In re Abigail H. CA2/5

CourtListener 10873919Calctapp11.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/11/26 In re Abigail H. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re ABIGAIL H., a Person B350335
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
_____________________________
Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 22CCJP03276A)
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDI H.,

Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner.
Affirmed.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica J. Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Megan Turkat-Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

******
Brandi H. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights over her 12-year-old daughter
Abigail. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception to the termination of parental rights, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Family
Mother and Daniel F-H. (father) are the parents of Abigail,
who was born in May 2014. Mother has an adult daughter,
Aubrey D., from a prior relationship and father has two other
children with other women.
II. Conduct Giving Rise to Initial Exertion of
Dependency Jurisdiction
Mother was an alcoholic who drank heavily and slept all
day. Mother would go missing for days at a time, leaving Abigail
in the care of Aubrey, Abigail’s paternal aunt, or other relatives.
Mother also had a history of engaging in domestic violence with
her male companion in Abigail’s presence.

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Father had a history of substance abuse; he used
marijuana. Additionally, father has unaddressed mental health
issues.
III. Initial Assertion of Dependency Jurisdiction
In August 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over
Abigail on the basis of (1) father’s mental and emotional problems
as well as his history of substance abuse (rendering jurisdiction
appropriate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b)),1 and (2) mother’s abuse of alcohol and the violent
altercations with her male companion (rendering jurisdiction
appropriate under section 300, subdivision (b)).2
At a combined adjudication and disposition hearing on
October 14, 2022, the juvenile court sustained the above-noted
allegations, but allowed Abigail to remain in her parents’
custody. The court noted that it was important that mother
“maintain sobriety” because this was “a home of parent case.”
The court ordered mother to participate in enhancement services,
including to (1) participate in a drug/alcohol treatment program,
(2) undergo weekly drug/alcohol testing, (3) participate in a 12-
step program with a sponsor, (4) join a domestic violence support
group, (5) complete a parenting class, (6) engage in individual

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 The petition further alleged that mother and father
engaged in mutual acts of domestic violence. The juvenile court
did not sustain those allegations. Because father is not a party to
this appeal, we refer to him only as necessary to provide a
complete account of the underlying events.

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counseling, and (7) ensure that Abigail have no contact with
mother’s male companion.
In early November 2022, mother tried to pick up Abigail
from school while visibly drunk, and later that month tested
positive for alcohol in violation of the court’s orders. In early
December 2022, the Department obtained a warrant to detain
Abigail from parental custody, and she was placed with her
paternal aunt.
IV. Supplemental Jurisdictional Petition and Petition
for Removal
On December 9, 2022, the Department filed (1) a
supplemental petition, pursuant to section 342, again asking the
court to assert jurisdiction based on mother and father’s history
of engaging in violent altercations (rendering jurisdiction
appropriate under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)), and (2) a
supplemental petition, pursuant to section 387, seeking to
remove Abigail from parental custody based on mother’s alcohol
abuse and her failure to comply with court orders.
On February 9, 2023, the Department filed first-amended
petitions pursuant to sections 342 and 387, adding a further
allegation that father’s history of substance abuse and positive
drug tests placed Abigail at risk of harm.
On February 21, 2023, the court sustained the amended
supplemental petitions.
On May 22, 2023, at a continued disposition hearing, the
court removed Abigail from her parents’ custody, placed Abigail
with the paternal aunt, ordered reunification services for both
mother and father, and granted them monitored visitation for
nine hours per week.

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V. Reunification Period
A. The six-month review period
Abigail resided in her paternal aunt’s care, where her
needs were adequately met. Mother’s visitation with Abigail was
inconsistent. Mother failed to confirm several scheduled visits,
arrived late to others, and cancelled some altogether, all of which
caused Abigail distress. Abigail was “‘angry that [mother w]as
not taking responsibility’” for what she did, and was “‘tired of
waiting for someone not to show’” because mother always left
Abigail “‘hanging.’” Abigail was experiencing significant
depression, increased behavioral challenges, and attention
deficits due to mother’s conduct toward her. At the six-month
review hearing in November 2023, the juvenile court found that
the mother’s progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating
dependency was “unsubstantial”; concluded that continued
jurisdiction over Abigail remained necessary; and ordered further
family reunification services for mother.
B. The six- to 12-month review period
Mother’s visitation with Abigail initially increased in
frequency, and Abigail appeared to enjoy her time with mother
and to develop trust in her. As a result, in February 2024, the
juvenile court liberalized visitation to permit unmonitored
contact. Following several weekly visits that month, however,
mother ceased contact with Abigail for approximately two to
three weeks. Mother later explained that she had been
struggling with her own mental health during that period.
In March 2024, Abigail filed a petition under section 388
seeking modification of the juvenile court’s visitation orders.
According to Abigail’s pediatrician, Abigail’s mental health had
deteriorated. Abigail informed her paternal aunt that she wished

