Manighalam v. City of Yorba Linda CA4/3

CourtListener 10875891Calctapp16.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/16/26 Manighalam v. City of Yorba Linda CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SHAHRAM MANIGHALAM et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, G064764

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-
01222864)
CITY OF YORBA LINDA,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Melissa R. McCormick and Shawn Nelson, Judges. Affirmed.
Shahram Manighalam et al., in pro. pers., for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Rutan & Tucker and Todd O. Litfin for Defendant and
Respondent.
* * *
The City of Yorba Linda (the City) notified Shahram Manighalam
et al. (Manighalam) of two code violations at his townhome (the Property).
The first violation concerned unpermitted gas and electric lines leading to an
outdoor barbeque. The second violation concerned unpermitted exterior
floodlights. Manighalam appealed to the City’s Building Board of Appeals
(the Board). Following a hearing, the Board upheld the violations.
Manighalam filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial
court challenging the Board’s rulings. The court denied the petition. The
court found the Board’s rulings were supported by substantial evidence and
awarded costs to the City. Manighalam filed a motion to vacate judgment,
and a motion to quash/tax costs. The court denied the postjudgment motions
because they were not filed within the relevant deadlines. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 663a, subd. (a)(2) 1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

Manighalam challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for
a writ of mandate, and the denial of his postjudgment motions. We affirm the
judgment and the orders of the trial court.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2020, Manighalam purchased the Property, which
included a detached brick-and-mortar barbeque on the patio.
On October 5, 2020, Manighalam contacted Southern California
Gas Company (SCGC) to reconnect an old gas line running from the home’s
garage to the barbeque that had been disconnected years earlier. SCGC did

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Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
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not perform the requested work because its technician determined that the
gas line was not properly connected from the home to the barbeque and the
gas line was not permitted.
On October 21, 2020, the City received an e-mail concerning a
strong smell of gas coming from rear yard of the Property. The City made
multiple requests of Manighalam to conduct an on-site inspection of the
Property, but he refused.
On March 2, 2021, the City obtained an inspection warrant,
which the City executed the following day. The inspection of the Property
revealed there were gas and electric lines running from the home to the
barbeque. (See Appendix One.) The City found that no permits had been
obtained for these gas and electric lines.
On March 15, 2021, the City issued a notice of violation. The City
required Manighalam to secure permits, and then allow an inspection of the
Property to confirm that the gas and electric lines were now in compliance
with the relevant City Building Codes. The City also gave Manighalam an
option to secure a permit to properly seal off and abandon the gas and electric
lines. Manighalam appealed to the Board from the notice of violation.
Manighalam maintained that building permits may have been issued when
the Property was built in 1978, and the City had no evidence showing the gas
and electric lines were not permitted as part of the initial construction.
On March 29, 2021, the City received an e-mail concerning two
exterior floodlights Manighalam had installed on the Property. The City
found no permits for the new light fixtures. The City sent Manighalam a
notice of violation. Manighalam appealed to the Board from the notice of
violation. Manighalam maintained that the light fixtures were exempt from

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permitting requirements. (See Appendix Two.)
On June 24, 2021, the Board convened a hearing regarding the
two violations via teleconference. Manighalam was present and represented
by counsel. The building official who inspected the Property presented
reports, and then responded to questions by the Board members and by
counsel. Manighalam was then given an opportunity to make a presentation
and take questions.
The Board ultimately adopted a resolution “upholding the
building official’s determination to require building permits for unpermitted
gas and electrical lines serving a rear yard barbeque structure . . . .” (Boldface
& capitalization omitted.) The Board found that “photographs of the gas line
leading from the clothes dryer in the appellant’s garage, through the garage
wall and into patio slab leading to the barbeque structure, clearly indicate
that the barbeque structure is served by a gas line.”
“Similarly, the photographic evidence collected by the City’s
inspection of the property shows a non-weather rated, non-compliant
electrical outlet built into the right side of the barbeque structure.” The
Board found no evidence that the gas and/or the electrical lines “were
permitted as part of the original house construction.”
The Board also adopted a resolution “upholding the building
official’s determination to require building permits for unpermitted
replacement floodlights . . . at [the Property].” (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.) The Board found that “photographs of the exterior electrical light
fixtures attached to the outside of the appellant’s home confirm that said
light fixtures have been installed” and there was no “evidence to support that
said light fixtures have been permitted.” The Board noted that “the

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applicable code sections are intended to protect the public health, safety and
welfare by ensuring that the installation of electrical light fixtures meets the
. . . standards for energy conservation purposes, and for the protection of life
and property due to potential fire and/or electrical shock hazard from
improper installation.”

