People v. Cerratos CA2/5

CourtListener 10873800Calctapp11.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/11/26 P. v. Cerratos CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B340422

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. YA099545)

ROMAN CERRATOS et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelly M. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.
Kathy R. Moreno, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Roman Cerratos.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Maricela Mercado.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The jury found Roman Cerratos and Maricela Mercado
guilty of murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a), count 1) and
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), count 2). The jury found true the
special circumstance that the murder was committed in the
commission of the kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and the
allegation that a principal to the murder was armed with a
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)). As to Cerratos, the jury found true
the allegations that he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(d)), and personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
The trial court sentenced both defendants to life without
parole for the special circumstance murder. Cerratos was
sentenced to an additional term of 25 years to life for the firearm
use enhancement. The court stayed the defendants’ sentences for
the kidnapping pursuant to section 654. The remaining
enhancements were stayed or dismissed.
On appeal, Cerratos argues that the prosecutor violated his
California and federal Constitutional right to due process by
commenting in closing argument on Cerratos’s failure to testify,
and by giving his personal opinions. Mercado argues that her
murder conviction must be reversed because the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury on aiding and abetting felony
murder. She alternatively argues that her murder conviction
must be reversed because the court refused to give an instruction
on the required logical nexus between the kidnapping and the

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
homicidal act. Mercado joins in any and all of Cerratos’s
arguments that inure to her benefit.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS

Prior to 2019, the victim, Jeffrey Appel, lived in Las Vegas
with his father, Steven Appel.2 Rena Pitchess, who was a
partner in a CPA firm in Manhattan Beach, testified that she
hired Appel in 2019 as an accountant for the tax season. Appel
moved from Las Vegas to Redondo Beach because of this job
opportunity, and because he was in a romantic relationship with
Mercado. Mercado was previously married to Cerratos.
In early April, Pitchess noticed that Appel was acting
agitated. On April 12, 2019, Appel checked into a Howard
Johnson hotel in Torrance. He was scheduled to depart on
April 16, 2019.
Steven testified that on April 15, 2019, he and Appel
exchanged emails. Steven told Appel to “leave, to get out of
[Redondo Beach].” Steven expected Appel to arrive in Las Vegas
either that night or the next day.
Pitchess testified that on April 15, 2019, Appel was
working, but he appeared nervous. He paced back and forth and
left files on the floor instead of putting them on his desk.
Pitchess told Appel to either sit down and work or leave because
he was distracting her. Appel left the office around 5:00 or 6:00
p.m.

2 Because Jeffrey and Steven Appel share the same last
name, we refer to Steven Appel as Steven.

3
Nicholas Lee lived in an apartment complex on Torrance
Boulevard next to a parking lot. At around 4:00 a.m. on April 16,
2026, Lee woke up because someone in the parking lot was
screaming, “Help. Please help me. Stop.” Lee looked out the
window and saw a white, four-door Audi in the parking lot.
There was someone in the passenger seat with their legs still
outside of the vehicle. A six-foot tall man wearing a black hoodie
was standing near the Audi. The man punched the person sitting
in the passenger seat at least three times. Lee heard the person
who was punched make a gurgling noise while attempting to yell.
Lee testified, “It sounded like there was maybe blood or
something in his—caught in his throat.” The man punched the
passenger about four more times. Lee thought the man threw
about ten punches total. Lee did not see the person in the
passenger seat punching back. Lee yelled “ ‘Hey!’ ” from his
window. The man stopped punching the person in the passenger
seat, and got into the back seat of the Audi on the passenger side.
A woman got out of the driver’s seat and tried to close the front
passenger door. The front passenger’s feet were inside the car,
but his knees were sticking out. The passenger tried to kick and
push the door open. The woman used her arms and body weight
to push the door shut. She got into the driver’s seat and drove
the car out of the parking lot.
Yuri Ishikawa also lived near the Torrance Boulevard
parking lot. She heard a man yelling “ ‘Help me’ ” and looked out
her window. The man was in the passenger seat of a white four-
door vehicle. The passenger side door was open and the man’s
legs were still outside. A woman standing near the car was
trying to push the man into the car and shove the door closed
with her arms and shoulder. The woman closed the door, walked

