CourtListener 10869078•In re A.E. CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/1/26 In re A.E. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.E., a Person Coming Under B347816
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01064)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.U.G., et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.U.G.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant W.E.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services.
______________________________
C.U.G. (Mother) and W.E. (Father) appeal from the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, contending the
orders are unsupported by substantial evidence, the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
conducted an inadequate inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and the California
statutes implementing ICWA (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.),1
and, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the juvenile court improperly
exercised jurisdiction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The family is comprised of Mother, Father, their daughter
A.E., born in August 2024, and E.U., A.E.’s older half-sibling.
This appeal concerns only A.E.
A. Prior Dependency Proceedings Involving E.U.
In 2021, DCFS received a referral alleging Mother’s drug
and alcohol abuse and altercations with a male companion
endangered E.U. The referral was substantiated and mother
participated in voluntary family maintenance services from
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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2021 to 2022, which included substance abuse testing and a
12-step program. After another referral in 2023, the juvenile
court sustained a section 300 petition alleging E.U. was at risk
due to Mother’s methamphetamine, marijuana, and alcohol
abuse. The court declared E.U. a dependent of the court,
removed him from Mother’s custody, and ordered DCFS
to provide reunification services. Mother failed to reunify
with E.U., and the court terminated her parental rights on
February 25, 2025.
B. Current Proceedings
On February 13, 2025, Mother moved with six-month-old
A.E. from Utah to California to enter an in-patient treatment
program. Mother hoped evidence of her sobriety would support
a section 388 petition for changed orders regarding E.U.
On February 25, 2025, DCFS received a referral regarding
A.E., alleging general neglect by Mother.
Mother, age 26, had a substantial history of substance
abuse that included relapses over the years after periods of
sobriety. She admitted that she used marijuana and alcohol
when A.E. was two months old and in her care, and the maternal
grandfather detected the smell of alcohol on her when A.E. was
four months old and in Mother’s care. Mother admitted that on
February 13, 2025, while traveling with A.E., she drank enough
alcohol to feel “tipsy” before the flight from Utah to California,
then after the flight had two beers in her hotel room. She also
disclosed using marijuana on this date. Mother tested positive
for marijuana four times from February to March 2025, but
tested negative in April, June, and July 2025.
Mother was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) in 2016 and depression and anxiety in 2020. She
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reported that she previously participated in therapy but had
a “bad experience” with it, and stopped taking a prescribed
antidepressant because it did not help. She currently took
medication to treat anxiety and reduce alcohol cravings.
Mother reported that before she was pregnant with A.E.,
Father hit her with an open hand on the side of her head and
she threw a metal water bottle at him. In November 2023,
Father grabbed her arms hard enough to leave finger marks.
Mother reported that she hit Father in July 2023 and in April
2024, when she was pregnant with A.E. Mother said she was
afraid of Father and did not know if incidents like this would
occur after he was released from incarceration.
Mother told DCFS that she checked herself into the in-
patient treatment program on February 14, 2025, and expected
to remain in the program for 12 months, after which she planned
to move to Recovery Bridge housing. She reported that although
she wanted eventually to move out of state with A.E. and E.U.,
she transferred A.E.’s medical care from a provider in Utah to a
provider in California and planned to remain in California for a
while after she left Recovery Bridge housing.
Father had a long history of heroin and methamphetamine
abuse and an extensive criminal history that included drug-
related offenses. He had been incarcerated since May 2024, three
months before A.E. was born, and reported not having used drugs
while in prison. Mother reported that Father was a “terrible
person” when he used drugs, and she did not believe he could
maintain sobriety.
Father reported that he was drug free while incarcerated
and participated in Alcoholics Anonymous. He expected to be
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released from incarceration in July 2025 and hoped to be involved
in A.E.’s life and support her and Mother.
A.E. was healthy, well-groomed, and developmentally
on track, and Mother interacted with her in an appropriate,
nurturing, and loving manner. Social workers expressed no
concern regarding A.E.’s home life. Father interacted with A.E.
only during prison visits.
