CourtListener 10869075•Marriage of Gouda and Little CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/1/26 Marriage of Gouda and Little CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re Marriage of SAMAH
MOHAMED RAMADAN GOUDA
and BRIAN JAMES LITTLE.
SAMAH MOHAMED RAMADAN G065715
GOUDA,
(Super. Ct. No. 22D000585)
Appellant,
OPINION
v.
BRIAN JAMES LITTLE,
Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Elia A. Naqvi, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Samah Mohamed Ramadan Gouda, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
* * *
Appellant Samah Mohamed Ramadan Gouda appeals the trial
court’s denial of her request for order (RFO) to modify an out-of-state custody
order issued in Egypt, seeking removal of conditions which allegedly violate
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Fam. Code,1
§ 3400 et seq.; UCCJEA). The trial court concluded there was insufficient
evidence to terminate Egypt’s jurisdiction or to transfer jurisdiction to
California and therefore declined to amend the custody order. On the record
before us, we conclude there is a factual dispute regarding: (1) whether the
Egyptian custody order is enforceable; and (2) if it is not, whether California
has jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the order denying the RFO and remand
to the court to make this factual determination.2 If the court concludes
California has jurisdiction, it has discretion to amend the Egyptian custody
order to remove the conditions Gouda challenges, or alternatively, to craft a
new custody order.
FACTS
Gouda and Brian James Little, an American citizen, were
married in the United Arab Emirates in 2015. Their son, J.L., was born in
1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise noted.
2 On October 16, 2025, Gouda filed a motion to construe her
notice of appeal as limited to the issue of custody. We deny Gouda’s motion as
unnecessary because our review is limited to the issue or issues raised in the
appeal.
2
June 2017 in Saudi Arabia. J.L. obtained United States citizenship in Saudi
Arabia through Little.
Gouda alleges Little locked her and J.L. out of their home in
Saudi Arabia when J.L. was nine months old. Little later cancelled Gouda’s
and J.L.’s Saudi Arabian residency visas.
In March 2018, Gouda moved with J.L. to Egypt, where she
resided with her family. While in Egypt, Gouda initiated divorce and custody
proceedings. Throughout these proceedings, Little resided in Saudi Arabia.
On June 26, 2018, the Egyptian court granted Gouda sole custody
of J.L. with the following conditions: “The guardian woman must be adult,
sane, free, and non-apostate”; “She must be free from the diseases or defects
that would make her unfit for custody”; “She must be such an honest
guardian that the child doesn’t get lost at her custody”; “She mustn’t be
married to person that is a foreigner to the child”; and “She mustn’t stay,
with the child, at an apartment owned by a person whom the child hates.”
In July 2018, Gouda relocated with J.L. to California and later
naturalized as a United States citizen. On January 27, 2022, Gouda
registered the Egyptian custody order and filed a UCCJEA declaration in the
Orange County Superior Court.
In November 2024, Gouda filed a RFO to modify the Egyptian
custody order. Gouda later filed a memorandum of points and authorities and
declaration in support of the RFO.
In April 2025, both parties filed briefs in response to the trial
court’s request for briefing regarding whether it had subject matter
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. On May 9, 2025, the court held an
evidentiary hearing. The court concluded, “California does not have
jurisdiction over the custody issues concerning the minor child unless and
3
until Egypt relinquishes jurisdiction. If necessary, the [c]ourt will conduct a
UCCJEA hearing with the appropriate authority in Egypt to address
jurisdictional issues.” Gouda apparently filed the instant appeal before the
court could contact the Egyptian court.
DISCUSSION
I.
UCCJEA LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The UCCJEA governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign
custody orders. (§ 3400 et seq.) California courts “shall recognize and enforce”
an out-of-state or foreign custody order “under factual circumstances
meeting” UCCJEA jurisdictional standards unless the order has been
vacated, stayed, or modified by a court with UCCJEA jurisdiction. (§§ 3405,
subd. (a), 3443, subd. (a), 3446, subd. (b), 3453; see also V.L. v. E.L. (2016)
577 U.S. 404, 407 [“‘final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority . . . qualifies for recognition throughout the land’”].)
