Sarkissian v. Bentson CA2/8

CourtListener 10873906Calctapp11.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/11/26 Sarkissian v. Bentson CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ANOUCHE SARKISSIAN, as B334193
Administrator, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC708214)
v.

PATRICIA SLESINGER BENTSON,

Defendant and Respondent.
ANOUCHE SARKISSIAN, as B339517
Administrator, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC708214)
v.

CHAMPION MACHINERY
MOVERS, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.
ANOUCHE SARKISSIAN, as B342956
Administrator, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC708214)
v.

NISIM BARAK et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEALS from orders and judgments of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County. Christopher K. Lui, Judge.
Affirmed.
Mazur & Mazur, Janice R. Mazur; Law Office of Ara
Aroustamian and Ara Aroustamian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of David E. Wheeler and David E. Wheeler for
Defendant and Respondent Patricia Slesinger Bentson.
Eliel Chemerinski for Defendant and Respondent
Champion Machinery Movers, Inc.
Kahana & Feld, Samuel Yu, Sebastian Kaplan and Donald
Hall III for Defendants and Respondents Nisim Barak and Island
Snacks, Inc.
McGarrigle, Kenney & Zampiello, Patrick C. McGarrigle
and Aidan P. McGarrigle for Defendants and Respondents David
Berg and DCDC Holdings, LLC.

**********

2
Plaintiff appeals from orders denying motions for leave to
withdraw admissions, and from summary judgments entered
thereafter in favor of six codefendants. Plaintiff contends the
trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to
withdraw and amend admissions under Code of Civil Procedure
section 2033.300,1 and also erred in subsequently entering
judgment in favor of defendants based on those admissions.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying plaintiff leave to withdraw the admissions. We also
conclude that plaintiff has failed to affirmatively show any basis
for reversing the judgments entered in favor of any defendant.
We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Garbis Sarkissian and David Bentson were business
partners who formed a company called Hoop Nuts, LLC that
produced nut-based snacks. Sarkissian and Bentson each held
an equal 50 percent membership interest in Hoop Nuts. Garbis
Sarkissian passed away in March 2014. David Bentson died a
year later.
The plaintiff and appellant in this action is Anouche
Sarkissian, the widow of Garbis Sarkissian, in her capacity as the
administrator of the Estate of Garbis Sarkissian (plaintiff).
Patricia Slesinger Bentson (Slesinger), the widow of David
Bentson, is one of the defendants and respondents. The other
five defendants and respondents are entities and individuals
allegedly involved in the events related to the winding up of Hoop
Nuts as a company. DCDC Holdings, LLC (DCDC) was the

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

3
entity that leased Hoop Nuts its principal place of business in
Van Nuys, California, and eventually evicted Hoop Nuts in 2016
via unlawful detainer. David Berg is the owner of DCDC. Island
Snacks, Inc. (Island Snacks) was a long-time customer of Hoop
Nuts that eventually purchased some of Hoop Nuts’ equipment,
after Hoop Nuts had been evicted and was no longer doing
business. Nisim Barak is a principal stakeholder in Island
Snacks. Champion Machinery Movers, Inc. (Movers) was the
entity that stored Hoop Nuts’ equipment and other assets after it
was evicted by DCDC.
Plaintiff filed this action in June 2018, four years after the
death of Garbis Sarkissian. In the fourth amended complaint,
plaintiff alleged eight causes of action: (1) dissolution;
(2) accounting; (3) breach of contract; (4) declaratory relief;
(5) conversion; (6) conspiracy to commit conversion; (7) fraudulent
transfer; and (8) receipt of stolen property. DCDC, Berg, Barak,
Island Snacks, and Movers were served and brought into the
action as doe defendants.
Plaintiff alleged that up until his death in 2014, Garbis
Sarkissian was the managing member of Hoop Nuts. As part of
his initial capital contribution, Sarkissian loaned $750,000 to
Hoop Nuts which the company was to repay at the rate of $6,200
per month. The terms of the loan were recognized in a Managing
Member Deal Memo executed by Sarkissian and David Bentson.
According to plaintiff, after the death of Bentson in 2015, his
widow, Slesinger, seized control of the business from Anouche
Sarkissian and stopped making payments on the loan. Slesinger
mismanaged Hoop Nuts and in December 2015, the company was
shut down following a failed health inspection. Plaintiff further
alleged that all defendants wrongfully conspired to convert, and

