CourtListener 10870824•Deng v. Gogal Law Office CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/5/26 Deng v. Gogal Law Office CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
XINHUI DENG et al., D086588
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24CU026778N)
GOGAL LAW OFFICE, PC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Motion for judicial notice denied as moot.
Affirmed.
Xinhui Deng, in pro. per., and Jianhua Wu, in pro per., for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Gogal Law Office, Michael Gogal, Bonsall, for Defendant and
Respondent Gogal Law Office.
Orick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Julie A. Totten and Scott Morrison, for
Defendant and Respondent GenMark Diagnostics, Inc.
Plaintiffs Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu (Landlords) were involved in
a protracted landlord-tenant dispute with defendants Michael and Hildy
Baumgartner-Gogal (Tenants). After Tenants prevailed on their retaliatory
eviction claim, Landlords responded by suing Michael Gogal’s law firm—who
represented Tenants—and GenMark Diagnostics, Inc.—a former employer
of Deng that Tenants subpoenaed for documents—alleging various acts of
misconduct during the earlier litigation. The claims asserted by Landlords
included the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
law firm and invasion of privacy against the company. In sustaining the law
firm’s demurrer and the company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
both without leave to amend, the court held that the litigation privilege
barred Landlords’ tort claims and that the rest of their causes of action—
all asserted against the law firm—were defective for other reasons.
Landlords appeal the trial court’s application of the litigation privilege
and decision to deny leave to amend. We find no error in these rulings. The
allegedly wrongful acts about which Landlords complain fall within the ambit
of the litigation privilege. And the trial court appropriately withheld leave to
amend because Landlords bear the burden of showing how they could amend
their complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the demurrer. Here, the
revisions to the complaint proposed by Landlords would not state any viable
claims. Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Tenants prevailed in their retaliatory eviction lawsuit, we
resolved appeals of two postjudgment orders entered in that case. (Gogal
v. Deng (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1161 (Gogal I); Gogal v. Deng (2025) 112
Cal.App.5th 1193, review granted July 22, 2025, S292779 (Gogal II).)
2
Michael Gogal’s solo legal practice, Gogal Law Office (Gogal Law or the firm),
represented Tenants at all relevant times.
While Gogal I and II were pending, Landlords sued Gogal Law and
GenMark Diagnostics, Inc. (GenMark) for alleged misconduct committed in
connection with the first action. Landlords asserted against Gogal Law
causes of action for (1) violations of Business and Professions Code section
6068—“Duties of Attorney”—and the rules of professional conduct; (2) failure
to obtain a business license while operating out of the house that Tenants
rented from Landlords; (3) “abuse of process and retaliation”; (4) “obstruction
of justice and misconduct”; and (5) the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED). Against GenMark, Landlords asserted a tort claim
of invasion of privacy based on the contents of documents it produced to the
parties pursuant to Tenants’ subpoena.1
Judgment was entered for defendants after the court sustained
Gogal Law’s demurrer and granted GenMark’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings. The court held that Landlords’ IIED claim against Gogal Law
was barred by the litigation privilege codified at Civil Code section 47 and, in
the alternative, the complaint failed to allege facts amounting to “extreme
and outrageous” conduct by the firm that resulted in “severe or extreme”
1 Landlords also sued Tri-City Medical Center—another party Tenants
subpoenaed for documents in the first action and whose successful demurrer
is the subject of another pending appeal.
3
emotional distress to Landlords.2 The court did not apply the litigation
privilege to Landlords’ other claims against the firm, finding instead that
they suffered from multiple other pleading defects.3 As for Landlords’
privacy claim against GenMark, the court concluded that it was sufficiently
pleaded but was nonetheless barred by the litigation privilege under the
rationale stated in Foothill Federal Credit Union v. Superior Court (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 632, 635 (Foothill). Leave to amend was not requested by
Landlords, and was not granted by the court as to either defendant.
