O'Toole v. Haynes CA2/7

CourtListener 10869071Calctapp01.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/1/26 O’Toole v. Haynes CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ALETHEA O’TOOLE, B332472

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STRO02848)
v.

DARRYL SCOTT HAYNES,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jannet Perez Santiso, Judge. Affirmed.
Alethea O’Toole, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

Alethea O’Toole petitioned for a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) against Darryl Haynes, which the trial
court denied after it granted her a continuance and O’Toole failed
to serve moving papers on Haynes. O’Toole appeals, arguing the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant her an
alternative method of service or a second continuance of the
DVRO hearing, given the difficulty of personally serving Haynes.
Haynes did not file a respondent’s brief.1 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. O’Toole’s Petition for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order
O’Toole and Haynes previously dated. After that
relationship ended, at a certain point the parties filed multiple
legal actions against each other and each sought restraining
orders against the other. This appeal is limited to the trial
court’s denial of O’Toole’s petition for a DVRO.
On May 4, 2023, O’Toole filed a petition for a DVRO
against Haynes, seeking protection for herself and her adult son
Hunter. O’Toole’s petition and attachments are absent from the
record. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on
May 5, 2023 as to O’Toole, but found insufficient evidence to
include Hunter as a protected party.

1 Where, as here, a respondent fails to file a respondent’s
brief, “the court may decide the appeal on the record, the opening
brief, and any oral argument by the appellant.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)

2
On May 30, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on O’Toole’s
petition, at which Haynes did not appear. O’Toole provided a
declaration of due diligence by the sheriff’s department, dated
May 16, documenting three unsuccessful attempts to serve
Haynes at his residence address earlier in May. The declaration
stated: “possible private/personal service needed.” O’Toole asked
for a continuance and for an alternative method of service. She
also stated it was going to be difficult to serve Haynes and that
he had evaded service in the past.
The trial court denied O’Tooole’s request for alternative
service. The court granted a continuance of the hearing to
June 23, and “admonished” O’Toole that if she did not serve
Haynes before the next hearing date the court might dismiss the
matter without prejudice.
On June 8, 2023, O’Toole filed a request to continue the
hearing so that she could have more time to effectuate personal
service on Haynes, alleging that Haynes had “evaded the sheriff
summons service” on multiple occasions and had recently left the
country. O’Toole attested that on May 31 she learned through
social media that Haynes had boarded a plane on May 30 to
vacation in London, England. O’Toole attached screen shots of
social media posts allegedly reflecting Haynes’s travel with his
wife. O’Toole also attested that on May 31 she had received a
vulgar and harassing letter by mail in Haynes’s handwriting
(signed from “Lucy”) and attached the letter.
On June 14, O’Toole filed a declaration in support of an ex
parte request for the court to order a permanent restraining
order, based on Haynes’s alleged continued harassment of her
despite the temporary restraining order and his “history of
intentionally eluding service of summons, making it difficult to

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serve.” O’Toole attached the letter she had received, as well as
due diligence declarations from the sheriff’s department in two
other cases between the parties, reflecting six unsuccessful
attempts to serve Haynes in February and March 2023.
On June 23, 2023, the trial court held the continued
hearing, and the court found that no proof of service on Haynes
had been filed. O’Toole testified she had hired a private server
who had been unable to serve Haynes with notice of the DVRO
hearing, but she provided no affidavit of due diligence or other
showing of any attempts at private service or service by the
sheriff’s office since the May 30 hearing. O’Toole stated the
private server was not available to come to court that day,
O’Toole was not provided with a declaration of due diligence by
the private server, and O’Toole did not know that a declaration of
due diligence was needed. O’Toole further testified regarding her
belief that Haynes had left the country and the harassing letter
she had received. The court also reviewed O’Toole’s declaration
filed on June 14, which it treated as a supplemental declaration
in support of her request for a permanent DVRO.
The court dismissed the petition for a DVRO without
prejudice “for lack of prosecution,” “[b]ased on [O’Toole]’s failure
to serve moving papers,” and it dissolved the temporary
restraining order.
O’Toole timely appealed.

