CourtListener 10872104•In re Jesse B. CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/8/26 In re Jesse B. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
In re JESSE B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile C104927
Court Law.
(Super. Ct. No. STK-JD-DP-
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES 2023-0000252)
AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Mother appeals the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights and
freeing the minor Jesse B. (Jesse) for adoption (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; statutory
section citations that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) She contends the
juvenile court erred in: (1) denying her request to change Jesse’s placement; (2)
terminating her parental rights despite her request to apply the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception to the preference for adoption; and (3) failing inquire as to possible
Apache heritage in violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et. seq.). We issued an order for supplemental briefing asking the parties to address
whether substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s ICWA determination in light
of the failure of the San Joaquin Human Services Agency (Agency) to provide additional
information to the Cherokee Nation as requested by that tribe. Having reviewed that
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briefing, we now conditionally reverse the matter and remand for the limited purpose of
compliance with the ICWA. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s orders.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Case Initiation and Reunification Proceedings
In July 2023, a mandated reporter contacted the Agency because of mother’s
threats to drown, murder, and/or throw newborn Jesse (26 days old) against a wall.
Jesse’s 12-year-old brother A.W. took him to another room to keep him safe, and an
officer placed mother on a section 5150 hold given her two prior strike convictions.
Jesse’s father, J.B., was soon to be released from prison and controlled mother and
A.W.’s behavior. A protective custody warrant issued, and the paternal grandmother,
A.B., expressed an interest in taking custody of the children. In the interim, A.W. tried to
run away from the emergency shelter with Jesse, and as a result, they had to be placed
separately.
The initial dependency petition alleged Jesse and A.W. were dependents according
to section 300 subdivisions (b), (g), and (j). Mother failed to appear for the initial
detention hearing, the children were detained, and supervised visits with mother
authorized. Mother had her first supervised visit on July 24, 2023. Thereafter, mother’s
visits vacillated between in-person and virtual between August 2023 and November
2023. Jesse was placed with the paternal grandmother in October 2023.
In November 2023, mother submitted on jurisdiction and disposition, the children
were adjudged dependents, and mother granted reunification services. The Agency’s
second amended dependency petition filed a few weeks thereafter continued to allege the
children were dependents pursuant to section 300 subdivisions (b), (g), and (j). From
November 2023 to March 2024, mother’s visits vacillated between in-person and virtual
due to physical incidents with father and mother’s prioritization of her delivery job.
Mother had seven visits canceled for not showing, arriving beyond the grace period, and
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for failing to confirm her visits as directed during this timeframe. She also missed one
April visit and one May visit. Leading up to the July 2024 status hearing, mother missed
five consecutive weekly visits. Despite this, the juvenile court approved additional
reunification services, adding domestic violence services and admonishing mother to
make her visits. The court also approved findings and orders that stated, “the parents
have consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the children.”
As of January 2025, mother had last visited Jesse in-person in September 2024.
She otherwise had once weekly virtual visits. Mother missed at least one visit with Jesse
in October 2024.
In February 2025, and following over 18 months of services, the juvenile court
terminated mother’s reunification services as to Jesse.
The Section 366.26 Briefing and Related Issues
The Agency’s section 366.26 report recommended terminating mother’s parental
rights and freeing Jesse for adoption. The paternal grandmother had cared for Jesse since
October 2023, and she was committed to providing him with a permanent home through
adoption. Jesse lived with the paternal grandmother in her one-bedroom apartment. The
paternal grandmother was in her 40s and worked for a rideshare company. The two lived
alone, as the paternal grandmother’s husband passed away from COVID-19 a few years
prior. The Agency did not believe it would be detrimental to terminate mother’s parental
rights. The report did not analyze any exceptions to the preference for adoption.