DISCUSSION
Landlords appeal the trial court’s application of the litigation privilege
and its decision not to grant leave to amend. According to Landlords, the
conduct alleged in the complaint consists of acts to which the privilege does
2 The elements of IIED are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by
the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe
or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually
and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Cochran
v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.)
3 The court, for example, correctly held that there are no private rights
of action for either an attorney’s violation of the rules of professional conduct
(People ex rel. Herrera v. Stender (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 614, 632–633), a
business’s failure to obtain a required license (see Bus. and Prof. Code,
§ 16240), or obstruction of justice based on allegations of the commission of
perjury (Pollock v. University of Southern California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
1416, 1429) or concealment or destruction of evidence (see Pen. Code, § 135;
Rosen v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange County (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 453,
459 (Rosen)). We also agree with the court that Landlords’ abuse of process
claim failed because the only challenged legal process was a judgment lien
which “was imposed for the very purpose liens were designed to fill—to
encumber an asset which ensure that funds are available to satisfy a
judgment in a potentially meritorious action.”
4
not apply because they were either illegal or were noncommunicative. They
also contend that leave to amend should have been given because they can
supplement their complaint to exempt their IIED claim from the application
of the litigation privilege and repackage their original factual allegations into
viable claims against both defendants. For their part, Gogal Law and
GenMark argue that the court correctly applied the litigation privilege and
that granting leave to amend would be futile.
We review de novo a judgment after an order either sustaining a
demurrer or granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (City of
Rancho Palos Verdes v. State of California (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 13, 22–23
(Rancho Palos Verdes.) Under this standard, the complaint’s factual
allegations are assumed true, liberally construed, and reasonably
interpreted. (Id. at p. 22; Sproul v. Vallee (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 285, 293
(Sproul).) We do not, however, assume the truth of any contentions,
deductions, or conclusion of law. (Sproul, at p. 22.)
“The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is a
discretionary one for the trial court. An appellant may demonstrate an abuse
of that discretion by showing there is a reasonable possibility any defect in
the complaint can be cured by amendment.” (Rancho Palos Verdes, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 23.) We may find an abuse of discretion “even though
no request to amend such pleading was made.” (Code Civ. Proc.,4 § 472c,
subd. (a).)
A. The Litigation Privilege
Codified at subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 47, “the litigation
privilege applies to communications made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding.’ ”
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
5
(RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
413, 435 (RGC Gaslamp).) The “principal purpose” of the privilege “is to
afford litigants and witnesses ‘utmost freedom of access to the courts without
fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.’ ” (Ibid.) To
this end, “[t]he privilege is absolute, providing a defense to all torts except
malicious prosecution and applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of their
maliciousness.’ ” (Ibid.; accord Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 635
[privilege may bar claims of IIED and invasion of privacy].) The privilege
“is applied broadly, and doubts are resolved in favor of [it].” (McNair v. City
and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1162.)
The absolute nature of the privilege “serves broad goals of guaranteeing
access to the judicial process, promoting zealous representation by counsel of
their clients, and reinforcing the traditional function of trial as the engine for
the determination of the truth.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299,
324.) We acknowledge that the breadth of the privilege may result in the
“ ‘occasional unfair result’ in an individual case” because courts, and litigants,
sometimes must tolerate illegal conduct such as perjury. (Ibid.) But the risk
of such an occasional unjust result is outweighed “by the larger goal of access
to the judicial process.” (Ibid.) Thus, the onus is on litigants to “ ‘expos[e]
during trial the bias of witnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby
enhancing the finality of judgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of
litigation, an evil far worse than an occasional unfair result.’ ” (Id. at p. 322.)
“In general, the privilege applies ‘to any communication (1) made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that
[has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ ” (RGC Gaslamp,
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.) Under this rubric, the “[p]leadings and
6
process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications.”
(Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1058 (Rusheen); RGC Gaslamp,
at p. 435 [“the privilege applies to any publication that is either required or
permitted by law in the course of a judicial processing to achieve that party’s
litigation objective”].) The privilege may also protect communications that
occur after a trial (RGC Gaslamp, at p. 435), such as those related to the
enforcement and execution of a judgment (Rusheen, at p. 1065).
“ ‘Because the litigation privilege protects only publications and
communications, a “threshold issue in determining the applicability” of the
privilege is whether the defendant’s conduct was communicative or
noncommunicative.’ ” (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948,
957 (Jacob B.).) “ ‘[I]f the gravamen of the action is communicative, the
litigation privilege extends to noncommunicative acts that are necessarily
related to the communicative conduct.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Stated another way, unless
it is demonstrated that an independent, noncommunicative, wrongful act was
the gravamen of the action, the litigation privilege applies.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Gogal Law’s Demurrer
As it relates to their IIED claim, Landlords challenge only those
aspects of the court’s order sustaining Gogal Law’s demurrer that involve
application of the litigation privilege. Landlords do not address—and thereby
appear to concede—the trial court’s conclusion that their IIED claim as
originally pleaded failed to satisfy two of the cause of action’s elements.
Rather than attempt to negate all the court’s reasons for rejecting the rest of
7
their claims against Gogal Law, Landlords propose amending their complaint
to assert different causes of action.5
1. Landlords’ IIED Claim As Pleaded
Landlords’ complaint asserts two categories of misconduct by
Gogal Law during the first action that allegedly caused them to “suffer
tremendously … through battery, retaliation, threats, and excessive use
of legal weapon[s] and process to cover up [Michael Gogal’s] illegal action.”
The first category consists of allegations that the firm presented fraudulent
statements and evidence, recorded a judgment lien based on the incorrect
abstract of judgment, took an appeal in Gogal I, and sent Landlords a letter
“pressuring [them] to withdraw” this lawsuit. The other category is
comprised of alleged misconduct unconnected to any litigation, including
that the firm chased Landlords’ car and used the house Tenants rented in
ways not contemplated by the lease or authorized by law.
As to the court’s application of the litigation privilege, our de novo
review reveals that all the litigation-related acts about which Landlords
complain are protected. Consistent with the basic tradeoff underlying the
privilege—which allows litigants to access the judicial process without fear
of creating derivative tort liability—pleadings, process, and the submission
of evidence are protected even if they are alleged to contain false information.
(Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058.) So too is the filing of an abstract
of judgment that results in the recordation of a judgment lien. (O’Keefe v.
5 Landlords’ complaint and briefs also repeatedly accuse Gogal Law
of misconduct in securing decisions in Tenants’ favor in small claims court
concerning the judgment lien. Those decisions, which do not appear to have
been appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, are in any
event not before us and not relevant to our decision here. (§§ 116.710,
116.770, 116.780, subd. (a).)
8
Kompa (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 130, 134–135.) The privilege also applies to
Gogal Law’s actions in prosecuting the appeal in Gogal I and attempting to
resolve this lawsuit by letter informally—actions permitted by law even if
Landlords believe they were motivated by malice. (RGC Gaslamp, supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at p. 435.) As a result, Landlords have no available tort remedy
for the acts that form the basis for the first category of alleged misconduct.
2. Leave to Amend
Landlords offer to amend their IIED cause of action to allege that
(1) Gogal Law’s “post-judgment lien recording and refusal to release after
satisfaction, vehicle pursuit and threats, … interference with subpoena
process[es,]” and violations of specific statutes and court orders were acts
to which the litigation privilege would not apply, and (2) these acts caused
unspecified “emotional distress.” As to their other claims, Landlords propose
repackaging their allegations into new causes of action of “abuse of process,
fraud/deceit, intrusion upon seclusion,” a statutory claim of unfair
competition, and claims based on Gogal Law’s alleged used an unauthorized
deposition officer to handle its subpoenas to their former employers.6 The
firm counters that any claim Landlords could assert would be barred either
by the litigation privilege or collateral estoppel, or both, and that the
specificity required to justify leave to amend is lacking.