On April 14, 2025, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging A.E. was endangered by Mother’s and Father’s history
of physical altercations and substance abuse and Mother’s
mental health problems. The juvenile court detained A.E. from
Father and maintained her in Mother’s custody on the condition
that Mother reside at her inpatient program and continue drug
testing.
On July 21, 2015, the juvenile court amended and
sustained DCFS’s section 300 petition. The sustained petition
alleged: (1) Mother and Father had a history of domestic
violence, and Mother once struck Father while she was pregnant
with A.E.; (2) Mother had a history of substance abuse and was a
current abuser of marijuana and alcohol—on February 13, 2025,
she was under the influence of alcohol while A.E. was in her care,
and in March 2025 she tested positive for marijuana while A.E.
was in her care; (3) Mother had been diagnosed with PTSD,
bipolar depression, and anxiety, and failed to participate
consistently in mental health treatment services or regularly
take prescribed psychotropic medication; (4) Father had a history
of substance abuse; and (5) E.U. was a current dependent of the
juvenile court due to Mother’s substance abuse. The sustained
petition alleged that these circumstances rendered Mother and
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Father incapable of caring for A.E. and put her at substantial
risk of serious physical harm.
The juvenile court declared A.E. to be a dependent of the
court pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), removed her from
Father’s custody and maintained her in Mother’s custody,
ordered family preservation services for Mother and monitored
visits for Father, and ordered both parents to participate in a full
drug program that included random, on-demand testing.
The parents appealed.
C. Facts Pertaining to ICWA
Mother and both of her parents denied any Native
American ancestry but Father and his relatives reported possible
membership in several tribes. DCFS investigated Father’s
ancestry and contacted several Native American communities.
The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, Standing Rock
Sioux tribe, Upper Sioux Community tribe, Crow Creek Sioux
tribe, Rosebud Sioux tribe, and Lower Sioux tribe all reported
that A.E. was neither a member of nor eligible for membership in
their communities. The court found no reason to believe ICWA
applied to A.E.
DISCUSSION
The parents contend the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings and dispositional orders are unsupported by substantial
evidence. Father raises further challenges, which Mother joins,
concerning the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under the UCCJEA
and its ICWA findings.
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A. Evidence Supporting Jurisdiction and
Disposition
Subdivision (b) of section 300 authorizes the juvenile
court to exercise jurisdiction over a child when, among other
circumstances, there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or
inability of a parent to adequately supervise or protect the child.
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) The court may exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to this provision only upon a showing that at the time
of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of
serious physical harm in the future. (See In re Destiny S. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 999, 1004.) Prior acts of neglect, standing alone,
do not establish a substantial risk of harm; there must be some
reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.
(Ibid.)
We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
and orders for substantial evidence. (In re E.B. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 568, 574–575.)
1. Domestic Violence
Physical violence between a child’s parents may support
the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
but only if there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or
likely to continue and that it directly harmed the child physically
or placed the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
(In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391.)
Here, the evidence showed that Mother and Father
engaged in domestic violence prior to A.E.’s birth, and Mother
reported she was afraid of Father and did not know if the
violence would reoccur after he was released from incarceration.
The evidence thus showed that the parents’ relationship was
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violent, and it was within the court’s discretion as the assessor
of “issues of fact and credibility” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52
Cal.App.4th 183, 193) to conclude that the violence would likely
reoccur when Father was released and would pose a substantial
risk to A.E. of serious physical harm.
Whether the parents would definitively remain a couple
is not determinative. Father wanted to remain a couple, and
the parents would be linked through A.E. regardless of the status
of their relationship. The most recent evidence before Father
was imprisoned supports that the parents’ would continue the
domestic violence. (See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126,
133 [“[a] parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future
behavior”].)
2. Substance Abuse
Although a parent’s substance abuse, without more,
does not bring a minor within the jurisdiction of the dependency
court, there is more here. Mother admitted using marijuana and
alcohol on two occasions when A.E. was in her sole care, and the
maternal grandfather detected the smell of alcohol on her when
A.E. was four months old and in Mother’s sole care. The evidence
supports that despite her history of substance abuse that caused
her to lose parental rights to E.U., Mother was still willing to use
drugs and alcohol while the sole caregiver of a very young child.
