People v. Clark CA5

CourtListener 10875264Calctapp15.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/15/26 P. v. Clark CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F085335
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CF80264587)
v.

AL RICKEY CLARK, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. John F. Vogt,
Judge.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Cameron M. Goodman and
Christopher J. Rench, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before us on transfer from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 (Emanuel), which considered the
sufficiency of evidence supporting a finding of reckless indifference to human life for
purposes of first degree felony murder liability (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(3))1 in an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6. In accordance with the direction of the
Supreme Court, we vacated our earlier decision and notified the parties they may file
supplemental briefs.
In 1981, appellant Al Rickey Clark pleaded guilty to the second degree murder of
Daniel Torrez. In 2021, appellant filed a petition for resentencing in light of the passage
of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). The court found
appellant had established a prima facie basis for resentencing, issued an order to show
cause, and held an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) On October 19, 2022,
after an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, finding that appellant was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life in the murder of
Torrez.
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition after the evidentiary hearing,
asserting the evidence is insufficient to establish he is ineligible for resentencing, and he
contends we should review the trial court’s factual findings de novo.
Having now considered our high court’s decision in Emanuel and the parties’
supplemental briefs, we conclude the trial court’s findings that appellant was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life are supported by
substantial evidence, and we affirm the order denying the petition.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated otherwise.

2.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Evidence From the Evidentiary Hearing
The evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing shows Ronald Equarte, Sanders
Bledsaw and appellant hatched a plan to steal a vehicle and rob a bank. On July 17,
1980, after being unable to find a vehicle to steal, appellant suggested they carjack one,
put the driver in the trunk, and commit the bank robbery in the stolen car while the
kidnapped driver remained in the trunk. They drove around for a few hours, searching
for a victim, and appellant selected someone drying his car at a car wash. Bledsaw—
carrying a loaded shogun—and appellant got out of Equarte’s car, ambushed the victim,
later identified as Daniel Torrez, and tried to shove him into the trunk of his car. Torrez
fought back, Bledsaw ended up shooting Torrez, appellant and Bledsaw fled to Equarte’s
car, and they escaped the scene. The evidence about the shooting was acquired almost
exclusively from the transcript of a 1981 preliminary hearing where Equarte, appellant’s
ex-girlfriend (Allyson D.), and a percipient witness to the shooting (Edward L.) all
testified.
Equarte testified he had known Bledsaw since grade school and had met appellant
in March 1980—together they had participated in at least three robberies between March
and July 1980. Equarte had participated in six robberies prior to Torrez’s murder, and in
all but the first robbery in March, Equarte was armed with the same loaded, sawed-off
shotgun that he had purchased in March after his first robbery.
Appellant lived with his girlfriend, Allyson. In June 1980, Bledsaw was at their
apartment, and she heard appellant and Bledsaw talking about a plan to rob a bank. They
were going to steal a car from a senior citizen or someone who could not fight back so no
one would get hurt, put the person in the trunk, and use the car to commit the robbery.
According to Equarte, he met with Bledsaw and appellant at the house of
Bledsaw’s brother (Solomon) to plan the robbery on July 16, 1980. In that conversation,
appellant asserted they should “pull” a bank robbery because they were not getting

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enough money from the robberies they had already committed. None of them wanted to
use their own car, so Equarte suggested they steal one. Equarte knew it was easier to
steal 1960 to 1965 Chevrolets, and he had a few keys that were known to start those cars.
Appellant mentioned a few banks that could be possible targets and appeared the easiest
to rob. They agreed to meet at appellant’s apartment the next morning.
The following morning, Equarte drove his car to appellant’s apartment with his
loaded shotgun in the backseat, meeting appellant and Bledsaw there. Equarte and
Bledsaw were planning to steal the car, so appellant drove them around in his car for a
few hours. They did not find a satisfactory car to steal, so appellant suggested they
“[t]ake one” from someone. Equarte pointed out a police report would get filed right
away and they would not have time to use the car for the robbery. Appellant responded
they would just take the driver, too. The plan was to put the driver in the trunk and keep
him there while they committed the robbery. There was no real discussion about what
would be done with the driver after the robbery, and Equarte assumed they would just
park the car and leave it afterwards.
Appellant suggested they switch cars since Equarte was not going to be the one to
steal the car anymore. They went back to appellant’s apartment about 11:00 a.m. and
switched cars; they transferred Equarte’s gun, which both Bledsaw and appellant knew
was loaded, drove to Solomon’s house where appellant parked his car, and they set out in
Equarte’s car.
Appellant told the others he would handle the gun, but Equarte had heard appellant
make statements in the past that if “he had to use a gun that he wouldn’t hesitate on using
it.” Equarte had known Bledsaw for years and had never seen him be violent with
anyone, so Equarte wanted Bledsaw to have the gun. Bledsaw and appellant agreed to
that arrangement; appellant told Bledsaw that he should keep his hand off the trigger
unless he planned on using it, and Equarte told Bledsaw that the trigger was “fairly easy”
to pull.

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The three men drove around for a couple of hours looking for a suitable person.
When they turned onto a street next to a car wash, appellant said, “‘Ooh! Ooh! That’s it.
That’s it. Right there—uh—make a right. Make a right.’” Appellant directed Equarte to
the car wash, where a slim man (Torrez), who looked to weigh approximately
100 pounds, was drying his car with the trunk up. Equarte pulled the car into one of the
wash stalls. Appellant and Bledsaw immediately got out of the car; Bledsaw had the gun,
and he and appellant walked to the area where Torrez had just been seen, out of Equarte’s
sight.
Equarte never saw Torrez once he parked his car—the drying area was not visible
from where Equarte’s car was parked in the washing stall. After appellant and Bledsaw
were out of sight, Equarte heard loud screaming and struggling. A few minutes later, he
heard appellant say, “‘Let’s go’” and then Equarte restarted the car and started backing it
up out of the stall. Appellant reappeared and got in the front seat; then Bledsaw also
came into view, Equarte saw Bledsaw turn around facing toward Torrez and heard him
say, “‘Get back. Do you want to get shot?’” Then he saw Bledsaw pull the trigger and
heard the blast of the gun. The gun jumped out of Bledsaw’s hands, Bledsaw bent down
to pick it up, and ran to the car and jumped into the backseat and laid down. As soon as
everyone was in the car, Equarte panicked, took off and went to Solomon’s house.
Edward L., a 16-year-old who lived in the house behind the car wash, had heard
and witnessed portions of the incident. He was outside smoking a cigarette about
1:00 p.m. when he heard loud voices that sounded like an argument coming from the car
wash. He went to the fence that separated his backyard from the car wash, looked over,
and saw a “skinny” man he estimated to weigh about 95 pounds washing a black
Chevrolet with its trunk open, and another man was standing on the other side of the car
leaning up against a pole. There was no conversation going on between the two when
Edward looked over the fence, and it did not appear to be a fight. Edward went back and
sat down to finish his cigarette.

