People v. Rusco CA5

CourtListener 10870318Calctapp04.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/4/26 P. v. Rusco CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089146
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF200712A)
v.

RODNEY JAMES RUSCO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D.
Oglesby, Judge.
Nathan A. Coelho, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Charlotte Woodfork and
Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Rodney James Rusco of assault with a deadly weapon
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and attempted criminal threats (id., §§ 664/422) in
connection with an altercation he had with a security guard and the trial court found true
a prior serious felony allegation (id., § 667, subd. (a)) and multiple aggravating
circumstance allegations. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court reversibly erred in failing to instruct
the jury that attempted criminal threat requires a finding that the intended threat be
sufficient under the circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.
Defendant also asserts insufficient evidence supports his conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon. In his opening brief, defendant also challenged the court’s order that the
amount of victim restitution was to be determined by the probation department, but he
abandons this claim in his reply brief.
We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1),
count 1) and attempt to commit criminal threats (§§ 664/422, count 2). As to each count,
it was further alleged that defendant had previously been convicted of a serious or violent
felony within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (e) through (j) and 1170.12,
subdivisions (a) through (e). Multiple aggravating circumstances were also alleged as to
each count including: the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness (rule 4.421(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court; all rule references are to
the California Rules of Court); defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of
the commission of the crime (rule 4.421(a)(2)); defendant has engaged in violent conduct
that indicates a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); defendant has prior
convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings that are

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numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); defendant has served a prior
prison term or jail term under section 1170, subdivision (h) (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and
defendant has had unsatisfactory performance on probation, mandatory supervision,
postrelease community supervision or parole (rule 4.421(b)(5)). As to count 2, it was
further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction
pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a).
Prosecution Evidence
Jordan M. was working as a security guard at a shopping center on August 10,
2024 where he would patrol the parking lot. Jordan noticed defendant standing where the
sidewalk meets the parking lot. Defendant was drinking from a bottle of wine; he had a
plastic bag in the other hand. Jordan had previously told defendant on multiple different
days not to return to the property after receiving calls about him. That day, Jordan asked
defendant to leave. Defendant was upset and had been drinking. Jordan saw him drink
from what appeared to be a white wine bottle in his hand. Jordan could smell the odor of
alcohol on defendant’s breath and defendant’s speech was slurred. Defendant cursed at
Jordan a couple of times and he was not cooperative. Jordan testified defendant had
“[v]ery rarely” been cooperative in the past. Jordan called the police. Defendant walked
around the shopping center and Jordan followed him to make sure he left. Defendant was
yelling at Jordan and Jordan repeatedly told defendant to leave.
At some point, defendant reached in his pocket and Jordan “saw what appeared to
be a blade of a pocketknife or knife of some sort.” Jordan also testified he saw the handle
of what he believed to be a knife, but he did not actually see a knife. As defendant was
walking away from Jordan, he turned his head back, looked at Jordan who was five or six
feet away, and said, “one cut and one stab and you’re done.” Jordan understood the
statement to mean defendant was threatening to stab or kill him given that defendant was
reaching in his pocket and showing him what appeared to be the handle of a knife.

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Jordan testified he was not afraid. He explained that he encountered this frequently in his
role as a security guard. He was “annoyed” and “[f]rustrated.”
Jordan continued to follow defendant at a reasonable distance. Defendant set his
things down and raised the wine bottle he was holding above Jordan’s head “like he was
going to smash the bottle over [his] head.” Defendant had his thumb over the mouth of
the bottle “so that way he didn’t lose any of it” and his hand was around the neck of the
bottle. Defendant approached Jordan. Jordan “wasn’t sure what was going to happen” so
he “put [his] arm up just in case.” Defendant “tried to psych [Jordan] out with a lunge”
and he half swung the wine bottle before pulling back immediately. Defendant’s arm hit
Jordan’s forearm. Jordan testified he was not injured. Jordan also testified he believed
defendant’s threats were credible because he had dealt with defendant before and
defendant was intoxicated. Jordan was in fight or flight mode; his heart was pumping.
He thought defendant could possibly take his life or beat him up “pretty good.” Police
officers arrived about five minutes after the bottle incident.
Officer Curtis Kniffen responded to the scene. Other officers had detained
defendant and Kniffen searched him. Kniffen removed a red kitchen knife from
defendant’s front left pocket.
Officer Kimberly Grimaldi also responded to the scene. She obtained a statement
from Jordan and read defendant his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384
U.S. 436. Referring to Jordan, defendant said, “He’s a bitch.” Grimaldi took
photographs of the knife and wine bottle and booked them into evidence. The
prosecution introduced a video recording of defendant being read his Miranda rights
while he was in a police car at the scene and his statements to Grimaldi. The prosecution
also introduced a video recording of the officer searching defendant’s pockets, which
shows the red knife that was recovered from defendant’s person.

