People v. Foley

CourtListener 4799943Calctapp23.10.2020

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/23/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B299677

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA115001)
v.

JEFFERY ALAN FOLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bruce F. Marrs, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant Jeffery Alan Foley was convicted
of sexually molesting his two granddaughters, F. and A. Foley
molested F. over a period of years, but she did not immediately
disclose the abuse. Thereafter, Foley molested A., who
immediately reported his conduct. He pled guilty to committing a
lewd and lascivious act against A., and was sentenced to prison.
Approximately two years later, F. disclosed that Foley had
sexually molested her as well. Foley was then tried and
convicted of various sex crimes against F. The trial court
sentenced him on three counts pursuant to the “One Strike” law,
Penal Code section 667.61,1 based on the jury’s true finding that
he had “been convicted in the present case or cases of
committing” a specified offense “against more than one victim.”
(§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4).) Foley argues that this multiple victim
circumstance does not apply when the crimes against multiple
victims are prosecuted in separate proceedings. Accordingly, he
contends the court misinstructed the jury on the multiple victim
circumstance and his One Strike sentence is unauthorized. We
agree that the multiple victim circumstance does not apply here.
Accordingly, we order it stricken and the matter remanded for
resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of
conviction.

1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
F. and A. Doe are identical twins. Appellant Foley is their
paternal grandfather. As children, the twins frequently visited
Foley and their grandmother, at the grandparents’ residence.
On February 7, 2015, when 12-year-old A. was visiting the
grandparents, Foley reached his hand into her pants and rubbed
her vagina beneath her clothing. A. reported the incident to her
mother. Foley admitted his conduct to a detective. On November
6, 2015, in Los Angeles County Superior Court case
No. KA109342, Foley pled no contest to one count of committing a
lewd and lascivious act on A., a child under 14 years of age, in
violation of section 288, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to
three years in prison.
Approximately two years later, F. disclosed that Foley had
sexually molested her over a period of years, prior to his offense
against A. The abuse included touching her breasts and vagina,
digital penetration, and oral copulation; Foley also showed her
pornographic material. Consequently, Foley was charged in
October 2018, in case No. KA115001, with various sexual offenses
against F. An amended information was later filed. The offenses
were alleged to have transpired between May 23, 2009 and May
22, 2015. Neither the original nor the amended information
alleged Foley committed offenses against any other specific
victim, but did allege a multiple victim circumstance under the
One Strike law as to counts 6, 7, and 8. (§ 667.61, subd. (e).)

2
Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the convictions, and therefore we do not discuss it in
detail.

3
At trial, A. testified regarding Foley’s conduct against her.
Foley stipulated that he had been previously convicted of
molesting A. He served time in prison as a result.
During trial, the court asked the parties about the
“multiple victim instruction.” It observed that the standard
CALCRIM instruction presupposed that charges against multiple
victims were all brought in the same case. Without objection
from the defense, the court ultimately instructed with a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 3181. As relevant here, it stated: “If
you find the defendant guilty of one or more sex offenses as to
[F.], as charged in Counts 6, 7, 8, you must then decide whether
the People have proved the additional allegation that those
crimes were committed against more than one victim. ([A.] and
[F.])” The court also instructed with CALJIC No. 1.12, which
stated in pertinent part: “In this proceeding the alleged victim
has been identified as [F.] Doe & [A.] Doe. This has been done
only for the purpose of protecting [his/her] privacy pursuant to
California law.”
The jury convicted Foley of three counts of committing a
lewd act upon a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a), counts 6, 7, and
8) and two counts of sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age
or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b), counts 2 and 3).3 F. was the named
victim in all counts. The jury also found true the allegation that
“pursuant to Penal Code section 667.61(b)(e) [sic], that the crimes
involved more than one victim involving lewd and lascivious acts
upon a child . . . .”