4
did convert, Hoop Nuts’ remaining assets to the detriment of
plaintiff.
1. The requests for admissions
In August 2022, after substituting new counsel to represent
her, Slesinger propounded additional written discovery to
plaintiff, including a second set of requests for admissions
containing 139 separate requests (RFA’s). An initial set of
requests consisting of 28 requests had been previously
propounded by Slesinger’s former counsel and responded to by
plaintiff.
The RFA’s included several requests to admit the
genuineness of various documents but otherwise focused
primarily on plaintiff’s standing to bring the claims alleged in her
operative pleading. The requests also sought to resolve issues
related to the existence of a security agreement between Garbis
Sarkissian and Hoop Nuts regarding the $750,000 loan made by
Sarkissian to the company when it was initially formed.
A response to the RFA’s was due on Tuesday, September 6,
2022, the day after the three-day Labor Day weekend. On the
afternoon of Friday, September 2, 2022, a paralegal from the Law
Office of Ara Aroustamian, counsel for plaintiff, contacted
Slesinger’s counsel to attempt to meet and confer. No prior
efforts to meet and confer had been made. Plaintiff asked
Slesinger to withdraw the RFA’s and serve a new set of more
tailored requests, or to grant plaintiff an extension of time within
which to respond to the RFA’s. Slesinger was unwilling to extend
the time to respond past September 6, 2022 or to withdraw the
RFA’s and serve a new set in light of the then-pending trial date
of March 13, 2023, and corresponding deadlines to file a

5
summary judgment motion. The parties were unable to resolve
the RFA’s by meet and confer.
On September 7, 2022, the day after responses were due,
plaintiff filed a motion for protective order arguing the RFA’s
were excessive and improper and requesting an order relieving
plaintiff from having to respond to any of the requests. The
hearing date plaintiff noticed for the motion was January 24,
2023, more than four months later. It is undisputed plaintiff did
not serve any written response to the RFA’s in conjunction with
filing the motion for a protective order. It is also undisputed
plaintiff did not seek an ex parte order advancing or otherwise
specially setting the hearing on the protective order for a date
earlier than January 24, 2023.
2. Slesinger’s motion to deem the RFA’s admitted
Shortly after plaintiff filed her motion for a protective
order, Slesinger filed a motion for an order deeming the RFA’s
admitted. Slesinger noticed the hearing for October 20, 2022.
In his supporting declaration, David Wheeler, counsel for
Slesinger, attested to the fact that in setting the hearing on his
motion, he saw multiple available hearing dates in the court’s
digital reservation system. Wheeler attached screen shots
verifying the available slots on the court’s calendar. Wheeler also
explained that plaintiff first made an effort to meet and confer
about the RFA’s on Friday afternoon, when the responses were
due the following Tuesday, after the holiday weekend. Slesinger
argued it was suspicious that plaintiff had set her motion for a
protective order in January 2023 with so many earlier available
dates on the court’s motion calendar, and had failed to seek an
order advancing the hearing date. Slesinger emphasized that
plaintiff had not served responses to the RFA’s.

6
In opposing Slesinger’s motion, plaintiff filed a brief
opposition arguing only that the RFA’s were excessive and
burdensome and advising the court that plaintiff had filed a
motion for protective order. The opposition was not supported by
a declaration from plaintiff’s counsel, Ara Aroustamian, attesting
to excusable neglect or mistake in failing to timely respond to the
RFA’s. The opposition also did not state that a response in
substantial compliance with the statutory requirements had been
served on Slesinger pending resolution of the motion.
At the October 20, 2022 hearing, Aroustamian for the first
time explained he had been in Europe for three weeks for his
daughter’s wedding during the time when a response to the
RFA’s was due. He conceded his office was “late” in meeting and
conferring but explained that his legal assistant filed the motion
for protective order at his direction in his absence, and that the
court gave the January 2023 hearing date as the first available
date on its calendar. Aroustamian said appropriate declarations
under oath could be provided attesting to those facts in
connection with plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, but he
did not explain why those declarations were not already filed as
part of the opposition to Slesinger’s motion.
The trial court granted Slesinger’s motion, reasoning that
plaintiff relied exclusively on having filed a motion for a
protective order, but offered no explanation for failing to comply
with the statutory requirements by serving a response to the
RFA’s at any time before the October 20, 2022 hearing date.
The court also pointed out that counsel had not made any effort
to advance the hearing on his motion for protective order other
than to make a belated oral request during the hearing.

