CourtListener 10870316•Vista Charter Public Schools v. Cal. State Bd. of Ed. CA2/5
Vista Charter Public Schools v. Cal. State Bd. of Ed. CA2/5
CourtListener 10870316Calctapp04.06.2026
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/4/26 Vista Charter Public Schools v. Cal. State Bd. of Ed. CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
VISTA CHARTER PUBLIC B342712
SCHOOLS,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
23STCP04041)
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed.
Young, Minney & Corr, John C. Lemmo and Adam D.
Afshar, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Len Garfinkel, General Counsel, Paul Gant, Assistant
General Counsel, and Virginia Cale, Deputy General Counsel, for
Defendant and Respondent.
Julie Ashby Umansky, Chief Legal Officer & General
Counsel for California Charter Schools Association; Law Office of
Ricardo J. Soto, Ricardo J. Soto, as Amicus Curiae.
_____________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Vista Charter Public Schools appeals from the
trial court’s denial of its petition for traditional writ of mandate.
According to plaintiff, the court erred by concluding that
defendant California State Board of Education did not abuse its
discretion when it affirmed the denials of plaintiff’s new charter
school petition. We affirm the court’s judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Petition
On August 17, 2022, plaintiff submitted a petition to
establish a new charter school (the petition) to the Los Angeles
Unified School District (the District) seeking to open and operate
a charter high school, Vista Legacy Global Academy (Vista
Legacy), within the District. The proposed school would become
the sixth charter school operated by plaintiff in Southern
California.
B. District Decision
On October 11, 2022, the District’s governing board held a
public hearing on the report prepared by District staff
2
recommending denial of the petition and adoption of the staff’s
proposed findings made pursuant to Education Code section
47605.1
On November 15, 2022, the District held a board meeting
at which it adopted the staff recommendation and denied the
petition. The District based its denial on three separate written
findings under section 47605, subdivision (c).2
1. Section 47605, subdivsion (c)(2)
Under subdivision (c)(2) of section 47605, the District
determined that plaintiff was “demonstrably unlikely to
successfully implement the program set forth in the petition.”
According to the District, the petition either omitted or failed to
disclose significant facts which “raise[d] questions and concerns
about the veracity and accuracy of the information presented by
[plaintiff] to the public, stakeholders, and charter school
authorizers about its schools and programs.” Among other
inaccuracies and omissions, the District found that, although the
petition stated plaintiff began operating another charter high
school in Orange County in 2021, data from the California
1 All further statutory references are to the Education Code,
unless otherwise indicated.
2 As discussed below, subdivision (c) provides that a school
district cannot deny a petition for the establishment of a charter
school “unless it makes written factual findings, specific to the
particular petition, setting forth specific facts to support one or
more” of the eight enumerated determinations in that
subdivision. (§ 47605, subd. (c)(1)–(8).)
3
Schools Dashboard (Dashboard)3 showed plaintiff had delayed
opening the school until the 2023–2024 school year; and the
petition failed to disclose that plaintiff was managing another
elementary school or describe the nature of plaintiff’s
relationship with that school.
The District also found that plaintiff was unfamiliar with
the contents of its own petition and applicable legal
requirements, citing: the petition’s representation that Vista
Legacy would offer dual enrollment with the University of
California, Irvine and California State University campuses
when school representatives, during the interview process,
admitted that no such courses would be offered; the proposed
Vista Legacy budget only allocated funds for a part-time principal
position, but school officials stated that the school would have a
full-time principal; and the petition’s reference to English
language development courses beginning at 7:30 a.m. which was
a violation of the 8:30 a.m. start-time provisions of the Education
Code.
And, the District found that plaintiff’s existing obligations
to the other schools it operated, along with other available data,
called into question its ability to serve the students of Vista
Legacy, noting that the Dashboard performance data available on
four of the other schools operated by plaintiff showed they were
underperforming state averages; another school operated by
plaintiff, but not disclosed in the petition, was also
underperforming; Vista Legacy would be opening at the same
time that another of plaintiff’s schools was scheduled to open;
3 The Dashboard is a publicly available online tool developed
and maintained by the Department of Education which provides
performance data on schools and districts.