3
The jury acquitted Foley of sexual intercourse or sodomy
with a child 10 years of age or younger.

4
The trial court sentenced Foley to 60 years to life,
configured as follows: on count 2, 15 years to life; on count 3, a
concurrent term of 15 years to life; and, under the One Strike
law, consecutive terms of 15 years to life on counts 6, 7, and 8. It
imposed a $10,000 restitution fine, a suspended parole revocation
restitution fine in the same amount, a sexual abuse fine and
related penalty assessment and surcharge, a court operations
assessment, and a criminal conviction assessment.
Foley filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The multiple victim circumstance must be stricken
a. The One Strike law
Section 667.61, commonly known as the “One Strike” law,
sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for
certain sex crimes when the People plead and prove the offenses
were committed under specified circumstances. (People v.
Hammer (2003) 30 Cal.4th 756, 759; People v. Perez (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 1218, 1223.) Subject to exceptions provided in
subdivisions (j), (l), and (m), section 667.61 provides that a
defendant must be sentenced to an indeterminate life term when
convicted of a sex offense enumerated in section 667.61,
subdivision (c), under one or more of the circumstances listed in
subdivisions (d) or (e) of the statute.4 (See People v.
Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 930; People v. Perez, at p. 1223.)
Specifically, if the defendant is convicted of a section 667.61,
subdivision (c) offense and at least one subdivision (d) or two

4
Subdivisions (j), (l), and (m) provide for increased penalties
when the victim was under the age of 14. The question of
whether Foley should have been sentenced pursuant to
subdivision (j)(2) is not before us.

5
subdivision (e) circumstances are found true, he or she must be
sentenced to a term of 25 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (a).) If
only one subdivision (e) circumstance is found true, he or she
must be sentenced to 15 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (b); People
v. Wutzke, at p. 930.)
Commission of a lewd act upon a child under 14 years old
in violation of section 288, subdivision (a)—the crime of which
Foley was convicted in counts 6, 7, and 8—is an offense
enumerated in subdivision (c). (§ 667.61, subd. (c)(8).) As
relevant here, one of the section 667.61, subdivision (e)
circumstances is that the defendant “has been convicted in the
present case or cases of committing an offense specified in
subdivision (c) against more than one victim.” (§ 667.61,
subd. (e)(4), italics added; People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th
521, 535.)
b. Contentions
Foley argues that the section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4)
multiple victim circumstance applies only when charges against
multiple victims are tried in a single proceeding. It cannot apply
here, he argues, because he was convicted of the offense against
A. in a prior, separate case. Therefore, the trial court committed
instructional error, his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance, and his One Strike sentences on counts 6, 7, and 8
were unauthorized. The multiple victim circumstance must be
stricken, and the matter remanded for resentencing.
The People argue that there was no instructional or
sentencing error because section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4) does
not require that crimes against multiple victims must be tried
together. A different interpretation of the statute, they argue,
would undermine the Legislature’s intent.

6
c. Standard of review
Foley’s argument turns on the interpretation of the
“present case or cases” language in section 667.61, subdivision
(e)(4). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo. (People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166;
People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 200.) Our task is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1105–1106;
People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727, 737.) We look first
to the statutory language, giving the words their ordinary and
usual meaning and viewing them in context. (People v. Gonzales
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 49–50; People v. Paige, at p. 200.) If the
statute’s language is not ambiguous, the plain meaning governs
unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
consequences the Legislature did not intend. (People v. Colbert
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 603; People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
985, 992.) If the statute’s words support more than one
reasonable interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids,
including the legislative history and the objects to be achieved by
the legislation. (People v. Ruiz, at p. 1106.)
d. The multiple victim circumstance
The plain language of section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4),
requires that for the multiple victim circumstance to apply, the
defendant must have been convicted of specified sex crimes
against more than one victim in the case or cases currently being
tried, rather than in a prior prosecution. “Present” modifies both
“case” and “cases.” The dictionary definitions of the adjective
“present” include “now existing or in progress”; “being in view or
at hand”; “constituting the one actually involved, at hand, or
being considered” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2020)

7
<https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/present> [as of Oct. 23,
2020], archived at <https://perma.cc/9C4W-35BB>) and “being,
existing, or occurring at this time or now.” (Random House
College Dict. (rev. ed. 1984) p. 1048.) The most natural reading
of the statute’s wording, therefore, is that the adjective “present”
in subdivision (e)(4) refers to the case being currently tried, not to
a different case previously adjudicated. Foley’s conviction for
molesting A., which occurred long before his trial on the crimes
against F., therefore does not qualify as a “present” case.
Language and analysis in other cases, while not directly
addressing this issue, support this reading. In People v.
Carbajal, supra, 56 Cal.4th 521, the defendant was charged with
sexually molesting two victims, and a multiple victim
circumstance was alleged. The jury convicted him of some counts
involving one victim, but deadlocked on all counts related to the
other victim. (Id. at p. 525.) He was retried by a second jury on
the counts on which the first jury had deadlocked, as well as on
the multiple victim circumstance. Our Supreme Court concluded
retrial on the multiple victim allegation was not barred by double
jeopardy, because the first jury had no authority to decide or even
consider it, since it did not find the defendant guilty of crimes
against more than one victim. (Id. at pp. 525, 533.) The court
stated: “[W]e construe section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4) to entail
that a jury may not consider whether a defendant ‘has been
convicted in the present case or cases of committing an offense
specified in subdivision (c) against more than one victim’ until the
jury has returned convictions on offenses involving more than one
victim. The essential predicate for the jury’s consideration of the
multiple victim allegation—conviction of a section 667.61,
subdivision (c) offense against more than one victim—consists of