7
Some of the requests deemed admitted by the court’s order
included admissions (request Nos. 83 through 97) that neither
plaintiff, nor Anouche Sarkissian individually, was a member or
manager of Hoop Nuts at any time from June 2018, when this
action was filed, through the date the RFA’s were served. In
addition, request Nos. 121 through 129 admitted that Hoop Nuts
was dissolved by operation of law in 2015, and plaintiff had no
standing to pursue any of the alleged claims derivatively on
behalf of Hoop Nuts.
3. Plaintiff’s first motion for leave to withdraw
admissions
On January 19, 2023, three months after the court granted
Slesinger’s motion, plaintiff filed her first motion for leave to
withdraw the admissions, with a hearing noticed for March 7,
2023.
Aroustamian’s supporting declaration stated the following
facts on the issue of excusable neglect. Aroustamian said he was
a solo practitioner handling, on average, 55 active cases at a time,
while also providing estate planning and other transactional
services to clients. He explained he did hire outside contract
counsel when calendar conflicts could not be avoided, but he
usually relied on two legal assistants to help with the workload.
His legal assistants were customarily either a paralegal or an
individual with a law degree, and he said he had not had prior
difficulties providing proper representation to his clients despite
his small staff. However, during the summer of 2022 when the
RFA’s were served, Aroustamian experienced staffing issues.
One of his legal assistants took an extended leave of absence to
sit for the bar exam, and the other assistant unexpectedly gave

8
his two-week notice. After securing a replacement from a temp
agency, that individual then immediately gave notice as well.
Aroustamian further explained he was scheduled to be in
Europe for three weeks from August 31, 2022 through September
19, 2022 to attend his daughter’s wedding. A response to the
RFA’s was due during this three-week period, along with
responses to the related form interrogatories and requests for
documents that Slesinger had served with the RFA’s.
Aroustamian knew it was going to be a challenge to respond to
such voluminous discovery so he left directions with his staff to
meet and confer with Slesinger’s counsel, and to file a motion for
a protective order if no informal resolution could be reached.
Aroustamian also noted that significant work was due around
that same time in other pending litigation matters.
Plaintiff’s motion was also supported by the declaration of
Bobber Garibian, legal assistant to Aroustamian. Garibian
stated the January 24, 2023 hearing date was the first available
date for a hearing on a motion for protective order according to
the court’s digital reservation system. He explained that when
he checked the court’s digital reservation system after learning of
the court’s order granting Slesinger’s motion, he checked to see if
it provided different dates for different types of discovery
motions. He said that when asking to schedule a motion for
protective order, the court’s system did not offer the same
number of available slots that were given to other discovery
motions like motions to compel.
In opposing the motion, Slesinger argued the court’s ruling
deeming the RFA’s admitted was proper and in accordance with
the statutory requirements and applicable law.

9
In January 2023, the parties appeared at the hearing on
plaintiff’s motion for protective order which was denied as moot.
After discussing scheduling issues with the parties, including
plaintiff’s pending motion for leave to withdraw the admissions,
the court advanced the hearing on its own motion, setting the
hearing for February 15, 2023. The court ordered Slesinger’s
pending motion for summary judgment to be heard on the same
date. The court also continued the then-pending March 13, 2023
trial date to July 31, 2023, and extended all discovery and motion
cut-off dates to correspond to the new trial date.
At the hearing on February 15, 2023, Aroustamian stated
he had nothing to add to his papers regarding excusable neglect.
He reiterated his willingness to pay reasonable attorney fees in
the event the court granted him relief for the failure to timely
respond to the RFA’s.
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, explaining that
Aroustamian’s declaration failed to establish mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The court emphasized that
while Aroustamian detailed staff shortages and heavy caseloads
compounded by his travel abroad, he provided no explanation for
failing to get a belated response served at any time before the
October 20, 2022 hearing on Slesinger’s motion. The court found
the failure to respond to the RFA’s and avoid a deemed admitted
order was due to “inexcusable neglect” by an experienced
attorney who should have been aware of the statutory
requirements for responding to requests for admissions. The
court also found there would be undue prejudice to Slesinger if
relief was granted because the pending trial date would make it
impossible to get another motion for summary judgment duly
noticed and heard. The court noted there was little leeway for