4
and, although plaintiff’s “span school” was approved to serve
students in grades 6 through 12, it had only been serving
students in grades 6 through 10, and therefore would require
plaintiff’s resources to serve additional students in grade levels
11 and 12.
2. Section 47605, subdivision (c)(5)
Under subdivision (c)(5), the District determined that the
petition did not contain a reasonably comprehensive description
of at least two of the 15 elements required by that subdivision.
(§ 47605, subd. (c)(5)(A)–(O).) The District found (1) the petition
failed to adequately describe Vista Legacy’s educational program
because, among other things, it did not “provide sample course
schedules, course sequence of all grades, and the specific courses
proposed to be offered to 9th grade students in the first year of
operation[;]”and (2) the petition failed to describe adequately the
proposed school’s governing structure because plaintiff’s articles
of incorporation did not describe plaintiff’s operation of one of its
charter schools.
3. Section 47605, subdivision (c)(7)
Finally, under subdivision (c)(7), the District determined
that Vista Legacy was “demonstrably unlikely to serve the
interests of the entire community in which the school [was]
proposing to locate,” based on findings that (1) the opening of
Vista Legacy “would substantially undermine/impact existing
services, academic offerings, or programmatic offerings in the
proposed targeted community” as the majority of the schools in
that community were underenrolled and the new school would
5
therefore have “a substantive fiscal impact” on the existing
District schools in the community; (2) Vista Legacy would
duplicate programs currently offered in the District as there was
“some duplication” between programs offered by the school, such
as its career technical education (CTE) pathways and psycho-
social supports, and existing similar programs offered in the
District … and those existing programs had the capacity to serve
the students Vista Legacy proposed to serve; and (3) plaintiff’s
other schools had not demonstrated the academic achievement
necessary to meet the needs within the community; Dashboard
data on the performance of three of the other charter schools
operated by plaintiff showed those schools underperformed the
state averages in four of five categories, including English
language arts, math, English learner proficiency, and chronic
absenteeism, while outperforming state averages in one category,
suspension rates.
C. Appeal to County Board
On December 14, 2022, plaintiff submitted an appeal of the
District’s denial of the petition to the Los Angeles County Board
of Education (County Board) pursuant to section 47605,
subdivision (k)(1)(A).
On February 7, 2023, the County Board held a hearing on
the appeal at which a Vista Legacy representative provided an
overview of the school and a District representative spoke in
opposition to the petition.
On March 14, 2023, the County Board voted to deny the
appeal based on the same three determinations under section
47605 as the District had made.
6
1. Section 47605, subdivision (c)(2)
Under subdivision (c)(2) of section 47605, the County Board
found plaintiff was “demonstrably unlikely to successfully
implement the program set forth in the petition” based on
findings that: (1) other charter schools operated by plaintiff had
failed to timely submit performance data to the Dashboard,
conduct which showed plaintiff’s unfamiliarity with the legal
requirements applicable to charter schools; (2) plaintiff submitted
a proposed budget with an unrealistic financial and operational
plan for Vista Legacy, including, among other issues, understated
staff salaries, overstated revenue projections, and overstated
projected enrollment; and (3) there were issues with the CTE
pathways and dual enrollment program described in the petition,
including plaintiff’s failure to fully develop curriculum for its
health, business, and climate change courses, a lack of a dual
enrollment relationship with any universities or community
colleges, and a prior failure to fully implement a similar dual
enrollment program in another charter school.