However, California is not required to give full faith and credit to a child
custody determination made by a court that lacks jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA. (Haywood v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 956–957
[under former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)3].)
Unless its custody law “violates fundamental principles of human
rights,” a foreign country is treated like a sister state for UCCJEA
enforcement purposes, and its child custody determinations made “under
factual circumstances in substantial conformity with” UCCJEA jurisdictional
3 The UCCJEA became effective January 1, 2000, replacing the
former UCCJA. (Stats. 1999, ch. 867, § 3.)
4
standards “must be recognized and enforced.” (§ 3405; In re Marriage of
Paillier (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 461, 470 [French custody order].)
An out-of-state custody order is not entitled to full faith and
credit and does not establish the exclusive jurisdictional situs for subsequent
modification proceedings, if the forum court was not exercising jurisdiction in
“substantial conformity” with the UCCJEA or its determination was not
made under factual circumstances meeting UCCJEA jurisdictional
standards. (§§ 3443, 3453; In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
478, 506 (Nurie) [Pakistani visitation order not enforceable because
jurisdiction was not exercised in substantial conformity with UCCJEA
principles].)
“‘The UCCJEA takes a strict “first in time” approach to
jurisdiction.’” (W.M. v. V.A. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 64, 72.) “In general, once
the court of an ‘appropriate state’—one having jurisdiction under section
3421, subdivision (a)—has made a child custody determination, ‘that court
obtains “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction . . . .”’” (Ibid.) Generally, the state
that made the initial child custody determination will have exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction to modify the order. (§§ 3422, 3423.) There cannot be
concurrent UCCJEA modification jurisdiction. Thus, when a California court
is asked to make a custody determination but discovers that a child custody
proceeding has already been commenced in another state having jurisdiction
“substantially in accordance with” the UCCJEA, the California court must
stay its proceeding and consult with the other state court. (§ 3426, subd. (b).)
As a matter of full faith and credit, a California court must
recognize and enforce an out-of-state order but may not modify it unless the
court has jurisdiction to modify. (§ 3446, subd. (b).) Deference to the
rendering state’s continuing jurisdiction to modify is required even if custody
5
proceedings are not presently pending in the out-of-state court. (McArthur v.
Superior Court (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1292–1293.)
“‘We are not bound by the [trial] court’s findings regarding
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather “independently reweigh the
jurisdictional facts.” [Citation.] “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction either exists or
does not exist at the time the action is commenced” [citation] and cannot be
conferred by stipulation, consent, waiver, or estoppel [citations].’” (Ocegueda
v. Perreira (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084 (Ocegueda) [applying de novo
review to jurisdictional issue under UCCJEA].)
II.
ENFORCEABILITY OF EGYPTIAN CUSTODY ORDER
The trial court must first make a factual determination whether
the Egyptian custody order is enforceable. As noted, an out-of-state custody
order is entitled to deference unless the forum court was not exercising
jurisdiction in “substantial conformity” with the UCCJEA or its
determination was not made under factual circumstances meeting UCCJEA
jurisdictional standards. (§§ 3405, subd. (b); 3443, 3453; Nurie, supra,
176 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) Additionally, a California court need not defer to
an out-of-state custody order if the child custody law of a foreign country
“violates fundamental principles of human rights.” (§ 3405, subd. (c).)
