CourtListener 10873361•People v. Moore CA5
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Filed 6/10/26 P. v. Moore CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089075
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22CR-01026)
v.
ROBERT DAVID MOORE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Steven K.
Slocum, Judge.
Nicholas Seymour, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and
Viktoriya Chebotarev, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
On February 18, 2022, Robert David Moore repeatedly hit D. Goates on the head
with a hammer, and she died from her injuries. At trial, the trial court instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 625, which states: “You may consider evidence, if any, of the
defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that
evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill, or the
defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation, or the defendant was unconscious
when he acted[.]” Over defense counsel’s objection, the court modified the instruction to
include the following statement: “Voluntary intoxication can only negate express malice,
not implied malice.”
On appeal, Moore argues that the trial court erred by modifying CALCRIM
No. 625 because the modification erroneously instructed the jury that his voluntary
intoxication could not negate premeditation or deliberation. The People disagree. We
affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 2, 2024, the District Attorney of Merced County filed an amended
information charging Moore with first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189;
count 1); resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count 2); and vandalism resulting in
damage of $400 or more (§ 594, subd. (a); count 3). As to count 1, the amended
information alleged that Moore personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
On October 17, 2024, Moore was found guilty by a jury on counts 1 and 3. The
jury also found true the weapon enhancement. As to count 2, Moore was found not guilty
of resisting an executive officer, but guilty of the lesser included offense of resisting a
peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).
A jury trial was then held on the issue of Moore’s sanity at the time he committed
the crimes. On October 21, 2024, the jury found Moore was sane.
On December 13, 2024, Moore was sentenced to an aggregate term of 27 years
four months to life.
On December 16, 2024, Moore timely filed a notice of appeal.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Prosecution’s Case
Moore, who was 51 years old in February of 2022, lived with his mother, C.
Walter, and her partner, D. Goates. Up until about November of 2021, Moore was
“extremely” helpful around the house. Then, he started using drugs again. He also had
mental health issues.
Moore and Goates initially got along, but the relationship deteriorated. Goates
told Walter she did not want Moore living with them anymore, and she began “really
pressuring” Walter to evict Moore starting in about January of 2022. Walter then began
asking Moore to find somewhere else to live.
On February 16, 2022, Walter once again asked Moore to find somewhere else to
live. Moore got upset and broke his phone. He stated, “ ‘I don’t need the phone. I’m
going to prison. I’ll take care of her tonight. I’ll take care of her.’ ” After that Walter
began locking their bedroom door, but she never thought that Moore would kill Goates.
On February 18, 2022, Moore found an eviction notice prepared by Walter. After
seeing the notice, he became angry. He said, “ ‘Are you f[**]king kidding me. Are you
f[**]king kidding me.’ ” He then walked to his room. A couple minutes later, he came
out of his room. He said, “ ‘I warned you[,] I warned you,’ ” and he started walking
toward the garage. Walter followed him.
Moore went to where Goates was standing in the garage and hit her on the head
with a hammer. She fell, and he continued hitting her on the head with the hammer.
Walter tried to pull Moore away, and she eventually succeeded. Moore raised the
hammer and said, “ ‘Mom, leave me alone. Leave me alone or I’ll finish her right
now.’ ”
Walter got her phone so she could call for help, but Moore took it from her. He
also took Goates’s phone. Walter had to go to a neighbor’s house to get help. Moore left
a couple minutes after Walter, riding his electric bike.
3.
Thomas Griffin, a police officer with the Livingston Police Department, was
dispatched to the scene. He located Goates, who was covered in blood. He asked her
what happened and who hurt her. She answered, “I don’t know,” to both questions. He
also asked her if it was “the son,” and she said, “No.” She appeared to be dazed and
confused, like she did not know what was happening. She was subsequently transported
to a hospital.
Later that day, law enforcement officers located Moore in a nearby orchard.