2. Section 47605, subdivision (c)(5)
Under subdivision (c)(5), the County Board determined that
the petition did “not contain a reasonably comprehensive
descriptions of all of the required elements” of subdivision
(c)(5)(A) through (O). (Boldface omitted.) Specifically, the
County Board found that the following “three of the 15 required
elements were determined to be not reasonably comprehensive”:
(1) under subdivision (c)(5)(A), the description of the educational
program lacked “an option for students to meet the requirements
for the [California] State Seal of Bi-literacy, despite the high
7
number of bi-lingual students in the targeted community,”
“specifics regarding students who [were] behind academically,”
including an inadequate explanation of how “differentiation”
would work in the classroom, and “a detailed plan to address
credit deficient students;” (2) under subdivision (c)(5)(B), the
petition did not contain reasonably comprehensive descriptions of
measurable pupil outcomes as it did not “cite any annual
academic outcomes for [9th] or [10th] grade students, … fail[ed]
to have outcomes for science in any grade level[,]” and the
“outcomes proposed in the petition for measuring student
achievement based on internal assessments or comparison
schools [could not] be used or verified” by the office of education;
and (3) under subdivision (c)(5)(C), the method for measuring
pupil progress was not reasonably comprehensive because the
“petition relie[d] on the comparison of ‘similar schools,’ but there
[was] no stated method for determining [those] schools and no
way of retrieving this internal assessment information from
similar schools” and “[t]he means by which the school [would]
measure AP success [did] not align with the stated goal.”
3. Section 47605, subdivision (c)(7)
Under subdivision (c)(7), the County Board determined
Vista Legacy was demonstrably unlikely to serve the interests of
the entire community in which the school was proposing to locate
based on findings that: (1) Vista Legacy would substantially
undermine existing services, academic offerings, or programmatic
offerings because the District might “be forced to close and
consolidate some of its high schools and reduce current staffing;”
and (2) Vista Legacy would duplicate current programs offered
8
within the District, such as health science and business,
including programs offered at Belmont high school, LA Academy
of the Arts & Enterprise, and Downtown Business high school.
D. Appeal to Defendant
Following the denial of its appeal to the County Board,
plaintiff submitted an appeal to defendant.4 The District and the
County Board then submitted their written oppositions to the
appeal.
At an August 8, 2023, hearing, the advisory commission on
charter schools (commission) reviewed the appeal and
4 Plaintiff asserted four abuses of discretion in the County
Board’s decision to deny the petition: (1) the Board’s finding
under section 47605, subdivision (c)(2) was not supported by
evidence in the record; (2) the Board’s finding under section
47605 subdivision (c)(5) was not supported by evidence in the
record; (3) the Board acted unlawfully when it failed to provide a
de novo review and instead gave undue deference to the District
in adopting its finding under section 47605, subdivision (c)(7),
which was not supported by evidence in the record; and (4) the
Board failed to proceed in a manner required by law when it did
not allow a board member to amend the motion to deny the
petition.
Plaintiff asserted two grounds constituting abuses of
discretion in the District’s decision to deny the petition: (1) the
District’s finding under 47605, subdivision (c)(2) was not
supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record;
and (2) the District acted unlawfully and in a procedurally unfair
manner by using an incorrect definition of the term “‘community
impact’” and, in any event, its finding under section 47605,
subdivision (c)(7) was not supported by evidence in the record.
9
documentary record and voted to recommend that defendant hear
the appeal.
At its September 13, 2023, meeting, after considering the
record and the commission’s recommendation, defendant voted in
favor of hearing the appeal. Defendant then held the hearing on
the appeal from approximately 3:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. In addition
to the parties’ written submissions, supporting documentation,
and the records from the District and County Board proceedings,
defendant considered the written recommendation from the
Department of Education (the Department) and its attached
proposed findings. Defendant also heard presentations from the
Department, plaintiff, the District, and the County Board,
followed by public comment in-person and by phone.
Following the parties’ presentations and comments, the
Department’s representative stated, “If even one basis for denial
is supported by evidence in the record, the determination to deny
should be affirmed.”5 The representative explained that the
Department had “determined both the district and the county
made written factual findings for denial of the ... petition, that
are supported by evidence in the record ….” The representative
then cited, as an “example[ ] of evidence” that supported the
District’s finding under section 47605, subdivision (c)(2), “‘The
district’s finding that [plaintiff is] demonstrably unlikely to
5 Plaintiff cites to slides that were presented by the
Department in advance of the hearing, which included a bullet
point that stated, “If even one basis for denial is supported by
evidence in the record, the determination to deny should be
affirmed,” as well as discussion between defendant and the
Department representative about this slide in support of its
contention that defendant adopted a purported “any one finding”
rule.
