also argues that he did not act as a major participant or with
reckless indifference to human life. But this would be relevant at the prima
facie stage only if Soltero had been convicted as an accomplice to the actual
killer under a felony murder theory. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708 [“Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the
intent to kill can be held liable for [felony] murder only if they were ‘major
participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life . . . .’ ”].) Soltero was convicted as the actual killer who acted with

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a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill, not as an accomplice on a felony
murder theory.
For these reasons, we conclude that the issues identified by Soltero lack
arguable merit. Because the record of conviction conclusively demonstrates
that Soltero was not convicted of murder on any theory covered by section
1172.6, the trial court correctly ruled that he did not show a prima facie case
for relief. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Soltero’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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