CourtListener 9438007•Van Du v. L.A. County Employee Relations Com. CA2/5
Van Du v. L.A. County Employee Relations Com. CA2/5
CourtListener 9438007Calctapp08.11.2023
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/8/23 Van Du v. L.A. County Employee Relations Com. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
BINH VAN DU, B319663
Petitioner and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCP00562)
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
COMMISSION et al.,
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
Pelayes & Yu, Tom Yu; Law Offices of Joseph N. Bolander
and Joseph N. Bolander for Petitioner and Appellant.
Sanders Roberts, Shawn P. Thomas, and Eric S. Mintz for
Respondent Los Angeles County Employee Relations
Commission.
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski,
and Brian P. Ross for Respondent Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs.
Petitioner and appellant Binh Van Du (Deputy Van Du) is
a Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff who received a written
reprimand for engaging in conduct the specifics of which the
appellate record does not reveal; the best we can say is that the
reprimand was for what Deputy Van Du alleges was a “violation
of Policy of Equality – Inappropriate Conduct Toward Others.”
Deputy Van Du filed a grievance with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department (the Department) challenging the
reprimand and, after informal and formal proceedings in the
Department, the reprimand stood. Deputy Van Du then
attempted to initiate, on his own, an arbitration procedure agreed
to by the County of Los Angeles (the County) and the Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (the Sheriffs’ Association) in an
October 2018 Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU). The
Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (the
Commission), the entity that administers the arbitration
procedure, denied the arbitration request because the MOU
permits only the Sheriffs’ Association, not individual deputies, to
initiate arbitrations. We consider whether Deputy Van Du has
shown the Commission violated a ministerial duty to initiate an
arbitration at his request, and in resolving that question, we
focus on whether Deputy Van Du has alleged his grievance is an
arbitrable dispute.
2
I. BACKGROUND
A. The MOU: Grievance Procedures and Arbitration
The County is empowered to negotiate with certified
employee organizations1 to establish a procedure for handling
employment disputes arising within its bargaining units.
Specifically, “[t]he [C]ounty and a certified employee organization
may negotiate an agreement providing for final and binding
arbitration of unresolved grievances . . . . The processes for these
arbitrations shall be established by agreement of the parties.”
Since 1976, the Sheriffs’ Association has been the certified
majority representative for Peace Officers, Unit 611 (Unit 611),
which covers deputy sheriffs.
The County and the Sheriffs’ Association entered into the
MOU governing relations between the County’s management and
Unit 611. Article 16 of the MOU provides that “individual
departmental grievance procedures in effect in [the Department]
(attached hereto as Appendix “B”) . . . will be fully effective as the
grievance procedure applicable to the employees in” Unit 611.
Appendix B to the MOU provides for up to a three-step
grievance procedure. The first step (which an employee may
waive) is an “informal” process involving discussions between an
aggrieved employee and his or her first and second-level
supervisors. If that informal process does not resolve the dispute,
under the second step of the procedure, “the employee may file a
formal written grievance with his/her third level supervisor or
1
A “certified employee organization” is defined as “an
employee organization . . . that has been certified by [the
Commission] as representing the majority of the employees in an
appropriate employee representation unit.”
3
middle management representative.” If that does not resolve the
dispute, “the employee may [then] submit his/her written
grievance . . . to his/her Division Chief” and the matter will be
decided by a Review Board consisting of the division chief, the
area commander in the employee’s chain of command, and a
maximum of two sworn members of the Sheriff’s Department
that may be selected by the employee.