4
quickly to the driver’s side of the car, and drove away. Ishikawa
called 911.
Torrance Police Department Officer Matthew Jungers
responded to the Torrance Boulevard parking lot at
approximately 4:15 a.m. He discovered a shoe, a bloody knife,
and what appeared to be fresh blood on the asphalt. The knife
did not have a hilt.
Early in the morning on April 16, 2019, John Chaves was
attending a training class for work and parked his car on Carson
Plaza Drive. Chaves noticed a parked white car with blood on
the passenger door. Chaves called to a friend who was also
attending the training and they looked inside the car. Chaves
saw what appeared to be a dead body “stuffed” into the passenger
floorboard and seat area. Chaves saw some instructors
approaching and told them to call 911.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Adnan
Ahmed responded to Carson Plaza Drive at 6:00 a.m. He found
Appel in the front passenger area of the car covered in blood.
Appel was pronounced dead at the scene. The Audi had a
Nevada license plate and was registered to Appel. A trail of blood
ran from the car to some buildings nearby. Deputy Ahmed
obtained video surveillance footage of the area taken at 4:35 a.m.
that morning. The video depicted a man with a cigarette exiting
the Audi carrying two bags and a woman in dark clothing
carrying an object in her hand. Both people ran where
authorities later discovered the blood trail.
Los Angeles County Police Department Detective Steven
Blagg also responded to the scene. He testified that Appel’s body
appeared to be stuffed into the right front passenger area of the
vehicle. Appel’s wallet was still in his possession. He did not

5
have a cell phone. The detective found paperwork in the car
indicating that Appel had checked into a Howard Johnson hotel.
Later, when Detective Blagg went to the hotel, it did not appear
that Appel had checked out.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department crime lab forensic
specialist Danielle Tiesma photographed the scene and collected
evidence. She observed possible blood stains on the exterior of
the front passenger door of the vehicle. There were possible blood
stains on other parts of the exterior as well, and on the asphalt.
Tiesma followed the suspected blood trail. It led into an open
space between two buildings. There was also a cigarette with
what appeared to be blood on it in a trash can. When Tiesma
processed the interior of the Audi, she noted that Appel was only
wearing one shoe. There was possible blood on the back and side
of the front passenger seat, on the inside of the window, and on
the door frame. An expended bullet and an unexpended bullet
were recovered from the Audi. The unexpended bullet was
discovered underneath Appel’s buttocks. It had a head stamp
with “Speer 45 Auto” on it. A fired bullet was collected from
Appel’s right shoulder. There were also expended bullet
cartridge casings in the passenger’s side door and on the floor of
the rear passenger side seat. There was a pair of black socks
with an unexpended bullet attached to them by possible blood.
There was gunshot residue on Appel’s hands and in the Audi.
The word “fuck” was scratched into the Audi’s hood.
Medical examiner Dr. Richard Ou reviewed the autopsy
report and the photos of Appel’s body.3 Appel suffered five stab
wounds to his torso, neck, and leg, in addition to cuts. He

3 At the time of trial, the coroner who performed the
autopsy was deceased.

6
sustained three gunshot wounds, to his neck, right flank, and
right leg. Dr. Ou concluded that Appel died from blood loss as a
result of all of these injuries. Two of the expended bullets were
recovered from Appel’s body. A third bullet passed through
Appel’s leg and exited. There was methamphetamine present in
Appel’s body.
Jennifer Harbaugh, a close friend of Mercado’s, testified
that at about 8:00 a.m. on April 16, 2019, Mercado and Cerratos
arrived at her house unexpectedly. Mercado was out of breath,
Cerratos’s hand was bleeding, and both of them were muddy.
They took showers and Harbaugh gave them clean clothes to
wear. Harbaugh then drove Mercado and Cerratos to Mercado’s
house.
The next day Harbaugh was on her way to work when she
saw Mercado, Cerratos, and Mercado’s daughter in Mercado’s
white BMW. They spoke briefly before Harbaugh left.
When authorities later searched Harbaugh’s home, there
were possible blood stains in the bathroom, bathtub, and shower
drain.
Video obtained from a surveillance camera near
Harbaugh’s house depicted events on the morning of April 16,
2019. The video showed Cerratos carrying a trash bag toward a
trash bin. He was wearing a white T-shirt with “Stage Fright”
written on it.
On April 18, 2019, San Diego Police Department Officer
Ruben Berton was patrolling near the Mexican border when a
man flagged him down to report a backpack and handbag that
the man discovered in the driveway of his apartment complex.
The handbag contained Mercado’s identification card and the key
fob for a BMW.