10
extending dates further when the case was almost at the five-
year dismissal date and the case was being “saved” from
dismissal solely because of the extension granted by “Emergency
Rule 10(a)” passed during the Covid-19 pandemic.
In the same written order, the court granted Slesinger’s
motion for summary judgment. The court explained the reasons
for its ruling at length, including that plaintiff was deemed to
have admitted facts demonstrating a lack of standing to pursue
her asserted claims.
4. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to withdraw and amend
certain admissions and motion for reconsideration
Two weeks later, plaintiff filed two more motions asking for
relief from the deemed admissions order. One motion was
directed specifically to request Nos. 67, 76, 78, 83, 85, 87 through
90, 95 and 97, and asked for leave to withdraw those admissions
and to substitute denials. The other motion asked the court to
reconsider its order of February 15, 2023, denying plaintiff’s first
motion. Plaintiff also filed a motion asking the court to
reconsider its summary judgment ruling in favor of Slesinger.
The hearing on all three motions was set for April 25, 2023.
In support of these motions, Aroustamian reiterated the
facts from his original motion that the court had already found to
be deficient. In addition, Aroustamian attested that it was his
“usual practice” to leave directions for his staff on handwritten
notes, and he followed that same practice before leaving for
Europe with respect to responding to Slesinger’s RFA’s. He said
he recalled leaving a note directing his assistant to prepare a
response to the RFA’s, in addition to a motion for protective
order, and to show the response to plaintiff for review and
verification. Aroustamian said he did not know why the note was

11
not seen or how it may have been misplaced, but the note had
still “not been recovered to this day.” He said he was unaware
his assistant had not seen the note and had only prepared and
filed the motion for a protective order without simultaneously
serving a response to the RFA’s. Garibian attested to no new
facts, except that he served responses to Slesinger’s RFA’s on
March 1, 2023.
At the April 25, 2023 hearing, Aroustamian conceded that
his office neglected to timely respond to the RFA’s, but argued his
client would suffer greater prejudice than the defendants if relief
was not granted. He pointed out that significant discovery had
already been completed and that much of the delay in the case
had been occasioned by Slesinger who changed counsel several
times, along with difficulty in adding and serving doe defendants.
Aroustamian offered to stipulate to shorten time for the hearing
of defense motions and to pay reasonable fees to ameliorate any
prejudice to defendants.
Wheeler reiterated that the court had correctly granted his
deemed admitted motion under the applicable statutes. He
argued that Aroustamian’s claimed additional facts about leaving
a note for his staff lacked credibility, and that if Aroustamian had
left a note directing that responses be prepared, then why did he
not inquire of his staff about where the response was when they
presented only the motion for protective order for his final
approval. Wheeler pointed out that Aroustamian had yet to
explain the failure to serve responses after he returned home
from Europe, well in advance of the October 20, 2022 hearing,
which would have defeated the motion.
Aroustamian responded by saying he simply did not recall
leaving the note for his staff when he was preparing the first