The section 366.26 report further noted mother’s virtual visits with Jesse would
last approximately 15 minutes. Mother skipped at least one of her virtual visits in June
due to staying up late with Jesse’s brother A.W., who was on a home visit. Mother told
the Agency she intended to “detach herself now” and that A.W. did not want to
participate in virtual visits with Jesse anymore because he did not “feel comfortable”
talking with the paternal grandmother there. Nonetheless, mother requested in-person
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visits for herself and A.W. informing the Agency that she “does not get along with [the
paternal grandmother] due to her attitude and parenting styles.” The Agency tentatively
arranged a supervised in-person visit for June 19, 2025.
The Agency’s June 2025 status report indicated that when contacted about in-
person visitation, mother refused to visit if the paternal grandmother was there.
Consistent with this, mother refused to visit on Jesse’s birthday even though she
acknowledged it was his birthday.
The June 2025 status report also relayed mother’s statement that she, father, and
the paternal grandmother had agreed to a legal guardianship for Jesse, and mother
opposed any adoption. The Agency informed mother Jesse’s permanent plan was
adoption, and the Agency was not aware of any agreement with the paternal
grandmother. Jesse was thriving in his current placement and was attached to the
paternal grandmother. The paternal grandmother met Jesse’s needs, worked
collaboratively with his providers, and was eager to adopt him. This report also did not
analyze any exceptions to the preference for adoption.
The Agency filed its next status review report at the end of July 2025. This report
reflected mother’s complaint that she had video showing smoke being blown into Jesse’s
face during a virtual visit and requesting his removal from the paternal grandmother’s
home. Mother also complained that the paternal grandmother was unfit to care for Jesse
as she had been a teen mom, met mother while they were prostitutes, introduced father
while he was incarcerated, and allowed father into her home as evidenced by a screenshot
of father’s phone’s location and pictures posted to his Instagram feed. Father was not at
the paternal grandmother’s home at an unannounced visit by the Agency following
mother’s complaint.
When asked, the paternal grandmother explained the smoke from the video was
either incense or sage and denied vaping into Jesse’s face. The paternal grandmother
vaped, but never near Jesse. The paternal grandmother initially reported that prior to
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meeting with the adoptions unit, father was allowed to enter the home to pick up Jesse for
visits, but she later denied that he entered her home and stated that exchanges occurred
outside. Father denied being in the paternal grandmother’s home when Jesse was there
and had been living with mother but now lived with a friend. Agency efforts to locate an
alternative family placement were unsuccessful. Although the Agency intended to
remove Jesse from the paternal grandmother, it continued to recommend adoption as the
permanent plan given that Jesse was generally adoptable.
In August 2025, Jesse’s attorney objected to his proposed removal from the
paternal grandmother and requested he be left with the paternal grandmother pending a
hearing and discovery. The juvenile court directed the paternal grandmother to only
allow visitation as scheduled by the social worker and that there should be no smoking of
any kind around Jesse. The paternal grandmother would transport Jesse to supervised
visits to be scheduled by the Agency.
The Agency’s October 2025 interim review report continued to recommend the
termination of mother’s parental rights. It also recommended Jesse’s removal from the
paternal grandmother and placement with another relative. The Agency conducted two
unannounced visits to the paternal grandmother’s home in response to mother’s
complaints, father was not at the home, nor were his belongings present. Nonetheless,
mother and father’s plan was for A.W. to be returned to mother, Jesse would be adopted
by the paternal grandmother, and then the paternal grandmother would give Jesse to
father. However, the paternal grandmother made clear that she did not intend to give
Jesse to anyone and wanted to adopt and raise him herself. The paternal grandmother
later told the Agency she had cut ties with father, did not know what the smoke was from
the video, and apologized if vaping smoke drifted in from the patio, promising it would
never happen again.
The Agency spoke with paternal great cousin Y.B. who was interested in caring
for Jesse and had begun the approval process. Y.B. told the Agency troubling things
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about the paternal grandmother’s background (including that she has a criminal history
for prostitution) and was willing to adopt Jesse. Y.B. had five adult children, the
youngest of which was leaving for college, and she enjoyed helping to care for two of her
grandchildren, ages three and four. Her two-bedroom home was clean and appropriate.