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Section 1118.1 Motion
The defense moved for entry of a judgment of acquittal after the prosecution
rested. The defense argued that Jordan “indicated he was not in any sort of sustained
fear,” with regard to count 2 for criminal threats and Jordan only saw the small portion of
the handle of what he assumed to be a knife. Defense counsel argued such evidence casts
doubt on Jordan’s state of mind and if he was in fear. With regard to count 1, counsel
argued that the specific intent requirement for assault with a deadly weapon had not been
met as Jordan indicated it was his belief defendant intended to “psych him out, … not
actually strike him with the bottle.”
With regard to count 2, the prosecutor argued he had “proven all of the elements
with the exception of the threat causing fear or causing the victim to be in sustained fear
for his safety, but that’s what the attempt [section] 422 is there [sic].” With regard to
count 1, the prosecutor argued there was evidence to support a perspective that “holding a
bottle over a head and moving it towards the victim’s head would indicate that
[defendant] intended to hit the victim in the head with the glass bottle, and so much so the
victim actually put his hand up to block him from such an attack.”
The trial court denied the section 1118.1 motion, concluding there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to make a determination.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty as charged of assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1) and attempt to commit criminal threats (§§ 664/422,
subd. (a), count 2). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation
that defendant had previously been convicted of a serious or violent felony within the
meaning of sections 667, subdivision (e) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (e). The

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court found true the aggravating circumstances alleged pursuant to rule 4.421(a)(1),
(2),(b)(2)–(5).1
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior strike conviction
pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The court
sentenced defendant to the upper term of eight years on count 1. It struck the
section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony enhancement pursuant to section 1385.
The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of two years on count 2 but it found
count 2 was part of a continuing incident and, accordingly, it stayed imposition of the
sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION

The Alleged Error in the Attempted Criminal Threat Instructions Was Not
Prejudicial
Defendant asserts the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury
that attempted criminal threat requires a finding not only that the defendant had an intent
to threaten but also that the intended threat be sufficient under the circumstances to cause
a reasonable person to be in sustained fear pursuant to People v. Chandler (2014) 60
Cal.4th 508 (Chandler). We conclude the alleged error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Relevant Factual Background
Here, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 460 and 1300 with
regard to the crime of attempted criminal threat (count 2). Pursuant to CALCRIM
Nos. 460 and 1300, the court instructed:

“To prove … defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove, one, that … defendant took a direct but ineffective step towards

1 The trial court found not true the aggravating circumstance allegation that the conduct
was violent pursuant to rule 4.421(b)(1).

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committing the crime of criminal threat, and two, … defendant intended to
commit the criminal threat.

“A direct step requires more than merely planning or preparing to
commit a criminal threat or obtaining or arranging for something needed to
commit a criminal threat. A direct step is one that goes beyond planning or
preparation and shows that a person is putting his plan into action. A direct
step indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to commit a criminal
threat. It is a direct movement towards the commission of the crime after
preparations are made. It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion
so that the plan would have been completed if some circumstance outside
the plan had not interrupted the attempt.