7
On the same day, Mercado’s BMW was found near the
Mexican border in San Ysidro. The recovered key fob opened
Mercado’s BMW. In the trunk of the BMW, there were bags of
clothing and passports for Mercado and her child. There was a
white T-shirt with “Stage Fright” written on it in the back seat of
the BMW.
On April 19, 2019, the police searched Mercado’s house.
They discovered a rifle case containing a shotgun and a plastic
bag with various types of ammunition inside, including a Speer
45 cartridge. There was a bloody towel in the dining room.
Police discovered a first aid kit on the counter in the upstairs
bathroom. Detective Blagg ran the serial number for the shotgun
and determined that it was not registered to anyone in
California. The detective could not determine where the shotgun
had been purchased. He did not investigate further because
Appel was not killed with a shotgun. Detective Blagg did not
have the Speer 45 cartridge analyzed for fingerprints because the
crime lab no longer tested cartridges for fingerprints.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department senior criminalist
Leslie Thompson obtained blood samples from the crime scene
that she later analyzed. Thompson determined that the blood on
the knife found in the parking lot was consistent with the DNA
profiles of both Appel and Cerratos. Blood from samples taken
from the parking lot where the knife was recovered were
consistent with Appel’s and Cerratos’s DNA profiles. A sample
taken from the blood trail on Carson Plaza Drive was consistent
with Cerratos’s DNA profile, as was blood from a sample taken
from the cigarette that was recovered. Blood taken from samples
from the exterior and interior of the Audi were consistent with
Cerratos’s DNA profile. Non-blood DNA samples from the

8
interior of the Audi were consistent with Cerratos, Mercado, and
Appel.
Mexican agents apprehended Cerratos in June 2019, and
Mercado in July 2019, and delivered them into Detective Blagg’s
custody. At the time that he was apprehended, Cerratos had a
scar on his right hand between his thumb and index finger that
was 1½ to 2 inches long. In Detective Blagg’s experience, an
assailant using a knife without a hilt may slip and cut their hand
in this area.

DISCUSSION

A. Prosecutorial Error

Cerratos contends that in making his closing argument, the
prosecutor rendered his trial fundamentally unfair by improperly
commenting on Cerratos’s failure to testify and by offering the
prosecutor’s own opinions on the evidence. Cerratos claims (and
Mercado joins) that either separately or in combination these
alleged errors require reversal. We find no error.
Under state law, “ ‘ “[a] prosecutor who uses deceptive or
reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits
misconduct . . . .” ’ (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.)
Prosecutorial misconduct violates the federal Constitution when
it results in a fundamentally unfair trial. (Ibid.) When a claim of
misconduct is based on remarks to the jury, we consider whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in
an improper fashion. (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234,
1275.)” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 350.)

9
1. Griffin Error

Defendants first contend the prosecution committed error
by commenting on their decisions not to testify, which improperly
shifted the burden of proof to the defense. The contention lacks
merit.

a. Legal Principles

“In Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [(Griffin)], the
United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not
comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify in his or her own
behalf.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339.) In
accordance with this principle, the prosecutor may not argue to
the jury that testimony or evidence is uncontradicted or
unrefuted when such testimony could be provided only by the
defendant. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 371.)
“[Griffin’s] holding does not, however, extend to bar prosecution
comments based upon the state of the evidence or upon the
failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call
anticipated witnesses.” (Bradford, at p. 1339.)

b. Proceedings

In her closing statement, Cerratos’s counsel argued:
“Each defendant is entitled to their own trial in this case,
and as to each defendant the district attorney has to prove every
single element of every charge independently and you have to
decide whether they have met their burden of proof.” Counsel

10
told the jury that even if they ignored all of the defense’s
arguments, “you still are going to come up to the same
conclusion: that the district attorney has failed to prove this case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond any doubt. He’s just failed to
prove the case.”
Counsel reminded the jury that the prosecution had “to
produce either witnesses or evidence that proves the facts of their
case, whether it be by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.”
Counsel then stated, “We don’t have to prove anything. But in
order to prove their case, the D.A. has to be able to connect all the
facts that they’re presenting to you. Can’t do it in a vacuum. You
can’t do each one separate and hope they come together.”
As relevant here, counsel argued there was no proof that
Cerratos supplied the murder weapons. Counsel reminded the
jury that the criminalist testified she did not test the knife for
handler DNA because it was overwhelmed by blood. Counsel did
not believe this explanation because the knife did not appear to
be overwhelmed by blood in photographs. If the criminalist had
tested the knife for handler DNA, the evidence may have
established that the knife belonged to Appel and not Cerratos.
Counsel further argued there was no proof that Cerratos owned
the gun used to shoot Appel. If the prosecution had tested the
shotgun found in Mercado’s house (which was not used in the
killing) for fingerprints, testing may have shown that it was
Appel’s shotgun, from which the jury could draw the inference
that the gun used in the killing likely belonged to Appel as well.
Counsel theorized: “Mr. Appel took the gun to a knife fight,
maybe; or maybe Mr. Appel took the knife and the gun to the
fight.”