Thus, the trial court must determine whether the Egyptian
custody order was not made “under factual circumstances in substantial
conformity with the jurisdictional standards” of the UCCJEA or if Egypt’s
child custody law “violates fundamental principles of human rights.” (§ 3405,
subd. (b), (c).) Gouda argued in the family law proceedings that the conditions
imposed by the Egyptian court violated fundamental principles of human
rights. However, during the hearing, the court inaccurately conflated the
6
issue of whether the Egyptian custody order violated Gouda’s state or federal
constitutional rights with whether it violated “fundamental principles of
human rights” under the UCCJEA.4 On remand, the trial court should
explicitly address whether the Egyptian custody order complies with
California’s “fundamental principles of human rights.”
We note that we have been unable to locate any California case
addressing whether a foreign child custody law violates fundamental
principles of human rights. Furthermore, the term “‘fundamental principles
of human rights’” was “left undefined” in the UCCJEA. (Toland v. Futagi
(2012) 425 Md. 365 [40 A.3d 1051, 1058, 1062]).5 However, “the drafters
alluded to a similar provision in the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of Child Abduction, which permits a country to refuse to return a child if the
return would violate ‘the fundamental principles of the requested State
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,’ which
has been interpreted by the United States Department of State as ‘utterly
shock[ing] the conscience or offend[ing] all notions of due process.’” (Toland,
supra, 40 A.3d at p. 1058 [citing Hague Internat. Child Abduction
4 For example, the trial court stated: “[T]hat’s not what the law
says . . . . It doesn’t say it has to be an American-like order. It says that it has
to violate fundamental Constitutional rights.” The court later asked Gouda’s
counsel, “What is the fundamental constitutional right? . . . [I]s there, in the
Constitution, the right to get married?” After hearing counsel’s argument, the
court stated, “I do not think those violate fundamental Constitutional rights.”
5 “Although the decisions of our sister states and the lower
federal courts may be instructive to the extent we find their analysis
persuasive, they are neither binding nor controlling on matters of state law.”
(T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 175.)
7
Convention, text and legal analysis, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10510 (Mar. 26,
1986)].)
If the trial court determines the Egyptian custody order is
enforceable, the court must stay proceedings and communicate with the
Egyptian court to resolve any jurisdictional conflict. (§ 3426, subd. (b); In re
Marriage of Kent (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 487, 494–495.)
III.
JURISDICTION
However, if the trial court concludes the Egyptian custody order
is not enforceable, it must then determine whether California has jurisdiction
in this child custody matter. We note that UCCJEA jurisdictional
requirements must be satisfied whenever a California court is called upon to
make an initial or modified custody determination where another state or, as
here, a foreign country has an interest in the custody matter. (§§ 3421–3424;
In re Marriage of Arnold & Cully (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 499, 502.) “‘It is well
settled in California that the UCCJEA is the exclusive method of determining
subject matter jurisdiction in custody disputes involving other jurisdictions.’”
(Ocegueda, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.)
The UCCJEA sets forth the jurisdictional tests for an initial
custody determination, and a California court is empowered to hear and
determine the matter only if one of those tests is satisfied at the time the
litigation is commenced. (§ 3421, subd. (a); Ocegueda, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1084 [subject matter jurisdiction under UCCJEA “‘“either exists or does
not exist at the time the action is commenced”’”].) As applicable here,
California may exercise custody jurisdiction if it was J.L.’s “home state” when
the proceeding was commenced, that is, the date the first pleading was filed.
(§ 3421, subd. (a)(1)); 3402, subd. (e).) “‘Home state’ means the state in which
8
a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody
proceeding.” (§ 3402, subd. (g).)
Before the trial court determines whether California has
jurisdiction, it must afford the parties a full and fair evidentiary hearing,
with adequate notice for the parties to present their claims regarding the
exercise of jurisdiction. (Cole v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 265,
271–272; see also In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 520–523 [court
erred by failing to hold evidentiary hearing regarding UCCJEA jurisdiction
before making custody orders].)
If the trial court concludes it has jurisdiction after an evidentiary
hearing, it then has discretion to amend the Egyptian custody order or craft a
new custody order.
9
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellant is
entitled to her costs on appeal.
SCHWARM, J.*
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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