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The arguing and yelling resumed, and Edward heard someone say, “‘No, man.’”
He heard more yelling and went back to the fence to look again. The slim man who had
been washing his car was about five feet from the rear of the car, and the car’s trunk lid
was still open. He was facing the same individual Edward had seen originally and
another man standing about 30 feet away over by the washing area wall—one of the men
had what looked like a Michelob bottle in his hands. They were not yelling when he
looked over the fence, but then either a few seconds or a few minutes later he heard a
blast from the washing area and the slim man who had been washing the car fell to the
ground. Edward saw the other two men running away. Edward ran toward his house and
told his brother to call the police because someone had been shot, he then jumped the
fence, and found the slim man lying by his car and bleeding from his side. The man was
mumbling, and Edward could not make out what he was saying. From the time Edward
first heard yelling to the time the victim was shot was approximately seven to ten
minutes.
At Solomon’s house after they fled the car wash, Equarte parked his car, Solomon
came out and the four of them talked outside. Bledsaw told Solomon what had happened,
and appellant said Bledsaw had done the right thing and he would have done the same
thing himself. Bledsaw wanted to get rid of the gun, and Equarte agreed, so Solomon
took the gun. Equarte asked Bledsaw and appellant what had happened, and appellant
said they “couldn’t get the guy … couldn’t get the trunk shut because the guy’s hand was
between the lock and the latch.” Appellant hoped his palm print was not on the trunk.
There was some conversation about whether someone at the car wash would recognize
Equarte’s car.
Later that afternoon, appellant told Allyson that he had killed a man while trying
to steal the man’s car at a coin operated car wash. Appellant said it was a “Mexican”
guy; they had tried to put him in the trunk of his car, but they could not push the lid of the
trunk down because the guy was fighting, and he got out. According to appellant, the

6.
“guy ran back on ‘em,” they got into a “scuffle,” and the gun went off by accident.
Appellant told her Bledsaw had the gun, and appellant knew the victim was dead because
his chest turned bright orange. Appellant said they ran, got in Equarte’s car, and drove
back to appellant’s apartment.
On the following Monday, Equarte talked with Bledsaw and appellant again after
the crime had been covered on the news and it was reported there was a witness. It was
suggested that Equarte get out of town, and appellant said he was going to leave for Salt
Lake City. Equarte left town on Wednesday, but he was arrested later that day.
II. Procedural Background
A criminal complaint was filed against appellant, Equarte and Bledsaw in
December 1980, charging them with the first degree murder of Torrez; it also included
two special-circumstance allegations. Equarte made a deal with the prosecution, and he
testified at a January 1981 preliminary hearing regarding the murder. In May 1981, a
first amended information charged appellant and Bledsaw with the murder of Torrez; a
personal firearm enhancement was alleged against Bledsaw under section 12022.5; and a
prior conviction allegation (§ 667.5, subd. (a)) and a firearm enhancement were alleged
against appellant under section 12022, subdivision (a).
In July 1981, appellant entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder; the
firearm enhancement and prior conviction allegations were dismissed. In August 1981,
appellant was sentenced to 15 years to life for the murder; during sentencing, the court
denied appellant’s change of plea request.
In 2021, appellant filed a section 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95) petition seeking
resentencing. The court concluded he had made a prima facie showing, and the petition
advanced to an evidentiary hearing. Asserting appellant was not entitled to resentencing
because he was a major participant in the underlying felony and had exhibited reckless
indifference to human life, the prosecution offered into evidence the January 1981
preliminary hearing transcript, the July 1981 change of plea hearing transcript, parole

7.
board hearing transcripts from 2011 and 2021, and a copy of Torrez’s death certificate.
After admitting the evidence at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found appellant
was ineligible for resentencing and denied the petition.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution’s assessment of the evidence in finding
appellant was a major participant and that he had acted with reckless indifference to
human life under section 189, subdivision (e)(3). The trial court found appellant had
played a prominent role in the planning, he did not use or supply the gun that killed
Torrez, but he was aware of it. And, he was present at the scene. He actively assisted in
trying to force Torrez into the trunk of the car, and he fled the scene after the shooting,
despite that he had seen Torrez shot and knew that he was bleeding—he fled to save
himself from detection.
Pertaining to reckless indifference, the trial court found appellant ignored the
obvious risk to life in confronting the victim, trying to “stuff him into his own car” so that
appellant could use the car to rob a bank. The trial court found appellant had targeted a
“vulnerable and alone citizen, planned to have the victim on board while a bank was
robbed, and while there was no explicit plan to leave the victim to languish after the bank
robbery, such a consequence was clearly implied.” There was only one weapon, but it
was a dangerous, hair triggered shotgun; appellant’s apparent recklessness had led
Equarte to select Bledsaw to carry the gun; and appellant knew the gun was loaded.
Appellant was present at the scene of the killing, and there was no evidence he acted as a
restraining influence, which confirmed his willingness to use violence. Appellant did
nothing to stop the killing or aid the victim, though opportunities to do so existed. “He
was right there with Bledsaw, doing nothing to minimize the possibility of violence
though the likelihood of the shooting was announced. And [appellant] fled as the victim
was clinging to the final moments of life.”
In view of these findings, the court concluded appellant was a major participant in
the attempted robbery/carjacking/kidnapping, and he acted with reckless indifference to

8.
human life. Accordingly, appellant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 was
denied. Appellant now appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill 1437
Senate Bill 1437 was enacted “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437
amended section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees
of murder to address felony-murder liability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–3.)
Section 188 now provides that, “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189,
in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person solely based on his or her
participation in a crime.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) The change reflects the Legislature’s intent
that “[a] person’s culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own
actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 189, subdivision (e), to the Penal Code, which
limits the circumstances under which a person may be convicted of felony murder: “A
participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) [defining first degree murder] in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶]
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”

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The legislation also added section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95), which provides a
procedure by which defendants whose cases are final can seek retroactive relief if the
changes in the law would affect their previously sustained convictions. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4.) Initially, section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95) permitted those “convicted of
felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a
petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts .…” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4, subd. (a).)
In Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, the
Legislature amended the language of section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95) to expand the
scope of the petitioning procedure. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Under the amended
statute, if the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, the court “shall issue an
order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Within 60 days after the order to show cause
has issued, the trial court must then hold a hearing “to determine whether to vacate the
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner
had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater
than the initial sentence .…” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
“At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden
of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by
the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of
evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of the case recited
in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a