11
Later, counsel returned to the subject of the shotgun.
Counsel emphasized that after Detective Blagg determined the
shotgun was not registered in California, he stopped
investigating the shotgun because it was not used to kill Appel.
Counsel argued that the detective should have investigated
further, stating: “I think the only conclusions he’s telling you is
I’m just not a good detective.”
In rebuttal, immediately following Cerratos’s closing
statement, the prosecutor stated:4
“So I wanted to start by reminding everybody that the
People have the burden of proof. Absolutely. We need to prove
every element of the crime, and I believe I have shown that. I
have told you from jury selection up through closing argument
that while you may have some questions, it’s up to you to
determine whether those questions really matter.
“All of those things the defense asked you about, all those
questions, all those things that they claim we can’t prove, those
have nothing to do with the actual crime. Right. What happened
before, [defense counsel is] right. Don’t know. But we do know
everything that happened from the Torrance parking lot stabbing
all the way to them dumping the car and running away. Right.
“Both sides have the ability to subpoena witnesses. Both
sides have the ability to produce evidence for you. Right.
Neither side has to call all the witnesses or produce all the
evidence, and we do have the burden of proof but both sides have
that ability. If there was something that was so important to their
case, some witness or some piece of evidence they could have
shown you. For example, there was some talk—”

4 The comments of which Cerratos complains are italicized.

12
Mercado’s counsel objected that this was Griffin error, and
Cerratos’s counsel joined. The court overruled the objection.5
The prosecutor continued:
“There was talk of what more could have been done about
the shotgun and who it was registered to. The defense has the
same ability to investigate.”
Both counsel again objected on the basis of Griffin error.
The court told the prosecutor to move on.
The prosecutor argued: “But as I listened to both closing
arguments I also struggled to determine if our theory of the case
is wrong, if the story I told you is wrong, then what is the right
one?”
Both counsel objected on the basis of Griffin error a third
time. The court overruled the objection.
The prosecutor resumed: “All right. I told you how the
evidence links together based on the evidence that you heard in
court. All right. In their closing argument they asked questions.
They tried to create doubt in your mind, but they really have no
unified theory of what happened.”
Both counsel objected a fourth time on the basis of Griffin
error. The court sustained the objection and held a sidebar
conference outside of the presence of the jury. Mercado’s counsel
argued that the prosecutor had improperly shifted the burden of
proof to the defense. Counsel asserted the prosecutor
inappropriately argued that the defense had to present an
alternative theory of what occurred and also had to prove that
alternative theory was correct. The defendants had no duty to

5 Mercado’s counsel appears to have been objecting on the
basis of Griffin error in court, although the court reporter
transcribed Griffin as Green.

13
prove anything. They could rely on the prosecutor’s lack of
evidence.
The prosecutor responded that he was not arguing the
defense had the burden of proof. He was simply telling the jury
that the defense had the ability to call witnesses and present
evidence. The prosecutor claimed that he was setting up the
argument that the defense’s theories of the case were
unreasonable. The defense had called all of the prosecutor’s
inferences into question, and had only offered speculative
alternative theories of what occurred that were not based on the
evidence.
Cerratos’s counsel countered that the prosecutor had not
made that particular argument to the jury. The prosecutor’s
statement that the defense failed to present evidence was not
equivalent to stating that the defense had presented speculative
theories. The defense had no duty to present evidence.
The trial court warned the prosecutor that he was getting
“dangerously close” to telling the jury that the defendants had a
duty to present evidence, thereby shifting the burden of proof.
The court told the prosecutor to focus his argument on the state
of the evidence and his theory of the case.
Cerratos’s counsel requested that the court admonish the
jury. The court agreed. When trial resumed, the court instructed
the jury:
“Please remember that the sole burden of proof in this case
and in all criminal cases is on the People. The defense has no
burden of proof.”