10
successfully implement the program set forth in the petition is
supported by specific facts, including, but not limited to, the
following. Details of the proposed English language development
program, factual omissions pertaining to [plaintiff’s] existing
charter schools and governance structure, and the performance
and operational demands of [plaintiff’s] existing charter schools.’”
The Department representative also listed, as an example of the
evidence that supported the County Board’s finding under section
47605, subdivision (c)(7), “‘The county’s finding that the charter
school is demonstrably unlikely to serve the interest of the entire
community in which the school is proposing to locate is supported
by specific facts, including but not limited to, enrollment data of
nearby district and charter schools, programs available at schools
in the community.’”
Following the hearing, defendant voted to adopt the
Department’s recommendation to affirm both the District’s and
the County’s decisions to deny plaintiff’s petition. The
recommendation, as adopted by defendant, stated: “Both the
District’s and the [County Board’s] determinations to deny
[plaintiff’s] petition were made pursuant to … [s]ection 47605[,
subdivision] (c) and are supported by evidence in the
documentary record, and thus there was no abuse of discretion.
Under … [s]ection 47605[, subdivision] (k)(2)(e), the lack of an
abuse of discretion by both the District and the [County Board]
means that there is no basis to support a recommendation of
reversal of the [District’s] and [the County Board’s]
determinations to deny [plaintiff’s] petition.”
11
E. Petition for Writ of Mandate
On November 1, 2023, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of
mandate asserting a cause of action under ode of Civil Procedure
section 1085 which sought a writ of traditional mandamus
requiring defendant to vacate its decision affirming the
determinations by the District and the County Board and hold a
rehearing on plaintiff’s appeal.6
On June 24, 2024, plaintiff filed its opening brief for the
hearing on the mandamus petition, contending that defendant
abused its discretion in denying the petition because neither the
District nor the County Board made factual finding supported by
specific facts and analysis in the record, as required for denial
under section 47605, subdivision (c)(7). According to plaintiff, the
District made no competent factual findings that Vista Legacy
would “‘substantially undermine’” existing District services or
that Vista Legacy would duplicate any existing District
programs; and the County Board simply repeated the District’s
unsupported findings. Plaintiff also argued that defendant
abused its discretion by improperly relying on a stayed trial court
ruling interpreting defendant’s application of the abuse of
discretion standard; by failing to utilize its own criteria under
California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 11967.5.1; and by
failing to apply the correct standard of review under section
47605, subdivision (k)(2)(E). Finally, plaintiff maintained that
defendant failed to conform to procedures required by law when
it unlawfully excluded certain members of the public from
6 Plaintiff also alleged a cause of action under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5 which sought a writ of administrative
mandate. But the trial court sustained a demurrer to that cause
of action, and plaintiff does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
12
exercising their right to present public comment during the
hearing.
Defendant opposed the mandamus petition, and plaintiff
then replied and lodged the administrative record.
On August 22, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the writ petition and issued a ruling denying the petition. The
court concluded that defendant did not abuse its discretion in
affirming the decisions of the District and the County Board to
deny the petition. According to the court, even assuming there
was insufficient evidence to support the findings of the District
and the County Board under section 47605, subdivision (c)(7),
defendant did not abuse its discretion because both entities made
other findings under subdivisions (c)(2) and (5) sufficient to
support their denials of the petition.7
The trial court also rejected plaintiff’s assertion that
defendant did not consider the factors in California Code of
Regulations, title 5, section 11967.5.1, stating, “[that section]
does not require any particular findings be set forth by
[defendant], only that [it] consider the factors contained therein.
It is presumed that [defendant] performed its official duties
(Evid. Code[,] § 664), and [plaintiff] has not presented any
persuasive argument to the contrary.”
7 In reaching its conclusion, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s
assertion that the County Board failed to make findings
independent from those made by the District, explaining that,
“[t]o the extent that [the County Board’s] findings and citations
to evidence are similar to the findings and citations of [the
District], such similarity does not demonstrate [the County
Board] failed to conduct a de novo review of the ... petition. [The
County Board] was entitled to agree with [the District’s]
reasoning.”
