CourtListener 10872149•Heale v. Pratt CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/8/26 Heale v. Pratt CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LARA HEALE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065040
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24V001838)
ADAM MCCURDY PRATT, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Cheri T. Pham, Judge. Affirmed.
Adam McCurdy Pratt, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Lara Heale, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Adam Pratt appeals the trial court’s grant of a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) against him sought by his ex-girlfriend, Lara
Heale. Pratt claims the court erred by improperly admitting and crediting
Heale’s evidence and refusing to admit or consider his evidence. We find no
error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Heale filed a request for DVRO against Pratt on July 22, 2024,
claiming Pratt refused to let her leave his home and took her keys and purse.
Heale claimed she escaped and ran to Pratt’s friend’s home. Heale alleged
Pratt continued to call her and came to her home after the incident. She also
alleged Pratt had harassed her with calls, e-mails, and voicemails, and
stalked and threatened her by the same means.
Heale attached several e-mails from Pratt to her containing
obscene and threatening language. She also attached call history logs
showing numerous phone calls from a “No Caller ID” number.
On July 22, 2024, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) through August 12 and scheduled a hearing for that date. The
TRO prohibited Pratt from contacting Heale or her children and ordered
Pratt to stay at least 100 yards away from Heale.
Heale was unable to serve Pratt before the first hearing and
asked for a continuance. The trial court rescheduled the hearing to
September 26 and extended the TRO to the new hearing date. Heale was
finally able to serve Pratt via posting, after obtaining permission from the
court.
Pratt appeared on September 26 and asked for a continuance.
The court granted a continuance to October 24 and kept the TRO in effect.
2
Pratt then filed his own application for DVRO, alleging Heale
was the one who had verbally abused and threatened him. Pratt attached
several e-mails from Heale containing heated and obscene language toward
him.
At the hearing, Heale presented the trial court with a binder
containing printouts of e-mails and call histories. She also gave a copy of the
binder to Pratt. Heale testified that, despite the TRO, Pratt had continued to
call her up until the night before the hearing. In fact, she said he had called
her six times in a row at midnight and left voicemails. When the court asked
Pratt whether this was true, he admitted he had called Heale more than
once, though he claimed there were benign reasons for doing so.
The court issued the DVRO in favor of Heale and against Pratt,
finding he had perpetrated domestic violence. The DVRO expires in 2027.
The court then denied Pratt’s request for DVRO.
Pratt timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Pratt argues the trial court erred in three ways: (1) it issued the
DVRO based on evidence which he claimed was inconsistent and
unsupported; (2) it admitted only Heale’s evidence and not his, violating his
right to due process; and (3) it admitted unauthenticated material in Heale’s
binder of evidence. We review the grant of injunctive relief for abuse of
discretion. (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820
(Rodriguez).)
The trial court may issue a DVRO after a hearing “to restrain
any person for the purpose specified in Section 6220, if an affidavit or
testimony and any additional information provided to the court pursuant to
Section 6306, shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a
3
past act or acts of abuse. The court may issue an order under this part based
solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the restraining
order.” (Fam. Code, 1 § 6300, subd. (a).) The “purpose specified in Section
6220” is “to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to
provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a
period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of
the violence.” (§ 6220.) “[A]buse under the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act]
includes physical abuse or injury, as well as acts that ‘destroy[] the mental or
emotional calm of the other party.’” (Rodriguez, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
p. 820.)
Heale presented evidence to the trial court that Pratt had sent
her numerous obscene and harassing e-mails in addition to preventing her
from leaving his home on July 7. These actions would tend to destroy Heale’s
mental or emotional calm and render Pratt subject to a DVRO.
Pratt claims it was inconsistent for Heale to allege that the first
incident took place on July 7, 2024, while simultaneously alleging prior
abuse. But this is not what Heale alleged. She completed the form application
for DVRO and discussed the July 7 incident under the category “Most Recent
Abuse,” along with conduct occurring prior to that date. The fact that Heale
discussed the most recent abuse did not preclude her from notifying the court
of abuse that allegedly occurred prior to July 7.