14
c. Analysis

Although in trial the defendants objected to the two
statements that they now challenge as Griffin error, at sidebar
defense counsel did not argue that the prosecutor was
commenting on the defendants’ failure to testify. The substance
of the objection was that the prosecutor was impermissibly
shifting the burden of proof.
On appeal, defendants characterize the issue as one of
Griffin error that resulted in an impermissible shift in the
burden of proof. However, nothing in the prosecutor’s argument
indicates that he was commenting on Cerratos’s or Mercado’s
decision not to testify. Among other things, Cerratos’s counsel
argued vigorously in her closing statement that Detective Blagg
and the crime lab had not tested the knife or the shotgun as
thoroughly as they could have, and that Detective Blagg was
remiss for not attempting to trace the shotgun’s registration
beyond California. In response, the prosecutor first correctly
emphasized that the People bore the burden of proof. The
prosecutor then proceeded to argue that, if the defendants
believed certain evidence such as the shotgun’s registration was
essential to their case, they had the power to obtain and present
that evidence. Doing so was not improper. (People v. Alaniz
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1, 7 [“a jury’s consideration of the defense’s
failure to call logical witnesses is proper and does not
impermissibly shift the burden of proof”].) The prosecutor did not
insinuate, nor could the jury have reasonably inferred, that
Cerratos would be required to testify to establish the shotgun’s

15
registration, or to describe the results of knife or shotgun DNA
testing.
Cerratos takes out of context the prosecutor’s comment “if
our theory of the case is wrong, if the story I told you is wrong,
then what is the right one”? The comment came on the heels of
Cerratos’s counsel’s statement faulting the prosecutor’s theory of
the case based on an alleged failure to properly investigate the
crimes. The jury would have understood that the prosecutor’s
use of the word “story” was not a commentary on Cerratos’s or
Mercado’s failure to tell the jury what occurred by testifying, but
rather a statement that the facts supported the prosecution’s
theory and that there was no reasonable contrary inference that
could be drawn from the evidence. To the extent that this could
have been error, it would be for its tendency to shift the burden of
proof to the defense to present a coherent theory of what had
occurred when the defense had no such duty, and not Griffin
error. Here, however, there is no reasonable likelihood that the
jury would have understood the prosecutor’s comments in this
manner. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor repeatedly
emphasized that the defense did not have to prove anything, and
that the burden rested on the prosecution to establish every
element beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence that it
presented. There was no prosecutorial error based on the
challenged statements.

2. Personal Opinions

Defendants next argue the prosecutor’s use of the word “I”
twice in closing argument was improper because the prosecutor
was urging the jury to accept his personal beliefs regarding how

16
Cerratos and Mercado located Appel, which were not based on
evidence in the record. This contention also lacks merit.

a. Legal Principles

“ ‘[A] “prosecuting attorney has a wide range in which to
state his views as to what the evidence shows and the conclusions
to be drawn therefrom[.]” ’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th
306, 336.) However, “[i]t is misconduct for a prosecutor to
express a personal belief in the merits of a case, rather than a
belief based upon the evidence at trial.” (People v. Johnson
(1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 94, 102.) Prosecutors are “ ‘prohibited
from vouching for the credibility of witnesses or otherwise
bolstering the veracity of their testimony by referring to evidence
outside the record. [Citations.] Nor is a prosecutor permitted to
place the prestige of [his or her] office behind a witness by
offering the impression that [he or she] has taken steps to assure
a witness’s truthfulness at trial.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Caldwell
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1269–1270.)
“[A]ny allegedly improper statements by the prosecutor
must be considered in light of the entire argument. [Citation.]
‘ “In conducting [our] inquiry, we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the
jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” ’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 789.)

17
b. Proceedings

In his closing statement, the prosecutor argued that
Cerratos and Mercado intended to kill Appel and had devised a
plan to kill him:
“Jeffrey Appel was staying in a Howard Johnson hotel in a
big county, in a big city, and somehow [Cerratos and Mercado]
find him in his own car just a couple blocks away. Somehow all
three are together in the same place. I find it very hard to believe
that Mr. Appel would do that voluntarily. So how did Mr.
Cerratos find him? Ms. Mercado must have known. How did she
know where to find him? The reasonable conclusion I have is that
Mr. Appel told Ms. Mercado where he would be staying after he
moved out.”
Cerratos’s counsel objected following this statement. The
court overruled the objection, but admonished the jury: “Ladies
and gentlemen, these are the arguments of counsel. It is their
recitation of what they believe that the evidence has reasonably
shown.”
Soon thereafter the court ordered a recess and the parties
discussed defense counsel’s objections.
Cerratos’s counsel asserted that the prosecutor’s statement,
which counsel remembered as “ ‘I personally believe’ ” was an
improper personal opinion of the defendants’ guilt. Counsel
moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. The court, however,
reviewed the record over a recess and addressed the matter
further, stating:
“While the court reporter’s transcript does reflect that [the
prosecutor] used the word ‘I’ in two different sentences, upon

