CourtListener 10873916•La Due v. Boyadjian CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/11/26 La Due v. Boyadjian CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ROBIN LA DUE et al., B344344
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22VECV01165
SHAHE BOYADJIAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Wendy L. Wilcox, Judge. Affirmed.
Robin La Due, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Phillips, Spallas & Angstadt, Michael R. Halvorsen,
Howard P. Brody and Vivian Zambrano for Defendant and
Respondent.
_________________________
Robin and Sabine La Due1 appeal from the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of their former landlord,
Shahe Boyadjian. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The small claims and unlawful detainer cases
The La Dues were tenants in a house Boyadjian owns in
Encino. On November 29, 2021, Boyadjian filed a small claims
action against Robin—Case No. 21VESC02511—for 11 months
of unpaid rent (November 2020 through September 2021) totaling
$45,375. On November 9, 2022, the court entered judgment for
Boyadjian for $45,505—the full amount due plus interest.
In the meantime, on June 21, 2022, Boyadjian filed an
unlawful detainer (UD) case against the La Dues for nonpayment
of rent from April 1 to May 31, 2022, Case No. 22VEUD00858.
Robin filed an answer, asserting a number of defenses, including
breach of the warranty of habitability, retaliation, and arbitrary
discrimination “in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the
United States or California.” Robin also asserted he had “made
needed repairs and properly deducted the cost from the rent,”
and Boyadjian had violated the “Tenant Protection Act of 2019.”
On July 19, 2022, Sabine filed a “Prejudgment Claim of
Right to Possession” in the UD case. She declared under penalty
of perjury, “I have . . . an oral or written rental agreement with
a person other than the landlord.” About a week later, Sabine
filed an “Amended Answer” in the UD action, asserting the same
defenses as had Robin. In an attachment, Sabine also alleged
1 The trial court referred to Sabine La Due as “Robin
La Due’s elderly mother.” We refer to appellants as the La Dues
or—where relevant, and to avoid confusion—by their first names.
2
she had “walked up the stairs from the garage to the kitchen.
It is quit [sic] dark there and the stairs are uneven and not the
same hight [sic] or step length. I must have tripped and fell
backwards.” Sabine alleged she broke her shoulder and hit
her head “so I had a concussion.” She stated she had gone to
the emergency room four times and had to “spend some time
in a [sic] after trauma care nursing place.”
The La Dues also added allegations to their “Amended
Answer” that the house had “inhabitable [sic] conditions,”
including windows that weren’t sealed, resulting in “air blow[ing]
through them,” a “gas and power bill” that was four times what
it should have been, and an inoperable “HVAC system.”
On September 19, 2022, the case proceeded to a court trial.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered a UD judgment
in Boyadjian’s favor and against the La Dues for past-due rent
of $11,000, holdover damages of $14,000, attorney fees of $1,000,
and costs of $475, for a total of $26,475. In ruling for Boyadjian,
the court “stat[ed] first that the defects alleged did not rise to
the level of constituting substantial noncompliance with the
landlord’s obligation to warrant the habitability of the premises.”
The court observed that Robin’s “ ‘inability to provide specific
dates . . . work[ed] against [his] credibility,’ ” and the court
was “unable to determine whether the alleged breaches of
habitability, even if substantial, took place during the rental
period at issue.” The court ruled the La Dues’ rights under
the lease were forfeited, and it awarded Boyadjian possession
of the premises.
The La Dues appealed and, on August 4, 2023, the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed the UD
judgment. The court noted it was “difficult to decipher [the
3
La Dues’] precise contentions.” The court stated the La Dues’
“appellate brief, among other defects and failures to comply with
the California Rules of Court, [was] almost completely bereft
of citations to supporting legal authority and to the record.”
Nonetheless, the court continued, it would “exercise [its]
discretion to consider [the La Dues’] claims on the merits,
to the extent they can be discerned.”
The Appellate Division noted Robin had testified that
“ ‘cars [had] drop[ped] by, taking pictures,’ ” and “gaps between
two of the doors and their frames” resulted in “ ‘draftiness.’ ”
Robin apparently presented “photographs showing items in need
of repair.”2 The court stated, “Questioned about various repairs
he purportedly made to the premises, [Robin] was unable to
produce any receipts to show the amounts paid or when they
were incurred.”