13
Finally, the trial court concluded that defendant did not
violate the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Gov. Code,
§ 11125.7, subd. (a)) by barring plaintiff’s employee from making
public comment, finding, “[i]t was reasonable to bar [plaintiff’s]
employee, including an assistant superintendent ..., from
speaking and effectively augmenting the amount of time that
[plaintiff] was allotted to speak during the hearing. In any event,
[plaintiff’s] employee was able to finish her comment.”
On September 24, 2024, the trial court entered judgement
on its ruling denying the writ petition. On November 22, 2024,
plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. On
April 2, 2026, we granted the request of the California Charter
Schools Association to file an amicus brief in support of plaintiff
to which defendant filed a response.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In an appeal from a traditional mandate proceeding under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, “‘the trial court’s findings
as to foundational factual matters are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. Thereafter, the appellate court performs
essentially the same function as the trial court—it determines if
the agency’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking
in evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy,
unlawful or procedurally unfair.’ [Citation.] ‘The arbitrary and
capricious standard of review employed under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085 is more deferential to agency
decisionmaking than the substantial evidence standard.
14
[Citation.] … [¶] … Nevertheless, the proper interpretation of a
statute is ultimately the court’s responsibility.’ [Citation.] We
independently review ‘the trial court’s conclusions on questions of
law, which include the interpretation of a statute and its
application to undisputed facts.’ [Citation.]” (California Public
Records Research, Inc. v. County of Alameda (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 800, 805, fn. omitted (California Public Records).)
“In a mandamus proceeding, the ultimate question,
whether the agency’s action was arbitrary or capricious, is a
question of law. [Citations.] Trial and appellate courts therefore
perform the same function and the trial court’s statement of
decision has no conclusive effect upon us. [Citation.] ‘[R]eview by
this court will preclude any possibility of prejudice from any
mistake by the trial court as to the proper scope of review.’
[Citation.]” (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 218, 233.)
B. The Charter School Act
Under the Charter Schools Act of 1992 (section 47600 et
seq.), the Legislature provided “opportunities for teachers,
parents, pupils, and community members to establish and
maintain schools that operate independently from the existing
school district structure ….” (§ 47601.)
“Typically, the process for establishing a new charter school
involves the submission of a complying petition for the
establishment of a charter school, including the proposed charter,
to the school district in which the proposed school is to be located.
(§ 47605, subd. (a).) ‘In reviewing petitions for the establishment
of charter schools …, the chartering authority shall be guided by
15
the intent of the Legislature that charter schools are and should
become an integral part of the California educational system and
that the establishment of charter schools should be encouraged.
The governing board of the school district shall grant a charter
for the operation of a school … if it is satisfied that granting the
charter is consistent with sound educational practice and with
the interests of the community in which the school is proposing to
locate.’ (Id., subd. (c).) ‘The governing board of the school district
shall not deny a petition for the establishment of a charter school
unless it makes written factual findings, specific to the particular
petition, setting forth specific facts to support one or more’ of the
statutory findings set forth in section 47605, subdivision (c)(1)
through (8) justifying denial. (Id., subd. (c).)
“‘If the governing board of a school district denies a
petition, the petitioner may elect to submit the petition for the
establishment of a charter school to the county board of
education.’ (§ 47605, subd. (k)(1)(A)(i).) ‘If the county board of
education denies a petition, the petitioner may appeal that denial
to the state board.’ (Id., subd. (k)(2).) If the state board elects to
hear the appeal rather than summarily deny it based on the
documentary record (see id., subd. (k)(2)(D), (E)), ‘the state board
may affirm the determination of the governing board of the school
district or the county board of education, or both of those
determinations, or may reverse only upon a determination that
there was an abuse of discretion by each of the governing board of
the school district and the county board of education.’ (Id., subd.
(k)(2)(E), italics added.)” (Napa Valley Unified School Dist. v.
State Board of Education (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 609, 616–617
(Napa Valley Unified School Dist.).)