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preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the
hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the
hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence
to meet their respective burdens. A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations
and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
II. Standard of Review
Relying on People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar), appellant argues we
should independently review the record because this is a “cold-record case,” where the
entire factual basis for the decision came from the preliminary hearing transcript.
Appellant asserts that cold-record cases not presenting live testimony eliminate the need
to defer to the trial court’s credibility assessments.
In Vivar, the appellant filed a motion to vacate his 2002 conviction under recently
enacted section 1473.7, a statute that offers relief to those who have served their
sentences and their conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error that
affected the defendant’s ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential
immigration consequences of a plea. (Id., subds. (a)(1), (e)(1).) (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 517.) The trial court denied Vivar’s motion, which was affirmed. Our high court
reversed based upon its independent review of the record and concluded the Court of
Appeal erred. The court explained its “embrace of independent review in this context”
(id. at p. 527) was based upon the history of section 1473.7; the interests at stake in a
section 1473.7 motion—i.e., “the profound and substantial consequences of a prejudicial
misadvisement on a defendant’s life” (Vivar, supra, at p. 524); the type of evidence on
which a section 1473.7 ruling is likely to be based and where the judge adjudicating the

11.
motion may never have participated in the underlying proceedings that occurred years
earlier and must rely on a cold record; and the relative competence of trial courts and
appellate courts to assess that evidence (Vivar, supra, at pp. 526–257). Additionally, the
court pointed out, “[w]hether counsel’s advice regarding immigration was inadequate and
whether such inadequacy prejudiced the defense, while mixed questions, are
predominantly questions of law.” (Id. at p. 524.) In a footnote, the court articulated the
limited nature of its holding: “Our decision addresses only the independent standard of
review under section 1473.7. Nothing we say here disturbs a familiar postulate: when
reviewing a ruling under the substantial evidence standard, ‘an appellate court should
defer to the factual determinations made by the trial court,’ regardless of ‘whether the
trial court’s ruling[s are based] on oral testimony or declarations.’” (Vivar, supra, at
p. 528, fn. 7.)
Multiple courts have declined to extend Vivar to govern the standard of review in
evidentiary hearings under section 1172.6. (See People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
27, 42; People v. Werntz (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1109; People v. Oliver (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 466, 480 (Oliver); People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 232–233;
People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 590–591; People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 283, 302.) These courts have concluded that determining whether a
defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 is predominantly a factual
question reviewable for substantial evidence. (Njoku, supra, at p. 43 [“Whereas the
prejudice issue at the center of Vivar was a legal question traditionally afforded
independent judgment review [citation], the issue here is a factual one traditionally
afforded substantial evidence review [citation].”]; Werntz, supra, at p. 1109, review
granted [“the questions we face on a review from a court’s denial of a section 1172.6
motion are primarily factual” and “the factors that persuaded the court in Vivar to apply
independent review are not at play here”]; Oliver, supra, at p. 480 [distinguishing Vivar
and concluding “Whether Oliver was a major participant in the underlying felonies who

12.
acted with reckless indifference to human life is predominantly a factual question
reviewable for substantial evidence.”]; Sifuentes, supra, at pp. 232–233 [rejecting
independent standard of review and concluding whether the appellant knew or reasonably
should have known the victim was a police officer under resentencing statute was
predominantly a factual question reviewable for substantial evidence]; Mitchell, supra, at
pp. 590–591 [distinguishing Vivar and concluding “Substantial evidence support[ed] the
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mitchell was a major participant in a felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.”]; Clements, supra, at p. 283 [concluding
that “trial judge sits as a fact finder at a hearing under [former] section 1170.95,
subdivision (d) and that substantial evidence support[ed] the trial judge’s finding beyond
a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder”].)
More recently, our Supreme Court has confirmed the denial of a section 1172.6
petition following an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988; accord, Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.) “In
reviewing the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence, we apply well-settled
principles. ‘We “‘examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the
necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” [ Citation.] Our job on review is different
from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all
the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there
is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact
finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.)
Reversal is not warranted unless “‘“upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the trial court’s ruling].”’” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53
Cal.4th 500, 508.)

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III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Findings
The prosecution asserted the evidence showed appellant was guilty of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), as a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. As noted,
Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e), which limits the circumstances under
which a person may be convicted of felony murder: “A participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a felony listed in [section 189,] subdivision (a) in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was
the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) the person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
Section 189, subdivision (e)(3), tracks the language of section 190.2,
subdivision (d) (section 190.2(d)), which applies to the felony-murder special
circumstance. Under section 190.2(d), a nonkiller who, “with reckless indifference to
human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated” in section 190.2,
subdivision (a), which results in the death of some person or persons, and who is found
guilty of murder in the first degree therefor, shall be punished by death or life in prison.
In 2015 and 2016, the Supreme Court provided guidance as to the meaning of
section 190.2(d) in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
As the Legislature is presumed to know and act against the backdrop of existing
case law (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 407), the language of section 189,
subdivision (e)(3), as enacted by the Legislature in 2018, necessarily was intended to
accord with the interpretation of section 190.2 articulated in Banks and Clark, as both

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opinions were issued at least two years before Senate Bill 1437 was signed into law. (In
re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 561 (Taylor) [“the standard under section 189,
subdivision (e)(3) … is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under
section 190.2(d), as the former provision expressly incorporates the latter”].)
A. The Enmund-Tison Continuum
In Banks, the California Supreme Court held that section 190.2(d) was designed to
codify the holding in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which articulates the
constitutional limits on executing felony murderers who did not personally kill. (Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.) Banks explained Tison and a prior decision on which it is
based, Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund), “collectively place conduct on
a spectrum, with felony-murder participants eligible for death only when their
involvement is substantial and they demonstrate a reckless indifference to the grave risk
of death created by their actions.” (Banks, supra, at p. 794.) As such, section 190.2(d)
(and, in turn, § 189, subd. (e)(3)), must be accorded the same meaning. (Banks, supra, at
p. 794.)
At one end of the continuum is Enmund where the defendant’s culpability did not
meet the constitutional minimum for the death penalty. (Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at
p. 801.) There, the defendant identified a robbery victim, planned the crime, and drove
armed confederates to the home of the victims. (Id. at p. 784; id. at p. 803 (dis. opn. of
O’Connor, J.).) The confederates shot and killed the robbery victims, and Enmund acted
as a getaway driver and helped dispose of the weapons. (Id. at pp. 784–787.) The high
court held the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for any felony-murder aider and
abettor “who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force will be employed.” (Enmund, supra, at p. 797.) “The intent to commit
an armed robbery is insufficient; absent the further ‘intention of participating in or
facilitating a murder’ ([Enmund, supra], at p. 798), a defendant who acts as ‘the person in
the car by the side of the road at the time of the killings, waiting to help the robbers

