In re Zi.J. CA2/2

CourtListener 10874418Calctapp12.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/12/26 In re Zi.J. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Zi.J. et al, Persons Coming B348340
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
23LJJP00383A-D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Debra L. Gonzalez, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded with directions.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________

Defendant and appellant A.C. (mother) appeals the juvenile
court’s order terminating her reunification services with her four
children, challenging the findings that (1) the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
provided reasonable services and (2) it would be detrimental to
return the children to mother’s custody. Mother also argues that
DCFS failed to conduct an adequate further inquiry pursuant to
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.)
(collectively, ICWA).1 DCFS concedes ICWA error but contests
mother’s other claims.
We vacate the juvenile court’s ICWA finding and remand
with directions. In all other respects, we affirm the juvenile
court’s order.
BACKGROUND
I. The Family
Mother shares four children with Willie J. (father): Zi.J.
(born Dec. 2012), Zy.J. (born Jan. 2016), Zak.J. (born Aug. 2017),
and Zam.J. (born Jan. 2020).2 Father moved out of state in or
around November 2020, leaving the children with mother. By

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Father is not part of this appeal.

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November 2023, the children were living with their
grandparents.
II. Removal and Jurisdiction
In November 2023, DCFS investigated the family after
receiving a report that mother appeared heavily intoxicated at a
pediatrician appointment. The juvenile court subsequently
removed the children from both parents. DCFS placed the
children with their maternal grandmother.
In February 2024, the juvenile court sustained an amended
section 300 petition and took jurisdiction over the children. As to
mother, the court found that she “has a history of substance
abuse and recently tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and
fentanyl,” which impacted her ability to care for the children; on
one occasion, while mother was under the influence, Zy.J. “lit
multiple items around the home on fire and burned” Zak.J.
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1); count b-1). The court also found that mother
“did not ensure [Zi.J.] . . . receive[d] consistent mental health
treatment” despite his “history of mental and emotional
problems[,]” ongoing “auditory hallucinations[,]” and recent
involuntary hospitalization. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1); count b-5).
The juvenile court ordered mother to submit to random
drug tests; participate in a 12-step program with a sponsor; and
complete a parenting program and individual counseling. The
court also ordered mother to sign release of information forms
(ROIs) so that DCFS could obtain drug test results and copies of
mother’s current prescriptions. Mother was granted monitored
visits with the children a minimum of three times per week. The
juvenile court ordered DCFS to provide mother with
transportation assistance.
III. Six-Month Status Review Hearing

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A. Mother’s Progress
1. Drug testing and 12-step program
Between February 22 and August 12, 2024, mother missed
13 out of 19 scheduled drug tests. The remaining six tests were
positive for oxycodone and oxymorphone.
Although mother had provided an oxycodone prescription
in March 2024, the amount for which she tested positive was
inconsistent; for example, her April 3, 2024 test was 19 times
higher for oxycodone than the previous week’s test. When asked
about the change, mother claimed that her prescription had
increased. She refused to sign ROIs for her medical providers
and did not comply with requests for proof of an updated
prescription.
Mother provided no verification of enrollment in a 12-step
program.
2. Parenting program and individual counseling
Mother completed a substance abuse treatment program in
January 2024, prior to receiving her case plan. Although the
program included some individual counseling and parenting
groups, mother could not articulate any insights she learned from
those services.
DCFS reported that mother was “not . . . easy to engage
and [wa]s inconsistent[ly] . . . responsive[]” to social workers’
attempts to monitor her progress.
3. Visitation
Mother’s visits were sporadic. She completed just 10 visits
over two months, and arrived late to some visits.
4. Transportation assistance
In March and April 2024, mother’s social worker offered
her bus passes. Mother declined both times and instead

