Schneider v. Domeyer CA4/1

CourtListener 10870812Calctapp05.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/5/26 Schneider v. Domeyer CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MARK SCHNEIDER, D086228

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-00043492-
CU-OR-CTL)
v.

MARK DOMEYER et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carolyn M. Caietti, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Schneider, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce and Nabeel M. Zuberi for Defendants
and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Mark Schneider appeals the trial court’s judgment after it sustained a

demurrer and granted two motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute,1

1 SLAPP is an acronym that refers to a strategic lawsuit against public
participation. (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1242.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,2 and a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. He filed no opposition to the motions in the trial court but claims
the court erred in granting them as unopposed because service was improper
and constitutionally inadequate. He also argues the court erred in finding
his complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for quiet title.
We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2019, a deed of trust was recorded for “Julie C. Schneider,
a married woman as her sole and separate property” securing a $406,036
loan for property in Spring Valley. (Capitalization omitted.) Mark was not

named as a borrower or signatory.3 A loan modification was recorded in
April 2021. It again named “Julie . . . , a married woman as her sole and
separate property” as the borrower and did not name Mark. (Capitalization
omitted.)
The deed of trust was assigned to a mortgage company in May 2022.
The next month, a non-judicial foreclosure service provider was substituted
as trustee, and a notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust was
recorded. The notice stated that the default amount was $22,380.68. A
notice of trustee’s sale was recorded in September 2022. The property sold at
foreclosure to Freedom Mortgage Corporation.
In October 2022, Julie filed a wrongful foreclosure action in federal
court. In January 2023, the federal district court granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss because the complaint failed to state a claim under the

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

3 Because Mark and Julie share the same last name, we refer to them by
their first names. We do so for the sake of clarity, intending no disrespect.

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Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Because that was “the sole federal claim,”
the court “decline[d] to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.” It dismissed the state law claims without prejudice to being refiled
in state court.
In January 2023, Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation filed an
unlawful detainer action against Julie “and all unknown occupants.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
In October 2023, Mark filed his verified complaint for quiet title in this
action. Defendant Mark Domeyer then filed a verified answer and
Defendants Freedom Mortgage Corporation, Stanley Middleman, Stan
Moskowitz, and Cathy K. Robinson filed a demurrer and an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike. Domeyer subsequently filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike
and a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In January 2025, the court granted the defendants’ motions after
finding defendants “duly served” Mark “at the address listed” on his
complaint. Because Mark failed to file any opposition to the motions, the
court found he “impliedly concede[d]” the merits of the motions. Additionally,
the court found “the first and only cause of action fails to state sufficient facts
to constitute quite title and is uncertain.” It “agree[d] with Defendants that
it is difficult to follow and ascertain what [Mark] is alleging.” It also found
the complaint “fail[ed] to allege the basis for his title and how Defendants
have adverse claims to the title.” The court therefore granted the motions
and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as Mark “did not request
leave to amend, nor identify any facts to cure the defects raised in the
demurrer.”

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DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
“Appealed judgments and orders are presumed correct, and error must
be affirmatively shown.” (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.) Although we appreciate the challenges of
appearing as a self-represented litigant, the litigant “is entitled to the same,
but no greater, consideration” as any other attorney or litigant on appeal and
is required to follow the rules. (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623,
638.) We are not required to develop the appellant’s arguments or search the
record for supporting evidence and may instead treat arguments that are not
developed or supported by adequate citations to the record as waived.
(ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1011.)
We review de novo orders sustaining demurrers (Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318), orders granting anti-SLAPP motions (Monster
Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788) and orders granting
motions for judgment on the pleadings (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor
Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777).
B. Analysis
Mark first argues that the “demurrer orders and judgment are
void for lack of constitutionally adequate service and notice.” Mark,
however, waived this argument because he failed to develop it adequately.
(See, e.g., People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 324 [“By
failing to adequately develop its argument, [defendant] has waived its claim
of error.”]; Sevidal v. Target Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 928 [failure to
develop legal argument waives appellate challenge].) Mark repeatedly claims
service was “defective” and made to an “incorrect address,” but he fails to
specify how service was defective or identify any error in the service address.