6 A party subpoenaing business records from a nonparty may elect to use
a deposition officer—a “professional photocopier” with no stake in the lawsuit
and who has complied with certain registration requirements. (§ 2020.420.)
When this election is made, the subpoenaed party must send responsive
documents to the deposition officer, who in turn distributes them to the
subpoenaing party and any other party who requests them. (§§ 2020.430 &
2020.440).)
9
“As a general rule, if there is a reasonable possibility the defect in the
complaint could be cured by amendment, it is an abuse of discretion to
sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)
Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating this reasonable probability, as
“neither the trial court nor this court will rewrite a complaint.” (Rakestraw v.
California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44.) They “must
clearly and specifically set forth the ‘applicable substantive law’ [citation] and
the legal basis for amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause of action and
authority for it,” as well as “set forth factual allegations that sufficiently state
all required elements of that cause of action.” (Id. at p. 43; see ibid.)
The vague and conclusory amendments that Landlords propose fail to
meet these standards. Landlords offer no proposed amended pleading, nor do
they otherwise identify the specific factual allegations they would add to their
complaint. They likewise fail to explain how the elements of any claims they
wish to assert would be met. Indeed, with respect to their proposed IIED
claim, Landlords still do not identify the conduct they believe was “ ‘extreme
and outrageous’ ” or what was the nature and duration of the emotional
distress they contend was inflicted. Thus, the additional details Landlords
suggest adding to support this claim would not address the specific
deficiencies the trial court identified in the first complaint.
Landlords’ proposal fails to surmount other obstacles as well. For
example, many of the proposed repackaged causes of action appear to be
precluded by the litigation privilege, a possibility Landlords reject with
10
conclusory statements rather than reasoned explanations.7 And they
similarly fail to explain how claims based on Gogal Law’s selection of an
allegedly unauthorized deposition officer would be viable given the absence
of any allegation that they timely objected to that selection. (§ 2020.420
[objection to deposition officer waived if not made before documents were
produced or when basis could have been identified upon reasonable
diligence].) For these reasons, Landlords have not shown that the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to grant leave to amend.
C. GenMark’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
1. Additional Background
Prior to the initiation of the first action, Landlords represented that
they could not extend their lease with Tenants because their financial
condition precluded them from agreeing to Tenants’ proposed monthly rental
rate, a justification Tenants believed was pretextual. Accordingly, Tenants
sought documents from Landlords’ employers in an attempt to substantiate
their belief. Gogal Law issued subpoenas on Tenants’ behalf to these
employers through a deposition officer.
The first subpoenas were issued to employers other than GenMark. In
this first round of subpoenas, Tenants requested, among other documents, all
annual tax forms and documents related to the compensation these
7 See, e.g., Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pages 1061–1066 (discussing
privilege in connection with the tort of abuse of process in execution of
judgment); Home Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 17, 22–26
(applying privilege to a fraud claim); Nayab v. Capital One Bank USA (2019)
942 F.3d 480, 491 (inclusion upon seclusion is a form of the tort of invasion of
privacy); People v. Potter Handy, LLP (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 938, 951–956
(discussing privilege in connection with statutory unfair competition claim
against a law firm).
11
companies paid to Landlords from 2017 to 2022. Along with copies of the
subpoenas, Tenants sent Landlords the required consumer notice that they
had a right to object to the production or to challenge the subpoena in court.
(§§ 1985.3, subd. (e) & 1985.6, subd. (f)(1).)
Landlords moved to quash these subpoenas in part because they
believed these documents were protected by their right to privacy (see Board
of Trustees v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d
516, 528) and the privilege against disclosing tax documents (see Brown v.
Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141, 144). The trial court partially
agreed with Landlords by limiting this category of documents to “final annual
paystubs” and only certain tax-related documents for these years.
Tenants later issued a similar document subpoena to GenMark, a
former employer of Deng’s, with one relevant modification.8 Consistent with
the court’s order regarding the earlier subpoenas, Landlords limited their
request for compensation-related documents to “[a]ll final annual paystubs.”
As before, Tenants sent a copy of the subpoena and notice to Landlords. This
time, Landlords neither objected to the subpoena nor raised any issue with
the court.
Claiming to be “unfamiliar with the term ‘final annual’ in relation to
paystubs,” GenMark initially produced all of Deng’s paystubs. In response
to another category of records requested by tenants’ subpoena, GenMark
produced an unemployment benefits form that included Deng’s social security
number. The record indicates that GenMark produced some documents
8 Landlords attached this subpoena to a declaration they filed with the
Superior Court during the first action. Because this subpoena was properly
included in the appellants’ appendix and thus is already in the appellate
record (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122(b)(3)(A) & 8.124(b)(1)(B)), we deny as
moot GenMark’s motion to take judicial notice of it.
12
directly to Gogal Law and Landlords, but it is not clear from the complaint
whether Landlords are alleging that GenMark failed to provide any
documents to the deposition officer.
After receiving the documents, Landlords wrote GenMark to complain
that producing all of Deng’s paystubs violated the aforementioned court order
and that his social security number should have been redacted. GenMark
clawed back the production of payroll records and produced annual pay
information directly to the parties. The company also directly provided the
parties with a redacted copy of Deng’s unemployment benefits form.
2. Landlords’ Privacy Claim
As noted, the trial court found that Landlords sufficiently pleaded an
invasion of privacy claim, but that the litigation privilege precluded them
from pursuing it. Landlords’ main argument on appeal is that the court
failed to recognize Foothill was not controlling because it did not involve
allegations that the subpoenaed party “bypass[ed]” the deposition officer
to produce documents directly to a party, “violat[ed] a limiting order,” and
“overproduc[ed] confidential data,” acts that Landlords believe fall outside
the litigation privilege because they were noncommunicative or illegal or
both.9 GenMark disagrees that Foothill is distinguishable because its acts in
complying with Tenants’ subpoena were, at worst, noncommunicative acts
closely related to the undisputably communicative act of producing
responsive documents.
9 Landlords make the threshold argument that the constitutional right
to privacy they are invoking cannot be trumped by the litigation privilege.
An extended analysis of this proposition is not necessary because “the
litigation privilege bars a privacy cause of action whether labeled as based
on common law, statute, or Constitution.” (Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 962.)
13
In Foothill, the plaintiffs asserted claims of IIED and invasion of
privacy against a bank whose response to a subpoena for records included
personal financial documents that had not been requested. (Foothill, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 635–636.) The Court of Appeal held that this
production was a communicative act protected by the litigation privilege
even though the production was overbroad. (Ibid.) Referring to the elements
of the privilege, the court reasoned that this production was (1) made in the
course of judicial proceedings, (2) by a participant who was authorized by law
to participate in these proceedings, (3) the production was made to achieve
the objects of litigation because plaintiff sought them to “prove [its] position,”
and (4) the production bore some relation to the action. (Id. at p. 635.)
We agree with the trial court that Foothill guides our analysis.
GenMark’s production of documents was a protected, communicative act
because the company was brought into a judicial proceeding by a subpoena
to produce documents relevant to a position the subpoenaing party sought
to prove. The mere fact that the responding company produced more
information than what was called for by Tenants’ subpoena, Foothill teaches,
does not negate the privilege’s protection. GenMark’s alleged failure to
redact Deng’s social security number from a document or “bypassing” the
deposition officer were protected by the privilege because they were acts
“ ‘necessarily related’ ” to the company’s communicative act of producing
documents under a subpoena. (Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 957; Nelson
v. Tucker Ellis LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827, 846–847 [subpoenaed party’s
failure to withhold confidential materials or produce them under a protective
order “cannot be distinguished” from communicative act of producing
documents].)