B. Settled Statement Process
Although a reporter was present for the May 30 and
June 23 hearings, O’Toole elected to proceed by way of a settled

4
statement on appeal.2 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.137(b)(1)(B) [an appellant with “an order waiving his or her
court fees and costs” may elect “to use a settled statement as the
record of the oral proceedings in the superior court without filing
a motion”].)3
O’Toole filed a proposed settled statement on December 13,
2023. On August 13, 2024, the trial court ordered O’Toole to
serve and file a modified proposed settled statement
incorporating a set of modifications provided by the court. (See
rule 8.137(f)(3)(B)(ii), (g)(1); Marks v. Superior Court (2002)
27 Cal.4th 176, 194.) O’Toole filed a second proposed settled
statement on October 10, 2024, but the record does not include it.
On January 28, 2025, the trial court again ordered that
corrections were required, and it provided to O’Toole a “Court’s
Modified Settled Statement” substantially similar to the
modifications it previously proposed. (See rule 8.137(f)(3)(B)(i),
(g)(1).)
The trial court’s modified settled statement described the
May 30 hearing and sheriff’s department declaration of due

2 “The purpose of a settled statement is to provide the
appellate court with an adequate record from which to determine
contentions of error.” (In re Marriage of Fingert (1990)
221 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1580.) Thus, a settled statement must
contain “a statement of the points the appellant is raising on
appeal” and a “condensed narrative of the oral proceedings,”
including “a concise factual summary of the evidence and the
testimony of each witness relevant to the points that the
appellant . . . raise[s] on appeal.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.137(d).)
3 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

5
diligence provided by O’Toole, and the court found that “[n]o
evidence was presented that [Haynes] was evading service
relative to this restraining order.” The statement described the
court’s grant of “a continuance for service” as well as O’Toole’s
request for “alternate service,” which it “denied . . . based upon
the evidence and the information before the court.”
The trial court’s modified settled statement also
summarized the June 23 hearing, stating the court reviewed
O’Toole’s declaration filed June 14 and received testimony from
O’Toole as follows: “When the court inquired regarding the
efforts to serve [Haynes] since the last hearing date of 5/30/23,
[O’Toole] did not provide any evidence of further attempts by the
Sheriff’s Department to serve [Haynes]. Additionally, [O’Toole]
indicated that she used a private server and that service had not
been effectuated. [O’Toole] claimed that the private server was
not available to come to court today, that [O’Toole] was not
provided with a Declaration of Due Diligence by the private
server and that [O’Toole] did not know that a Declaration of Due
Diligence was needed although one was provided at the 5/30/23
hearing date. [O’Toole] further informed the court that [Haynes]
had left the country, and that [O’Toole] did not know how long he
would be gone. [O’Toole] further claimed that she received
harassing mail from [Haynes]. [O’Toole] did not present
declarations of due diligence, including any further attempts by
the Sheriff’s Department to serve [Haynes].”
The record does not reflect that O’Toole filed any proposed
modifications or objections to the court’s modified settled
statement. (See rule 8.137(g)(2) [party may file proposed
modifications or objections within 10 days after court’s modified
statement is served].) Thereafter, the trial court’s modified

6
settled statement was not formally certified by the court as the
certified settled statement before it was included in the clerk’s
transcript. (See rule 8.137(g)(2), (h)(1) [judge must review the
modified statement within 10 days after the time for filing
proposed modifications or objections has expired, and “must
promptly certify the statement” if no further modifications or
corrections are necessary]; (h)(3) [“Upon certification of the
statement . . . the certified statement must immediately be
transmitted to the clerk for filing of the record . . . .”]; Branger &
Driard v. Chevalier (1858) 9 Cal. 351, 352 [“The settled
statement, until certified, is not record.”]; Potter v. Solk (1958)
161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 870, 871-872 [“[t]he requirement of
certification of the engrossed statement by the trial judge is
mandatory”].)
On February 11, 2026, this Court on its own motion
directed the trial court to certify the settled statement. On
March 13, 2026, the trial court resubmitted the clerk’s transcript,
with a clerk’s verification “that the Settled Statement has been
certified by the trial court judge, as required by . . . rule 8.137(c).”
Accordingly, “[w]e are bound by the contents of the engrossed
settled statement.” (Waller v. Waller (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 456,
464 (Waller).)4

4 The record as resubmitted does not contain a separate
signed certification of the settled statement by the trial judge.
However, O’Toole does not argue the trial court failed to properly
certify the settled statement, and there is no record that O’Toole
raised any objections to the trial court’s second proposed modified
settled statement, nor did she seek writ relief regarding any error
in the settled statement process. (See Waller, supra,
3 Cal.App.3d 456, 464 [where no objection to the contents of