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requested mileage reimbursement. DCFS could not obtain
funding for reimbursement before the six-month review hearing.
B. Hearing
In August 2024, the juvenile court held a six-month review
hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) The court found that although
DCFS had made reasonable efforts to provide services, mother
had not made substantial progress.
IV. 12-Month Status Review Hearing
A. Mother’s Progress
On September 3, 2024, mother’s social worker provided her
with a copy of “her most recent minute order and additional case
plan documents[.]” Two weeks later, the social worker “email[ed]
written instructions of outstanding services left for her case
plan.” The instructions included the addresses of three drug
testing sites, and an offer to provide additional locations if
needed.
On September 25, 2024, mother’s social worker reviewed
the information with her by phone; “requested sponsor
information[] [and her] medical provider’s information[;]” and
“reminded mother of [ROIs] needing to be signed for her
providers.”
On October 16, 2024, mother’s social worker “met with
[her] in person and went over outstanding case plan services and
documents[.] Mother reported she understood.”
1. Drug testing and 12-step program
Between September 6, 2024 and January 28, 2025, mother
was scheduled for 22 drug tests. She missed all of them.
A counselor at mother’s substance abuse treatment
program verbally reported that she had three negative drug tests

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in January of 2024. The counselor did not respond to requests for
copies of the tests.
Mother filed an ROI with her substance abuse program
after repeated requests. However, she did not file an ROI with
her medication management team, rendering DCFS unable to
verify her prescriptions. In October 2024, mother’s social worker
conference called mother and her medication provider; both the
social worker and provider explained that mother would have to
sign and file an ROI for DCFS to receive information. Mother
agreed to do so “by the end of the month[,]” but never followed
through.
2. Parenting program and individual counseling
In August 2024, mother’s social worker “assisted [her] in
enrolling into [a] parenting [class] . . . coupled . . . with individual
counseling.” Between August and October of 2024, Mother
attended six out of seven individual counseling sessions and three
out of nine scheduled parenting classes. Mother was “discharged”
from the program in October 2024.
Mother remained inconsistently responsive to DCFS
inquiries. When mother did speak to social workers, she
demonstrated a “lack[] [of] insight,” “dismiss[ing] case issues if
they are not of benefit to her” and “express[ing] [that] her
children should not have been removed from her and that since
she does not have them in her custody she is limited in her living
quality because the children were her main source of income[.]”
Mother was unable “to discuss and express understanding of why
her case was opened and how to prevent the same or similar
incident[s] from happening in the future.”
3. Visitation and transportation assistance

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Mother consistently visited the children in June and July of
2024, and the visits went well. She also regularly visited from
September through December.
On October 2, 2024, mother’s request for mileage
reimbursement was rejected. Two weeks later, mother’s social
worker was able to obtain and transmit to mother an emergency
transportation check in the amount of $196.
At the end of February 2025, mother was injured in a car
accident; thereafter, she did not have a vehicle. She was only
able to visit the children nine times in January and February.
Mother again denied an offer of bus passes.
B. Hearing
In February 2025, the juvenile court held a 12-month
review hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) The court again found that
DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide services, but mother
remained substantially out of compliance with her case plan.
V. 18-Month Permanency Review Hearing and
Termination of Reunification Services
A. Mother’s Progress
1. Drug testing
Mother was scheduled for 12 drug tests between February
and April of 2025; again, she missed all of them.
Mother’s substance abuse treatment provider never
responded to DCFS requests for copies of drug tests. Mother still
had not filed an ROI with her medication provider. Nor had she
provided proof of participation in a 12-step program, even though
her social worker gave her relevant resources.
2. Parenting program and individual counseling
In April 2025, mother reenrolled in her counseling and
parenting program. Her service provider notified DCFS that,

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following mother’s long absence, she would need to restart the
program, requiring mother to complete 16 counseling sessions.
Mother was “very upset and reported she would not complete 16
sessions.” She only attended four sessions after restarting the
program. However, after her last counseling session, the
provider concluded that mother “ha[d] achieved her goals and
objectives related to case issues and services have concluded.”
Mother began a new parenting program on May 7, 2025.
She completed eight of the required 12 parenting classes.
Mother’s social worker attempted to contact her at least
once every two weeks. Mother inconsistently responded to these
outreach efforts and often failed to arrive for scheduled visits,
impeding DCFS’s ability to evaluate her progress.
3. Visitation
Mother visited the children 11 times in March and April
2025.
4. Transportation assistance
When mother said she was unable to travel to drug test
after her January 2025 car accident, her social worker offered to
personally pick up mother and take her to tests. Mother did not
accept this offer.
In May 2025, mother’s social worker renewed her request
for mileage reimbursement, even though mother no longer had a
car.
B. Hearing
In June 2024, the case reconvened for a contested
permanency review hearing. (§ 366.22.) After receiving evidence
and hearing argument, the juvenile court found that although
DCFS “provided or offered reasonable services to aid the parents
in overcoming the problems that led to the” children’s