Hector Becerra, a police officer with the Livingston Police Department, as well as
Merced County Sheriff’s Office deputies Dustin Bender and Shay Muirbrook,
approached Moore. The officers announced themselves and told Moore to stop, but he
ran. The officers chased him. As he ran, he threw a lighter and a methamphetamine pipe
over a fence. Eventually, Bender caught up to him and he turned to face Bender. He had
a box-cutter in his hand, so Bender pushed him to the ground. He swung the box-cutting
tool at Bender’s leg, so Bender deployed his taser. Moore still did not comply, so Bender
deployed his taser again. Moore was then placed in handcuffs. Subsequently, Griffin
took custody of Moore. Griffin observed Moore’s erratic hand movements, which were
similar to what he had observed with people who were under the influence of a stimulant,
such as methamphetamine.
Moore was taken to a hospital. While at the hospital, he told Griffin, “Doesn’t
matter, my life[’]s over anyway. You know it and I know it. I’ll probably never spend a
day out of jail again. You know it and I know it. It is what it is.” At the time, Moore
was coherent and “pretty calm.”
A couple days later, Walter called the police to report that her laptop, which
Moore had been using, had been destroyed by a hammer. She found it on Moore’s bed.
She had purchased the laptop for $1,400.
Approximately 18 days after the incident, Goates died from her injuries.
4.
Moore’s Case
Moore testified on his own behalf. According to Moore, he felt depressed and
heard voices in his head since he was a teenager. He began using methamphetamine in
his early twenties, which helped him feel less depressed. He stopped using for about
seven and a half years, but he started using again about six months before the incident.
Moore did break his phone after Walter told him he needed to find somewhere else
to live, but he did not say anything about going to prison and he never said anything
about hurting Goates.
On the day of the incident, Moore saw the eviction notice and he felt angry. He
went into his room and started smoking methamphetamine. He “just kept hitting and
hitting and hitting.” His next clear memory was of Walter yelling at him to get out of the
house. He did not remember picking up a hammer or hitting Goates with it, but he had
never had thoughts of killing her.
He did remember walking and running away from law enforcement, but he did
that because he initially thought they were “shadow monsters.” He did not realize they
were law enforcement until after the taser was deployed. And while he was holding a
box cutter because a dog had snuck up on him, he never swung it at the officers.
He also remembered being at the hospital, but he did not remember saying that he
would spend the rest of his life in jail.
As to the laptop, Walter gave it to him, and he broke it about a week before the
incident.
Moore also called Teresa Vince, a licensed marriage and family therapist, to
testify. Vince assessed Moore after he was arrested. She provisionally diagnosed him
with depression. She also referred him to a psychiatrist to rule out major depressive
disorder.
5.
The Prosecution’s Rebuttal
Michael Zimmerman, a psychologist, interviewed Moore in October of 2022.
Moore told Zimmerman that after he received the eviction notice, he “ ‘just lost it.’ ”
DISCUSSION
I. Additional Background
When discussing jury instructions with the parties, the trial court informed them it
added the following pinpoint instruction to CALCRIM No. 625: “voluntary intoxication
can only negate express malice[,] not implied malice.” Defense counsel objected to the
pinpoint instruction, arguing it only applied to cases involving a Watson murder2 and it
would confuse the jury regarding how to apply CALCRIM No. 626 (which involves
voluntary intoxication that causes unconsciousness). The court overruled the objection
and instructed the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 625, as follows:
“You may consider evidence, if any, of [Moore’s] voluntary
intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in
deciding whether [Moore] acted with an intent to kill, or [Moore] acted
with deliberation and premeditation, or [Moore] was unconscious when he
acted, or [Moore] had knowledge that Dustin Bender and Shay Millbrook
were peace officers.
“A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he becomes intoxicated by
willingly using any intoxicating drug knowing that it could produce an
intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.
“Voluntary intoxication can only negate express malice, not implied
malice.
“You may not consider evidence of [Moore’s] voluntary intoxication
for any other purpose.”
2 (See People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 152 [“Under certain
circumstances, malice may be implied when a defendant kills someone while willfully
driving under the influence of alcohol, thus subjecting the defendant to a charge of
murder. [Citation.] This is ‘colloquially known as a Watson murder’ after [People v.]
Watson …, 30 Cal.3d 290[.]”].)
6.