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to end her life because doing so was the only way to stop the
anxiety she experienced surrounding visits with her parents.
Later that month, school officials sent Abigail home due to
suicidal ideations. The court granted Abigail’s section 388
petition in part, ordering weekly one-hour monitored visits
between mother and Abigail, and conjoint counseling for mother
and Abigail to occur in a neutral setting.
At the May 16, 2024, 12-month review hearing, Abigail’s
attorney notified the court that Abigail did not want to reunify
with mother (or father). The juvenile court again found that the
mother’s progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating
court intervention was “unsubstantial” and concluded that
continued dependency jurisdiction over Abigail remained
necessary. The court found “that it[ was] in [Abigail’s] best
interest to give [mother] another six months of time to reunify
with [Abigail],” and ordered additional family reunification
services for mother.
C. The 12- to 18-month review period
In July 2024, Abigail informed the social worker that she
did not want to reunify with mother because she was afraid
mother would live with someone who would mistreat her. Abigail
declined all efforts to initiate conjoint counseling with mother. At
a progress hearing in September 2024, Abigail told the court that
she wanted to continue living with her paternal aunt, and that
she did not “trust” her parents. Abigail felt comfortable and safe
in the paternal aunt’s home, where her needs were fully met.
The quality of mother’s visits during this period fluctuated
markedly, ranging at times from appropriate and positive to
inconsistent and of questionable benefit to Abigail. Abigail
enjoyed her visits with mother and had begun conjoint counseling

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with her, but when asked in late September 2024 whether she
wished to begin unmonitored visitation with mother, Abigail
declined, stating that she did not want to, asserting, “‘No’” as her
“‘final say.’” Abigail’s mental health deteriorated once more, and
she again expressed suicidal ideations. She refused to allow
mother to transport her alone to the conjoint counseling sessions
explaining that she “‘d[id] not want to be alone in the car with
[mother] at all’” because “‘anything could happen.’” Following a
seemingly positive visit in November 2024, Abigail reported that
she enjoyed spending time with mother but added that it was
“‘bad that she is not the person I want to be with.’”
In advance of the review hearing, Abigail filed a declaration
stating, “[W]hen I lived with my mom, my mom would forget
about me. She would leave me at home alone . . . or would forget
to pick me up from school or other places . . . Now that I live with
my aunt, I know that someone will always be there to pick me up.
[¶] . . . [¶] In a perfect world I would live with my aunt
permanently . . . I love my parents, but I can’t trust them and I
don’t feel safe with them . . . I do not want to live with [mother].”
At the February 11, 2025, review hearing, the court heard
testimony from the social worker and the paternal aunt. The
court terminated mother’s reunification services after finding
that she had made only partial progress in her case plan.
VI. Termination of Parental Rights
The Department recommended that Abigail be adopted by
her paternal aunt and uncle as her permanent plan. Abigail had
been placed with them since December 2022; they expressed a
desire to adopt her; and she regarded her cousins in the home as
her brothers. When asked if she had any fears about being

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adopted, Abigail responded, “‘No, I 100 . . . no 101% want to be
adopted.’”
Mother’s visitation with Abigail through July 2025 was
generally positive. However, mother also sent text messages to
Abigail expressing that Abigail’s decision to be adopted by her
paternal aunt “‘kills her,’” which caused Abigail significant
emotional distress, as she feared Mother might harm herself.
At the permanency planning hearing on October 21, 2025,
the juvenile court found Abigail to be adoptable, identified her
paternal aunt and paternal uncle as her prospective adopters,
and terminated mother’s (and father’s) parental rights. The
court expressly found that the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception did not apply to bar termination because (1) mother did
not “consistently visit[] Abigail throughout the pendency” of the
case, (2) mother did not establish that she had “a substantial
emotional attachment to Abigail,” and (3) termination of mother’s
parental rights “would not be so detrimental that it would
outweigh the benefits of the adoptive home [Abigail] will have
with her paternal aunt.”
VII. Appeal
Mother filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in not applying
the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
I. Pertinent Law
Once a juvenile court has terminated reunification services,
the court “shall terminate parental rights” if it finds, ‘“by clear
and convincing evidence[,] that it is likely that the [child] will be
adopted’” within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1);
Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) Thus, a