18
further review he did not use the word ‘I’ in the form of vouching
or stating his belief as to the guilt of the defendants; rather he
used it once in a sentence, ‘I find it very hard to believe
essentially that the defendants and Mr. Appel ended up
coincidentally at the same location,’ and he used it after that in a
sentence where he said that, ‘The reasonable conclusion I have as
to how that occurred,’ and then he went on to explain that.
“In neither of those context[s] did [the prosecutor] appear to
be vouching or expressing his own personal belief as to the guilt
of the defendants. Based on the court’s further review of the
court reporter’s transcript the court’s prior ruling in terms of
denying the motion for a mistrial will remain.”

c. Analysis

Here, the prosecutor was not referring to facts that were
not in evidence or asking the jury to reach a conclusion based on
evidence outside the record. He was highlighting the fact that it
would be very unlikely in such a large city for Cerratos and
Mercado to randomly encounter Appel in his car a few blocks
away from the hotel that he had checked into when he decided to
return to Las Vegas. The jury could reasonably infer that, given
Mercado and Appel’s romantic relationship, Appel would have
told Mercado where he was staying while he finished his work for
the 2019 tax season. The jury could also logically infer that
Mercado shared this information with Cerratos, who was her ex-
husband. Mercado was the logical link between the two men
based on her respective relationships with each of them. It would
also be reasonable to infer that Mercado and Cerratos planned
their encounter with Appel, based on the fact that they

19
encountered each other not at Mercado’s house but at Appel’s car,
which was parked close the hotel where he was staying. The
prosecutor did not commit error by pointing out these connections
to the jury. He did not rely on evidence that was outside the
record or comment on either defendant’s guilt.

B. Instructional Error

The trial court is required “to instruct on all of the
elements of a charged offense [citations], including the mental
state required to commit the offense and the union of that mental
state and the defendant’s act [citations].” (People v. Jo (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1128, 1160.) Failure to do so is error. (People v.
Saavedra (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 615.)
We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “Review of the adequacy of
instructions is based on whether the trial court ‘fully and fairly
instructed on the applicable law.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) In determining whether
error has been committed in giving jury instructions, we consider
the instructions as a whole and assume jurors are intelligent
persons, capable of understanding and correlating all jury
instructions which are given. (Ibid.) “ ‘Instructions should be
interpreted, if possible, so as to support the judgment rather than
defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The crucial assumption underlying our
constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally
understand and faithfully follow instructions.” (People v. Mickey
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17.)

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1. Actus Reus Requirement for a Non-Killer Who
Intends to Kill

Mercado contends that the trial court’s instructions to the
jury regarding felony murder liability for a participant in a felony
who is not the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)), may have led the
jury to find that, as a non-killer who intended to kill, Mercado
could be liable for murder if she aided and abetted the actual
killer in the underlying kidnapping but not in the killing itself.
The contention lacks merit.6

a. Legal Principles

Effective January 1, 2019, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), the Legislature
amended section 189 to narrow the circumstances under which a
jury may find a defendant guilty of murder under the felony
murder rule. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449.)
Now, a person who is a participant in a felony that is listed in
section 189, subdivision (a)—which includes kidnapping—is
guilty of felony murder only if the jury finds one of the following
to be true:
“(1) The person was the actual killer.

6 Mercado concedes that her counsel did not object to
CALCRIM No. 540B at trial, but to avoid forfeiture, she argues
counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that regardless, the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury correctly
regarding the elements of felony murder. Because we conclude
that the claim of instructional error fails on the merits, we do not
address the issue of forfeiture.