After conclusion of the formal grievance process,
arbitration is the only remaining dispute resolution procedure
provided for in Appendix B. Section 6 of Appendix B, which
governs arbitration, is the crux of this appeal. It provides that
“[w]ithin ten . . . business days from the receipt of the written
decision of the department head or his designated representative,
an employee, only if he/she is represented by [the Sheriffs’
Association], may request that the grievance be submitted to
arbitration as provided for hereinafter.” Section 6, however, also
places subject matter limitations on the type of disputes that can
be arbitrated. It states “[o]nly those grievances which directly
concern or involve the interpretation or application of the specific
terms and provisions of this [MOU] and which are brought by an
employee who was represented by [the Sheriffs’ Association] in
any steps of the grievance procedure may be submitted to
arbitration hereunder.” As stated in Section 6, paragraph 3, “In
the event [the Sheriffs’ Association] desires to request a grievance
which meets the requirements of [the aforementioned subject
matter limitation provision] be submitted to arbitration, [the
4
Sheriffs’ Association] shall . . . send a written request to [the
Commission] . . . .”2
After a written request for arbitration by the Sheriffs’
Association has been accepted and processed by the Commission,
“a representative of the County and [the Sheriffs’ Association]
shall meet and prepare a submission statement setting forth the
issue(s) to be determined which shall be submitted to the
arbitrator” prior to the arbitration hearing. Section 6 of
Appendix B to the MOU further provides that the decision of the
arbitrator is “binding upon [the Sheriffs’ Association]” and on the
County (unless it requires legislative action by the County’s
Board of Supervisors); no mention is made of whether the
arbitrator’s decision is binding on the employee whose grievance
ultimately led to the arbitration.
B. Deputy Van Du’s Writ Petition Challenging the
Commission’s Denial of His Arbitration Request
Deputy Van Du filed a petition for writ of mandate in
February 2020, and an amended petition in August of that year,
asserting the Commission violated its ministerial duty to initiate
2
The Commission is an independent agency of the County;
its mission is to ensure all County employees are “fairly treated,
that their rights are maintained, and that their requests are
fairly heard, considered and resolved.” Although the availability
of the arbitration procedure is determined by agreement between
the County and certified employee organizations, the Commission
is responsible for “[e]stablishing formal rules and procedures to
provide for the orderly and systemic presentation, consideration,
and resolution of employee relations matters,” including “rules
for the requests for arbitration.”
5
the MOU’s arbitration procedure in response to his request for
arbitration. The operative petition says little about the dispute
that led to Deputy Van Du’s grievance and arbitration request.
All it avers is that he received a written reprimand from the
Department in August 2019 “for violation of Policy of Equality –
Inappropriate Conduct Toward Others.”
The operative petition does allege Deputy Van Du
completed the formal grievance process provided for in Appendix
B to the MOU and the written reprimand was upheld.3 In the
operative petition’s words, “[s]ince the Department denied
[Deputy Van Du’s] grievance process, the next step is to appeal
the discipline by arbitration through [the Commission].” The
operative petition accordingly alleges that Deputy Van Du filed a
request for arbitration with the Commission but the
Commission’s Executive Director advised him the request for
arbitration was denied because it was not initiated by the
Sheriffs’ Association.
A copy of the form request for arbitration that Deputy Van
Du submitted to the Commission is attached as an exhibit to the
operative petition. In response to the form’s direction to identify
the section of the MOU under which the request for arbitration
was made, Deputy Van Du identified Article 16 of the MOU and
the associated Appendix B (the grievance procedure provisions).
In response to the form’s direction to identify the article or
3
A later-filed declaration from a Sheriffs’ Association
defense representative states Deputy Van Du met with the
representative but elected not have the Sheriffs’ Association
appear on his behalf when participating in the MOU’s formal
grievance procedure.
6
section of the MOU he claimed had been violated, Deputy Van Du
identified the same grievance procedure provisions, “Article 16,
Appendix B.” Finally, in response to the form’s direction to
“[s]tate in concise language the issue(s) to be arbitrated,” Deputy
Van Du wrote, “Contesting the facts contained under LASD IV
2467465 which resulted in a written reprimand.”
C. The Trial Court Denies Van Du’s Writ Petition
Deputy Van Du’s briefing in support of his mandate
petition argued the Commission’s rule that all arbitration
requests must be initiated by the Sheriffs’ Association was
contrary to section 5.04.070 of the County’s Employee Relations
Ordinance, which provides that all County employees “shall have
the right to represent themselves individually in their
employment relations with the county.” Deputy Van Du argued
further in his brief supporting the petition that the Commission’s
rule was also contrary to Government Code section 3502, which,
in pertinent part, provides: “Public employees . . . shall have the
right to represent themselves individually in their employment
relations with the public agency.”