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juvenile court must terminate parental rights and order adoption
unless the parent opposing termination proves that one of six
statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B);
In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527, overruled in part on
other grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)
The exception at issue here is the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception. Because the exception “applies in
situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child,” a court will find the exception
applicable only if the parent “establish[es]” “(1) regular visitation
and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)
In assessing whether the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child “when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home” (the third
element), a court is to examine “how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship” entirely. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 633, 636.) This is necessarily a “subtle, case-
specific inquiry.” (Id. at p. 633.) We review a juvenile court’s
findings regarding the third element (balancing of detriment
versus benefit) for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639-641.)
II. Analysis
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that mother
maintained regular visitation and contact with Abigail (the first
element), and that mother had a relationship with Abigail that

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would benefit her (the second element), the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the advantages Abigail
would gain through adoption outweighed any potential detriment
resulting from the termination of mother’s parental rights (the
third element). Abigail’s relationship with mother—even if
assumed to be beneficial to Abigail—was not strongly so: Despite
the bond they had formed that sometimes resulted in good visits,
mother repeatedly and consistently disappointed Abigail, and
that disappointment repeatedly and consistently damaged
Abigail’s mental health. This is no doubt why Abigail, time and
again, expressed no reservation about being adopted rather than
being placed in a legal guardianship—even after the concepts had
been explained to her, including by the juvenile court. The
benefits to Abigail of remaining in her paternal aunt and uncle’s
home, by contrast, were strong: Abigail had been in their custody
for nearly three years, felt safe and comfortable with them, and
had come to view their children (Abigail’s cousins) as siblings. In
evaluating the relative bonds between Abigail and her mother on
the one hand, and Abigail and her prospective adoptive family on
the other (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634), the juvenile
court acted reasonably in concluding that the termination of
Abigail’s sometimes beneficial-sometimes harmful relationship
with mother would be a detriment to Abigail when balanced
against the wholly positive benefits of her new, adoptive home.
Mother resists this conclusion with what boils down to
three arguments.3

3 Mother also argues that the juvenile court relied too
heavily on Abigail’s wishes regarding adoption, but for support
quotes the parties’ argument to the juvenile court—not the

10
First, mother argues that the Department’s indication that
it might be in Abigail’s “best interest to remain in contact with
[mother] post adoption, as long as the interaction is positive”
dictates a finding that termination of her parental rights would
be detrimental. We disagree. For starters, mother’s citation of
the Department’s comments is selective and ignores the
Department’s ultimate conclusion that “adoption would allow
Abigail to maintain a sense of lifelong stability, consistency, and
secure attachment that Abigail needs” and that “a permanent
plan less than adoption would be harmful to [Abigail].” All of the
Department’s comments reflect the reality, explained above, that
mother’s relationship with Abigail had both positive and negative
aspects; the negative aspects can reasonably support the juvenile
court’s ruling that termination of mother’s parental rights would
not be detrimental to Abigail while the positive aspects can
simultaneously warrant the possibility of continued contact after
adoption. They are not irreconcilable, or even inconsistent. (See
In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 [a parent “‘who has failed
to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption
merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from
continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation
with the parent’”].)
Second, mother argues that terminating her parental rights
would “leave [Abigail] with unresolved residual trauma,” which
should preclude termination of mother’s parental rights. This
argument has it backwards. The record supports the finding that
it is Abigail’s continued relationship with mother that continues
to inflict that trauma, and that the cessation of that trauma by

court’s oral ruling. The court’s actual ruling properly examined
the Caden C. factors.

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terminating mother’s parental rights will be a benefit to Abigail
rather than a detriment. Accepting mother’s argument that
children should remain in contact with parents who have
inflicted trauma until that trauma is resolved would effectively
preclude any termination of parental rights; that is inconsistent
with the parental benefit exception being an exception instead of
the rule.
Third and lastly, mother seems to argue that the juvenile
court’s findings were too “summary” and “brief.” This argument
lacks merit. There is no “requirement . . . that [a] juvenile court,
in finding the [beneficial] parent[-child relationship] exception
inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its
conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the
exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.)

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s parental
rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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