The Agency also spoke with two of mother’s friends, E.R. and J.W., who were
both willing to adopt Jesse, although one of them preferred he be adopted by a family
member if possible.
Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, mother visited Jesse in a community park once
weekly for two hours as supervised by the Agency from August 27, 2025, to October 10,
2025. Jesse called the paternal grandmother mom, was reluctant for her to leave, and was
happy each time she came back at the end of visits. Mother would bring Jesse food,
which he mostly refused to eat, and the two would play either with the park equipment or
toys. Jesse enjoyed playing with mother. Sometimes Jesse would try to hit mother or
have a temper tantrum when she told him no or tried to redirect his behavior. Sometimes
mother changed his pullups, although Jesse occasionally resisted. At the end of the visits,
Jesse would not always comply with mother’s requests for kisses or for him to say, “I
love you.” Redirections by the paternal grandmother often resulted in Jesse complying
with mother’s requests.
The combined section 366.26 and placement hearing occurred in October 2025.
The Agency told the juvenile court it had lost faith in the paternal grandmother and asked
the court to approve its request to remove Jesse. Jesse’s counsel opposed this request
arguing the paternal grandmother had cared for Jesse his entire life, Jesse was bonded to
the paternal grandmother, and it would be hard to move him to another placement despite
concerns that the paternal grandmother might not keep the parents away. Father also
opposed the request arguing the paternal grandmother had corrected the issues, and it
would not be in Jesse’s best interests to take him from the only parent he had ever known.
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Mother supported Jesse’s removal, arguing the paternal grandmother could not be trusted
and that a paternal cousin had confirmed concerns about the paternal grandmother.
In the context of these arguments, the juvenile court identified the two primary
concerns with the paternal grandmother as “the smoke” and “the father’s presence,” and
inquired concerning father’s background, how long it might take to complete an adoption,
and whether the plan could be changed if it needed to be (e.g., to legal guardianship).
The Agency social worker explained that mother said that the paternal grandmother
previously allowed mother and father in her home, and they would leave when the
Agency social worker would do announced visits. The Agency had recently conducted
two unannounced visits to the paternal grandmother’s home, and father was not there, nor
were there any items of his in the home. The video that mother had shared with smoke
being blown into Jesse’s face did not show the origin of the smoke. The paternal
grandmother’s home was clean, with toys and food. Jesse was happy. Jesse’s counsel
further urged the court to consider the source of the information, that father was likely
moving out of state, and that the Agency could do more unannounced visits if necessary.
Ultimately, the juvenile court elected to leave Jesse placed with the paternal grandmother.
On the issue of terminating mother’s parental rights, mother testified that she
attended most of her visits with Jesse, which had been Zoom visits for much of the case,
but had recently been in person. Mother visited with Jesse for two hours in a public park
where they would play, and she would bring him food. Jesse called her “Mommy” and
recognized her as his mom, which mother stated was something she had been working
on. Jesse would have an attitude at the end of visits, which she assumed was because she
was leaving. The two would share hugs and kisses, and Jesse would tell mother he loved
her. Mother opined terminating her relationship with Jesse would be detrimental to him
because she had completed all her services, was not unfit, and she had a bond with him as
his birth mother. Mother believed Jesse knew and loved her and had also bonded with
this brother. On cross-examination, mother conceded that prior to August 2025, she had
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video visits and had attended most of them. Jesse’s participation in and the duration of
the video visits varied given his young age. They would practice his letters and numbers
and sing songs.
The Agency argued there was clear and convincing evidence Jesse was likely to be
adopted, and mother had not established regular visitation or that mother had the type of
relationship with him that would justify not terminating her parental rights. Jesse’s
counsel agreed, arguing Jesse considered mother to be a friendly visitor, and thus, it
would not be a detriment to terminate parental rights. Mother asked the juvenile court to
apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption, arguing she visited
consistently, had opportunities through her illicit contact with the paternal grandmother to
care for the minor, and that Jesse had a strong bond to mother as shown by his anger at
the end of visits and recognition of mother as his mom.