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escape’ (id. at p. 788) cannot constitutionally be sentenced to death.” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 799.) The high court reversed Enmund’s death sentence as prohibited by the
federal Constitution, concluding Enmund was a “‘minor actor in an armed robbery, not
on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental
state.’” (Banks, supra, at p. 800.)
Tison lies at the other end of the continuum, where the defendants’ conduct was
deemed death-penalty eligible under the federal Constitution. In Tison, three brothers
(Ricky, Raymond and Donald Tison) assisted their father Gary Tison (who had killed
someone in a previous escape attempt) and his cellmate in breaking out of prison,
bringing a large arsenal of weapons with them to the prison. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at
pp. 139–140.) In the ensuing escape, “their car, already down to its spare tire, suffered
another flat, so the five men agreed to flag down a passing motorist in order to steal a
replacement car. Raymond waved down a family of four; the others then emerged from
hiding and captured the family at gunpoint. Raymond and Donald drove the family into
the desert in the Tisons’ original car with the others following. Ricky and the cellmate
removed the family’s possessions from their car and transferred the Tison gang’s
possessions to it; Gary and his cellmate then killed all four family members. When the
Tisons were later apprehended at a roadblock, Donald was killed and Gary escaped into
the desert, only to die of exposure. [Citation.] Ricky and Raymond Tison and the
cellmate were tried and sentenced to death. The trial court made findings that Ricky and
Raymond’s role in the series of crimes was ‘“very substantial”’ and they could have
foreseen their actions would ‘“create a grave risk of … death.”’” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at pp. 799–800 [summarizing the facts of Tison].)
In Banks, guided by Tison and Enmund, the court considered “under what
circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a major
participant .…” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.) There, Banks and two other men
attempted to rob a medical marijuana dispensary. During the attempted robbery, shots

16.
were fired and the three fled. When a security guard attempted to stop them, Banks shot
him twice, killing him. (Id. at p. 795.) Matthews was acting as the getaway driver,
driving the three to the dispensary, waiting for them, and then picking up two of them
after the failed robbery and driving them away. (Id. at p. 805.) In comparing and
contrasting the factors the United States Supreme Court had considered in Tison and
Enmund, our high court concluded Matthews was not a major participant in the robbery:
there was no evidence of Matthews’s role in the planning or procuring of weapons; there
was no evidence any of them had previously committed murder, attempted murder, or
any other violent crime; Matthews was not present when the shooting took place, and
there was no evidence he instigated or could have prevented the shooting. (Banks, supra,
at p. 805.)
The court further found Matthews did not act with reckless indifference to human
life: although Matthews knew he was participating in an armed robbery, there was no
evidence he “knew his own actions would involve a grave risk of death. There was no
evidence Matthews intended to kill or, unlike the Tisons, knowingly conspired with
accomplices known to have killed before. Instead, as in Enmund, Banks’s killing of [the
security guard] was apparently a spontaneous response to armed resistance from the
victim.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 807.)
The California Supreme Court expanded its discussion of reckless indifference to
life in Clark. There, Clark was involved in the attempted robbery of a computer store.
Clark “was the mastermind who planned and organized the attempted robbery and who
was orchestrating the events at the scene of the crime.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 612.) During the robbery, one of Clark’s confederates, shot and killed the mother of a
store employee who arrived at the store to pick up her son. At the time of the shooting,
Clark was not at the store, but he drove to the location shortly thereafter and fled when he
saw a woman lying on the ground, the police approaching, and the shooter fleeing the
scene. (Id. at pp. 537–542, 612–613.)

17.
Clark was convicted of first degree felony murder, and true findings were made on
the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance allegations based on his
aiding and abetting liability in the shooting. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 608–610.)
To decide whether Clark was a major participant in the robbery, the court reviewed the
factors discussed in Banks, but did not decide whether Clark was a major participant
because it held the evidence was insufficient to show reckless indifference to life. (Clark,
supra, at p. 614.)
In reaching this conclusion, the court expanded on factors relevant to the reckless
indifference to life analysis: there was only one gun at the scene of the killing, it was not
carried by Clark and it was loaded with only one bullet; as Clark was not present at the
scene, there was no evidence he had an opportunity to intervene to prevent the killing;
Clark’s departure was ambiguous as to his mental state concerning the victim’s death,
and Clark knew police were arriving to aid the victim; the period of interaction between
the perpetrators and the victims was designed to be limited; no evidence was presented
that Clark knew the shooter had a propensity for violence, and, as he was not at the scene,
he had no opportunity to observe the shooter’s conduct that might have indicated the
shooter was likely to engage in lethal violence; and, finally, there was evidence Clark had
taken some steps to minimize the risk of violence during the robbery—the robbery was
undertaken after closing time, there were not supposed to be any bullets in the gun, and
the gun was actually loaded with only one bullet. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 618–623.)
In In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins), our high court again revisited
section 190.2(d). There, the defendant planned an unarmed robbery and assault of a man
(Wilson) who had swindled the defendant out of money. (Scoggins, supra, at p. 671.)
Pursuant to the plan, two of Scoggins’s friends (Powell and Howard) would hide inside a
van, and then they would jump out and assault Wilson. (Ibid.) Scoggins was not going
to be involved in the attack, and there was no evidence the plan involved the use of

18.
weapons. (Ibid.) In executing the plan, however, Powell pulled out a gun and fired
several shots and killed Wilson; Powell and Howard got into a confederate’s van and
drove away. (Id. at p. 672.) Scoggins, meanwhile, waited at a gas station nearby, but
exchanged numerous phone calls with Powell and Howard in the hour before the
shooting. (Ibid.) After the shooting, Scoggins walked over to Wilson, spoke with
bystanders and participated in a police interview at the scene. (Ibid.)
The court held that Scoggins did not act with reckless indifference to human life:
Scoggins did not use a gun, nor did he know one would be used; his plan did not involve
shooting Wilson; he was not physically present at the crime scene and was not in a
position to restrain Powell once the meeting with Wilson began; Scoggins’s view of the
scene was obstructed, so he was unaware in real time that Powell was deviating from the
original plan; although he was in contact with Powell and Howard by phone, he lacked
control over their actions once they arrived at the crime scene, especially given how
quickly the shooting occurred; there was no evidence Scoggins instructed his
confederates to kill Wilson, or that he directed them to deviate from the plan once they
arrived at the crime scene; Scoggins’s return to the scene after the shooting reflected
ambiguity as to his mindset—it could be inferred that Scoggins walked back to the crime
scene because he was unsurprised by the shooting; alternatively, he might have intended
to check on Wilson and render aid; the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators and the victim was very limited; and there was no evidence Scoggins knew
that Powell or Howard was likely to use lethal force. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 680–681.)
Most recently, in Emanuel, our high court considered the reckless indifference
standard in the context of section 1172.6. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 885–896.)
There, Emanuel and a confederate planned an unarmed robbery where they would meet
the victim in a public park in the afternoon and steal his stash of marijuana. When the
victim resisted the heist, Emanuel told his cohort, “‘let’s go’” (id. at p. 891), and started