Court Proceedings
On September 22, 2021, Manighalam filed a petition for writ of
mandate seeking to set aside the Board’s resolutions concerning both the
unpermitted gas and electric lines, and the light fixtures.
On January 14, 2022, Manighalam filed a request with the court
asking the City “to prepare a complete record of the administrative
proceedings between the parties pursuant to . . . § 1094.6(c).”
On July 27, 2023, the trial court (the Honorable Judge Melissa R.
McCormack) conducted a court trial. The court filed a minute order denying
Manighalam’s petition for a writ of mandate.
On August 15, 2023, the City filed a proposed judgment with the
trial court and served Manighalam’s counsel. Manighalam did not object to
the proposed judgment.
In February and March 2024, the City’s counsel made inquiries of
the trial court as to why the proposed judgment had not yet been signed
(Judge McCormack had apparently been transferred to a different
courtroom). On April 10, 2024, and again on April 16, 2024, the City
resubmitted the proposed judgment. The language of the resubmitted
proposed judgments was the same as the original proposed judgment filed on
August 15, 2023.

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On April 16, 2024, the trial court (Judge McCormack) signed the
judgment, dismissing the writ of mandate with prejudice, and awarding costs
to the City “pursuant to timely filed memoranda and any motions.”
On April 18, 2024, the City served Manighalam’s counsel with a
written notice of the entry of judgment.
On April 29, 2024, the City filed a memorandum of costs for
$10,314.41 ($455.00 filing fees, $274.01 photocopies, and $9,585.40 to prepare
the administrative record). On that day, the City served the memorandum of
costs on Manighalam’s counsel.
On May 13, 2024, Manningham attempted to file a motion (in
pro. per.) to vacate judgment and a motion to substitute counsel of record (the
superior court reviewed and rejected the electronic filings).
On May 16, 2024, Manningham filed a motion captioned:
“Petitioners’ notice of errata re: ‘notice of motion and motion to vacate
judgment and notice of entry of judgment and quash memorandum of costs;
in the alternative, to tax memorandum of costs filed by respondent City of
Yorba Linda.’” (Boldface & Capitalization omitted.)
On May 29, 2024, Manighalam filed a motion to disqualify the
Honorable Judge Layne H. Melzer, who had been reassigned the case.
On May 30, 2024, Manighalam filed a motion captioned: “Notice
of motion and motion to vacate judgment and vacate notice of entry of
judgment and quash memorandum of costs; in the alternative, to tax
memorandum of costs filed by respondent, City of Yorba Linda.” (Boldface
& capitalization omitted.)
On May 31, 2024, the case was reassigned from Judge Melzer to
Judge Shawn Nelson.

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On October 3, 2024, the trial court (Judge Nelson) denied the
motion to vacate judgment and the motion to quash/tax costs because they
were not timely filed.

II.
DISCUSSION
Manighalam claims that the trial court erred by (A) denying his
petition for a writ of mandate and (B) by denying his postjudgment motions
to vacate the judgment and quash/tax costs. We disagree.

A. Petition for Writ of Mandate
A court of appeal applies the substantial evidence standard when
evaluating a trial court’s findings in granting or denying a writ of mandate.
(City of San Diego v. San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 69, 78.) “In both jury and nonjury trials, factual findings
made by the trier of fact are generally reviewed for substantial evidence.”
(Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 500–501.)
The substantial evidence standard of “review begins and ends
with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
trial court’s factual determinations.” (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital, supra, 152
Cal.App.4th at p. 501.) “[S]ubstantial evidence review is deferential to the
ruling below—and makes it difficult to show reversible error—due to the
prism through which it mandates we review the evidence: We must resolve
all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling below [citation], must draw
all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the ruling below

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[citation], and may not reweigh the evidence or any credibility findings.”
(Estate of Berger (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1293, 1307.)
“In so doing, we accept all evidence that supports the judgment,
disregard contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences to uphold the
judgment. [Citation.] ‘It is not our role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine
the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we
will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support it.’” (Slone v. El
Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.)
The California Building Code states: “Any owner or owner’s
authorized agent who intends to construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move,
demolish or change the occupancy of a building or structure, or to erect,
install, enlarge, alter, repair, remove, convert or replace any electrical, gas,
mechanical or plumbing system, the installation of which is regulated by this
code, or to cause any such work to be performed, shall first make application
to the building official and obtain the required permit.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
24, § 105.1, italics added.)