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dependency, mother was still “not in substantial compliance”
with her case plan and “ha[d] not demonstrated that she has
addressed her drug abuse issues.” Among other things, the court
noted that mother had not submitted to a drug test for more than
one year; had never participated in a 12-step program; and failed
to comply with court orders to sign ROIs. Accordingly, the
juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services.
VI. Appeal
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Findings Regarding Termination of Reunification
Services
A. Reasonable Services
Generally, after removing children from a parent, the
juvenile court must order DCFS to provide reunification services.
(§ 361.5, subd. (a); see also § 362, subd. (d).) To effectuate this
mandate, the court sets forth the services that must be provided
in a case plan. The court thereafter holds periodic review
hearings to assess compliance with the case plan. (§§ 366, subd.
(a)(1)(B), 366.21, subds. (e)(8) [six-month hearing] & (f)(1) [12-
month hearing], 366.22, subd. (a)(3) [18-month hearing].)
At each review hearing, the juvenile court must assess
whether, by clear and convincing evidence, DCFS has made
“reasonable” efforts to implement the case plan. (§§ 366.22, subd.
(a)(3), 366, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Unless DCFS provides a parent with
reasonable reunification services, the court may not initiate a
permanency planning hearing. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594–597.)

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An agency provides “reasonable” services when, as relevant
here, it “offer[s] services designed to remedy” the problems
identified in the parent’s case plan and makes “reasonable efforts
to assist the parent[ ] in areas where compliance proved difficult.”
(In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.)
To be reasonable, DCFS’s efforts need not be ideal or perfect (In
re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972), and it need not force
a parent to participate in the offered services (In re Nolan W.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233).
We review a juvenile court’s finding that DCFS has
provided reasonable reunification services for substantial
evidence, asking whether the record supports such a finding by
clear and convincing evidence. (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238–1239 (T.J.), disapproved on other
grounds by Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609,
631, fn. 8 (Michael G.); In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 149.)
In applying this standard of review, we review the record in the
light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012.)
Here, the record provides clear and convincing evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS made
reasonable efforts to provide mother with the services ordered in
her case plan. Mother’s social worker repeatedly reached out to
her to make sure she understood the requirements of her case
plan; provided addresses of three drug test sites; offered to find
additional locations if needed; attempted to obtain test results
from mother’s substance abuse treatment program and updated
prescriptions from her medication management team; offered to
personally transport mother to tests after her car accident;
attempted to provide mother with resources on 12-step programs;

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helped her enroll in a program that offered both parenting classes
and individual counseling; arranged a conference call with
mother and her medication provider to explain the provider’s ROI
process; offered mother bus passes multiple times; secured
emergency mileage reimbursement; and submitted multiple
requests for additional reimbursements, even after mother lost
her vehicle.
Mother argues that DCFS did not provide her with “reliable
and efficient transportation assistance to attend visits and
participate in her case plan.” The record—which, as noted above,
includes emergency mileage reimbursement, application for
further reimbursements, and offers of bus passes and personal
rides—belies mother’s claim.
Mother contends that DCFS’s efforts did not resolve her
transportation issues to her satisfaction, but that does not mean
that the agency’s efforts were unreasonable. “In almost all cases
it will be true that more services could have been provided more
frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The
standard is not whether the services provided were the best that
might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services
were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R.
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Under the circumstances of this
case, the services provided were exceedingly reasonable. The
cases mother cites in support of her argument are
distinguishable. (T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1229,
disapproved on other grounds by Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 631, fn. 8 [agency completely failed to provide multiple court-
ordered services and unduly delayed in providing others]; In re
A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994 [no evidence that agency