Pratt also contends Heale presented no witnesses and submitted
no declarations. She need not have. The court heard her testimony, which is
sufficient under section 6300, subdivision (a).
1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code.
4
Pratt’s next argument is that the trial court erred by not
admitting his evidence. This is an inaccurate characterization of the
proceedings. Before making its ruling, the court stated that it “reviewed the
declarations from both parties,” and “heard the testimony from both sides.”
The level of proof required for issuance of a DVRO is a preponderance of the
evidence. (Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137.) The court
has broad discretion in determining whether that level of proof has been met.
(In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.)
Here, the trial court allowed Heale to present her evidence first
as the moving party but then allowed Pratt to respond to it. Pratt claimed he
had not had a chance to review Heale’s binder but then began discussing
other matters. The court had to interrupt him several times to keep him
focused, but was asking him questions all the while to ascertain his response
to Heale’s allegations.
The trial court allowed Pratt to read into the record a text
message sent to him by Heale seemingly exploring whether they could avoid
the need for a DVRO.2 It then asked Heale whether she sent the message; she
conceded she did, but stated she was trying to get Pratt to agree not to call
her if she agreed not to proceed with the DVRO hearing. Instead, Pratt
continued to call her.
At this point, the trial court turned back to Pratt to ask whether
he was continuing to call and e-mail Heale. Pratt did not answer the question
directly, which caused the court to interrupt him and ask: “If you don’t want
2 The text read in part: “We can cancel it like the other couple
did. We can both move on our way. That way you do not have a permanent
restraining order on the record and I won’t have to see you in court again.”
5
to contact her anymore, . . . then why have you continued to call her up until
last night?” Pratt responded that he wanted to know if Heale was still
proceeding with the hearing. He admitted he had called her more than once
the previous night.
In Pratt’s reply brief, he contends the trial court did not admit
threatening e-mails made by Heale. This is also inaccurate. At the hearing,
the trial court recognized Pratt had made a mutual request for a restraining
order. Pratt confirmed that “everything” in his declaration was “true and
correct.” When Pratt began to mention Heale calling his “ex-wife,” the court
stated, “I have it on the declaration.” Pratt’s declaration alleges that Heale
had threatened to “use a gun or other weapon,” and had caused him
“emotional or physical harm.”
The e-mails referenced in Pratt’s reply brief are attached to his
declaration filed in support of his request for DVRO. Although the trial court
did not expressly mention the e-mails, the record confirms the court reviewed
Pratt’s declaration. The court acknowledged that the declaration referred to
Pratt’s “ex-wife,” which showed the trial court was familiar with the contents
of Pratt’s declaration. Thus, we can reasonably infer that the court was also
aware of the threatening e-mails mentioned in Pratt’s reply brief, and
considered them under section 6300, subdivision (a), as part of Pratt’s
declaration.
The combination of Heale’s testimony and Pratt’s admissions
were sufficient for the trial court to determine that Pratt was the instigator of
the communications between the two parties. Since Pratt was already bound
by the July 22 TRO and had violated it, the court was within its discretion to
find he was the perpetrator of the abuse. There was no error.
6
Finally, Pratt’s reply brief asserts that the trial court improperly
considered unauthenticated “screenshots of alleged text messages, app
verification codes, and email notifications.” The record on appeal does not
include Heale’s binder of evidence marked as exhibit 1 for identification. The
record does not reflect that Pratt objected to the court’s consideration of
exhibit 1, or that he directed the court to the items identified in his reply
brief. Thus, Pratt has not preserved this issue on appeal. (Anaheim Police
Dept. v. Crockett (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 606, 621 [“An objection to the
admission of evidence must be ‘timely made’ and address the ‘specific ground
of the objection’ in order to preserve the issue for appeal”].)
Further, even if the evidence identified in Pratt’s reply brief was
inadmissible, there was still other evidence that sufficiently supported the
trial court’s decision as discussed above. The California Constitution only
requires reversal for improper admission of evidence if there has been a
miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. 6, sec. 13; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co.
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 [“Thus, ‘a “miscarriage of justice” should be
declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that
a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in
the absence of the error’”].)
7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover her costs on
appeal.
SCHWARM, J.*
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
8
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.