16
C. Analysis
1. Challenge to Trial Court’s Ruling
On appeal, plaintiff challenges only one of the three
grounds cited by the District and the County Board in their
denial of plaintiff’s petition, specifically, their decision to deny
the petition under section 47605, subdivision (c)(7), based on
their finding that Vista Legacy was demonstrably unlikely to
serve the interests of the entire community in which the school
proposed to locate. It does not challenge the other two grounds
cited by the District and the County Board in support of their
denial of the petition. Nor does it contend that it was prejudiced
by the District and County Board’s finding that section 47605,
subdivision (c)(7) applied, in that it does not argue that its
petition would have been approved absent that finding.
Instead, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it
“sidestepped any substantive review of the glaring abuse of
discretion surrounding [the District’s] erroneous [application of]
[s]ection 47605[, subdivision ](c)(7) ….” Thus, at bottom, plaintiff
contends that the court was required to make an express finding
as to whether the District and County Board abused its discretion
when it concluded that the petition should be denied under
section 47605, subdivision (c)(7), notwithstanding their
unchallenged findings that the petition should be denied on two
other grounds set forth in subdivision (c).8 We disagree.
8 The Charter School Association has filed an amicus brief in
which it similarly argues that the findings of the District and the
County Board that Vista Legacy was demonstrably unlikely to
serve the interests of the community in which the school is
proposing to locate was not supported by substantial evidence.
17
The phrase “one or more of the following findings” in
section 47605, subdivision (c) has a plain meaning—a single
determination under one of the enumerated categories in
subdivision (c)(1) through (8) is sufficient to deny a charter
petition, if supported by specific facts. (Hughes v. Board of
Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 775 [“When the
statutory language, standing alone, is clear and unambiguous—
that is, has only one reasonable construction—courts usually
adopt the plain or literal meaning of that language”]; Merced
Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 916, 924.)
Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant’s
affirmance of the District’s denial was not an abuse of its
discretion, so long as the District made at least one other
required finding under subdivision (c)(1) through (8), which was
supported by the evidence.
Moreover, under well-established principles of
justiciability, a judicial tribunal ordinarily may consider and
determine only an existing controversy, and not a moot question
or abstract proposition. (Costa Serena Owners Coalition v. Costa
Serena Architectural Com. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1205–
1206) For example, in the dependency context, “‘[w]hen a
dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a
reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of
jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for
jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need
not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory
grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’
[Citation.] This is true because no effective relief could be
18
granted in such a situation, as jurisdiction would be established
regardless of the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to any
such additional jurisdictional grounds.” (In re Madison S. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328–329.) Here, the unchallenged findings
by the District and the County Board supported a denial of the
petition, regardless of defendant’s conclusion that their findings
under section 47605, subdivision (c)(7) were also supported by the
record.
The trial court was not required, as plaintiff repeatedly
maintains, to nevertheless analyze whether the District
employed the wrong legal standard in making its findings under
section 47605, subdivision (c)(7). Instead, because the District
and the County Board made two other, independent
determinations under section 47605, subdivision (c), their denials
of the petition were warranted, as long as at least one of those
determinations was supported by sufficient facts. The court
therefore correctly proceeded to review the facts in support of
those two findings under section 47605, subdivisions (c)(2) and
(c)(5) and concluded that “reasonable minds could find that the
other findings of [the District] and [the County Board]—including
that [plaintiff] is demonstrably unlikely to successfully
implement the program set forth in the charter petition—are
sufficient to warrant denial of the charter petition.”
Although the County Board’s facts in support of its two
findings were similar in some respects to the facts asserted by the
District in support of its findings, we reject plaintiff’s contention
that the County Board failed to conduct a de novo review and
instead merely “parroted” the findings of the District. To the
contrary, the record of those proceedings supported an inference
that the County Board conducted its own review of the petition.
19
Given the facts in the record supporting the other findings
made by the District and the County Board, and plaintiff’s failure
to challenge the sufficiency of those facts in the trial court or on
appeal, the trial court did not err by concluding that defendant
properly exercised its discretion in affirming the denial decisions
of the District and County Board.