In affirming the UD judgment, the Appellate Division
characterized as “undeveloped” Robin’s assertion “that certain
rent checks claimed by [Boyadjian] to have been rejected
by the bank for nonsufficient funds appear[ed] to have been
‘fraudulently’ stamped as rejected.” Moreover, those checks
were for an earlier period, not the months (April and May 2022)
at issue. The court also rejected the La Dues’ arguments
based on the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19-related eviction
moratorium. The court stated, “[The La Dues] could have
produced evidence of any number of pandemic-related
circumstances in support of their affirmative defense—e.g.,
‘loss of income due to a COVID-19 related workplace closure,
2 None of the exhibits the La Dues or Boyadjian submitted
in the UD trial were in the record before the Appellate Division.
4
child care expenditures due to school closures, health-care
expenses related to being ill with COVID-19 or caring for a
member of the tenant’s household or family who [was] ill with
COVID-19, or reasonable expenditures that stem[med] from
government-ordered emergency measures.’ ” The La Dues
produced “[n]o such evidence.” “Instead, [Robin] elected to
attribute the unpaid rent for April and May to ‘COVID-related
drama in . . . [his] life,’ ” “offer[ing] no further detail[s] other
than to assert: ‘They said you don’t have to prove it.’ ”
2. The La Dues’ civil lawsuit against Boyadjian
On August 15, 2022, the La Dues filed this civil case
against Boyadjian. The third amended complaint (TAC), filed
on August 17, 2023, alleged eight causes of action: (1) negligence;
(2) premises liability; (3) negligent hiring, supervision,
or management; (4) breach of warranty/covenant of quiet
enjoyment; (5) violation of Civil Code section 1942.5,
subdivision (d)3; (6) common law retaliation; (7) intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (8) violation
of the Los Angeles County eviction moratorium.4 The La Dues
3 Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d) provides a
landlord may not increase rent, decrease services, or evict a
tenant “for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because
the lessee has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’
association or an organization advocating lessees’ rights or has
lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law.”
(Civ. Code, § 1942.5, subd. (d).)
4 Although the title of the La Dues’ eighth cause of action
is “Violation of Los Angeles County Eviction Moratorium
Ordinance,” the body of that cause of action refers to the
moratorium enacted by the City of Los Angeles, not the County.
5
alleged, “This case involves a number of causes of action all
of which arise out of or are related to Plaintiffs living at the
real property” (the Encino house).
The La Dues alleged Sabine “suffered injuries and damages
from a serious trip, slip and fall accident” at the house. They
alleged Sabine fell because a light was out, Boyadjian knew or
should have known the condition was dangerous, and he “failed
to repair” this “unsafe condition.” In their fourth cause of action,
the La Dues alleged Boyadjian “deprived” them of their quiet
enjoyment by “serv[ing] them” with notices of inspection and
notices to quit.
After more than two years of litigation, Boyadjian filed
a motion on September 30, 2024 for summary judgment or, in
the alternative, summary adjudication of issues, as to all eight
causes of action in the TAC. Boyadjian asserted res judicata and
collateral estoppel barred all of the La Dues’ claims. Boyadjian
filed a separate statement of undisputed facts and a request
for judicial notice of documents from the UD and small claims
actions. The court granted that request “for the collateral
estoppel and res judicata effect.”
Citing Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 750 and other cases, Boyadjian contended each
of the La Dues’ causes of action was “barred by the doctrine of
res judicata because the issues are identical to the issues which
were actually litigated, necessarily decided, and decided on the
merits in a former proceeding.” Boyadjian stated the La Dues
had asserted, as affirmative defenses in the UD case, the
allegedly uninhabitable condition of the premises, the needed
repairs, Sabine’s slip and fall on the dark, uneven stairs,
and Boyadjian’s noncompliance with the COVID-related
6
tenant protections. Boyadjian noted both Robin and Sabine had
appeared at the UD trial, been sworn and testified, and produced
exhibits that the trial court admitted into evidence.