1. Unpermitted Gas and Electric Lines
An owner is responsible for existing code violations on his or her
property, even if he or she did not create the violation. (Civ. Code, § 3483
[“Every successive owner of property who neglects to abate a continuing
nuisance upon, or in the use of, such property, created by a former owner, is
liable therefor in the same manner as the one who first created it”].)
At the Board hearing, the building inspector stated that the City
had searched their records and could not find a building permit for the gas
and electric lines. Manighalam argued that it was possible that the gas and

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electrical lines may have been part of the original construction in 1978, and
therefore the lines may have been permitted at that time. However, the
building inspector stated that based on his 40 years of experience as a
building inspector, as well as his research of the Property records, it was
likely that the Property did not originally include the exterior barbeque
because the home was not a model unit.
That is, based on the evidence, it is a reasonable inference that
the barbeque and the gas and electrical lines to the home were installed after
the initial construction of the Property, and the City’s search of the records
revealed that the gas and electric lines were installed without a permit.
In short, there is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s
rulings regarding the unpermitted gas and electric lines. (See Slone v. El
Centro Regional Medical Center, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173 [we “draw
all reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment”].)

2. Unpermitted Light Fixtures
The California Building Code states: “Exemption from permit
requirements of this code shall not be deemed to grant authorization for any
work to be done in any manner in violation of the provisions of this code or
any other laws or ordinances of this jurisdiction. Permits shall not be
required for the following: [¶] . . . [¶] Electrical [¶] Minor repair work,
including the replacement of lamps or the connection of approved portable
electrical equipment to approved permanently installed receptacles.” (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 24, § 105.2.)
At the hearing, when asked questions by the Board members,
Manighalam described how he took out the original light fixtures, and then

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connected electrical wires to the new light fixtures before putting them
behind the stucco walls. Manighalam argued at the hearing that this
constituted minor repair work that did not require a permit, but as one of the
Board members pointed out: “The wires are out. Once you attach the
conductors that are attached back to the main service panel, that is not
simply plugging into a receptacle that’s far more.”
In short, there is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s
ruling that Manighalam’s installation of the two light fixtures went beyond
minor repair work (changing bulbs), and the installations required building
permits. (Estate of Berger, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1307 [“We must
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling below”].)

3. Conclusion
As we have analyzed, there is substantial evidence supporting
the Board’s rulings, which found Manighalam in violation of the City’s
Building Codes regarding the unpermitted gas and electric lines, as well as
the unpermitted light fixtures. Thus, we uphold the ruling of the trial court,
which denied Manighalam’s petition for writ of mandate seeking to vacate
the Board’s rulings.

Manighalam argues that the administrative record included
additional pages that were not before the Board. But prior to the court trial
on the writ proceeding, Manighalam filed a request asking the City “to
prepare a complete record of the administrative proceedings between the
parties pursuant to . . . § 1094.6(c).”
“The complete record of the proceedings shall be prepared by the
local agency or its commission, board, officer, or agent which made the

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decision and shall be delivered to the petitioner within 190 days after he has
filed a written request therefor. The local agency may recover from the
petitioner its actual costs for transcribing or otherwise preparing the record.
Such record shall include the transcript of the proceedings, all pleadings, all
notices and orders, any proposed decision by a hearing officer, the final
decision, all admitted exhibits, all rejected exhibits in the possession of the
local agency or its commission, board, officer, or agent, all written evidence,
and any other papers in the case.” (§ 1094.6, subd. (c).)
Here, we have reviewed the administrative record. The City
complied with Manighalam’s request to prepare an administrative record
under the relevant provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. Manighalam has
not shown any errors by the City (or the trial court). Indeed, we note that in
his briefing Manighalam repeatedly cites to the administrative record.
Manighalam also argues that he was denied due process at the
Board hearing for various reasons, including that: the Board failed to
administer oaths to witnesses, he lacked notice of the hearing procedures,
and he was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. But Manighalam
did not raise these concerns during the administrative hearing, so they have
been forfeited for purposes of appellate review. (See Hand v. Board of
Examiners (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 605, 613.)
In any event, these claims fail on their merits. The Board was not
required to administer oaths to witnesses. (See Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6
Cal.4th 841, 859 [“‘Technical rules of evidence do not apply to administrative
hearings’”].) Further, the record reveals that Manighalam received notice of
the hearing procedures more than two weeks prior to the hearing. And the
administrative record reflects that Manighalam was given an opportunity to

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present his case with counsel at the hearing, he responded to questions from
various Board members, and he was given the opportunity to examine the
City’s only witness, the building inspector.
To reiterate and conclude, Manighalam has not demonstrated
that the trial court erred in denying his petition for a writ of mandate.

B. Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion to Quash/Tax Costs

A trial court’s rulings on a motion to vacate a judgment, and a
motion to vacate/tax costs, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Uriarte v.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 780, 790; Valenti v.
City of San Diego (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 218, 231.) “An exercise of discretion
will be disturbed on appeal only if the court exercised it in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” (Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1434.)

1. Motion to Vacate Judgment
“A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court,
or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be
set aside and vacated by the same court . . . .” (§ 663.)
A motion to vacate judgment must be filed within 15 days of
service of the written notice of entry of judgment. (§ 663a, subd. (a)(2).) The
15-day deadline under section 663a, subdivision (a), is jurisdictional.
(Conservatorship of Townsend (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 691, 702 [“The time
period to file a motion to vacate is jurisdictional and cannot be extended due
to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”].)
“The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is

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computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last
day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.” (§ 12.)
On April 18, 2024, the notice of entry of judgment was served by
the City on Manighalam’s attorney. The 15-day deadline therefore expired on
May 3, 2024. (See § 12.) Manighalam attempted to file a motion (in pro. per.)
to vacate judgment on May 13, 2024, and refiled the motion (in pro. per.) to
vacate judgment on May 16, 2024. However, Manighalam filed these
documents past the mandatory deadline.
Thus, the trial court properly denied Manighalam’s motion to
vacate judgment on the basis that it was untimely; further, the court had no
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion. (See Garibotti v. Hinkle
(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 479; Conservatorship of Townsend, supra, 231
Cal.App.4th at p. 702.)

2. Motion to Quash/Tax Costs
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing
party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or
proceeding.” (§ 1032, subd. (b).)
Recoverable costs include filing fees, cost of photocopies, and
costs incurred in the preparation of an administrative record. (§ 1033.5, subd.
(a)(1) & (13); No Toxic Air, Inc. v. Lehigh Southwest Cement Co. (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 1136, 1142 [“labor costs for attorneys and paralegals to prepare
the administrative record” are recoverable as expenses].)
“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a
memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of
entry of judgment . . . . The memorandum of costs must be verified by a

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statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her
knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the
case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)
“[T]he verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of
their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show
they were not reasonable or necessary.” (612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited
Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.) Merely objecting to a
requested cost does not shift the burden to the requesting party to
demonstrate its costs were reasonable and necessary. (Benach v. County of
Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 856.) Where a party offers no
evidence to support its challenge to the opposing party’s requested costs, it
has not sustained its burden of proof to show the claimed costs were
unnecessary. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.)
“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and
filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1700(b)(1).) “The time in which any act provided by these rules is to be
performed is computed by excluding the first day and including the last,
unless the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or other legal holiday, and then it
is also excluded.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.10(a).)
On April 29, 2024, the City filed a memorandum of costs totaling
$10,314.41 ($455.00 filing fees, $274.01 photocopies, and $9,585.40 to prepare
the administrative record). On that day, the City served the memorandum of
costs on Manighalam’s counsel. The 15-day deadline therefore expired on
May 14, 2024. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.10(a).) Manighalam filed his
first motion to quash/tax costs on May 16, 2024. However, that was beyond
the 15-day deadline.

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Thus, the trial court properly denied Manighalam’s motion to
quash/tax costs because it was untimely. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1700(b)(1).) In any event, the City submitted a verified memorandum of
costs, but Manighalam did not submit a declaration, or any other evidence, to
show that the City’s claimed costs were unnecessary. (612 South LLC v.
Laconic Limited Partnership, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1285 [“the burden
is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or
necessary”].) Thus, the trial court’s ruling was also correct on the merits.
To reiterate and conclude, we find the trial court did not err when
it denied the petition for a writ of mandate, the motion to vacate judgment,
and the motion to quash/tax costs.2

2
At oral argument, Manighalam accused several trial judges and
opposing counsel of collusion and other improprieties. When asked about this,
Manighalam could not identify evidence showing any misconduct. We
understand Manighalam is disappointed in the outcome of this litigation. But
we also have a professional responsibility to caution him against making
unsupported attacks on the integrity of the court, its judges, and its officers.
(See N.D. v. Superior Court (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1292, 1296 [“duty to
‘“‘protect the integrity of [the] court’”’”], 1300 [condemning personal attacks
against trial judge made without evidence].)

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III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment and orders in favor of the City are
affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to the City.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, J.

SCOTT, J.

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APPENDIX ONE

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APPENDIX TWO

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