The Commission opposed Deputy Van Du’s request for
mandate relief. The Sheriffs’ Association intervened in the action
and also opposed the mandate petition. Both parties argued,
among other things, that the right to arbitration is a matter of
contract and the MOU vested the Sheriffs’ Association, not
individual employees, with the discretion to decide which
grievances should proceed to arbitration.
In January 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Deputy
Van Du’s writ petition and denied it. The court found the MOU’s
grievance provisions were best read to authorize only the Sheriffs’
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Association to initiate an arbitration and that such a reading was
consistent with California case law interpreting the right to self-
representation in the context of collective bargaining agreements.
The trial court also rejected Deputy Van Du’s contention that he
was, in fact, represented by the Sheriffs’ Association at the time
of his arbitration request by virtue of his membership in that
organization; such an interpretation, the court concluded, would
render operative language in the MOU grievance provisions (e.g.,
“only if he/she is represented by[the Sheriffs’ Association]”)
“superfluous.”
II. DISCUSSION
Deputy Van Du contends the trial court’s interpretation of
who can initiate an arbitration under the MOU was not only
incorrect but also “inconsistent” with state and local law. We
doubt that in light of, among other things, the aforementioned
paragraph 3 of the arbitration section of the MOU (explaining
how the Sheriffs’ Association may initiate an arbitration if the
association so desires). But even if Deputy Van Du were right
about who can initiate an arbitration, affirmance is still required.
(Rutgard v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 815, 825;
see also Williams v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353,
1361 [customary rule of appellate practice is to review a trial
court’s ruling, not its rationale].) Our reasoning will not take
long to explain.
Deputy Van Du does not dispute arbitration is a matter of
contract and, thus, he can only be permitted to initiate an
arbitration against the Department or the County if some
contract so provides. (See, e.g., Brinkley v. Monterey Financial
Services, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 330-331.) The only
8
contract providing such a basis that has been proffered by Deputy
Van Du is the MOU.
The MOU, however, specifies those disputes that are
subject to arbitration—no matter who or what entity requests
arbitration. It says: “Only those grievances which directly
concern or involve the interpretation or application of the specific
terms and provisions of this [MOU] and which are brought by an
employee who was represented by [the Sheriffs’ Association] in
any steps of the grievance procedure may be submitted to
arbitration hereunder.” Deputy Van Du’s first amended writ
petition does not allege his grievance directly concerns or involves
the interpretation or application of the specific terms and
provisions of the MOU. It instead alleges Deputy Van Du’s
grievance concerns a violation of some otherwise unspecified
“Policy of Equality.”
The arbitration request form that Deputy Van Du
completed and attached to his writ petition makes it even more
plain that there is no arbitrable dispute alleged here. In
response to a prompt on that form requiring Deputy Van Du to
state the issue to be arbitrated, Deputy Van Du stated he wished
to contest the facts (contained under LASD IV 2467465) that
resulted in a written reprimand. It perhaps goes without saying,
but a desire to contest facts relied on to issue a reprimand does
not concern the interpretation or application of the MOU’s terms
or provisions.4 The Commission therefore cannot have violated a
4
Insofar as Deputy Van Du contends his petition avers there
is an arbitrable dispute under Article 26 of the MOU (a single
paragraph concerning “management rights”), the contention fails
for multiple reasons. First, it is at odds with the arbitration
9
ministerial duty to grant Deputy Van Du’s request for
arbitration—the dispute is not arbitrable. A writ of mandate was
properly denied. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.)
request form he attached to his petition, which identifies Article
16, Appendix B, not Article 26, as the portion of the MOU he
claimed had been violated. Second, the MOU’s subject matter
arbitration provision states only disputes that “directly” concern
or involve the interpretation or application of the specific terms
and provisions of the MOU are arbitrable; a roundabout
invocation of Article 26 in an effort to facilitate his desire to
contest the facts leading to his discipline would transgress this
limitation to direct interpretation or application matters. Third,
even if Deputy Van Du had invoked Article 26, he still does not
allege any practical consequence the written reprimand had on
the conditions of his employment.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
RUBIN, P. J.
KIM, J.
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