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identified or assisted parent with finding appropriate service
providers].)
Mother also faults DCFS for failing to provide her with
housing assistance. But the juvenile court did not order housing
assistance for mother.3 Mother cites no authority that obligates
DCFS to provide services beyond those ordered by the juvenile
court. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“To
demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority . . . that support the
claim of error.”].) The sole case mother cites is inapposite. (In re
T.W.-1 (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 339, 346–347 [no reasonable services
where agency did not provide housing assistance “despite the
juvenile court’s direction that such services be included”].)
B. Termination of Reunification Services
When a juvenile court terminates reunification services at
the 18-month status review hearing, the court must return the
child to the parent’s custody unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that doing so “would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) We
review a finding of detriment for substantial evidence. (In re
Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400–1401.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that returning the children to mother’s custody would have been
detrimental. Mother failed to comply with multiple elements of

3 To the extent that mother contends her case plan was
inadequate for failure to provide housing services, she waived
that argument by failing to object to her case plan at disposition.
(See, e.g., In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476;
Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811–812.)

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her case plan, including drug testing and filing ROIs with her
medication providers. These failures stymied the efforts of both
DCFS and the juvenile court to evaluate mother’s progress in
resolving the substance abuse issues that led to the children’s
dependency. Mother’s resistance to participating in services,
failure to complete parenting classes, and lack of insight into the
safety risks created by her behavior also support a finding of
detriment. (See § 366.26, subd. (a)(1) [in making its detriment
finding, the juvenile court “shall consider the efforts or progress,
or both, demonstrated by the parent or legal guardian and the
extent to which they availed themselves of services provided”].)
Mother argues that she should have been awarded
reunification services under section 366.22, subdivision (b)(3).
That section provides for reunification services beyond the 18-
month mark only if the juvenile court finds, inter alia, that “the
parent . . . has made significant and consistent progress in the
prior 18 months in resolving problems that led to the child[ren]’s
removal from the home.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(B).) As discussed
above, the record shows that mother’s progress was neither
significant nor consistent. She therefore does not qualify for
further reunification services.
II. ICWA Error Warrants Remand
“ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal
standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family.” (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881, disapproved on other
grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18.)

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ICWA and corresponding statutes that our Legislature
enacted to implement ICWA assign the juvenile court and DCFS
“three distinct duties” aimed at assessing whether a child in a
dependency action is an “Indian child,” and hence a child who
should not be separated from his or her tribal family through
adoption or foster care placement. (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052 (D.S.).) First, the statute imposes a duty
of inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be
an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).)
If that initial inquiry creates a reason to believe the child is
an Indian child, the agency must make further inquiry regarding
the possible Indian status of the child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) There
is reason to believe a child is an Indian child when there is
“information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the
child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or
citizenship, in an Indian tribe[.]” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) Further
inquiry includes gathering information from the parents and
relatives and contacting the tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).)
Contact with the tribe “shall include sharing information
identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a
membership or citizenship eligibility determination.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(2)(C).)
Finally, if that further inquiry results in a reason to know
the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements
of section 224.3 apply. (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.)
Here, the children’s paternal grandmother told DCFS that
the children may have Cherokee ancestry through their paternal
lineage. Mother argues—and DCFS concedes—that although
this provided a reason to believe that the children may be Indian
children, DCFS did not discharge its statutory obligations to

14
contact the potential tribes and share relevant information.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) We agree.
Mother argues that this error warrants conditional
reversal. However, this juvenile dependency case remains
ongoing, and DCFS has a continuing duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2,
subd. (a).) When an appellate court determines, on appeal from
an order prior to termination of parental rights, that the ICWA
duty of inquiry has not been satisfied, the appellate court may
affirm the court’s orders in part, vacate the court’s finding that
ICWA does not apply, and remand for DCFS to comply with its
ICWA obligations. (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560,
563–564, 567–568; see also In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206,
220–221.) We therefore decline to implement mother’s requested
remedy of conditional reversal of all the juvenile court’s findings
and orders made at the section 366.22 hearing.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is
vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings in
which DCFS and the court shall perform their continuing duties
of inquiry, including by: DCFS notifying all identified potential
tribes and relevant state agencies of the children’s potential
Indian status; DCFS documenting its efforts; the court making a
finding regarding ICWA’s applicability; and, if needed,
proceedings in accordance with sections 224.2, 224.3, and 224.4.
In all other respects, the juvenile court’s findings and orders are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

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_____________________, J.
GOORVITCH
We concur:

________________________, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON

________________________, J.*
GILBERT

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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