Thereafter, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Jesse
was likely to be adopted, that it was in his best interests to have parental rights
terminated, and that no exceptions to the preference for adoption applied. Accordingly,
the court terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother did not request, and the court did
not make any explicit rulings on the elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception.
The ICWA Investigation and Determination
In July 2023, mother told the Agency that the maternal great aunt, C.M., was a
member of a tribe in Oklahoma, although neither mother nor the maternal grandmother
knew which one or had the maternal great aunt’s contact information. Mother completed
a Parental Notification of Indian Status ICWA-020 form (ICWA-020 form) containing
this information the same day. The same month, the maternal grandmother confirmed the
family had Native American ancestry, telling the Agency they were “Cherokee Indian”
and “Blackfoot Indian,” but she could not identify a family member who has membership
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or is eligible for membership in a tribe, nor could she identify the state of origin of their
ancestry. The paternal grandmother denied Native American ancestry.
Another ICWA-020 form completed by mother was filed in August 2023 and
indicated she was a member or eligible for membership with the “Blackfoot” or
“Cherokee” tribes in Oklahoma and that maternal great aunt, C.M., was also either a
member or eligible for membership with these tribes. This form listed what appeared to
be a phone number for C.M.
In September 2023, the Agency filed a Notice of Custody Proceeding for Indian
Child ICWA-030 form identifying four possible tribes of Blackfeet and Cherokee origin.
It included the names and other biographical information for Jesse’s paternal and
maternal grandparents, as well as some of his maternal and paternal great grandparents.
The form identified three Cherokee tribes for Jesse’s maternal great grandfather, R.M.
Maternal great aunt, C.M., was also identified as having Cherokee affiliation. The
Agency sent this form to the three identified Cherokee tribes and the Blackfeet Tribe.
On December 6, 2023, the Agency filed the Blackfeet Tribe’s letter stating Jesse
was not eligible for enrollment with the Blackfeet Nation. On December 18, 2023, the
Agency filed responses from the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,
and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians. Notably, the October 2023
response from the Cherokee Nation stated that Jesse might be “connected to the Cherokee
Nation through the maternal great grandfather” but that the middle name and/or date of
birth for the maternal great grandfather was required to make this determination. The
remaining tribes indicated Jesse was not eligible for membership.
Thereafter, the Agency continued to speak with relatives and shared the paternal
grandfather’s supplemental information with other tribes, but the record does not reflect
that the Agency ever followed up with the Cherokee Nation.
According to the Agency’s October 2025 interim review report, mother requested
a referral to the Native America Center in Stockton in October 2025. Mother explained
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that an individual at Lilypad had told her about the Native American Center and how they
assisted in researching tribal heritage. Mother initially denied knowing which tribe she
might belong to. She later asked whether “Apache is a Tribe” and then stated she might
be Apache. Mother wanted to become associated with a tribe so that she could receive
payments from them. Mother asked about other tribes and was informed that there were
over 500 federally recognized tribes. The Agency also spoke to the maternal
grandmother who reported her continued efforts to identify which tribe the family might
be associated with, but she had not been successful.
At the section 366.26 hearing on October 20, 2025, the juvenile court determined
the Agency had completed its due diligence and that Jesse was not an Indian Child.
DISCUSSION
I
The Placement Change Request
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s refusal to remove Jesse from the paternal
grandmother’s home arguing the court abused its discretion considering the information
before it. Recognizing her reunification services had already been terminated, mother
argues she nonetheless has standing to challenge this determination because she appealed
the termination of her parental rights that occurred the same day, and Jesse’s placement
impacted that decision.
“ ‘Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in its
favor, only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus,
‘[a] parent cannot raise issues on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights.’
[Citations.] ‘A parent’s appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights confers
standing to appeal an order concerning the dependent child’s placement only if the
placement order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument against terminating parental
rights.’ ” (In re Jayden M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1459.)