8
facts that only the jury itself can establish by rendering verdicts
on the underlying substantive charges. Until the jury establishes
those predicate facts, it has no basis for deciding, and thus no
statutory authority to decide, the multiple victim allegation.”
(Id. at p. 535, italics added.) In her concurrence, Justice Kennard
clearly stated, the “multiple-victim allegation requires a finding
that the defendant, in a single proceeding, was convicted of
certain serious sex crimes against more than one victim.” (Id. at
p. 541 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.); see also People v. Stewart
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 163, 172 [multiple victim circumstance
applied where “there were multiple victims of defendant’s
criminal acts and the offenses against each of those victims were
tried together in the present case.” (Italics added.)].)
Also illustrative is People v. Stewart, supra, 119
Cal.App.4th 163. There, the defendant contended that section
667.61 violated equal protection principles because he was
subjected to potentially harsher One Strike sentencing due to the
prosecutor’s choice to try all charges against him in one
proceeding. In contrast, he argued, a hypothetical defendant
whose offenses against multiple victims were prosecuted in
separate proceedings would escape One Strike sentencing.
(Stewart, at pp. 172–173.) Tellingly, Stewart rejected this
argument, but not on the basis that the defendant’s underlying
premise—that the offenses had to be tried in the same
proceeding—was incorrect. Stewart did not directly consider the
question at issue here. But, if the court believed the multiple
victim circumstance applied to charges tried in separate
proceedings, this construction would have defeated the
appellant’s argument, and Stewart’s omission of that point would
be curious.

9
The People argue that the Legislature’s use of the words
“case or cases” requires the conclusion that the qualifying
convictions may be rendered in more than one case. (Italics
added.) This wording, they insist, is unambiguous and “expressly
contemplates that the qualifying convictions may be rendered in
more than one case.” A contrary construction would render the
word “cases” superfluous. They argue, “[i]f the multiple victim
circumstance only applies when all the qualifying crimes are
tried in a single prosecution, then those crimes would necessarily
become part of a single ‘case,’ and there would be no need to
specify, ‘or cases.’ ”
People v. Carbajal, supra, 56 Cal.4th 521 and People v.
DeSimone (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 693, provide examples of how
present “cases” can exist. As noted, in Carbajal, the defendant
was charged in a single case of sexually molesting two victims,
but the jury deadlocked on the counts related to one victim.
(People v. Carbajal, at p. 525.) He was retried on the mistried
counts, as well as on the multiple victim circumstance. (Ibid.)
Thus, the crimes were originally tried in a single proceeding, but
a second trial was necessitated by the jury’s deadlock. While
Carbajal did not expressly consider whether the multiple victim
circumstance applied on these facts, such was implicit in its
holding.
In People v. DeSimone, the court rejected a defendant’s
argument that only one multiple victim finding was permitted in
a case. (People v. DeSimone, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 695.) In
coming to its conclusion, the court reasoned that the language of
the multiple victim circumstance provision “merely clarifies that
the conviction for a crime against another victim may arise from
another pending case. For example, if two separate cases

10
involving different victims were consolidated for trial, the
prosecution could seek a timely amendment of the charging
document to include a multiple victim allegation . . . .” (Id. at
p. 698.)
These examples demonstrate that the Legislature wisely
used the word “cases” to cover these and similar situations. But,
no matter what the precise delineation of the meaning of “case or
cases,” the problem here is that the proceeding involving the
crime against A. simply cannot be characterized as a “present”
case. It was adjudicated in a separate proceeding that was final
long before the trial of the crimes against F. Foley’s guilt of any
offense against A. was not at issue in the trial. Indeed, Foley had
already begun or had completed his sentence imposed for the
crime against A. We cannot see how, under these circumstances,
the A. case can possibly be characterized as a “present” case.
Moreover, the People’s interpretation would render the
word “present” surplusage. If the Legislature intended the
multiple victim circumstance in section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4)
to apply whenever a defendant had suffered any conviction for
one of the enumerated sex crimes, addition of the word “present”
was entirely superfluous. We must accord significance to every
word, and may not excise words from a statute. (Kulshrestha v.
First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 611; People
v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 246–247; People v. Kareem
A. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 58, 71.) The People’s suggested
interpretation essentially eliminates the word “present” from
subdivision (e)(4).
The People further argue that their interpretation of the
statute harmonizes subdivision (e)(4) with subdivision (d)(1), the
“previous conviction” circumstance. Section 667.61, subdivision