12
motion. However, after the February 15, 2023 hearing, he
recalled preparing the note, and therefore he renewed his request
for relief in order to explain that to the court.
By written order dated May 22, 2023, the trial court denied
plaintiff’s motions. The court explained again that Aroustamian
was an experienced attorney and it was “inexcusable” for an
attorney with his years of experience to not have complied with
the statutory requirements by serving responses before the
October 20, 2022 hearing “regardless of whether a motion for
protective order was also filed or not.” Moreover, the court said
Aroustamian’s new assertion regarding the handwritten note was
“convenient but not credible.” The court found the failure to
follow the statutory requirements in responding to the RFA’s
constituted “inexcusable neglect” and was conduct that “fell below
the professional standard of care.” With respect to plaintiff’s
motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s denial of the first
motion to withdraw, the court concluded plaintiff had not shown
new facts or circumstances justifying relief under section 1008.
The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
of its summary judgment ruling in favor of Slesinger.
5. The order to show cause hearing
The trial court sua sponte set an order to show cause
hearing for September 1, 2023, to allow the parties a final
opportunity to argue any bases for the court’s possible
reconsideration of the deemed admissions order, focusing
primarily on whether substantial prejudice to the defendants
could be avoided if plaintiff was granted relief. After receiving
supplemental briefing and hearing lengthy argument from the
parties, the court took the matter under submission. On
September 5, 2023, the court issued a written order discharging

13
the order to show cause without modifying any of its prior orders
regarding the RFA’s.
Thereafter, a several judgment was entered in favor of
Slesinger on September 21, 2023. Separate motions for summary
judgment were granted in favor of the remaining defendants.
On May 7, 2024, judgment was entered in favor of Movers.
On November 5, 2024, judgments were entered in favor of Barak
and Island Snacks, and in favor of Berg and DCDC.
These appeals followed. We grant plaintiff’s request to take
judicial notice of the record on appeal in B334193 with respect to
all three appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. The orders denying plaintiff’s motions for leave to
withdraw and amend admissions
Like most discovery orders, we review the trial court’s
rulings on plaintiff’s motions for leave to withdraw admissions
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (St. Mary v.
Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 772 (St. Mary).) The
abuse of discretion standard of review “is founded on principles of
deference to the trial court, such as ‘whether or not the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
being considered.’ ” (Ibid.) We will not disturb the trial court’s
order absent a clear showing of abuse or a miscarriage of justice.
(Ibid.)
Where there are controverted facts in support of and in
opposition to the motion, “the trial court’s factual findings will be
upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (Costco
Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733
(Costco).) “[W]e defer to the trial court’s assessments of
credibility and the weight of the evidence and do not interfere

14
with its determinations of these matters.” (McClain v. Kissler
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 415 (McClain).) We are mindful that
a “trial court’s discretion in ruling on a motion to withdraw or
amend an admission is not unlimited, but must be exercised in
conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner that serves
the interests of justice.” (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420.)
In assessing the trial court’s exercise of discretion here, we
are guided by the statutes governing requests for admissions.
Section 2033.300 states that a party may withdraw or amend an
admission “only on leave of court granted after notice to all
parties.” (Id., subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) provides that the court
has the discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment “only if it
determines that the admission was the result of mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who
obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in
maintaining that party’s action or defense on the merits.” (Id.,
subd. (b), italics added.)
The facts before the court at the February 15, 2023 hearing
on plaintiff’s first motion for leave to withdraw admissions were
as follows: Aroustamian was in Europe for his daughter’s
wedding from August 31, 2022 through September 19, 2022.
Responses to the RFA’s were due on September 6, 2022, while
Aroustamian was abroad. He was a solo practitioner who had
long relied primarily on two legal assistants without any
problem, but during the summer of 2022, he experienced unusual
staffing issues. One of his assistants was gone for an extended
leave of absence to take the bar exam. The other assistant
unexpectedly gave two weeks’ notice. Aroustamian struggled to
maintain replacements via a temp agency. He nevertheless left

15
directions for his staff to meet and confer with Slesinger’s counsel
while he was in Europe and to file a motion for a protective order
if no informal resolution could be reached. Aroustamian’s
assistant attested to the fact that January 24, 2023 was the
earliest date available for a hearing on plaintiff’s motion for a
protective order. He also explained that the court’s digital
reservation system had fewer available dates for scheduling
motions for protective orders as opposed to other types of
discovery motions.
In denying plaintiff’s motion, the court acknowledged
counsel’s staffing issues but underscored that Aroustamian
provided no explanation whatsoever for failing to serve a belated
response at any time before the hearing on Slesinger’s motion.
The court found plaintiff’s failure to timely respond to the RFA’s
to be due to “inexcusable neglect” by an experienced attorney who
should have been aware of the statutory requirements for
responding to requests for admissions. The court also found
there would be undue prejudice to Slesinger if relief was granted
because of the pending trial date and the looming expiration of
the five-year dismissal statute.
The trial court acted well within the bounds of its statutory
authority in denying plaintiff’s motion for failing to demonstrate
excusable neglect. The court was required to grant Slesinger’s
motion unless it found that plaintiff “before the hearing on the
motion” had served “a proposed response to the requests for
admission that [was] in substantial compliance with Section
2033.220.” (§ 2033.280, subd. (c).) The statutory scheme thus
provides an explicit mechanism for a responding party who has
been dilatory in responding to requests for admissions with the
means to prevent the issuance of an order deeming facts