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In this case, mother seeks to challenge the juvenile court’s refusal to remove Jesse
from the paternal grandmother’s home. She posits that had the juvenile court moved
Jesse to another home, the court might have instead selected a legal guardianship as his
permanent plan. Although the “placement of a dependent child with relatives can, under
certain circumstances, make the termination of parental rights unnecessary” (In re K.C.
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 237), those circumstances do not exist in this case because each of
the individuals identified as alternatives to the paternal grandmother’s home affirmed
their willingness to adopt Jesse. (In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 436.) The
record does not suggest, and we will not speculate, that an alternative relative caregiver
would express a preference for legal guardianship. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)
[relative caregiver exception to the termination of parental rights].)
Nor are we persuaded by mother’s arguments that the juvenile court’s inquiry
concerning the possibility of altering the permanent plan sometime in the future to
include, for example, a permanent guardianship, placed terminating her parental rights
over Jesse’s safety. The complained-of inquiry occurred in response to suggestions that
the paternal grandmother would allow father unsanctioned visits with Jesse and reflected
the court educating itself so that it could make a reasoned determination weighing the
benefits to two-year-old Jesse of remaining in the only home he had ever known with the
caregiver he considered his mother, versus the possibility that the paternal grandmother
might ignore the court’s directive to keep father away except for Agency-sanctioned
visits. This does not suggest a legal guardianship was contemplated in Jesse’s case.
Again, all available alternative caregivers were willing to adopt Jesse, who was generally
adoptable. Accordingly, this claim fails.
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II
The Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because it
should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption.
Legal Background
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and
order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1); In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373.) One such exception is the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling
reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child,” because “[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
To establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, the parent must
show by a preponderance of the evidence three elements: “(1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such
that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.); see id. at p. 636.) In assessing whether
termination would be detrimental, the juvenile court “must decide whether the harm from
severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of
placement in a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632.) When the parent meets this burden,
the exception applies such that it would not be in the child’s best interest to terminate
parental rights, and the court selects a permanent plan other than adoption. (Id. at pp.
636-637.)
We review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
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p. 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two elements of regular
visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at pp. 639-640.) As a reviewing
court, we do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts’ ” and will uphold the juvenile court’s determinations even when
substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at p. 640.) The juvenile court’s
decision as to the third element—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) “A court abuses
its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
Application
In the present case, the juvenile court ruled from the bench, stating, “The Court
does find by clear and convincing evidence it is likely the child will be adopted. It’s in
the child’s best interest to have parental rights terminated. Termination of parental rights
is not detrimental to the minors—minor. [¶] None of the exceptions pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 366.26(c)(1) exist.” The court did not make any express
findings on the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, and no findings were
required unless the court were to apply that exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D).)
Nor has mother established that the juvenile court erred when it impliedly
determined she had not offered sufficient evidence to establish the applicability of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception. On the first element, while there is
evidence that mother visited Jesse, it is questionable whether that visitation should be
characterized as regular. Over the course of the case, mother missed at least 16 of her
weekly visits, at one point going over a month without having a visit of any kind, and
intentionally missed Jesse’s second birthday. Nonetheless, mother engaged in more
consistent weekly visitation towards the end of the case, and the record contains at least
one set of findings and orders that mother visited “consistently and regularly,” so there is
13
at least some evidence that the juvenile court could have used to find that mother visited
consistently.
Assuming only for purposes of argument that mother provided sufficient evidence
to meet the first element, there is a lack of evidence that mother established the kind of
bond required to satisfy the second element. There is ample evidence of mother’s bond
with and commitment to Jesse as she loved him very much, completed court services, and
was committed to loving and protecting him. However, that is not the pertinent inquiry.
Rather, the juvenile court was tasked with evaluating whether Jesse was bonded to
mother to the extent required for the exception to apply. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632.) While a parent-child relationship in this context need not conform to a particular
pattern (ibid.), mother bore the burden of establishing that her relationship with Jesse rose
above that of a friendly visitor in the child’s eyes. (See, e.g., In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230 [“an emotional attachment is one where the child views the
parent as more than a mere friend or playmate”].)
