People v. Garcia CA2/2

CourtListener 10873911Calctapp11.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/11/26 P. v. Garcia CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B343106

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24CMCF00006)

FREDY GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Affirmed.

Susan L. Ferguson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Megan A. Banke, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Fredy Garcia (Garcia) appeals
from his convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and
giving false information to a police officer. Garcia challenges the
trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found
during a search of a backpack. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
I. Facts1
On the evening of December 29, 2023, Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Deputies German Zambrano and Keegan Lynn were
patrolling the area of Bullis Road and Tucker Street. The
deputies stopped an SUV with an expired registration after the
SUV had entered a laundromat’s parking lot. As the SUV came
to a stop in a parking spot, three individuals quickly exited from
the passenger side of the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Garcia, who
was driving, exited the vehicle.
The deputies exited their vehicle and made contact with the
four individuals. The deputies asked Garcia if the SUV belonged
to him. Garcia answered in the negative, so the deputies
detained him and his passengers pending a stolen vehicle
investigation.
Deputy Lynn searched the SUV. His attention was then
drawn to the front, where a backpack was on the ground about
two feet from the vehicle. The area was illuminated by the SUV’s
headlights. The main compartment of the backpack was
unzipped and open. Deputy Lynn searched the backpack and
discovered a firearm. Deputy Lynn also found an identification

1 We draw these facts from the testimony and evidence
presented at the concurrently held hearing on the motion to
suppress and preliminary hearing.

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card with Garcia’s photograph but a different name than the one
he provided to the deputies.
II. Procedural History
The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed an
information charging Garcia with one count of felony possession
of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1))2 and one
count of giving false information to a police officer, a
misdemeanor (§ 148.9, subd. (a)). At the preliminary hearing,
Garcia moved to suppress the firearm under section 1538.5.
Deputy Zambrano was the only witness at the hearing.
Deputy Zambrano did not see Deputy Lynn locate and
search the backpack because he was in the patrol vehicle with
Garcia and one of the passengers. Rather, Deputy Zambrano
testified about those events based upon having watched Deputy
Lynn’s body camera video. The People did not introduce the
video as an exhibit. However, Garcia’s counsel did introduce the
video as an exhibit and cross-examined Deputy Zambrano based
upon its contents.
Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress, finding that Deputy Lynn was entitled to search the
backpack because it had been abandoned in front of the vehicle.
Garcia later filed a written motion to suppress under section
1538.5, subdivision (i), which the court also denied.
Garcia proceeded to trial and was convicted on both counts.
The trial court sentenced Garcia to a total of three years in state
prison. This timely appeal follows.

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
A defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained
during a warrantless search on the ground that the search was
unreasonable. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Unreasonable searches
and seizures are prohibited under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. (People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th
353, 359.) “Warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
One such exception is a search of abandoned property,
because people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
property they abandon. (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332,
345.) Whether property is abandoned is an issue of fact. (People
v. Daggs (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 361, 365 (Daggs).)
II. Standards of Review
In ruling on a section 1538.5 motion to suppress, the trial
court “sits as a finder of fact with the power to judge credibility,
resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences[.]” (People
v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718.) On appellate review, we
“must uphold the [trial] court’s express or implied findings if they
are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We
exercise our independent judgment to determine whether the
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v.
Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.)
III. There Is No Basis to Reverse Under the Secondary
Evidence Rule
Garcia argues the trial court erred in admitting Deputy
Zambrano’s testimony about the backpack, which was based upon
him having watched Deputy Lynn’s body camera video, per the