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to walk away, but his confederate shot and killed the victim. (Id. at pp. 877, 878.) The
trial court denied the petition, finding Emanuel was a major participant in the robbery
who acted with reckless indifference. The trial court emphasized Emanuel should have
done more to prevent the shooting. The appellate court affirmed, and a petition for
review was granted. (Id. at p. 881.)
Our high court held the facts before it did not support a finding Emanuel carried
out the crime with the requisite reckless indifference to human life within the meaning of
section 189, subdivision (e)(3). The court highlighted that Emanuel was not armed, and
he did not know his confederate was armed or likely to use deadly force—all facts
unsupportive of a finding of reckless indifference. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 885.) The crime unfolded quickly without any prolonged period of restraint—the short
length of the interaction did nothing to heighten the risk of violence beyond that inherent
in the robbery itself. (Id. at p. 886.) The robbery took place during the day in a public
place, circumstances which did not support an objective risk of lethal violence that would
have been reasonably anticipated by Emanuel. (Id. at p. 889.) When the victim
unexpectedly resisted the robbery, Emanuel attempted to act as a restraining influence on
his confederate by trying to abandon the plan, which the court found to be “crucial”
insights into Emanuel's state of mind. (Id. at p. 891.) The court emphasized that it was
not incumbent upon a defendant to actually prevent the violence or attempt to do so by
any means to demonstrate a lack of a recklessly indifferent mindset, nor does the failure
to restrain a cohort weigh in favor of reckless indifference without some evidence the
defendant had a meaningful opportunity to do so. (Ibid.) Finally, the court found
Emanuel's fleeing the scene and failing to aid the victim to be ambiguous as to his mental
state—it could have reflected a lack of concern for the victim, or a desire to avoid arrest,
or both. (Id. at p. 894.) Standing on its own, Emanuel’s failure to aid the victim and
fleeing was insufficient to demonstrate reckless indifference.

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With this legal backdrop in mind, we consider whether there is substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that appellant was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
B. Analysis
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to show either that he was a major
participant or that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
1. Major Participant
“The ultimate question pertaining to being a major participant is ‘whether the
defendant’s participation “in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death”
[citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered “major” [citations].”’” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) To assist in answering this question, Banks articulated the
following considerations: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying
or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the
other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.) “No one of these considerations is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” (Id. at p. 803.)
On the major participant prong, the trial court found that appellant played a
prominent role in planning, he was aware that Bledsaw had a weapon, and he was present
at the scene when the murder occurred and participated by trying to force the victim into
the trunk. The court adopted the People’s observation that appellant “was intimately
involved in the attempted robbery/carjacking/kidnapping. He actively assisted in trying
to stuff Mr. Torrez into his own car. This type of behavior is fraught with danger.” The

21.
court also adopted the People’s assessment that defendant fled the scene after the carnage
unfolded to save himself from detection.
Considering the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was
substantial evidence to support the finding appellant was a major participant. On the first
Banks factor—the defendant’s role in planning the crime—appellant played a primary
role. After being unable to find a car that Equarte could steal using his keys, it was
appellant who suggested they steal someone’s car and put the driver in the trunk;
appellant selected Torrez as the target of their kidnapping/carjacking plot, and directed
Equarte to pull into the car wash where Torrez was drying his car.
As to the second factor, while appellant did not procure the shotgun and appellant
was not armed, he knew Bledsaw was carrying the loaded shotgun. (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803.) With regard to the third factor and the particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, the weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants (id. at p. 811), appellant’s plan to obtain Torrez’s car was significantly more
dangerous than a typical armed robbery—appellant planned to shove Torrez into the
trunk of Torrez’s car with no plan to release him. The likelihood that a victim would
fiercely resist being pushed into the trunk of a car in the middle of the day in July in
Fresno where temperatures routinely soar above 100 degrees (and in a populated city
where people were awake and could view the crime) was substantially likely and highly
foreseeable, and elevated the risk to human life beyond those inherent in any armed
robbery. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 623.) While there was no evidence appellant
knew Bledsaw had any violent history or propensity to shoot Torrez, the situation itself
presented a grave risk of resistance and the need to meet that resistance with lethal force.
Considering the fourth factor and the defendant’s presence at the scene (Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803), appellant was with Bledsaw at the scene of the murder, he
worked with Bledsaw to try to get Torrez into the trunk of the car, and appellant saw
Torrez get shot. Equarte heard appellant say “‘Let’s go’” before Bledsaw fired his

22.
weapon, but he did not try to intervene when Bledsaw turned to Torrez and told him to
“‘Get back,’” nor did he urge Bledsaw to go at that point or tell him to stop.
Notably, appellant fled the scene with Bledsaw when he saw Torrez had been shot
and was bleeding, rendering no aid. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 [considering
what the defendant did after lethal force was used].) Appellant argues he thought Torrez
was dead from the shot, and thus no aid given by appellant would have changed the
outcome. Moreover, the crime was committed during the day with people around, thus
the victim would likely receive some aid from someone, which is what happened.
For purposes of the major participation analysis and distinct from his mental state,
appellant’s conduct after lethal force was used is relevant: appellant rendered no aid after
seeing Torrez was shot; instead, he fled, drove with the others to Solomon’s house where
they got rid of the weapon, and reassured Bledsaw he would have done the same thing—
suggesting they were full partners in the crime. (See In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
450, 462 [evidence the defendant was “close enough [to the murder scene] to hear the
gunshot,” but “did not go back inside and try and help the [victim],” and instead carried
stolen merchandise out to the car weighed in favor of a finding of major participation].)
This postlethal force conduct could reasonably be viewed, in concert with the other Banks
factors, as elevating the degree of appellant’s participation in the underlying crime and
his culpability under the totality of the circumstances.
In sum, the evidence strongly supports a finding that appellant was a major
participant. He was the primary planner for the kidnapping/carjacking, and the plan
significantly elevated the risk of resistance beyond that attendant to an armed robbery or
a kidnapping where the victim is not forced into such obviously dangerous confinement;
he selected the victim; he participated in trying to wrestle Torrez into the trunk; he was at
the scene of the murder the entire time and he saw Bledsaw shoot Torrez; he did not
attempt to intercede when Bledsaw turned and yelled at Torrez to “‘Get back’”; and he
did not render any aid to the victim afterwards, he fled with the group, got rid of the