Here, two-year-old Jesse had not been in mother’s care since he was a little over
three weeks old. The vast majority of his visits with mother had been virtual, although
they had recently converted to in-person playdates at the park. Jesse appeared to enjoy
visiting mother and would play with her. However, the record does not establish
mother’s relationship with Jesse rose to more than a playmate. (In re B.D., supra,
66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230.) Rather, the record shows that Jesse—following a transition
period wherein he was reluctant for the paternal grandmother to leave—enjoyed playing
with mother, including playing with toys and the equipment at the park, as well as
engaging in various games such as hide and seek. He objected, however, to her attempts
to: redirect his behaviors, feed him, and change his pull-ups. He also did not always
willingly return her overtures of love and affection. Further, while mother had been
trying to teach Jesse that she was his mom and that the paternal grandmother was
“meme,” Jesse continued calling the paternal grandmother mom. Moreover, and contrary
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to mother’s testimony that Jesse had an attitude at the end of visits because she was
leaving, the record reflects that Jesse was excited when the paternal grandmother returned
and would greet her as “mom.” Finally, mother’s testimony acknowledged that Jesse’s
bond with her derived from her status as his birth mother, which in this case does not
alone establish the requisite relationship.
Given the lack of evidence that mother was anything more than a friendly visitor
in Jesse’s eyes, we conclude that mother has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in
determining she had presented insufficient evidence to establish the parental benefit
exception to adoption. Accordingly, this claim fails.
III
Compliance with the ICWA
Mother complains that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
ICWA determination because the Agency failed to investigate mother’s possible
affiliation with the Apache Tribe. We issued a supplemental briefing order asking the
parties to address the Agency’s failure to provide the information requested by the
Cherokee Nation as part of its further inquiry duties. The parties agree, as do we, that the
matter must be conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the ICWA,
specifically, for the Agency to complete its further inquiry duties vis-à-vis the Cherokee
Nation.
Legal Background
The ICWA “protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the stability and
security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian
children from their families, and by permitting tribal participation in dependency
proceedings.” (In re A.W. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 662.) The ICWA defines an
“Indian child” as a child who “is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
15
tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) “Under ICWA’s state analogue statutes [the California
Indian Child Welfare Act] (Cal-ICWA; [citation]), courts and child welfare agencies are
charged with ‘an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child … is or may
be an Indian child’ in dependency cases.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125
(Dezi C.); § 224.2, subd. (a).) “Child welfare agencies discharge this state law duty by
‘asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.’ ” (Dezi C., at p. 1125, fn. omitted.)
A juvenile court’s finding that the ICWA does not apply is “subject to reversal
based on sufficiency of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) The court’s “fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially
discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) “ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively
broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and
duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record,
the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re Kenneth D. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101-1102.)
Application
Here, the record reflects that on October 12, 2023, the Cherokee Nation wrote the
Agency indicating that Jesse might be “connected to the Cherokee Nation through the
maternal great grandfather but without a middle name and/or date of birth for [R.M.], an
accurate determination of tribal enrollment eligibility cannot be made.” The Agency
filed this letter with the juvenile court on December 18, 2023. The Agency later obtained
the requested information concerning R.M., but the record does not reflect that it was
ever shared with the Cherokee Nation.
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Accordingly, the Agency did not comply with its duty of further inquiry, and the
juvenile court’s determination that the Agency had exercised due diligence is not
supported by substantial evidence. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1134, 1141; In re
D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1054.) In light of this determination, we must
conditionally reverse the matter for further ICWA inquiry. Should mother have
additional information suggesting a possible affiliation with the Apache Tribe, she may
share that information with the Agency on remand, and the Agency shall document any
such claim as part of its ICWA duties.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of
compliance with the ICWA. If the juvenile court thereafter finds a further inquiry was
proper, adequate, and duly diligent and concludes the ICWA does not apply, the
judgment shall be reinstated. If, however, the court concludes the ICWA applies, the
juvenile court is ordered to conduct a new section 366.26 hearing and proceed in
accordance with the ICWA and California implementing provisions.
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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