11
(d)(1), lists as a circumstance requiring a 25-years-to-life term,
that “[t]he defendant has been previously convicted of an offense
specified in subdivision (c), including an offense committed in
another jurisdiction that includes all of the elements of an offense
specified in subdivision (c).” (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(1).)
The People correctly point out that, in regard to certain
recidivist statutes, a later-committed offense cannot be used to
enhance an earlier-committed offense; that is, the prior
conviction must precede commission of the currently charged
offense. (See, e.g., People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201;
People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 820; People v. Diaz
(1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 74, 77–78, fn.1; People v. Shivers (1986)
181 Cal.App.3d 847, 849–850; People v. Rojas (1988) 206
Cal.App.3d 795, 797, 801–802; People v. Flood (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 504, 506–507; but see People v. Rogers (2013) 57
Cal.4th 296, 340–345; People v. Baez (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 197,
200–204.) People v. Huynh (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1210 (Huynh),
while not referenced by the parties, held the same is true in
regard to section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), reasoning that the
defendant’s conviction for a qualifying offense must
chronologically precede the commission of the currently charged
offense. (Huynh, at pp. 1212, 1215.)
In light of the foregoing, the People argue, section 667.61,
subdivisions (d)(1) and (e)(4) should be harmonized by construing
subdivision (d)(1) to apply to crimes a defendant committed before
he or she committed the charged offense, whereas subdivision
(e)(4) encompasses convictions incurred for crimes the defendant
committed after he or she committed the charged offense. A
contrary reading of subdivision (e)(4), they argue, would reward
defendants who successfully prevent their victims from

12
immediately disclosing abuse, in contradiction to the
Legislature’s intent to increase the penalties against sexual
predators.
The People’s concerns are not without force. If the Huynh
court’s interpretation of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1) is
correct, some defendants may evade One Strike sentencing if
their crimes against more than one victim qualify as neither a
present case for purposes of subdivision (e)(4) nor a previous
conviction for purposes of subdivision (d)(1). This result could be
problematic, especially where young victims are concerned: child
victims often delay reporting sexual abuse and may be unable to
pinpoint precisely when a molestation occurred, potentially
making it difficult to determine which offense preceded another.
But interpretation of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1) is
not before us. The People did not plead a subdivision (d)(1)
circumstance, and given section 667.61’s strict pleading
requirements, it is not at issue here. (See § 667.61, subds. (f), (o);
People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743; see generally
People v. Perez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1223, 1225.) In our
view, if section 667.61 contains an unintended loophole, the
problem lies not with our interpretation of subdivision (e)(4).
Characterizing an offense that has already been adjudicated in
an entirely separate proceeding as a “present case” stretches the
meaning of that phrase beyond recognition. As interpretation of
subdivision (d)(1) is not before us, we have no occasion to address
the question of the proper interpretation of that subdivision.
In sum, Foley’s previous conviction for molesting A.—
suffered in an entirely separate proceeding that concluded long
before the trial of his offenses against F.— does not fall within
subdivision (e)(4)’s multiple victim circumstance as a matter of

13
law. Therefore, the trial court should not have instructed on the
multiple victim circumstance or submitted it to the jury. Because
sentencing under the One Strike law in the absence of a valid
qualifying circumstance is an unauthorized sentence, the One
Strike sentences on counts 6, 7, and 8 are unauthorized. (See
People v. Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 743.) The multiple
victim circumstance must therefore be stricken, and defendant
resentenced. We so order, and remand the case to the trial court
for a full resentencing. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th
857, 893; People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1256.)
2. Penalty assessments and surcharge
The parties agree that the matter should be remanded to
allow the court to articulate the statutory basis for the penalty
assessments and the state surcharge, and to amend the abstract
of judgment to so reflect. As we are remanding the matter for
resentencing, the parties can raise these issues in the trial court
in the first instance.

14
DISPOSITION
The multiple victim circumstance is ordered stricken, and
the matter is remanded for resentencing. In all other respects,
the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.

15

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.