According to the superior court’s case register, the La Dues
filed an opposition to Boyadjian’s motion on December 23, 2024.
The La Dues did not designate that pleading for inclusion in the
clerk’s transcript—either in their initial designation of record
or in their supplemental designation—so our appellate record
does not contain it. The La Dues did not file a separate
statement in response to Boyadjian’s separate statement.
On December 31, 2024, Boyadjian filed a reply to the
La Dues’ opposition. Boyadjian noted Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c, subdivision (b)(3) requires a party opposing
summary judgment to file a separate statement. Boyadjian
asserted the La Dues’ opposition was “devoid of any admissible
evidence” and their declarations did not “set forth any facts.”
(Boldface omitted.)
On January 7, 2025, the La Dues filed a pleading entitled,
“Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Reply of Motion for
Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary
Adjudication.” The court accepted that pleading for filing,
apparently treating it as a surreply. The surreply was largely
unintelligible. The La Dues contended, “The evidence presented
to the court, showed the Defendants actively defrauded the court
on several occasions, by fraudulent [sic] altering Bank checks
[and] submitting those to court in former proceedings.” (Boldface
omitted.) The La Dues argued, “[T]he cited judgment should
be read and not unconditionally copied and presented to te [sic]
court as valid points. . . . Raising the accusation of misleading
the court would go too far. But given the time lines court have
7
to read the submitted documents, it should be carefully
investigated which former judgments are presented and not
a copy and paste mentality in hope the court will trust the
presenting party and decide in its favor.” (Boldface omitted.)
The trial court heard argument on the motion on
January 10, 2025. The court sustained Boyadjian’s evidentiary
objections to the La Dues’ declarations and granted his motion
for summary judgment. As we discuss below, we don’t know the
basis for the court’s ruling, as there is no reporter’s transcript
of the hearing or any other, alternative record of the oral
proceedings.
3. The record on appeal
The La Dues appealed. On paragraph 2 of their Notice
Designating Record on Appeal, entitled, RECORD OF ORAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT, filed February 14,
2025, Robin checked box 2.a. It provides, “I elect to proceed [¶]
WITHOUT a record of the oral proceedings in the superior court.
I understand that without a record of the oral proceedings in the
superior court, the Court of Appeal will not be able to consider
what was said during those proceedings in determining whether
an error was made in the superior court proceedings.” Robin
left blank box 2.b., which addresses substitutes for a reporter’s
transcript, including an agreed statement or settled statement.
About six months later, on August 11, 2025, Robin filed
another Notice Designating Record on Appeal form in the
superior court. The word “amended” appears handwritten
on the form. Robin checked box 2.b., which states, “I choose
to proceed . . . [¶] b. WITH the following record of the oral
proceedings in the superior court . . . [¶] (1) A reporter’s
transcript under rule 8.130.” The form then provides, “You must
8
fill out the reporter’s transcript section (item 5) on pages 3 and 4
of this form.” The form then states, “I have (check all that
apply).” Box (a) says, “Deposited with the superior court clerk
the approximate cost of preparing the transcript by including
the deposit with this notice as provided in rule 8.130(b)(1).”
Robin left that box blank. Box (b) states, “Attached a copy of
a Transcript Reimbursement Fund application filed under rule
8.130(c)(1).” That box has an “x” within it and a line through it,
along with an illegible mark that could be “PC” or “PL.” Box (c)
states, “Attached the reporter’s written waiver of a deposit under
rule 8.130(b)(3)(A) for (check either (i) or (ii)).” Box (c) is not
checked but subbox (i) under it has an “x” within it and a
line drawn through it, along with an illegible mark that could
be “PC” or “PL.” Robin seems also to have checked box (d),
which provides, “Attached a certified transcript under rule
8.130(b)(3)(C).” Some handwriting appears above that box,
the only part of which is legible says, “DCA.” No Transcript
Reimbursement Fund application is attached to the form, nor
is there an attached reporter’s written waiver of a deposit or a
certified transcript. In item 5, box a.(2) is checked, which states,
“I request that the reporters provide . . . [¶] (2) My copy of the
reporter’s transcript in paper format.” Box 5.b. is illegible but
seems to refer to a “hearing on motion,” a “status conference,”
and a “nonjury trial.” On October 13, 2025, the clerk of this court
issued a letter stating the supplemental record—consisting of
three supplemental clerk’s transcripts—had been filed. The
letter did not refer to a reporter’s transcript, as the La Dues
had not complied with the requirements to obtain a reporter’s
transcript for this appeal.