Subsequently, the parties presented their closing arguments. During her closing,
defense counsel argued that “the Court specifically instruct[ed] you that you may
consider evidence of [Moore’s] voluntary intoxication…. The fact that he was
voluntarily intoxicated can be used to negate the fact that he had an intent to kill. It can
be used to negate the fact that he did not act with deliberation and premeditation or that
he was unconscious when he acted.” The prosecutor did not object or otherwise dispute
this summary of the instruction.
II. Applicable Law
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought.”
(§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice can be express or implied. Malice is express when the
defendant intends to kill the victim. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1); People v. Saille (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1103, 1114-1115.) Implied malice has “ ‘ “both a physical and a mental
component. The physical component is satisfied by the performance of ‘an act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.[3]’ [Citation.] The mental
component is the requirement that the defendant ‘knows that his conduct endangers the
life of another and … acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Soto (2018)
4 Cal.5th 968, 974.)
“ ‘In a criminal trial, the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury
instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement. [Citation.]
Nonetheless, not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises
to the level of a due process violation. The question is “ ‘whether the ailing
instruction … so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due
process.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial
3 “To suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[ ] a high degree
of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
989.)
7.
isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’ ” [Citation.] If the
charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a “ ‘reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the
Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 677.)
III. Standard of Review
“ ‘We review a claim of instructional error de novo.’ ” (People v. Parker (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1, 66.) However, “ ‘[i]nstructions should be interpreted, if possible, so as to
support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such
interpretation.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.)
Depending upon the basis of the claimed instructional error, we review it for
harmlessness under either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) or
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). Under the more stringent
Chapman standard, which applies to errors of constitutional dimension, reversal is
required unless the reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the verdict. (Chapman, supra, at p. 24.) Under the alternative
Watson standard, which applies to errors of state law, reversal is not required unless it is
reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the
error not occurred. (Watson, supra, at p. 836.)
IV. Analysis
Moore argues that the trial court erred by modifying CALCRIM No. 625 because
by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication can only negate express malice, the jury
was effectively instructed that voluntary intoxication cannot negate premeditation or
deliberation. The People argue that Moore forfeited this claim, that the court did not err,
and that any error was harmless.
Even assuming Moore did not forfeit this claim, we agree with the People that the
trial court did not err. The court instructed the jury that there “are two kinds of malice
aforethought, express malice and implied malice.” The court subsequently instructed the
8.
jury that they could consider evidence of Moore’s voluntary intoxication “only in
deciding whether [Moore] acted with an intent to kill, or … with deliberation and
premeditation[.]” The court then clarified that “[v]oluntary intoxication can only negate
express malice, not implied malice.”
Read in context and in light of the instructions as a whole, the pinpoint instruction
informed the jury that voluntary intoxication could negate only one of the two kinds of
malice (express malice). The instruction does not suggest, directly or indirectly, that
voluntary intoxication cannot be used to negate deliberation or premeditation. In fact, the
court directly informed the jury that it could be so used.
Moreover, “we consider the arguments of counsel in deciding whether the jury
misunderstood the instructions.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 193.) And
here, while not the model of clarity, defense counsel specifically argued that voluntary
intoxication could be used to negate deliberation and premeditation, and the prosecutor
did not challenge this assertion.
Accordingly, when viewing the instructions as a whole and considering the
arguments of counsel, there is not a reasonable likelihood that any member of the jury
applied the instruction in the manner argued by Moore. (People v. Solomon (2010)
49 Cal.4th 792, 822 [“ ‘A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to
erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the
jury understood the instruction in the way asserted by the defendant.’ ”].)
In arguing otherwise, Moore relies on Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307
(Franklin). He asserts that, pursuant to Franklin, the accurate general instruction in
CALCRIM No. 625 that the jurors could consider his voluntary intoxication “in deciding
whether [he] … acted with deliberation and premeditation” cannot cure the defect in the
conflicting specific pinpoint instruction. This argument is not persuasive. The pinpoint
instruction does not conflict with CALCRIM No. 625. Rather, the pinpoint instruction
clarifies that while voluntary intoxication can negate express malice, it cannot negate
9.
implied malice. Moreover, the pinpoint instruction accurately states the law. (See
People v. Parker (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1269 [“Evidence of voluntary
intoxication cannot be used to negate implied malice.”].)
Therefore, based on the foregoing, Moore’s claim fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
DE SANTOS, J.
10.
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