CourtListener 9379201•People v. Henson CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/23/23 P. v. Henson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE, C096757
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
STK-CR-FECOD-2015-
v. 0007347)
MARCUS HENSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
This appeal comes to us ostensibly pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436. A jury convicted defendant Marcus Henson of four counts of attempted murder,
four counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and
participating in gang activity, and found several enhancements true. (People v. Henson
(Oct. 14, 2020, C084770 [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant appealed, and we reversed and
remanded two of the attempted murder counts, and vacated his conviction on three other
counts and their associated enhancements. After he was resentenced to 15 years to life
plus 20 years, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1
1172.6.1 The trial court denied that petition at the prima facie stage. Having reviewed
the record and having found no arguable error that would result in a disposition more
favorable to defendant, we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An indictment filed on August 20, 2015, charged defendant with two counts of
attempted murder of two police officers (§§ 664, 187 subd. (a.)—counts 1 & 2); two
counts of attempted premeditated murder of those same officers (§§ 664, 187 subd. (a.)—
counts 3 & 4); two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm on those officers
(§ 245, subd. (d)(2)—counts 5 & 6); two additional counts of assault with semiautomatic
firearms on those officers (§ 245, subd. (b)—counts 7 & 8); shooting at an occupied
vehicle (§ 246—count 9); and participation in gang activity. (§ 186.22, subd. (a)—count
10.) The indictment also alleged a series of enhancements: as to counts 1 through 4,
defendant and/or a principal intentionally discharged a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subds. (c),
(e)(1)), and as to counts 5 through 9 that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)), rendering those counts serious felonies (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and counts 1
through 9 were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).)
The basic facts of the case are that defendant and his fellow gang members fired
26 shots at an unmarked police car containing two Stockton police officers in plain
1 Defendant filed his petition under former section 1170.95. The Legislature
amended section 1170.95 effective January 1, 2022, under Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2). Further, effective June 30, 2022, the
Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6, without substantive change.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the
opinion.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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clothes.2 Only two bullets struck the car on its rear bumper area as the officers raced
away from the attack, and neither officer was injured.
At trial, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant had to have the intent to
kill to commit attempted murder and on the kill zone theory of liability (requiring the
person to have the intent to kill the specific victim and everyone else in that particular
zone of harm), but did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences
theory of liability.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found all of the enhancements
true. The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years eight months to life.
Defendant appealed and we reversed and remanded two of the attempted murder
counts based on instructional error (counts 1 & 3), vacated three other convictions and
their enhancements (counts 4, 7 & 8), and remanded the matter for resentencing and a
youth offender parole hearing.
On remand, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life on the attempted
murder count 2 (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement.
(§ 12022.53, subd. (e).) The trial court stayed the sentences on all other counts and
enhancements.
Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, alleging his
remaining attempted murder conviction was based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, which now could not support conviction due to the change in the
law. The prosecution opposed that motion on the grounds the trial court instructed the
jury under the kill zone theory, which requires proof of intent to kill, and did not instruct
the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the record and our opinion
affirming the judgment and conviction in defendant’s direct appeal. (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (d) [court may take judicial notice of records of “any court of this state”].)
3
The trial court appointed counsel, held a hearing, and denied the petition, finding
defendant was ineligible for resentencing.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of
the case and asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are any
arguable issues on appeal in accordance with People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.
Counsel advised defendant of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the
date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and defendant has not
filed a supplemental brief.
The protections afforded by Wende and the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493] do not apply to an
appeal from a postconviction denial of a section 1172.6 petition. (People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216.) The Delgadillo court laid out a framework for resolving appeals
in which counsel finds no arguable issues as follows: “(1) counsel should file a brief
informing the court of that determination, including a concise recitation of the facts
bearing on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a copy of
counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a
supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court
may dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If defendant files a brief, we are required
to “evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.”
(Id. at p. 232.) If defendant does not file a brief, the court may dismiss the appeal, with
notice to defendant. (Ibid.) The court may also exercise its discretion and choose to
conduct an independent review. (Ibid.)
In Delgadillo, the notice given by counsel and the appellate court advised
defendant that counsel had filed a Wende brief, directed counsel to provide defendant
with the brief and the record, and informed defendant he could file a supplemental brief
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within 30 days. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 232-233.) It did not
inform him the appeal would be dismissed as abandoned if he did not file a supplemental
brief. (Id. at p. 233.) Although the Supreme Court characterized this notice as
“suboptimal,” rather than reach the merits of whether this notice satisfied due process, the
Supreme Court conducted an independent review. (Id. at p. 233 & fn. 6.) Our facts are
identical and we also exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review. (People
v. Flores (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 266, 274 [appellate court may independently review the
record on appeal when an indigent defendant’s appointed counsel has filed a Wende brief
in a postjudgment section 1172.6 appeal].)
Appellate counsel complied with his obligations, defendant was advised of his
right to file a supplemental brief, but did not do so, and we have undertaken an
examination of the entire record. We find no arguable error that would result in a
disposition more favorable to defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KRAUSE , J.
We concur:
MAURO , Acting P. J.
McADAM , J. Pro Tem.*
* Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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