CourtListener 10873908•People v. Kelly CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/11/26 P. v. Kelly CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B345154
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA021377)
v.
DEMONT EARL KELLY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Dismissed.
James Koester, under the appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney, Noah P. Hill and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Demont E. Kelly appeals the trial
court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1172.1 petition for
resentencing, asserting that the court’s decision is appealable as
an order affecting his substantial rights (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd
(b)).1 We hold the order is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying the crimes are not in dispute and are
set forth in our prior unpublished opinion—People v. Kelly (Dec.
10, 1996, B096099 [nonpub. opn.]). In 1995, defendant entered a
bank to commit robbery and, in the process, fired his gun at two
people—Alex Tamayo and Richard Rodriguez. Tamayo was hit
and, as a result, was paralyzed from the chest down. Defendant
committed these crimes within a few months after his release
from prison, where he was serving time for his conviction of
assault with a deadly weapon.
That same year, defendant was convicted of attempted
murder of Tamayo (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), attempted willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder of Rodriguez (ibid.), and
attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211). Allegations that
he personally used a firearm in the offenses (§ 12022.5) and that
he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Tamayo (§ 12022.7,
subd. (b)) were found true. It was further determined that
defendant had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
(a)(1)), a prior conviction under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i)), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and had served a prior
prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court imposed a
state prison sentence of 40 years and eight months plus two life
terms. On December 10, 1996, another panel of our Division
affirmed the judgment but modified the sentence on the
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
conviction of attempted murder of Rodriguez from two life terms
to 14 years to life. (People v. Kelly, supra, B096099.)
RESENTENCING PETITIONS
In 2023, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing; he was represented by a deputy public defender.
On May 14, 2024, while the section 1172.6 petition was still
pending, defendant filed a pro per petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.1.
On July 17, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing
regarding the status of the section 1172.6 petition. After defense
counsel said she had spoken to defendant about the 1172.1
petition but had not seen the document, the court agreed to
provide her with a copy of the pleading and allowed counsel to
represent him on that petition. The court then continued the
matter for a status report on both petitions. Defense counsel filed
a section 1172.1 petition on September 10, 2024, as a supplement
to the pro per petition.
Several continuances followed, the last of which was on
November 21, 2024 whereupon the trial court continued the case
to February 5, 2025 for “status” on both petitions. At the
February hearing, the Deputy District Attorney assigned to the
section 1172.1 petition (each petition was assigned to a separate
prosecutor) argued the matter should be taken off calendar
because, pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c), the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to consider a petition filed by the
defense. Defense counsel took the position that the court should
interpret the defense petition as an invitation to the court to
exercise its discretion to make its own motion and set the matter
for a hearing. After citing facts related to the underlying offenses
and defendant’s conduct in prison, the trial court ruled as follows:
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The prosecution is correct. Penal Code section
1172.1[, subdivision] (c), the defendant is not entitled
to file a petition seeking relief from the court under
this section. (Sic.) If the defendant requests
consideration for relief under this section, the court is
not required to respond.
Weighing all the—everything that I know
about this case, I’m not going to resentence Mr. Kelly.
I’ve considered his petition. But based on
1172.1[, subdivision] (c) and the facts and
circumstances of the case along with other
considerations, the court declines to resentence the
defendant on his own motion.
So the 1172.1 request—I guess you could call
it—is denied.
DISCUSSION
I. No Statutory Right to Appeal
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015) 60
Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) Section 1237 governs criminal appeals and,
as relevant here, it permits an appeal from a postjudgment order
only if the order affects the appealing party’s substantial rights.
(§ 1237, subd. (b).) As we will explain, the court’s order denying
the section 1172.1 request for resentencing did not affect
defendant’s substantial rights.
A trial court may rule on postjudgment matters only if the
Legislature has provided it with jurisdiction to do so. (People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337.) With respect to section
1172.1 petitions, the Legislature has specifically vested certain
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officials as well as prosecutorial and correctional agencies with
the authority to request recall and resentencing. (§ 1172.1, subd
(a)(1).) In contrast, the statute expressly states, “[a] defendant is
not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under
this section” and, if a defendant requests section 1172.1 relief,
“the court is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c), italics
added.) Consistent with barring a defendant’s petition, section
1172.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of his or her
appeal rights only “[a]fter ruling on a referral authorized by this
section . . . .” (Id., at subd. (d), italics added.) Presumably, if the
Legislature had contemplated an appealable order from a ruling
on a defendant’s petition, it would not have limited the
advisement of appellate rights to rulings resulting from a referral
made by a qualifying agency or official.
In sum, defendant did not have a right to file a section
1172.1 petition and the trial court had no obligation to advise him
of any appellate rights connected to its order or to even issue an
order in the first place. Thus, we agree with our colleagues in the
Fourth District that “an appeal from an order acting on [a section
1172.1] petition (whether couched as a denial, dismissal, or any
other statement that the court is not acting) does not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights [under section 1237, subdivision
(b)].” (People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 695–696;
accord, People v. Brammer (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 675, 696 [a
court that receives an unauthorized section 1172.1 petition may
exercise its discretion to recall the sentence on its own motion but
“an order declining to exercise such discretion is not
appealable”].)
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II. Defendant’s Argument
Defendant attempts to analogize his case to two cases that
have held a trial court’s order denying the defendant’s petition for
relief under section 1172.1 affected the defendant’s substantial
rights and was therefore appealable—People v. Craig (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1165 (Craig) and People v. Olea (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 889 (Olea).
Olea and Craig determined the trial court accepted the
defendant’s invitation to act on the merits of a section 1172.1
petition by considering a written opposition from the prosecution,
holding a hearing wherein the prosecutor and defense counsel
argued whether resentencing was warranted, and fully
evaluating the merits of the petition. (Craig, supra, 117
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1169–1170; Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 901–902.)
This case is different. Defendant’s February 2025 hearing
was set for “status” on both petitions; it was not set for a hearing
on the merits of either petition. The trial court had not
considered or invited any opposition from the prosecution.
Although the trial court conducted a hearing and discussed some
of the facts underlying the crimes as well as defendant’s
performance in prison, the hearing was to determine whether the
court should exercise its discretion to consider the merits of the
petition on its own motion. Even defense counsel recognized as
much in her argument:
[Section 1172.1] does give the defendant the
ability to have an invitation for the court to then
motion for the 1172.1. (Sic.) And that is what we are
doing. [¶] We understand that we cannot create . . .
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the petition. But we do have the ability to invite the
court to then resentence [defendant] . . . .[¶] And so
that’s what we are asking the court. We are inviting
the court to consider resentencing [defendant] and set
this for a motion or hearing to be heard. And the
court does have that authority. (Italics added.)
The trial court’s decision to reject what it described
as defense counsel’s “request” reinforces the conclusion that
the trial court did not rule on the merits of the petition.
The focus of the brief argument made at the hearing by the
prosecutor assigned to handle the section 1172.1 petition aligns
with this interpretation of the trial court’s ruling. Rather than
concentrating on the merits of the petition, the prosecutor took
the position that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
petition—a position characterized by the court as “correct” and,
when it ruled, it properly supported that determination with a
citation to section 1172.1, subdivision (c).
We are not presented with a case where the trial court
effectively evaluated and denied the petition after conducting the
equivalent of a hearing on the merits.2 Olea and Craig are
inapposite.3
2 Notably, the section 1172.6 petition was also not addressed
on the merits; the matter was continued to April 22, 2025 for
what the trial court described as “just a setting.”
3 Because Craig and Olea are factually distinguishable from
the instant case, we decline to reach the People’s argument that
the analysis contained therein is flawed.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KUMAR, J.*
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
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