21
“(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree.
“(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e),
italics added.)

b. The Jury Instructions

At trial, the court instructed the jury regarding non-killer
liability for felony murder pursuant to section 189, subdivision
(e)(2) under the standard version of CALCRIM No. 540B, as
follows:
“A defendant may also be guilty of murder, under a theory
of felony murder, even if another person did the act that resulted
in the death. I will call the other person the perpetrator.
“To prove that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder
under this theory, the People must prove that:
“1. The defendant committed or aided and abetted
Kidnapping;
“2. The defendant intended to commit, or intended to aid
and abet the perpetrator in committing Kidnapping;
“3. If the defendant did not personally commit Kidnapping,
then a perpetrator, whom the defendant was aiding and abetting,
committed Kidnapping;
“4. While committing Kidnapping, the perpetrator caused
the death of another person;
“5A. The defendant intended to kill;

22
“AND
“5B. The defendant aided and abetted the perpetrator in
the commission of first degree murder.”

c. Analysis

Until very recently, the actus reus element of felony
murder liability under section 189, subdivision (e)(2) was a
matter of debate among the Courts of Appeal. Some appellate
courts concluded that a non-killer would be liable for felony
murder if the non-killer aided a qualifying underlying felony.
(See People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566 (Lopez I); People v.
Morris (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1016, review granted July 17,
2024, S284751 (Morris I); People v. Lopez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
616, review granted Nov. 13, 2024, S287162 (Lopez II); People v.
Taito (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 694, 704 (Taito).) Other Courts of
Appeal concluded that a non-killer must aid in the killing itself to
be found guilty of felony murder. (People v. Kelly (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 162, review granted Nov. 26, 2024, S287341 (Kelly);
People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, review granted
June 11, 2025, S290457 (Jackson).)
In the briefs on appeal, the parties took opposing positions
on the meaning of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) based upon
these conflicting authorities. Mercado argued that the phrase “in
the commission of murder in the first degree” requires the jury to
find the defendant aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted in the lethal act. The
People asserted that it was only necessary for the jury to find
that the defendant aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,

23
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the underlying felony, in
this case the kidnapping.
Mercado emphasized that the Courts of Appeal disagreed
regarding the meaning of section 189, subdivision (e)(2). She
asserted that the language of the provision must be ambiguous
because reasonable minds could disagree as to how to interpret it.
Mercado contended that the trial court should have modified
CALCRIM No. 540B, which “generally tracked the statutory
language contained in section 189(e)(2)[,]” to instruct the jury
“that in addition to participating in the underlying felony of
kidnapping, the jurors were required to find both that appellant
intended to kill and that she acted to aid, abet, encourage, solicit,
or assist in the killing of the murder victim.” (Italics added.)
After briefing concluded, our Supreme Court held in People
v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 681−686 (Morris II), that a non-
killer must intend to kill and must assist the actual killer in the
lethal act to be guilty of felony murder. Thus, the Supreme Court
decided the proper interpretation of section 189, subdivision (e)(2)
in Mercado’s favor. However, in reaching its conclusion, the
Morris II court held that “aiding ‘the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree’ means just that. The
commonsense meaning of aiding or abetting ‘the actual killer in
the commission of murder in the first degree,’ involves aiding or
abetting the killing of a human being, and not just aiding another
in the commission of an enumerated felony by an act that does
not aid in the killing. (See Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 166–167, [review granted] [collecting dictionary definitions of
‘murder’].)” (Id. at 683.) In light of the Supreme Court’s holding
that the words of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) unambiguously
state that the aider and abettor must aid in the lethal act,

24
Mercado’s argument that the instruction is ambiguous because it
“generally tracks” the statute fails.7 (See People v. Kimbrel
(1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 869, 872 [jurors are expected to
understand instructions as they are “ ‘commonly understood by
those familiar with the English language’ ”].)

7 We observe that the disagreement between the Courts of
Appeal regarding the correct interpretation of section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) did not arise from the plain meaning of its
words. In fact, no published opinion has held that the common
meaning of “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree” is to aid in an
underlying felony rather than to aid in the killing itself. The
appellate courts and dissenting justices who concluded the
phrase referred to aiding in the killing agreed that this
understanding reflected the plain meaning of the words.
(Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166–168; Kelly, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 172; Morris I, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1031–1032 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.); Lopez I, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 587 (dis opn. of Raphael, J.).) The appellate
courts that held the relevant actus reus for non-killer liability
was commission of the underlying felony did not focus on plain
meaning. They relied instead on legislative intent as influenced
by the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of the words “murder
in the first degree” as the commission of the underlying felony,
which the cases characterized as a “term of art.” (Taito, supra,
115 Cal.App.5th at p. 704; Lopez II, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 621–622; Morris I, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026; Lopez I,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.)