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Mark thus waived his argument that service of the motions was
unconstitutionally improper.
Moreover, even if Mark had not waived it, we would conclude the trial
court properly granted the motions as unopposed. The court correctly found
that the defendants served the motions to the address Mark listed on his
complaint: “1 General-Delivery [¶] Spring Valley, California.” The record
shows the address Mark provided on his complaint was used in each proof of
service defendants filed with the court. The motions, therefore, were properly
served on Mark. (See, e.g., Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 547
[concluding that service “at their usual mailing address, their
private/commercial post office box, was proper.”].) Although the address on
each proof of service included the zip code (whereas Mark provided the same
address without the zip code), Mark does not argue that the zip code was
incorrect. He also does not provide evidence that any delivery failure
resulted from an incorrect address rather than his own refusal to accept
delivery or his absence from the delivery location.
Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314.) Here, due process was
satisfied as defendants relied on the address Mark provided at the beginning
of the case and never updated. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.200 [requiring
parties to provide notice of change of contact information if that information
changes while the action is pending].) Thus, the trial court did not err when
it granted as unopposed the demurrer, the motions to strike and the motion
for judgment on the pleading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(c) [failure to

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oppose motion deemed consent]; Herzberg v. County of Plumas (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 1, 20 [unopposed demurrer properly sustained].)
Additionally, the court properly dismissed Mark’s lawsuit because his
complaint contained no viable claim. The court noticed the existence and
recording of documents such as the deed of trust. (See Poseidon Development,
Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117 [“A
court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be
controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading.
[Citation.] This includes recorded deeds.”]; Ragland v. U.S. Bank National
Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194 [“A recorded deed is an official act of
the executive branch, of which this court may take judicial notice.”].) The
documents show Julie—not Mark—was the borrower. (See Villa Zinfandel,
LLC v. Bearman (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 848, 858 [where there is no dispute
as to authenticity, “the court did not err in taking judicial notice of the
existence and facial contents of the recorded documents”]; Scott v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 755 [“the trial court did not err
at the demurrer stage in taking judicial notice of the identity of the
beneficiary of a deed of trust, based on the designation of the beneficiary in
the deed of trust, ‘since its status was not a matter of fact existing apart from
the document itself.’ [Citation.] The deed of trust, as a legally operative
document, designated the beneficiary, and therefore the identity of the
beneficiary was not reasonably subject to dispute”].)
Here, because Mark is not listed on the deed of trust or the loan
modification, the trial court did not err when it concluded his claim for quiet
title was precluded due to a lack of ownership interest. (Yvanova v. New
Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 936 [“California law does not
give a party personal standing to assert rights or interests belonging solely to

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others.”]; Chao Fu, Inc. v. Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 59 [“[A]bsent an
interest in the property, a party has no standing to ask the court to quiet title
in the property or to obtain damages for the cloud on title.”]; § 367 [“Every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”].)
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied leave
to amend, because Mark failed to show “in what manner he can amend his
complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his

pleading.”4 (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

4 On December 17, 2025, Mark filed a motion to augment the record on
appeal. In our January 8, 2026, order, we granted the motion in part and
deemed his complaint part of the record on appeal. We noted that we would
consider whether to further augment the record with the “entire
administrative process” documents concurrently with the appeal. Having
now considered the motion with respect to the “entire administrative process”
documents, we decline to further augment the record as the documents are
not necessary or relevant to the issues on appeal. (See Mission Beverage Co.
v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 696, fn. 4 [denial of
augmentation because materials not relevant to issues on appeal].) For the
same reason, we deny his motion to augment the record and request for
judicial notice filed on February 6, 2026. (Ibid.; see Meridian Financial
Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 688, fn. 10 [an appellate
court can decline to take judicial notice of matters that are not relevant or are
not dispositive].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on
appeal.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

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