“A person who attempts to commit a criminal threat is guilty of
attempted criminal threat even if, after taking a direct step towards
committing the crime, he abandons further effort to complete the crime or if
his attempt failed or is interrupted by someone or something beyond his
control. On the other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily abandons his
plan before taking a direct step towards committing a criminal threat, then
that person is not guilty of attempted criminal threat.

“To decide whether … defendant intended to commit a criminal
threat, please refer to the separate instruction I’ll give you on that crime. In
just a minute, I’ll read you the definition of what a criminal threat is.

“[D]efendant may be guilty of attempt even if you conclude the
criminal threat was actually completed. [¶] This is now the definition of
criminal threat.

“[D]efendant is charged in [c]ount 2 with the crime of attempted
criminal threat, in violation of … [s]ection[s] 664/422. [¶] The elements
required to prove a criminal threat by the People are as follows:

“One, … defendant willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or
unlawfully cause great bodily injury to Jordan [M.]; two, … defendant
made the threat orally; three, … defendant intended that his statement be
understood as a threat; four, the threat was so clear, immediate,
unconditional and specific that it communicated to Jordan … a serious
intention and the immediate prospect that the threat would be carried out;
five, the threat actually caused Jordan … to be in sustained fear for his own
safety; and, six, Jordan[’s]… fear was reasonable under the circumstances.

“Someone commits an act willfully when he does it willingly or on
purpose.

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“In deciding whether the threat was sufficiently clear, immediate,
unconditional, and specific, consider the words themselves as well as the
surrounding circumstances.

“Someone who intends that his statement be understood as a threat
does not have to intentionally carry out the threatened act.

“Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury.
It’s an injury that is greater than minor or moderate.

“Sustained fear means fear for a period of time that is more than
momentary, fleeting, or transitory.”
The prosecutor discussed the elements of the completed crime of criminal threats.
With regard to the fifth element—whether the threat actually caused Jordan to be in fear
for his own safety—the prosecutor admitted this element had not been met given that
Jordan testified he was not afraid; so, the offense of criminal threat was not complete,
which “is where the attempt comes into play.” Nevertheless, the prosecutor argued, with
regard to the sixth element of the completed offense of criminal threat, that if Jordan had
been afraid, “his fear would be reasonable. You have somebody agitated, cussing him
out, hand on a knife and says, one stab, you are done, that would put any reasonable
person in fear.”
Standard of Review
“The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements
of the offense.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824.) “When the jury is
‘misinstructed on an element of the offense … reversal … is required unless we are able
to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Wilkins
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 348.) “The independent or de novo standard of review is
applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly state the law [citations] and also
whether instructions effectively direct a finding adverse to a defendant by removing an
issue from the jury’s consideration.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)

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Applicable Law
Section 422, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]ny person who willfully threatens to
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with
the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an
electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of
actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is
made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the
person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the
threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own
safety or for their immediate family’s safety, shall be punished .…”
“[A] defendant properly may be found guilty of attempted criminal threat
whenever, acting with the specific intent to commit the offense of criminal threat, the
defendant performs an act that goes beyond mere preparation and indicates that he or she
is putting a plan into action.” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 230; Chandler,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 514.) “The crime of attempted criminal threat encompasses
situations where a defendant intends to commit a criminal threat ‘but is thwarted from
completing the crime by some fortuity or unanticipated event.” (Chandler, at p. 515,
quoting Toledo, at p. 232.) For example, “ ‘if a defendant, … acting with the requisite
intent, makes a sufficient threat that is received and understood by the threatened person,
but, for whatever reason, the threat does not actually cause the threatened person to be in
sustained fear for his or her safety even though, under the circumstances, that person
reasonably could have been placed in such fear, the defendant may be found to have
committed the offense of attempted criminal threat.’ ” (Chandler, at p. 515, quoting
Toledo, at p. 231.) “[T]he intent required for an attempted criminal threat is a specific
intent ‘to threaten to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury with the
further intent that the threat be taken as a threat, under circumstances sufficient to convey
to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution so as