9
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review
On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the record
de novo and independently determine whether triable issues
of material fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)
25 Cal.4th 763, 767; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334.) We view the evidence in a light favorable
to the nonmoving party and resolve any evidentiary doubts
or ambiguities in that party’s favor.5 (Saelzler, at p. 768.)
2. Issue preclusion
Issue preclusion—which historically has been called
collateral estoppel—“prohibits the relitigation of issues argued
and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises
different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015)
61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings).) It applies “(1) after final
adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and
necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against
one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that
party.” (Id. at p. 825.) Courts must consider the public policies
underlying the doctrine before applying it in a particular case.
(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342–343.) Those
policies include “preservation of the integrity of the judicial
system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants
from harassment by vexatious litigation.” (Id. at p. 343.)
5 We review a trial court’s exercise of its discretion in
admitting or excluding evidence for an abuse of discretion.
(Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446–447.)
The La Dues do not challenge or even discuss the trial court’s
rulings sustaining Boyadjian’s objections to their declarations.
Accordingly, we do not address them.
10
3. Analysis
Much of the La Dues’ brief is unintelligible. The
brief states, “Appellant, former tenant of property owned by
Respondent, agreed in the summer of 2021, to file an application
to the California Rent Relief program, to receive financial
assistance to cover for back rent owed by Appellant to
Respondent.”6 The brief states Boyadjian “signed the contract”
but then “cashed the $73.000 [sic] check from the California
Rent Reliefe [sic] program, breaching all agreements.” The brief
claims “Respondent had fraudulently altered 3 checks written by
Appellant to Respondent,” but then notes “[t]his issue is not part
of this appeal.”
The brief asserts Boyadjian didn’t establish that “there
was a final judgment on the merits.” The brief also says the court
in the UD case “used procedural difficulties as to the acceptant
[sic] of bank statements in hard copy on paper instead denied
a direct web connection to the bank of the defendant, which
constitutes a procedural error which led to the judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.”
Our ability to assess the La Dues’ claims of error is made
nearly impossible by the lack of a reporter’s transcript—or a
permissible equivalent, such as an agreed statement or settled
statement—of the hearing on Boyadjian’s motion.7 “Where
6 It is unclear if “Appellant” means Robin alone or Robin
and Sabine.
7 Rule 8.120(b) of the California Rules of Court provides:
“If an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires
consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court,
the record on appeal must include a record of those oral
proceedings in the form of one of the following: (1) A reporter’s
11
no reporter’s transcript has been provided . . . it is presumed that
the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence
of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973 992, citing
Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 153–154.) “The
effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment
but supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from
raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.”
(Estate of Fain, at p. 992, citing Sui v. Landi (1985) 163
Cal.App.3d 383, 385–386; National Secretarial Service, Inc.
v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521–522.)
Because the La Dues have failed to comply with rule
8.120(b), we simply don’t know what happened at the hearing,
at the conclusion of which the court granted Boyadjian’s motion
for summary judgment. From the limited record available to us,
it appears the court’s ruling was correct. Both the UD action and
the small claims case were finally adjudicated, and the Appellate
Division affirmed the UD judgment. The issues were identical:
the La Dues themselves stated in their TAC that “all” of their
causes of action “arise out of or are related to Plaintiffs living
at the real property commonly known as 3358 Alginet Drive,
Encino, California.” Those issues had been “actually litigated
and necessarily decided” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 825) in the UD and small claims cases. And both Robin
and Sabine were parties to the UD action.
transcript under rule 8.130; (2) An agreed statement under
rule 8.134; or (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137.”
12
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment in Shahe Boyadjian’s favor.
Boyadjian is entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
HANASONO, J.
13
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.