CourtListener 9395079•People v. J.R. CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/27/23 P. v. J.R. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F084654
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 17JL-00137C)
v.
J.R., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Jennifer O.
Trimble, Judge.
Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue and
Craig S. Meyers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, a juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that appellant J.R., a minor
at the time, had committed various felonies, including a gang-related murder. In 2021, an
amended petition was filed. It was alleged that appellant had participated in this gang-
related murder, and a principal had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that
caused the victim’s death.
In July 2022, the district attorney successfully moved the juvenile court to transfer
appellant to the superior court to be tried as an adult. The juvenile court granted the
transfer based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.
In the present appeal, respondent concedes that the order must be reversed. We
agree. Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1). This law retroactively requires the transfer
of a minor from juvenile court to a criminal court to be based on “clear and convincing
evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).) 1 Consequently, we
reverse the juvenile court’s order and remand for a new fitness hearing.2
BACKGROUND
We briefly summarize the alleged facts surrounding this murder. We also
summarize the juvenile court’s ruling.
1 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise noted.
2 We need not address appellant’s other claim that the juvenile court allegedly
abused its discretion because its findings lacked sufficient evidence. In light of the
change in law, a new record must be developed with different findings based on a higher
standard of proof. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); see also In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277,
1281 [declining to address an insufficiency of evidence claim due to the need to remand
for further proceedings in light of Assembly Bill No. 2361].)
2.
I. The Murder.
The victim was found deceased with a gunshot wound to his torso. It is alleged3
that, on the night in question, appellant and other males were drinking alcohol. Appellant
got into a verbal disagreement with the victim, and appellant wanted to fight the victim.
The victim ran away. Appellant and approximately three other males gave chase.
The males chased the victim both on foot and with a van. At some point, appellant
was driving the van. According to appellant, one of the other males shot the victim.
Appellant informed a detective that, although he took part in chasing the victim, he never
intended the victim’s death.
Evidence suggests that appellant and other males involved in this murder were
gang members. A gang expert opined at the fitness hearing that this murder was
committed in furtherance of a street gang. It is alleged that appellant took part in this
murder about 23 days before he turned 18 years old.
II. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling.
After the wardship petition was filed, the parties conducted a contested hearing
regarding appellant’s suitability to be transferred to the superior court. The juvenile court
considered the following five factors set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E):
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by appellant;
(2) Whether appellant can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction;
(3) Appellant’s previous delinquent history;
(4) The success of previous juvenile court attempts to rehabilitate appellant;
and
(5) The gravity of the present offense.
3 The facts surrounding this incident have not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
3.
The court found factors both for and against transfer.4 For example, the court
found that appellant had suffered childhood neglect, abuse, and trauma. A psychologist
had diagnosed appellant with persistent depressive disorder, severe conduct disorder, and
moderate cannabis and alcohol use disorder. On the night in question, appellant’s mother
had encouraged appellant’s criminal involvement. Evidence suggested that appellant’s
mother had provided the gun to either appellant or someone else within his group on the
night in question. Appellant’s prior delinquency record was “fairly minimal.” In
addition, appellant was on probation at the time of this incident. However, the court
concluded that the prior attempts to rehabilitate appellant had not been exhaustive or
intensive, which weighed against a transfer.
In contrast, however, the court found that appellant had been involved in a “gang
lifestyle.” Although the evidence was in conflict, some evidence suggested that appellant
had given the order to get a gun on the night in question. The court also expressed
concern that not enough time remained for rehabilitation to occur until the juvenile
jurisdiction expired when appellant turned 25 years old. Finally, the court noted that,
when this murder had occurred, the victim had attempted to retreat. Appellant had been
driving the van used to chase down the victim, and the gunman had been in the passenger
seat next to him.
After weighing all of the factors, the juvenile court granted the transfer motion.
The court stated that the prosecution had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
appellant should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court.
4 Appellant contends that some of the juvenile court’s findings lack evidentiary
support or were based on the court’s own speculation. We need not address those
concerns. Instead, this matter must be remanded for a new fitness hearing in compliance
with the retroactive change in law.
4.
DISCUSSION
When this juvenile fitness hearing occurred in July 2022, the prosecution bore the
burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant should be
transferred to criminal court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a); In re E.P. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 409, 415.) However, in September 2022, the Governor signed Assembly
Bill No. 2361. Effective January 1, 2023, this bill amended section 707 to require a
juvenile court to apply a higher standard of proof in a fitness hearing. Under the current
law, a juvenile court may transfer a minor to criminal court if it makes a finding by “clear
and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) Thus, Assembly Bill No. 2361
imposed two changes before a juvenile court may transfer a minor to adult court: (1) it
raised the standard of proof and (2) it required a new specific finding regarding
amenability to rehabilitation. (In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1284.)
“The standard of proof known as clear and convincing evidence demands a degree
of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance standard, but less than
what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This intermediate
standard ‘requires a finding of high probability.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 998.) This elevated standard of proof also affects the type and quality of the
evidence that must be presented by the prosecution, which bears this increased burden.
One appellate court has noted that, given the new focus on whether a minor is amenable
to rehabilitation, expert testimony will likely be necessary for a complete analysis at a
fitness hearing. (In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)
Respondent concedes that Assembly Bill No. 2361 retroactively applies in this
matter. We agree. Absent evidence to the contrary, we must assume that an amended
statute that mitigates the possible punishment for a class of persons is presumptively
retroactive and applies to all persons whose judgments were not yet final at the time the
statute took effect. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624.) In People v. Superior
5.
Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara), our high court held that Proposition 57,5 which
prohibited charging juveniles directly in criminal court, applied retroactively to nonfinal
judgments. (Lara, supra, at pp. 303–304.) The Lara court reasoned that “[t]he
possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court—where rehabilitation is the
goal—rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically
different and more lenient treatment.” (Id. at p. 303.)
We agree with the parties that, similar to Proposition 57, Assembly Bill No. 2361
represents an ameliorative change because it increased the burden of proof necessary to
transfer appellant to criminal court. Moreover, this amendment requires a specific
finding from the juvenile court that appellant is not amenable to rehabilitation. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3).) Appellant would receive a very different outcome if he remained under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult.
Accordingly, an inference of retroactivity applies. Because nothing in Assembly Bill No.
2361 rebuts this inference, this amendment retroactively applies to appellant, whose
appeal is not yet final. Consequently, we reverse the juvenile court’s order and remand
this matter for the juvenile court to conduct a new juvenile fitness hearing.
The People bear the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that
appellant “is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) “If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall
recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include
the reasons supporting the court’s finding that [appellant] is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Ibid.) We express no
opinion regarding how the juvenile court should rule when this matter is remanded.
5 Proposition 57 is the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. (Lara, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 303.)
6.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring appellant to a court of criminal jurisdiction
is reversed. This matter is remanded to the juvenile court for it to conduct a fitness
hearing pursuant to section 707, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361.
7.
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