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DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code,
§ 6200 et seq.) (DVPA), a court may issue a protective order “ ‘ “to
restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of
domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the
persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
abuse.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225; see Fam. Code, § 6300.)5 A temporary
DVRO may be issued on an ex parte basis without notice (§ 6320,
subd. (a)), but a permanent restraining order may be issued only
“after notice and a hearing” (§ 6345, subd. (a)). The DVPA
permits alternative methods of service—such as service by mail
or by publication—only where “the court determines that, after
diligent effort, the petitioner has been unable to accomplish
personal service, and that there is reason to believe that the
restrained party is evading service.” (§ 6340, subd. (a)(2)(A).) A
hearing on a request for a DVRO may be continued “on a showing
of good cause” by either party or on the court’s own motion.
(§ 245, subd. (b); see In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia, at p. 228;
see also rule 3.1332(c) [“The court may grant a continuance only

engrossed settled statement appears of record, “we must assume
that plaintiff made none”]; Randall v. Mousseau (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935-936 [“To preserve the issue of the denial
[of a request for settled statement] for appeal, the appellant may
seek writ review at the time of the denial, or raise the denial in
the opening brief on appeal.”].)
5 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

8
on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the
continuance”].)
“The denial of a restraining order under the DVPA is
appealable.” (N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 601; Code
Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) “We review the grant or denial
of a request for a DVRO for abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage
of Davila & Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) We likewise
review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. (In
re Marriage of Tara & Robert D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 871, 881.)
“We also review a trial judge’s failure to consider evidence for
abuse of discretion.” (Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
579, 589.) Under the abuse of discretion standard, “ ‘[t]he trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the
law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ”
(In re Marriage of Walker (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 137, 146.) “We
also review for substantial evidence the trial court’s finding
[whether] the petitioner made a diligent effort to locate and
personally serve the respondent.” (Yu v. Pozniak-Rice (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1143 (Yu) [construing “diligent effort” for
service of a civil restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure
section 527.6, subdivision (m)(2)].)6

6 Section 6340, subdivision (a)(2)(A) shares substantially
similar language with Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6,
subdivision (m)(2). (Compare § 6340, subd. (a)(2)(A) [“If at the
time of a hearing with respect to an order issued pursuant to this
part based on an ex parte temporary restraining order, the court
determines that, after diligent effort, the petitioner has been
unable to accomplish personal service, and that there is reason to
believe that the restrained party is evading service, the court

9
Where, as here, the plaintiff appeals from an order denying
a request for a restraining order, the substantial evidence
analysis has a different lens: “The party seeking a restraining
order bears the burden of establishing the circumstances
justifying the order. [Citations.] ‘ “In the case where the trier of
fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the
burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals,
it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as
whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. . . .
[Instead] the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law . . . .” ’ ” (Jan F. v. Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583,
593.) “ ‘ “Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Diamond (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th
550, 566.) Where the judgment is against the party with the
burden of proof, “ ‘unless the [trial] court makes specific findings
of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the [trial] court
found the [losing party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight and

may permit an alternative method of service designed to give
reasonable notice of the action to the respondent. . . .”] with Code
Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (m)(2) [“If the court determines at the
hearing that, after a diligent effort, the petitioner has been
unable to accomplish personal service, and that there is reason to
believe that the respondent is evading service or cannot be
located, then the court may specify another method of service
that is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the
respondent and may prescribe the manner in which proof of
service shall be made.”].)

10
credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no
power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to
reweigh the evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 567.)

B. O’Toole Does Not Demonstrate that The Trial Court Abused
Its Discretion
O’Toole argues the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to grant an alternative method of service or a second
continuance, given the difficulty of personally serving Haynes,
and that it did not consider the evidence O’Toole presented in her
initial DVRO petition and in subsequent filings. Although it is
unclear in the opening brief, O’Toole also appears to challenge
the denial of the DVRO for failure to prosecute.

1. Alternative method of service
We first address O’Toole’s argument the trial court should
have granted her an alternative method of service. A petitioner
seeking an alternative to personal service under section 6340,
subdivision (a)(2)(A), must make a showing of a “diligent effort
. . . to accomplish personal service” before the court may
authorize service by another method. (§ 6340, subd. (a)(2)(A); see
Yu, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144 [same, under Code Civ.
Proc., § 527.6, subd. (m)(2)].)
At the May 30 hearing, the trial court denied O’Toole’s
request for alternative service, but it granted O’Toole a
continuance to June 23 to attempt to serve Haynes. At the June
23 hearing, O’Toole stated she had hired a private server who
was unable to serve Haynes. O’Toole, however, provided no
documentary evidence or witness supporting her statement.
That is, she did not provide any evidence beyond her statements