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to reasonably cause the person to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his
or her family’s safety.’ ” (Chandler, at p. 516, quoting Toledo, at pp. 230–231.)
In Chandler, the California Supreme Court clarified that “the crime of attempted
criminal threat requires not only proof of a subjective intent to threaten but also proof that
the intended threat under the circumstances was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to
be in sustained fear.” (Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 511.) Accordingly, Chandler
held, “when a defendant is charged with attempted criminal threat, the jury must be
instructed that the offense requires not only that the defendant have an intent to threaten
but also that the intended threat be sufficient under the circumstances to cause a
reasonable person to be in sustained fear.” (Id. at p. 525.) Nevertheless, Chandler found
that “whether or not the instructions adequately conveyed this element of the offense,
reversal [was] not warranted because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Ibid.) That is, the Chandler court concluded “no reasonable juror could have failed to
find [the] defendant’s threats sufficient under the circumstances to cause a reasonable
person to be in sustained fear,” noting neither party suggested the defendant could be
convicted of the offense based on his subjective intent to threaten and the defense did not
contest the reasonableness of the victims’ fear. (Ibid.)
Sustained fear occurs over “a period of time ‘that extends beyond what is
momentary, fleeting, or transitory.’ ” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1140.)
“Fifteen minutes of fear … is more than sufficient to constitute ‘sustained’ fear for
purposes of … section 422.” (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156,
fn. omitted; see People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348–1349.)
Analysis
Here, the parties agree that the given instructions omitted the element of the crime
of attempted criminal threat that the intended threat was sufficient under the
circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear. However, they

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disagree about whether the omission was prejudicial. Defendant argues there were
“several objective facts that could have indicated to the jury that [defendant’s] statement
would not cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear under the circumstances,”
including that defendant did not take the knife out of his pocket; he only had his hand on
it for a few seconds; he was walking away from Jordan when he made the statement; and
he made no other threatening statements or otherwise escalated his language. He
contends a jury could have concluded Jordan did not clearly see the knife, weighing
against a finding of “reasonable sustained fear.” He also asserts Jordan’s history with
defendant and the lack of intervention by bystanders suggests a reasonable person would
not have experienced sustained fear. The People respond that any instructional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the evidence presented and arguments by
counsel. They note, as in Chandler, neither party argued the jury could convict defendant
of attempted criminal threats based only on his subjective intent to threaten. The People
also argue, as in Chandler, the evidence did not suggest the jury convicted defendant
based on his subjective intent to threaten. We agree with the People that the alleged
instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, defendant threatened to stab Jordan while looking at Jordan face-to-face and
while placing his hand on a knife in his pocket. We conclude, as the Chandler court did,
that “no reasonable juror could have failed to find defendant’s threats sufficient under the
circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.” As in Chandler,
neither party suggested the defendant could be convicted of the offense based on his
subjective intent to threaten. (See Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525.) Indeed, the
prosecutor expressly argued the circumstances of the threat would have put a reasonable
person in fear and the defense did not argue or suggest the threats would not cause a
reasonable person sustained fear. (See id. at p. 525.)
Defendant relies upon People v. Jackson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 590 to argue the
instructional error was prejudicial. In Jackson, the defendant was acquitted of the