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2. Logical Nexus Between the Kidnapping and the
Lethal Act

Finally, Mercado contends that the trial court erred by
refusing to modify CALCRIM No. 540B to include optional
language from the bench notes regarding the logical nexus
between the underlying felony and the lethal act. We conclude
that the trial court did not err.

a. Proceedings

At trial, Mercado’s counsel requested that the trial court
add the logical nexus language from the Bench Notes for
CALCRIM No. 540B to its instructions to the jury. The Bench
Notes state:
“There is no sua sponte duty to clarify the logical nexus
between the felony and the homicidal act. If an issue about the
logical nexus requirement arises, the court may give the following
language:
“There must be a logical connection between the
cause of death and the <insert felony or felonies from Pen.
Code, § 189> [or attempted <insert felony or felonies from
Pen. Code, § 189>]. The connection between the cause of
death and the <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code,
§ 189> [or attempted <insert felony or felonies from Pen.
Code, § 189>] must involve more than just their
occurrence at the same time and place.” (Judicial Council of
California Criminal Jury Instruction 540B, Bench Notes, citing

26
People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187 203–204; People v. Wilkins
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347.)
Counsel argued that the logical nexus language was
necessary in this case because the kidnapping and the murder
were not connected.
The prosecutor objected to inclusion of the logical nexus
language because the language did not clarify an element of the
crime that the People were required to prove. The prosecutor
expressed concern that the logical nexus language would create
confusion and lead the jury to believe the prosecution had to
prove an additional element of felony murder.
The court agreed that the logical nexus language could be
confusing. The court did not believe that there was an issue
regarding the logical connection between the kidnapping and the
lethal act. The court told the parties they could argue the point
to the jury, but that it would not add the language to the
instruction.
Mercado’s counsel argued that there was no evidence of
when and where the homicide occurred. Counsel opined that the
evidence indicated a temporal break between the two crimes. He
asserted that the kidnapping and murder occurred at different
locations.
The trial court disagreed with counsel’s characterization of
the evidence. The court stated that it was clear that the
kidnapping began at the parking lot where the stabbing took
place. The stabbing had to have occurred in the parking lot
because the knife was left there. Moreover, based on the
presence of gunshot residue inside the Audi there was very
strong circumstantial evidence that the shooting occurred in the
vehicle somewhere between the parking lot and the location

27
where the car was ultimately located, during which the
kidnapping was still in progress.

b. Legal Principles

A trial court’s duty to instruct may encompass providing,
upon request, “legally correct and factually warranted pinpoint
instructions designed to elaborate and clarify other
instructions . . . .” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 362.)
When considering whether to give a specific pinpoint instruction,
the trial court should consider whether the instruction incorrectly
states the law, is argumentative, duplicative, potentially
confusing, or is not supported by substantial evidence. (People v.
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 30, 32.) In other words, “[a] trial court
must give a requested instruction only if it is supported by
substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury
consideration.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39–40.)
“Whether or not to give any particular instruction in any
particular case entails the resolution of a mixed question of law
and fact that . . . is however predominantly legal. As such, it
should be examined without deference.” (People v. Waidla (2000)
22 Cal.4th 690, 733; People v. Quarles (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 631,
634 [“We review a trial court’s refusal to give a requested
instruction de novo”].)

c. Analysis

The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury
with the logical nexus language from the bench notes of
CALCRIM No. 540B. The evidence presented at trial did not

28
raise a question regarding whether there was a logical connection
between the kidnapping and the killing. A medical examiner
opined that Appel died from blood loss due to a combination of
stabbing and gunshot wounds. Appel was kidnapped and stabbed
in the Torrance parking lot. Two witnesses testified to seeing the
kidnapping as it took place in the Torrance parking lot. The
bloody knife, which was recovered in the parking lot, had
Cerratos’s and Appel’s blood on it. Blood samples taken from the
asphalt of the parking lot matched Cerratos’s and Appel’s DNA
profiles. Finally, gunshot residue and expended bullets were
found inside the Audi. All of the evidence suggests that Appel
was killed during the kidnapping and that Cerratos and Mercado
kidnapped him for the purpose of killing him. There was not
sufficient evidence for the jury to question the connection
between the kidnapping and the stabbing and shooting that
caused Appel’s death.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KUMAR, J.*

 Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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