Mother’s sobriety is fragile, and longstanding and chronic
substance abuse is a serious problem that cannot be ameliorated
in a few months. Although we cautiously laud and encourage her
progress, the possibility of relapse is real. We conclude that the
evidence supports that Mother’s history of substance abuse and
potential for relapse endangers A.E.
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Father argues that the order that he participate in a
full drug program, including random, on-demand testing, was
not narrowly tailored to his circumstances because he already
participated in Alcoholics Anonymous and no evidence suggested
he used any drugs while incarcerated. He acknowledges the
court’s broad discretion in fashioning disposition orders in the
best interest of A.E. but contends the court should have ordered
only drug testing for him, and should have ordered a complete
substance abuse program only if any test was missed or positive.
Although the evidence would support that order, it also supports
the court’s choice in requiring a more comprehensive approach.
“[T]he juvenile court’s discretion in fashioning reunification
orders is not unfettered. Its orders must be ‘reasonable’ and
‘designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s
finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.’ ”
(In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229, quoting § 362,
subd. (c).) The court-ordered reunification plan “ ‘ “must be
appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts
relating to that family.” ’ ” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) To that end, when a court is aware
of other parental issues that were not the basis for jurisdiction
but that would “impede the parent’s ability to reunify with his
child, the court may address them in the reunification plan.”
(Id. at p. 1008; see ibid. [juvenile court “reasonably concluded
appellant’s substance abuse was an obstacle to reunification
that had to be addressed in the reunification plan”]; see also In re
D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 639 [“a dispositional order may
reach both parents, including a nonoffending parent”].)
Here, the evidence supported orders requiring Father
to attend drug counseling. His long history of substance abuse
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demonstrates that he was unable to maintain sobriety
in the past. That he has done so while incarcerated is a
worthy achievement, but that conduct is a weak indicator of
conduct after release, particularly for an individual who has a
long history of substance abuse. Under these circumstances, the
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding a drug program
for Father was in A.E.’s best interests and would reasonably
assist in Father’s ability to reunify with her.
B. ICWA
The parents contend the juvenile court erroneously found
that ICWA does not apply to A.E. We disagree.
Congress enacted ICWA “ ‘to protect the best interests
of Indian children and to promote the stability and security
of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’ ”
(In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128–1129, italics added.)
“ICWA does not apply to a proceeding to place an Indian child
with a parent.” (In re J.B. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 751, 758,
italics omitted.)
Here, the juvenile court retained A.E. with Mother. The
court therefore correctly concluded that ICWA does not apply.
We express no opinion on the adequacy of DCFS’s ICWA inquiry.
C. UCCJEA
The parents contend that because California was not
the child’s home state, the juvenile court improperly exercised
jurisdiction in violation of the UCCJEA. We disagree.
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The UCCJEA “is the exclusive method of determining the
proper forum in custody disputes involving other jurisdictions
and governs juvenile dependency proceedings.” (In re C.T. (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 101, 106.)
The UCCJEA’s method for determining a proper forum
begins with the concept of a “home state.” “ ‘Home state’ means
the state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least
six consecutive months immediately before the commencement
of a child custody proceeding.” (Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (g).)
If a child has a home state, the UCCJEA requires certain
coordination with that state. But when a child has no home
state, any state in which the child is present may assert
jurisdiction without such coordination. (Fam. Code, § 3421,
subds. (a)(2) & (a)(4).)
Mother and A.E. lived in Utah for six months before
moving to California on February 13, 2025. These dependency
proceedings commenced 12 days later, on February 25, 2025.
A.E., therefore resided in no one state for at least six consecutive
months immediately before commencement of these dependency
proceedings. Because A.E. had no home state, the UCCJEA was
not a bar to a California court exercising jurisdiction over her.
D. Conclusion
Because substantial evidence supports that the parents’
history of domestic violence and Mother’s substance abuse posed
a substantial risk of serious physical harm to A.E., we will affirm
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings on these grounds and
its order that Father participate in a drug program. Given this
result, we need not consider Mother’s argument that a parent’s
mental illness does not by itself support jurisdiction.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
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