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secondary evidence rule. The rule generally prohibits the
admission of oral testimony to prove the content of writings,
which include videos. (People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367,
410 (Gonzalez); see also Evid. Code, § 1523.)
We need not determine whether Garcia forfeited this issue,
as argued by respondent. Garcia’s counsel cured any violation of
the secondary evidence rule by introducing the body camera video
herself. Once the video was admitted into evidence, Deputy
Zambrano’s testimony served to highlight and explain evidence
that was already in the record, which is permissible. (Gonzalez,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 410–411; People v. Son (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 689, 696.) Although the trial court indicated that
it had not watched the portion of the video where the backpack
was recovered, Garcia forfeited any claim of error in this regard.
The entire video was in evidence. Garcia’s counsel elected not to
play that portion of the video in open court. Garcia’s counsel did
not ask the court to watch that portion of the video in chambers
before ruling on the motion. Nor did Garcia’s counsel object to
the court ruling on the motion without having watched that
portion of the video.
Nevertheless, any error was harmless. There was no
dispute that the backpack was recovered in a public parking lot
in front of the vehicle. There was no dispute that Deputy Lynn
recovered a firearm from the backpack. Deputy Lynn’s body
camera video is in evidence and supports the trial court’s ruling
independently of Deputy Zambrano’s testimony. Thus, it is not
“reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [Garcia]
would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); see also People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 (Partida) [“Absent

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fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is
subject to the traditional Watson test”].)
Accordingly, there is no basis to reverse the trial court’s
ruling under the secondary evidence rule.
IV. There is Substantial Evidence of Abandonment
There is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that Garcia abandoned the backpack. “[P]roperty is
abandoned when a defendant voluntarily discards it in the face of
police observation, or imminent lawful detention or arrest, to
avoid incrimination.” (Daggs, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.)
Here, Deputy Lynn discovered a backpack, left unattended,
unzipped and open, in a public parking lot. The backpack was in
a grassy area between the vehicle and a wall, easily visible from
several vantage points, and the vehicle’s headlights illuminated
the area. The backpack was not concealed, for example,
underneath the vehicle or in some other dark, hidden place.
These facts support the trial court’s finding that Garcia
abandoned the backpack.
Garcia argues that he placed the open backpack in the
parking lot to protect his property from the deputies. Garcia cites
two United States Supreme Court cases, but both are
distinguishable. In Smith v. Ohio (1990) 494 U.S. 541, the
defendant placed a grocery bag on the hood of his car and used
his hand to protect the bag against the officer’s search. (Id. at
p. 542.) In Rios v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 253, the
defendant placed a package on the floor of the vehicle in which he
was riding, which suggested no intent to abandon the property.
(Id. at p. 262, fn. 6.) By contrast, Garcia placed the open
backpack in a visible location in a public parking lot and walked
away.

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Garcia also cites a series of cases from other jurisdictions.
Many are distinguishable. For example, in New York v. Pacheco
(N.Y.App.Div. 1985) 107 A.D.2d 473 (Pacheco) and Stanberry v.
State (Md.Ct.App. 1996) 343 Md. 720 (Stanberry), the defendants
placed their closed bags in locations intended for storage of such
items—namely, a shelf and an overhead luggage rack,
respectively. (Pacheco, supra, at pp. 475–476; Stanberry, supra,
at pp. 737–738.) Here, Garcia left an open backpack in a public
parking lot.
More important, though, whether property is abandoned is
a highly fact-specific inquiry. Our role is to determine whether
the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. We
answer this question in the affirmative based upon the body
camera video admitted into evidence.
V. There Is No Basis to Reverse Based upon the
Admission of Hearsay
Finally, Garcia argues the trial court erred by relying on
hearsay in denying the motion to suppress. The Evidence Code,
including the hearsay rules, applies to motions to suppress under
section 1538.5. (People v. Hawkins (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 194,
199.)
Here, Deputy Zambrano testified: “[Deputy Lynn] informed
me that as he exited the vehicle . . . [Garcia] became aware . . . of
our presence, us being there, and then he went back towards . . .
the driver’s side, and then quickly returned back towards the
rear of the car again.” The trial court relied on this testimony in
denying the motion to suppress: “The driver gets out, and
although you did not show me this portion of the video as to
where the backpack was recovered, but what . . . [Deputy]
Zambrano said was that Deputy Lynn had said to him that the

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driver got out, walked to the front of the car, and then walked
back to the rear of the vehicle . . . .”
Garcia forfeited this issue because he did not timely object
to this testimony. (Evid. Code, § 353.) Regardless, any error is
harmless because the body camera video is sufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding of abandonment. (See Partida,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
For this reason, we need not reach Garcia’s argument that
Deputy Zambrano’s testimony was false because Deputy Lynn
testified at trial that he did not observe Garcia walk to the front
of the vehicle and then turn around.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

GOORVITCH, J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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