2. Challenge to Defendant’s Denial
Plaintiff next contends that defendant abused its discretion
when it affirmed the District and the County Board’s denial of
the petition.
a. Section 47605, subdivision (c)(7) finding
In support of its contention that defendant abused its
discretion, plaintiff again cites to what it contends is insufficient
evidence to support the District and County Board’s denial of the
petition on the grounds that plaintiff was demonstrably unlikely
to serve the interests of the entire community in which the school
was proposing to locate (§ 47605, subd. (c)(7)). According to
plaintiff, section 47605, subdivision (k)(2)(E) supports its
contention that defendant was obligated to expressly state
whether the District and County Board abused its discretion with
respect to each of the grounds cited in support of their decision to
deny the petition as that section authorizes defendant “to reverse
a charter denial ‘upon a determination that there was an abuse of
discretion’—singular.”9
9 Amicus Curiae does not specifically join in plaintiff’s
statutory argument but urges us to reject defendant’s adoption of
20
We reject plaintiff’s novel construction of the statute, which
it has selectively quoted. In the sentence that immediately
follows the quoted language, section 47605, subdivision (k)(2)(E)
states: “Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard of
review, under which the state board must give deference to the
decisions of the governing board of the school district and the
county board of education to deny the petition.” Thus, the statute
clarifies that it is the decisions of the District and the County
Board that are reviewed by defendant, not each individual
finding.
b. Reliance on Stayed Trial Court Ruling
Plaintiff next maintains that defendant abused its
discretion by adopting the purported “any one finding rule” based
on the Department’s presentation at the hearing, which included
reference to a trial court ruling in another matter that was
stayed pending the outcome of an appeal. Although the record
reflects that the ruling was referenced by the County Board and a
Department representative during the hearing, it does not
support an inference that defendant’s interpretation of
subdivision (c) was predicated on the references to that case.10
the purported “any one finding” rule as such an interpretation
would be “unfair.” We disagree. “The mere denial of a charter
school petition based on specified, statutory grounds, without
something more, does not denote unfairness.” (Napa Valley
Unified School Dist., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 627.)
10 The superior court action to which plaintiff refers has since
been affirmed in Napa Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th 609.
21
And, as we have explained, defendant’s ultimate interpretation of
the statutory language was consistent with its plain meaning and
correct as a matter of law. Plaintiff therefore has failed to show
that defendant did not proceed in a manner required by law in
applying subdivision (c).
c. Changes to Section 47605, subdivision (k)(2)(E)
Citing to changes to the language of section 47605 made
after their appeal to defendant was filed, plaintiff contends that
defendant abused its discretion by retroactively applying the
amended version of subdivision (k)(2)(E) to their appeal.
According to plaintiff, the language of subdivision (k)(2)(E) prior
to the amendment required defendant to reverse the denial of the
petition based on a showing that either the District or the County
Board abused its discretion in denying it; after the amendment,
plaintiff was required to show that both the District and the
County Board engaged in such abuse. Because defendant relied
on the standard set forth in the amended language, plaintiff
maintains it abused its discretion.
Even if defendant relied on the prior version of section
47605, subdivision (k)(2)(E) that would have required a reversal
of the denial upon a finding that either the District or the County
Board committed an abuse of discretion, defendant ultimately
affirmed the decisions of both entities, finding that neither
abused its discretion. Plaintiff therefore would not have been
entitled to the mandamus relief it sought even if the prior version
had been applied to the review of its appeal. (See California
Public Record Research, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1449 [“When a party seeking a writ of
traditional mandamus has established an abuse of discretion, the
22
issuance of the writ is not automatic. That party also must show
prejudice resulted from the public agency’s action”].)
d. California Code of Regulations, Title 5,
Section 11967.5.1
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant was required to
address the criteria set forth in California Code of Regulations,
title 5, section 11967.5.111 in conducting its review of an appeal
under section 47605, subdivision (k)(2). According to plaintiff,
the “application of the section 11967.5.1 criteria in evaluating
whether a district or county abused its discretion is essential to
[defendant’s] duties in the implementation of statewide education
policy.”