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substantive offense of making a criminal threat and convicted of attempted criminal
threat. (Id. at p. 593.) On appeal, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury sua sponte that, “in order to find him guilty of attempted criminal threat,
it must find that ‘it would have been reasonable for a person to have suffered sustained
fear as a result of the threat under the circumstances of this case.’ ” (Id. at p. 595.) The
Jackson court agreed the jury instructions were erroneous because the reasonableness
element was included only in the substantive offense instruction (as here) and not in the
attempt instruction. (Id. at pp. 596–597, 599–600.) In holding the error was prejudicial,
the Jackson court explained: “In finding [the] defendant not guilty of the completed
crime but guilty of attempt, the jury must have found that [the] defendant made the
... statements [attributed to him] and that he intended them to be taken as threats but that
one or both of the last two elements of the completed crime was missing, namely that [the
victims] did not suffer sustained fear or that their fear was unreasonable under the
circumstances. The instruction allowed the jury to find [the] defendant guilty of
attempted criminal threats under either of these factual scenarios. And the evidence
would support either scenario. The jury might not have believed [the victims] when they
stated they actually feared for their lives. Or, the jury might have concluded, since [the
victims] were safely inside the house with a telephone to call the police while [the]
defendant sat out front, or since [the] defendant’s threats were so outlandish, that [the]
defendant’s statements could not reasonably have caused the victims to suffer sustained
fear. The latter scenario is legally insufficient to support conviction of an attempted
criminal threat and the former scenario is sufficient only upon finding that a reasonable
person could have suffered fear in those circumstances, something the jury was not asked
to decide.” (Id. at p. 600.)
Unlike Jackson, however, the evidence in this case does not support a conclusion
the threat was insufficient under the circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in
sustained fear. Here, defendant was mere feet away from Jordan with his hand on a knife

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when he threatened to stab Jordan, face-to-face. Such circumstances are in contrast to the
circumstances in Jackson where the victims were safely inside a house with a telephone
from which they could call police and the defendant’s threats could be deemed
outlandish. (See Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 526 [reasoning, in contrast to the
circumstances in Jackson, the victims testified defendant “made explicit threats that he
was going to kill each of them, and defendant made the threats while face-to-face with
the victims”].) That, here, Jordan had encountered defendant before and defendant’s
back was turned to Jordan at the time he turned around and made the threat did not
undermine the gravity and reasonable effect of his statement, particularly given the
evidence reflected defendant had his hand on a knife while threatening to stab Jordan.
Rather, “defendant’s threats were sufficient under the circumstances to cause a
reasonable person to be in sustained fear—indeed, defendant did not argue otherwise at
trial—and no reasonable juror could have concluded otherwise.” (Chandler, at p. 526.)
We reject defendant’s first contention.
Sufficient Evidence Supports Defendant’s Conviction for Assault with a Deadly
Weapon
Defendant next asserts insufficient evidence supports his conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Standard of Review
On appeal, the relevant inquiry governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055.) The
reviewing court’s task is to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find

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the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
331; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
“The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies
mainly on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) It is
the jury, not the appellate court, which must be convinced of a defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (Ibid.)
We “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327,
357.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon
no hypothesis … is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.”
(Ibid.)
Applicable Law
“An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a
violent injury on the person of another.” (§ 240.) The crime of assault with a deadly
weapon is defined as “an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or
instrument other than a firearm.” (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).)
An assault “requires an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts
sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the
application of physical force against another.” (People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th
779, 790).) That is, “it is a defendant’s action enabling him to inflict a present injury that
constitutes the actus reus of assault. There is no requirement that the injury would
necessarily occur as the very next step in the sequence of events, or without any delay.”
(People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164, 1172). “ ‘There need not be even a direct
attempt at violence; but any indirect preparation towards it, under the circumstances

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mentioned, such as drawing a sword or bayonet, or even laying one’s hand upon his
sword, would be sufficient.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, “when a defendant equips and positions
himself to carry out a battery, he has the ‘present ability’ required by section 240 if he is
capable of inflicting injury on the given occasion, even if some steps remain to be taken,
and even if the victim or the surrounding circumstances thwart the infliction of injury.”
(Ibid.) “ ‘[A] conviction for assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof of an
injury or even physical contact’ [citation], but limited injury or lack of injury may
suggest that the nature of the object or the way it was used was not capable of producing
or likely to produce death or serious harm.’ ” (In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 535.)
For purposes of section 245(a)(1), “a ‘deadly weapon’ is ‘any object, instrument,
or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to
produce, death or great bodily injury.’ ” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023,
1028–1029.) If the weapon is not inherently deadly, “the object alleged to be a deadly
weapon must be used in a manner that is not only ‘capable of producing’ but also ‘ “likely
to produce death or great bodily injury.” ’ ” (In re B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 533.)
Analysis
Defendant argues Jordan’s testimony was the only evidence of the alleged assault
and it established defendant half swung the bottle to intimidate Jordan. Defendant asserts
such evidence was insufficient for a reasonable juror to find defendant committed an act
that, by its nature, would probably result in the application of physical force to Jordan.
He argues the evidence was insufficient to show he used the bottle as a deadly weapon or
that he could have caused great bodily injury by swinging the bottle in the manner he did.
We disagree with defendant’s contentions.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude
sufficient evidence supports defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
That is, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant raising a glass wine bottle

