CourtListener 10869829•People v. Watson CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/3/26 P. v. Watson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B346019
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A950372)
v.
SHAYLOR ALVIN WATSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Ava Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Shaylor Watson appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1170, subdivision (d).1 His appellate counsel filed a brief under
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and
Watson filed a supplemental brief. We review the contentions
Watson raises in his supplemental brief, and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are in the nonpublished opinion from
Watson’s direct appeal, People v. Watson, June 15, 1994, B056452
(Watson I). As relevant here, the People charged Watson with
three counts: first degree murder with malice aforethought of
Heidi Carr on November 25, 1986 (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1); first
degree murder with malice aforethought of Keidi Sutton-Daniels
on March 26, 1987 (ibid., count 2); and robbery of Keidi Sutton-
Daniels on March 26, 1987 (§ 211, count 3). The People further
alleged a multiple murder special circumstance
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and that Watson personally used a firearm
in the commission of each offense (§ 12022.5)).2 A jury convicted
Watson of all counts, and found true the special circumstances
and firearm allegations. (Watson I, supra.)
The trial court sentenced Watson to life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) on count 2, plus two years for the
firearm allegation; a concurrent term of 25 years to life on count
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 The People also alleged that the murder in count 2 was
committed while Watson was engaged in the crime of robbery.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) That special circumstance was
stricken on Watson’s direct appeal. (Watson I, supra.)
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1, plus two years for the firearm allegation; and four years on
count 3, stayed. (Watson I, supra.) The judgment was affirmed
on direct appeal. (Ibid.)
In December 2024, Watson filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1170, subdivision (d). That statute provides that
when a defendant was “under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to” LWOP, and the defendant has been incarcerated for at least
15 years, the defendant may seek recall and resentencing.
(§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Watson’s petition stated that he “was 17
years old when the murder in count one was committed” and that
he was “under 18 years old at the time of the offenses.”
In a minute order dated December 10, 2024, the trial court
noted that court records suggested Watson was over the age of 18
at the time he committed count 2, the murder for which he had
been sentenced to LWOP. The court ordered Watson to “supply
the court with proof that the defendant was a minor at the time
of the commission of the offense that resulted in an LWOP
sentence.” Watson provided his birth certificate to the court.
In a minute order dated January 9, 2025, the court stated,
“As indicated in the minute order of December 10, 2024, available
court records indicated that defendant was over age 18 at the
time of the commission of the offense. On January 6, 2025,
defendant supplied a copy of his birth certification from the state
of Missouri. It indicated that defendant was born December 11,
1968. Per available court records, the special circumstance
murder was committed March 27, 1987. Defendant was over age
18 at the time of the commission of the crime. It appears that
defendant is not eligible for relief under Penal Code Section
1170(d). [¶] However, to allow counsel to argue eligibility, the
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matter is calendared for the appearance of counsel. . . .” At the
hearing, counsel stated that he had nothing to add. The trial
court denied Watson’s petition, stating that Watson was
ineligible because he was over the age of 18 at the time of the
LWOP offense.
Watson timely appealed
DISCUSSION
Watson’s appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues
and asking this court to proceed pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th 216. Watson was advised of his right to file a
supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-
232), and he did so. We evaluate the arguments set forth in that
supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232 [“If the defendant
subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented
in that brief and to issue a written opinion”].)
In his supplemental brief, Watson argues that “state
authorities are unlawfully denying youth-offender parole
consideration for his juvenile offense by treating a separate adult
conviction as controlling.” This argument appears to be focused
on issues decided in Watson’s previous appeal, People v. Watson
(July 9, 2024, B328070 [nonpub. opn.]) (Watson II). Prior to that
appeal, “Watson filed a motion for proceedings preserving
evidence under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin), in preparation for an eventual youth offender parole
hearing under Penal Code section 3051.[ ] The trial court denied
Watson relief, noting section 3051 facially does not extend to
individuals who committed their offenses between the ages of 18
and 25 and received LWOP sentences.” (Watson II, supra.) This
court considered and rejected Watson’s arguments about equal
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protection relating to youth offender parole hearing eligibility.
(Ibid.)
Youth offender parole hearing eligibility is not at issue in
this appeal. Rather, Watson appealed from the trial court’s
denial of his petition for recall and resentencing under section
1170, subdivision (d). Thus, to the extent Watson’s arguments
focus on issues other than section 1170 resentencing, they are
beyond the scope of this appeal.
Watson’s supplemental brief also cites several cases that
involve sentencing youth offenders. He makes no attempt to
connect these cases to his section 1170 petition, nor does he
articulate how they apply to his circumstances.
Watson cites Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 82
(Graham)3 which held that the United States Constitution
“prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” However,
Watson was sentenced to LWOP for a homicide offense. Watson
also cites Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465 (Miller),
which held that “mandatory life without parole for those under
the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”
Watson was over the age of 18 when he committed the murder for
which he was sentenced to LWOP. He also argues that
Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190 (Montgomery)
holds that an LWOP sentence is “unconstitutional for all juvenile
offenders” unless “permanent incorrigibility” is present. Watson
was not a juvenile offender when he committed his LWOP
3 Watson cites case names only, without any citations. Thus,
the cases discussed herein are the ones we presume Watson
intended to reference.
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offense. “‘“[T]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.”’” (People v. Benson (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1079 fn. 2.) Watson has not done so here.
In addition to considering the arguments Watson raised in
his supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record. We conclude no arguable issues
exist. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COGLIATI, J.*
We concur:
MORI, ACTING P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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