23.
weapon, and reassured Bledsaw he would have done the same thing—suggesting they
were full partners in the crime. (See People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591
[full partners at every stage of the crime, including splitting the proceeds of the robbery
equally with the shooter, supported major participant finding].)
C. Reckless Indifference
We turn next to consider whether appellant acted with the requisite mental state,
examining the record for “sufficient evidence of ‘“‘reasonable, credible, and of solid
value’”’ to ‘support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt’” that appellant acted with
reckless indifference. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618; accord, Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 885.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears
“that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the
jury’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Even where the
evidence is primarily circumstantial, if “the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also be reconciled
with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.” (Id. at p. 358.)
To determine whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life,
we “look to whether a defendant has ‘“knowingly engag[ed] in criminal activities known
to carry a grave risk of death.”’” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) “The defendant
must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed, demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.” (Ibid.) Although “‘there are some felonies as to which one
could properly conclude that any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless
indifference to the value of human life’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615, quoting
Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12), such as “‘the manufacture and planting of a live
bomb,’” armed robbery is not among them (Clark, supra, at p. 615, quoting Banks,
supra, at p. 810, fn. 9). “Reckless indifference ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to
assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not

24.
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 676–677, quoting Clark, supra, at p. 617.)
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element.
[Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and he or
she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’
[Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’
[Citations.] ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any
[violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference to human life; ‘only
knowingly creating a “grave risk of death”’ satisfies the statutory requirement.”
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
In Clark, the court articulated the following considerations for determining
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life: “Did the defendant
use or know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were
ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have
the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the
interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the
defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood
of using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of
violence during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [listing factors set
forth in Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623].)
The reckless indifference considerations “‘significantly overlap’” with the major
participant considerations, “‘for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark,

25.
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.) As with the major participant considerations, “‘[n]o one of
[the reckless indifference] considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’” (Id. at p. 618.) “We analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether [the defendant] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
Considered in light of Emanuel, we are unpersuaded the trial court’s reckless
indifference finding is unsupported under the totality of the circumstances presented here.
1. Duration of the Crime
In considering whether a defendant exhibited a recklessly indifferent mindset,
Clark explained that courts “have looked to whether a murder came at the end of a
prolonged period of restraint of the victims by [the] defendant” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 620, fn. omitted) because “[w]here a victim is held at gunpoint, kidnapped, or
otherwise restrained in the presence of perpetrators for prolonged periods, ‘there is a
greater window of opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly culminating in murder”
(ibid.). The robbery plan appellant presented to his cohorts involved kidnapping a driver
with the use of an especially dangerous gun, taking the driver’s car, and holding the
driver for an apparently unlimited duration in the trunk of that car on a July afternoon in
Fresno—there was no plan to release the driver after the robbery.
In attempting to execute this plan, the victim appellant chose responded with such
vigorous resistance that Bledsaw and appellant could not shove him in the trunk, despite
Torrez’s relatively diminutive size (estimated by Equarte and Edward to be around
100 pounds). The exact duration of Bledsaw and appellant’s physical struggle with
Torrez is unknown, but Edward testified it occurred over the course of about 7 to
10 minutes, while Equarte estimated the time between Bledsaw and appellant leaving the
car until he heard appellant saying “‘Let’s go’” was about three minutes. In the end, the
altercation with Torrez lasted only minutes and, thus, the duration factor is neutral.
However, we hasten to note, that while the duration of the struggle did not necessarily

26.
heighten the risk of violence, the crime’s planned duration exponentially increased the
likelihood of the victim’s death in the trunk of a hot car. A factfinder could reasonably
conclude the degree and duration of Torrez’s resistance was likely influenced by the
obvious lethal dangers of what appellant and Bledsaw were trying to force Torrez to do.
Thus, while we conclude the duration factor is neutral given that the actual struggle with
Torrez lasted only minutes (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886), we consider the
planned lengthy duration of the crime as part of appellant’s failure to minimize the risks
of violence.
2. Use or Awareness of the Presence of Weapons and Knowledge
of Cohort’s Likelihood of Killing
As to evidence of appellant’s awareness of the presence of weapons and his
knowledge of Bledsaw’s propensity for violence (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–
619, 621), appellant himself was not armed with a gun or other weapon, he had not
supplied the shotgun to Bledsaw, and his plan for the crime did not involve shooting
Torrez. Nevertheless, appellant knew Bledsaw was armed with a loaded gun that had a
highly sensitive trigger. (See id. at p. 618 [where accomplices bring weapons to the
scene of the crime can weigh in favor of a finding of reckless indifference to life].)
“A defendant’s willingness to engage in an armed robbery with individuals known
to him to use lethal force may give rise to the inference that the defendant disregarded a
‘grave risk of death.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621.) Here, there is no evidence
appellant knew that Bledsaw had any propensity or reputation for violence. (Ibid. [the
petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to human life, in part, because “no
evidence was presented at trial that [the confederate] was known to have a propensity for
violence, let alone evidence indicating that [the] defendant was aware of such a
propensity”]; In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1025 (Bennett) [finding
“‘significant’” the lack of evidence that the petitioner knew of his confederates’ “violent
propensities”].) Nonetheless, the reason Equarte wanted Bledsaw to carry the gun was

27.
due to appellant’s reputation for recklessness and Equarte’s concern appellant would use
the gun if he was carrying it. While appellant and Bledsaw had conducted at least three
prior armed robberies together, and there is no evidence anyone was shot or hurt during
those robberies, the crime appellant planned was completely different: they were
planning to first assault and kidnap a victim with the use of a gun, and then force the
victim into the trunk of a car at the height of summer (July) for the entire course of the
bank robbery with no plan or discussion to release the victim from the trunk after the
robbery.
While appellant may not have had knowledge of Bledsaw’s propensity to use the
gun, a reasonable factfinder could conclude appellant’s plan to assault and kidnap the
victim vastly increased the likelihood of fierce resistance and responding lethal force, and
appellant’s own conduct in helping Bledsaw try to force the victim into the trunk
precipitated the gun’s ultimate use. These facts, in conjunction with appellant’s
knowledge of Bledsaw’s gun, tend to support a conclusion appellant acted with a
recklessly indifferent mindset.
3. Efforts Taken to Minimize the Risk of Violence
Turning to evidence minimizing the risk of violence, efforts at the planning stage
to minimize the potential for violence may, but do not necessarily, bear on reckless
indifference. Given the two-part nature of the reckless indifference standard, “‘[t]he
existence of efforts to minimize violence does not necessarily foreclose a finding of
reckless indifference to human life .…’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 888, quoting
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 682.) “Where an ‘objective evaluation of the
circumstances’ of the crime suggests the risk of violence is grave, the defendant’s
apparent efforts to minimize that risk may be unavailing.” (Emanuel, supra, at p. 888,
quoting Scoggins, supra, at p. 683.) “Conversely, the absence of such efforts does not
necessarily evince a subjective disregard for risk where the objective circumstances of the