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over Jordan’s head and half swinging it at Jordan such that their arms made contact
established that defendant had the present ability to commit a violent injury on Jordan.
(See In re Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 78, 83–84 [finding sufficient evidence to
support assault with deadly weapon conviction where juvenile raised knife but was never
within striking distance of victim and he did not make stabbing or slashing motions with
the knife]; People v. Yslas (1865) 27 Cal. 630, 633–634 [evidence sufficient to establish
assault with a deadly weapon where defendant approached victim with raised hatchet but
the victim escaped injury by running away and defendant never closed the distance
between himself and the victim or swung the hatchet].) And, a reasonable juror could
conclude that defendant “actually used the [glass bottle] in a way capable of producing,
and likely to produce death or great bodily injury” (Raymundo M., at p. 88), in that, if
defendant had swung the bottle down such that it made contact with Jordan’s head or
body, it could have caused great bodily injury or even death. (See People v. Cordero
(1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 196, 199 [“bottle … used as club or a missile, constitutes a deadly
weapon”]; see also People v. Fagalilo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 524, 532 [throwing of wine
bottle at victims was sufficient to establish assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury].)
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contentions and conclude sufficient evidence
supports defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
Challenge to Victim Restitution Order
Here, the trial court ordered defendant “to pay restitution under [section] 1202.4[,
subdivision ](f) in an amount to be determined by the probation department at the
direction of the court to Jordan … for related losses. And also under 1202.4[,
subdivision ](f)(2) to the Victim Compensation Fund.”
In his opening brief, defendant argued the trial court’s order that he pay victim
restitution in an amount to be determined by the probation department was an abuse of

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discretion because the court’s order did not provide for a subsequent hearing. He also
asked our court to hold the trial court’s “delegation of the determination of the amount of
victim restitution to the probation department to be invalid and interpret the order of the
court below to be setting the amount of victim restitution under section 1202.4[,
subdivision ](f) to zero dollars.” The People responded the claim by defendant was
premature and lacked merit. They noted the trial court could review any victim
restitution amount before imposing such an order and, because no victim restitution
amount was set, the record did not support the argument that the trial court improperly
delegated its duties or failed to provide a hearing. On reply, defendant “concedes his
arguments relating to error surrounding the determination of victim restitution.”
“[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the
defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the
victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss
claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. If the amount of loss
cannot be ascertained at the time of sentence, the restitution order shall include a
provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court.” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f).) “ ‘ “Section 1202.4 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof.
However, the trial court is entitled to consider the probation report, and, as prima facie
evidence of loss, may accept a property owner’s statement made in the probation report
about the value of stolen or damaged property.” ’ ” (People v. Lockwood (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 91, 96, quoting People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1320.)
Here, the trial court stated it would order restitution set in an amount to be
determined by the probation department at the direction of the court as it was permitted
to by section 1202.4, subdivision (f). (See People v. Lunsford (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th
901, 903 [“The restitution order in this case complies with … section [1202.4,
subdivision (f)] in that it ‘directs’ the Officer of Revenue Reimbursement to ‘determine’
the amount of victim restitution because the proper amount could not be ascertained at

17.
the time of sentence” and the defendant could seek judicial review pursuant to
section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(1)].) Because defendant concedes there was no error with
regard to this victim restitution order, we do not address it further.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

PEÑA, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DESANTOS, J.

HARRELL, J.

18.

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