16
admitted, i.e., service of a belated response in substantial
compliance with section 2033.220. Aroustamian never explained
what prevented him from serving a response after he returned
home from his daughter’s wedding. Irrespective of the difficulties
his depleted staff may have experienced in his absence,
Aroustamian had four weeks after he returned home to ensure a
proper response was made before the hearing on Slesinger’s
motion. He chose to do nothing, including failing to file an ex
parte application to advance the hearing on his own motion for a
protective order. Then, after the court issued the deemed
admitted order, plaintiff waited three months before filing a
motion for relief, notwithstanding the fact that a trial date was
pending and discovery and motion cut-off dates were looming.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff
relief. (St. Mary, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.)
We likewise find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
denying plaintiff’s subsequent motions. Plaintiff did offer
additional facts in support of the followup motions heard in April
2023, but the trial court rejected them. Aroustamian said he
recalled an additional fact that he had not remembered when
preparing the first motion for relief. He said he recalled leaving a
note directing his assistant to prepare a response to the RFA’s, in
addition to a motion for protective order, and he had no idea why
the note was not seen or was misplaced. In denying the motions,
the court rejected Aroustamian’s explanation as lacking
credibility, finding it “convenient but not credible.” The court
also reiterated that it was inexcusable for an experienced
attorney to not be aware of the statutory requirements regarding
requests for admissions.

17
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual
findings on the lack of excusable neglect, and we are therefore
bound to uphold those findings. (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 733.) We also find no basis in the record to disregard the
court’s assessment that counsel’s explanation lacked credibility.
(McClain, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 415.) Plaintiff correctly
points out that the law favors resolution of actions on their
substantive merits. But the policy favoring resolution on the
merits does not take precedence over a finding of inexcusable
neglect under section 2033.300 that is supported by substantial
evidence.
2. The summary judgment rulings
Section 2033.410, subdivision (a) states that “[a]ny matter
admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively
established against the party making the admission in the
pending action, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or
amendment of that admission under Section 2033.300.”
(§ 2033.410, subd. (a), italics added.)
Plaintiff was denied leave to withdraw the admissions
deemed admitted on October 20, 2022. As we have explained
above, the record does not demonstrate any abuse of discretion by
the trial court in denying plaintiff’s motions for relief. Based on
those admissions, it was conclusively established for purposes of
the pending action that plaintiff lacked standing to assert the
claims alleged in her operative pleading. All parties to the action
could rely on those facts being conclusively established, not just
Slesinger as the propounding party. Because plaintiff’s
admissions were considered conclusively established, it meant
they were “not subject to being contested through contradictory
evidence.” (St. Mary, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 775; see also

18
Swedberg v. Christiana Cmty. Builders (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d
138, 144.)
Thus, plaintiff was precluded from offering any evidence
purporting to contradict her admissions that she lacked standing
to proceed with her claims. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any
basis for the summary judgment orders being reversed that is not
dependent on a reversal of the deemed admitted order. We
therefore affirm the orders granting summary judgment in favor
of all defendants.
DISPOSITION
The orders of February 15, 2023 and May 22, 2023, denying
the motions for relief filed by plaintiff and appellant Anouche
Sarkissian, in her capacity as the administrator of the Estate of
Garbis Sarkissian, are affirmed.
The judgments entered in favor of defendants and
respondents Patricia Slesinger Bentson, DCDC Holdings, LLC,
David Berg, Nisim Barak, Island Snacks, Inc., and Champion
Machinery Movers, Inc., are affirmed.
Defendants and respondents shall recover their costs of
appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

SCHERB, J.

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