In re S.V. CA2/5

CourtListener 9395377Calctapp28.04.2023

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/28/23 In re S.V. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re S.V., a Person Coming B315819
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 19LJJP00882A)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael C. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon and Anne E. Fragasso, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
Father appeals from a dispositional order after a hearing
under Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 342. Father does
not challenge the jurisdictional findings that his then 15-year-old
daughter was at substantial risk of harm based on father’s
physical abuse, substance abuse, and inability to provide
appropriate care due to daughter’s behavioral problems,
including drug abuse. Father only challenges the portion of the
dispositional order requiring monitored visitation with daughter.
Father also contends the juvenile court erroneously failed to
ensure that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) complied with requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et
seq.). We agree with the Department that the juvenile court’s
monitored visitation order was not an abuse of discretion, and we
find father’s ICWA challenge to be moot.
The parties are familiar with the facts and our opinion does
not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.1105(c).) We accordingly resolve the cause before us, consistent
with constitutional requirements, via a written opinion with
reasons stated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; see Lewis v. Superior
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261–1264 [discussion of issue on
appeal need not discuss every fact or legal authority raised by
parties].)

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.

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Monitored visits

“We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of
discretion.” (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343,
1356.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 318–319.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it
ordered monitored visits and gave the Department discretion to
liberalize. The Department’s reports make it clear that the
relationship between daughter and father has been fraught over
the entire course of the dependency proceeding. Daughter has
accused father of mistreating her and father has taken the
position that daughter is manipulative and makes false
accusations in order to live in a more permissive environment.
The record includes extensive evidence that daughter has
significant behavioral and substance abuse problems. Daughter
has reported smoking marijuana with father, and has repeatedly
accused father of physical and emotional abuse and neglect, as
well as alcohol and substance abuse. In later interviews,
daughter recanted or minimized some of her accusations.
Nevertheless, daughter’s accusations led to the Department filing
a section 342 subsequent petition against father and the court
sustaining petition allegations relating to physical abuse,
substance abuse, and father’s inability to care for and supervise
daughter due to daughter’s behavioral problems and drug abuse.
Daughter’s behavioral and substance abuse issues have resulted

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in a concurrent delinquency case. Given these particular facts
and circumstances, monitored visitation was a reasonable means
of protecting daughter’s safety, both by ensuring that father could
not undermine daughter’s efforts at sobriety and by reducing the
likelihood that daughter would make unverifiable claims of
maltreatment by father.

ICWA

The “critical factor in considering whether a dependency
appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any
effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide on a
case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile
dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision
would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) ICWA does not apply when a
minor is in the custody of a parent. (In re J.B. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 751, 758.) Counsel may call the appellate court’s
attention to juvenile court rulings affecting whether a review of
the merits is necessary. (In re N.S., at p. 57.) The Department’s
January 19, 2023 unopposed motion requesting judicial notice of
postjudgment evidence is granted. Daughter was placed in
mother’s home and because daughter is now in mother’s custody,
we find father’s ICWA contention moot and decline to exercise
our discretion to review the merits of that portion of father’s
appeal.

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DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

KIM, J.

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