14
In reaching this conclusion, we are unpersuaded by Landlords’
argument that GenMark’s production was illegal, and thus not privileged,
because the company violated a court order and did not use a deposition
officer as required by section 2020.430. As we have already explained, the
policies underlying the litigation privilege require courts to protect—and
litigants to tolerate—conduct that may be illegal. This means that if an act is
generally permitted by law, it is protected by the privilege even if the specific
way it is accomplished might run afoul of a statute, regulation, or court order.
(Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Thus, even assuming the truth of
Landlords’ assertions of illegality concerning GenMark’s initial production of
Deng’s pay records and its failure to send responsive documents to the
deposition officer, those assumptions would not compel a different result
because the law generally permits a party to produce pay records in
litigation.10
3. Leave to Amend
In anticipation of this outcome, Landlords argue on appeal that they
should have been granted leave to amend their complaint as to GenMark to
assert other claims. Specifically, they propose recasting their original
allegations as causes of action for violations of various sections of the Code
of Civil Procedure, “negligent invasion of privacy,” and invasion of privacy by
public disclosure of private facts. GenMark responds that given its limited
10 Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 365—which held that the privilege
did not bar the pursuit of a statutory remedy by a victim of telephonic
eavesdropping that occurred before a judicial proceeding was commenced—
and Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 205–206, 209—which deemed
the privilege inapplicable to the noncommunicative act of secretly recording
telephone conversations—cited by Landlords to suggest that illegal acts are
not protected by the privilege are readily distinguishable.
15
role as a subpoenaed party, any proposed torts would be barred by the
litigation privilege and that, in any case, Landlords do not describe their
proposed new claims against it with the requisite specificity.
We agree with GenMark in both respects. A claim invasion of privacy
under the circumstances of this case, whether it is based on a statute or
common law, is barred by the litigation privilege. (Jacob B., supra, 40
Cal.4th at p. 962; accord Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co.
(1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 87 [neither the motive of person invading privacy
nor his claim of inadvertence or mistake are material to a privacy claim].) As
for the proposed causes of action under the Code of Civil Procedure,
Landlords fail to state any specific allegations that could apply to GenMark
or identify the elements of any of these new claims. For example, they do not
explain how GenMark, a nonparty to the first action that was subpoenaed to
produce documents—could be liable under statutes that concern either a
subpoenaing party’s responsibilities (§§ 1985.2, 1985.3, subds. (a)–(f), (h) &
(l), 1985.6, subds. (a)–(e), (g), 2020.410), the rights of a consumer whose
records are subpoenaed (§§ 1985.3, subds. (f) & (g), 1985.6, subd. (f)), the
obligations of a deposition officer while supervising an oral deposition
(§ 2025.320), or how a party to an action may object to a deposition notice
(§ 2025.410).
In short, as was the case with Landlords’ proposed amendments as to
Gogal Law, we are unable to discern any potential cause of action they could
assert against GenMark where the necessary elements would be satisfied by
the proposed amendments. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion by
16
the trial court in denying Landlords leave to amend their complaint as to
GenMark.11
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Gogal Law and GenMark shall recover
their costs on appeal.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
KELETY, J.
11 We need not reach defendants’ various alternative arguments for
affirmance, such as that certain issues and theories are barred by collateral
estoppel or that Landlords’ privacy claim was insufficiently pleaded. In
addition, we do not address the issue of whether alleged discovery misconduct
can be the basis of tort claims asserted in a new lawsuit, as it was not raised
by either defendant notwithstanding the “strong policy against creating
derivative tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct when sufficient
nontort remedies existed to punish and deter the misconduct.” (Rosen, supra,
193 Cal.App.4th at p. 459.)
17
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