28.
planned crime suggest the risk of violence posed is no more than that inherent in any
violent felony.” (Emanuel, supra, at p. 888, citing Scoggins, supra, at p. 679.)
Here, a factfinder could reasonably conclude the circumstances of the crime
objectively posed an extremely heightened and obvious risk to life that appellant
subjectively disregarded and took no meaningful steps to minimize. As the trial court
found, appellant’s plan for the carjacking and kidnapping the victim with no plan of
release posed obvious and heightened risks of death. The entire plan, which was
formulated and substantially carried out by appellant, demonstrates a recklessly
indifferent mindset from the outset: appellant’s plan required immediate resort to
violence by physically assaulting a victim while using a hair-triggered shotgun for the
purpose of an extended-duration kidnapping, elevating the risk of violence far above that
inherent in any violent felony. Beyond that, the plan called for coercing the victim into
the trunk of a car, a life-threatening environment in the summer, without any plan for the
victim’s release from the trunk, substantially increasing the risk of the victim’s death via
heat exposure. Given the obvious and lethal peril associated with confinement in the
trunk of a vehicle in excessive July afternoon heat, the likelihood of the victim’s
resistance to being shoved into the trunk of a car was exponentially increased—despite
that appellant sought a more vulnerable victim who might put up less of a fight. While
the daytime occurrence of the crime in a public place could tend to deter Bledsaw from
using the gun, neither appellant nor Bledsaw saw fit to unload the gun—rather, appellant
planned a necessarily violent physical confrontation for purposes of an extended-duration
kidnapping in the trunk of a car with the aid of a loaded, hair-trigger shotgun carried by
Bledsaw.

4. Physical Presence at the Scene and Opportunity to Restrain
Confederates or Aid the Victim
The final factor to consider is whether appellant was physically present at the
crime scene and whether he had opportunities to restrain the crime or aid the victim.

29.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) Physical presence may be highly relevant to a
defendant’s culpability because it could demonstrate the murder was the culmination or a
foreseeable result of several intermediate steps—it may show the defendant observed his
cohorts and that he shared in their actions and mental state; and it may show the
defendant had an opportunity to act to restrain his cohorts or aid the victim after the
shooting. (Ibid.) It is undisputed appellant was present at the scene of the murder, unlike
the defendants in Enmund, Banks, Clark, and Scoggins. Indeed, appellant was physically
present “during the entire sequence of events culminating in the murder[].” (Clark,
supra, at p. 619.) Not only that, he came up with the plan to carjack a driver and put the
driver in the trunk of the car; he searched with the group for a victim; he selected Torrez
while they were driving around and directed Equarte to the car wash; and he participated
with Bledsaw in violently assaulting Torrez, attempting to shove him into the trunk of the
car. A factfinder could reasonably conclude from this evidence that appellant not only
planned the crime, which called for the immediate use of violence against the victim with
the goal of subjecting the victim to life-threatening confinement in a car trunk, he took
the lead in carrying out the plan, and his actions, together with Bledsaw’s, precipitated
the victim’s fierce resistance and Bledsaw’s ultimate use of the gun that appellant knew
was loaded and had a sensitive trigger—i.e., it was a particularly dangerous firearm.
Also relevant is whether appellant acted “‘as a restraining influence on [his]
murderous cohort[].’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) “‘If the defendant fails to act
as a restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting
murders.’” (Ibid.) In the face of Torrez’s resistance and their inability to force him into
the trunk, appellant told Bledsaw, “‘Let’s go.’” In isolation, this fact might suggest
appellant was attempting to restrain the crime and did not hold a recklessly indifferent
mindset. (See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 879, 891 [after the victim refused to
acquiesce to the robbery, the defendant started walking away, telling his confederate they

30.
should go; under the circumstances, this showed the defendant was acting as a restraining
influence on his confederate and was not evidence of a recklessly indifferent mindset].)
Here, however, when viewing the circumstances as a whole, a reasonable
factfinder could conclude this statement was not meant to act as a restraining influence,
nor did it reflect the lack of a recklessly indifferent mindset. Torrez’s kidnapping and
carjacking were only the first steps in carrying out the bank robbery, which was the
group’s ultimate goal. Appellant’s sudden call to give up in the face of Torrez’s
unexpectedly successful resistance could be viewed as an attempt not to draw outside
attention to the struggle with Torrez, which according to Edward, a percipient witness,
involved a lot of yelling and occurred in the middle of the day at a public-facing business.
Viewed through that lens, a factfinder could reasonably view appellant’s statement
to Bledsaw as an effort not to get caught during the kidnapping/carjacking gambit, rather
than any concern for Torrez’s safety or to deescalate the situation so no one would get
hurt. Afterall, just moments before appellant called to Bledsaw to go, the two men were
violently trying to shove Torrez into the trunk of a car on a summer afternoon with no
plan for his release, showing no concern for the threat this posed to Torrez’s life—under
these circumstances, appellant’s attempt to get Bledsaw to leave reasonably could be
viewed as an effort to salvage the robbery plan, not an attempt to restrain the crime for
the sake of Torrez’s well-being. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314 [under
substantial evidence review, appellate court draws all reasonable inferences from the
evidence that support the factfinder’s verdict].)
Pursuant to Emanuel, appellant’s decision not to aid Torrez, despite knowing he
had been shot and instead fleeing the scene following the shooting, is ambiguous and
does not constitute substantial evidence of appellant’s mindset. (Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 894.) Appellant’s flight without rendering aid could just as easily have been
compelled by his fear of getting caught as any ambivalence over Torrez’s condition.
Moreover, the shooting occurred in public in the middle of the afternoon where appellant

31.
knew others would hear the shooting and could summon aid for the victim. Nothing
about appellant’s conduct after Torrez was shot prevented or delayed Torrez from
receiving aid. (Ibid.; cf. Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 140–141 [the defendants
abandoned the victims in a remote desert and disabled their only available chance of
survival evidenced reckless indifference]; cf. In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450,
457, 465 [after hearing gunshot, the defendant did nothing to aid the victim, and left the
victim hidden away in a bathroom where he was unlikely to be found quickly].)
5. Totality of the Circumstances
Considering the foregoing, there are several key factors, supported by substantial
evidence, that weigh strongly in favor of the trial court’s reckless indifference finding.
Appellant was heavily involved in planning the crime, and it was his idea to carjack and
kidnap a driver and attempt to violently wrestle the driver into the trunk on a hot summer
afternoon with no plan to release the driver so they could use the stolen car for the
robbery without it being reported. This plan not only elevated the risk of victim
resistance and the likelihood of a deadly response far above the risks implicit in any
violent crime, it demonstrated a mindset recklessly indifferent to human life at the outset:
first assaulting and kidnapping a victim with the use of an especially dangerous gun; and
then to forcing the victim into the trunk of a car on a summer day in Fresno where
temperatures routinely exceed 100 degrees with no plan for the victim’s release—all of
which clearly and substantially increased the victim’s risk of death far beyond the lethal
risk generally attendant to any violent crime.
Moreover, appellant not only took the lead in planning, he selected the victim and
directed Equarte to pull into the car wash. Appellant did not stay in the car—he was
present on the scene of the murder with Bledsaw the entire time, knowing his cohort was
armed with a loaded shotgun that had a hair trigger, and he participated actively. He
personally tried to force Torrez into the trunk of the car, and he saw Bledsaw shoot
Torrez—he saw Torrez’s wound and the blood. Although appellant said, “‘Let’s go’”