The cited regulation, however, does not apply to appeals
under section 47605, subdivision (k)(2), which provision applies
when, as here, defendant is called upon to review the denials of
petitions by a school district and a county board. Instead,
California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 11967.5.1 applies
when a plaintiff “elect[s] to submit [a] petition for the
establishment of a charter school to [defendant].” (§ 47605, subd.
(k)(1)(B); Tit. 5, C.C.R., § 11967.5.)12 In any event, even if
11 Code of Regulations, Title 5, section 11976.5.1 is entitled
“Criteria for the Review and Approval of Charter School Petitions
and Charter School Renewal Petitions by the State Board of
Education (SBE).” (Italics added.)
12 Section 47605, subdivision (k)(1)(B) provides: “If the
governing board of a school district denies a petition and the
county board of education has jurisdiction over a single school
district, the petitioner may elect to submit the petition for the
23
California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 11967.5.1 did
apply, that section requires only that a defendant consider
certain criteria, it does not require defendant to expressly state
that it considered the criteria or make written findings under
that criteria. (See Evid. Code, § 664 [An agency is presumed to
have regularly performed its duties].)
e. Underground Rule
For the first time on appeal, plaintiff contends that
defendant’s purported application of the “‘any one finding rule,’
… presents the characteristics of an invalid, underground
regulation.” Plaintiff did not plead the contention in the writ
petition or otherwise raise it in the trial court. “As a general
rule, ‘issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.’ [Citation.] On a number of occasions,
however, appellate courts have relaxed this rule and have
permitted a party to raise belatedly ‘a pure question of law which
is presented on undisputed facts.’ [Citations.] This forgiving
approach has been most frequently invoked when ‘important
issues of public policy are at issue.’ [Citations.]” (Sea & Sage
Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Comm. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412,
417.) We decline to exercise our discretion to consider plaintiff’s
contention under the circumstances presented here.
Even if we were to consider the contention, because we
have concluded that defendant’s interpretation was consistent
with the plain language of the statute and the legislature’s
establishment of a charter school to the state board. The state
board shall review a petition submitted pursuant to this
subparagraph pursuant to subdivision (c).”
24
expressed intent, we would find no abuse of discretion in any
event. (See Communities for a Better Environment v. State Water
Resources Control Bd. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1104
(“[W]hile interpretation of a statute or regulation is ultimately a
question of law, we must also defer to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of a statute or regulation involving its area of
expertise, unless the interpretation flies in the face of the clear
language and purpose of the interpreted provision”].)
f. Violation of Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act
As plaintiff reads the record, defendant conducted an
unfair proceeding in violation of Government Code, section 11120
et seq., the Bagely-Keene Open Meeting Act, when it objected to
allowing plaintiff’s representatives to speak during the time
allotted for public comment. According to plaintiff, that
“unlawful restriction was … arbitrary and capricious, and a
failure to conform to procedures required by law by excluding
certain members of the public from participating in the public
proceeding solely because of their affiliation with [plaintiff].”
The record of the hearing shows that defendant allotted
time for plaintiff’s representatives to speak on its behalf, and
plaintiff does not suggest that the time allotted for that purpose
was inadequate. After the parties had concluded making their
presentations, defendant opened the meeting for public comment.
Plaintiff’s assistant superintendent, Karen Amaya began to offer
comments in favor of the petition. Although a representative of
the Department objected to allowing Ms. Amaya to speak during
the public comment period because it would unfairly expand upon
the time allotted to present plaintiff’s case, defendant ultimately
allowed Ms. Amaya to finish her comments. No other
25
representative of plaintiff was prevented from speaking during
the public comment period.
On this record, we find no abuse of discretion. It was not
unreasonable for defendant to limit the time each party had to
present their case or to object to using the time allotted for public
comment to unfairly expand one party’s time. In any event,
plaintiff’s representative was not prevented from making further
comments on its behalf during the public comment period and no
other representative was prevented from making comments.
26
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is
affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KUMAR, J.*
* Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
27
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