32.
before the shooting, the evidence is susceptible to an interpretation appellant was not
attempting to restrain the crime so much as attempting to avoid detection and salvage the
robbery plan.
These facts are meaningfully distinguishable from Emanuel. In that case, there
was no evidence Emanuel knew his confederate possessed a gun, would bring that gun to
the robbery, or was likely to use lethal force. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.)
Here, by contrast, appellant knew Bledsaw was carrying a shotgun with a hair trigger
and, pursuant to appellant’s plan, he and Bledsaw initiated a violent attack on Torrez to
get him into the trunk of the car. Given the obvious life-threatening risk the nature of this
kidnapping posed to Torrez, the plan increased the risk Torrez would resist, which, in
turn, increased the likelihood of a deadly response from Bledsaw. Unlike the
circumstances in Emanuel, which indicated the defendant was attempting to restrain the
crime and walk away, appellant initiated a violent attack on the victim, planned to subject
the victim to imminently life-threatening conditions of extended duration with no concern
about his release or the threat to the victim’s life, and then called to Bledsaw to go only
after a loud fight with the victim that could draw attention. Appellant’s plan, and the
manner in which it was carried out, support a finding appellant acted with a recklessly
indifferent mindset.
These facts also distinguish this case from those that appellant cites. In In re
Miller, the defendant was a spotter in a “‘follow-home’” robbery scheme where the
defendant identified a victim at a bank, alerted his cohorts in a car, and the cohorts
followed the victim and robbed her while shooting and killing her companion. (In re
Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 964–965 (Miller).) Notably, there was no evidence
the defendant in Miller knew a gun would be used; he was absent from the scene of the
killing and therefore had no opportunity to stop it or help the robbery victim’s
companion; the shooting was impulsive after the shooter was confronted; and there was
no evidence the defendant knew the shooter was likely to kill. (Id. at pp. 975–976.)

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Nothing about the crime elevated the risk to human life beyond those inherent in any
armed robbery, and the court found the evidence insufficient to support the special
circumstance finding. (Id. at pp. 976–977.)
In Bennett, the defendant developed a plan with cohorts to rob a drug dealer.
(Bennett, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1008.) The defendant stayed in the car while his
cohorts confronted, chased, shot and killed the drug dealer. (Id. at pp. 1008–1009.)
Although the evidence established the defendant participated in planning the robbery (id.
at p. 1019), he was instrumental in carrying it out because he used his connection to the
drug dealer to initiate the meeting (ibid.), and he knew his cohorts were armed (id. at
p. 1020), he did not accompany his cohorts to confront the dealer, he did not see the
shooting occur and, thus, could not act as a restraining force, and shooting the dealer was
not part of the plan (id. at pp. 1023–1024). The court concluded the evidence was
insufficient to support that the defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to life. (Id. at p. 1026.)
In Taylor, the defendant and his cohorts planned to rob a store clerk while she was
making a night deposit of the day’s receipts. (Taylor, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 547–
548.) The defendant drove the group to the store, his cohort got out of the car and
confronted and shot the victim out of sight of the group’s vehicle. (Id. at p. 548.) The
court concluded the defendant had not acted with reckless indifference because, although
he planned the robbery and there was evidence he knew his cohort had a gun, he had
planned a quick confrontation with a lone employee after the store had closed, reducing
the risk of violence (id. at p. 558); the duration of the planned robbery was short (ibid.);
the defendant did not have information the shooter had a violent history (ibid.); and,
significantly, the defendant never got out of the car and had no opportunity to prevent the
shooting (id. at p. 559).
Differently here, appellant planned a significantly more dangerous confrontation
than a quick robbery. Nothing about the planned crimes in Miller, Bennett or Taylor was

34.
even close—they each involved plans for a quick robbery and nothing more. Appellant
planned a kidnapping of significant duration with no design to release the victim. The
ambush of Torrez was committed in broad daylight in the middle of a city on a
Thursday—there were people around and awake, the crime could be (and was) viewed by
onlookers, and, thus, the victim (especially upon being shoved into the trunk of a car)
would have every conceivable reason to resist even in the face of the gun, increasing the
risk of violence. There was evidence permitting an inference appellant subjectively
appreciated the elevated risks inherent in his carjacking/kidnapping plan: the group had
discussed finding an older person who would not fight back, and appellant ultimately
selected a smaller victim who, by inference, he viewed to be more easily overpowered.
Additionally, and importantly, appellant participated fully at the scene, and was
there when Bledsaw shot Torrez, a fact completely absent in Miller, Bennett and Taylor,
where none of the defendants were directly at the scene when the murder was committed.
Although Equarte testified appellant was already back in the car when Bledsaw turned to
Torrez and warned him before shooting, that testimony was in conflict with Edward’s
testimony that both of Torrez’s assailants were visible to him when Torrez was shot and
they took off running after shooting Torrez. Moreover, appellant told his girlfriend he
saw the shooting and the blood on Torrez—something he would not have seen had he
been back at the car with Equarte. It is not unreasonable, given this evidence, for a trier
of fact to conclude appellant was not in the car when Bledsaw shot Torrez, and we must
accept this view of the evidence under a substantial evidence standard of review. (People
v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357 [in applying substantial evidence test, we review
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from
the evidence].) It is unclear how much time appellant had to interject when Bledsaw
warned Torrez just before shooting him, and, thus, we do not consider it evidence
supporting a reckless indifference finding (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 891–892),

35.
but we note appellant stood by silently while Bledsaw shot the victim, and later said he
would have done what Bledsaw had done with respect to the shooting.
There are circumstances that do not support a finding of reckless indifference—
there was no evidence appellant knew that Bledsaw had any violent tendencies or history,
and the actual assault on Torrez did not occur over a lengthy amount of time. Yet, on
balance, the factors taken together amply supply substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life in carrying out the
crime.
A. Conclusion
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, there was substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s findings appellant was a major participant. Further, even
reconsidering the matter under Emanuel, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s finding appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s October 19, 2022, order denying the petition is affirmed.

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