11
that she attempted to serve Haynes after the May 30 hearing,
such as a declaration of due diligence from a private server or
from the sheriff’s department. Instead, O’Toole stated the
private server was unable to appear that day and she did not
know she was supposed to provide a declaration of due diligence
(despite providing one at the May hearing). Although O’Toole
represented that a process server tried to serve Haynes her
testimony was not competent because she did not have personal
knowledge of any specific attempts to serve Haynes by the
process server. (§ 6340, subd. (a)(2)(A); see Yu, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144 [petitioner should support a request
for alternative service “with declarations stating ‘probative facts’
. . . based on personal knowledge and demonstrating a thorough
investigation designed to learn the respondent’s whereabouts”].)
Thus, O’Toole’s testimony does not compel a finding that O’Toole
made a “diligent effort” to serve Haynes after the May 30
hearing.
The other evidence O’Toole submitted was also insufficient
to show a “diligent effort” to serve Haynes after being granted a
continuance to do so. The May 16 declaration of due diligence by
the sheriff’s department documented attempts to serve Haynes at
his residence address with notice of the May 30 hearing, not of
the June 23 hearing. And the other due diligence reports from
the sheriff’s department also pre-dated the May 30 hearing and
did not involve service attempts in this case, but were instead
from two other cases between the parties. This evidence is not
“ ‘ “ ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Diamond, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th
at p. 566.) O’Toole’s showing thus does not compel a finding that

12
she made a diligent effort to personally serve Haynes. Under the
circumstances, the court was within its discretion to deny
alternative service.

2. The request for a second continuance
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by not
granting a second continuance of the DVRO hearing. A DVRO
may be continued if a party makes “a showing of good cause.”
(§ 245, subd. (b).) “Such a continuance is discretionary rather
than mandatory” (N.M. v. W.K. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 978, 983),
and we “must uphold a trial court’s choice not to grant a
continuance unless the court has abused its discretion in so
doing” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
814, 823). “Circumstances that may indicate good cause” include
“[a] party’s excused inability to obtain essential . . . documents
. . . despite diligent efforts.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1332(c)(6).) “In ruling on a motion or application for
continuance, the court must consider all the facts and
circumstances that are relevant to the determination,” including
“[w]hether there was any previous continuance” and “[t]he
prejudice that parties . . . will suffer as a result of the
continuance.” (Id., rule 3.1332(d)(2), (5).) “When, as here, ‘[a]
motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court,’ we reverse if denial of a continuance denied the
applicant a fair hearing.” (N.M. v. W.K., at p. 983.)
Here, at the May 30 hearing, the trial court exercised its
discretion to grant one initial continuance to June 23 due to
O’Toole’s inability to personally serve Haynes. At that hearing,
the court reviewed the sheriff’s declaration of due diligence
indicating private service might be needed, and the court warned

13
O’Toole that if she did not serve Haynes before the next hearing
date the court might dismiss the matter without prejudice. The
court observed that “[n]o evidence was presented that [Haynes]
was evading service relative to this restraining order.” As stated,
at the June 23 hearing O’Toole did not provide any declaration of
due diligence demonstrating she attempted to serve Haynes
within the additional time the court granted. At that hearing,
the court considered O’Toole’s evidence and O’Toole’s belief that
Haynes was evading service, that he left the country on May 30,
and that he sent her the letter signed “Lucy.” However, O’Toole’s
“ ‘belief’ [Haynes] was evading service was opinion, not evidence”
(Yu, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145), and O’Toole was not
deprived of a fair hearing to make her argument that Haynes was
difficult to serve. The court was within its discretion to give her
evidence limited weight and to decline a second continuance of
the DVRO hearing, based on its conclusion O’Toole had not
shown she used the previous continuance to make diligent efforts
to serve Haynes.

3. Failure to prosecute
To the extent O’Toole challenges the denial of her DVRO
petition for “failure to prosecute,” the trial court was within its
discretion to deny O’Toole’s request given her failure to serve
Haynes. A permanent DVRO may be issued only “after notice
and a hearing.” (§ 6345, subd. (a).) O’Toole’s inability to serve
Haynes with notice of the DVRO hearing precluded the issuance
of a permanent DVRO, and, as discussed, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by declining to grant alternative service or an
additional continuance. Under the circumstances, O’Toole cannot
overcome the presumption of validity favoring the trial court’s

14
order. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-610 [“[A]
trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the
burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”].)
We further note that O’Toole remains entitled to refile her
request. Because the trial court denied her DVRO petition
without prejudice, O’Toole is not barred from refiling her petition,
providing additional evidentiary support with her petition, or
requesting alternative service under section 6340, subdivision
(a)(2)(A), if future personal service attempts are unsuccessful.
(See Egelston v. State Personnel Bd. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1050,
1056 [“ ‘ “The term ‘without prejudice,’ in its general adaptation,
means that there is no decision of the controversy on its merits,
and leaves the whole subject in litigation as much open to
another application as if no suit had ever been brought[;]” ’ ”
accordingly, an “order of dismissal without prejudice does not
constitute a final decision on the merits of [the plaintiff’s] request
for a DVRO”]; Fleishbein v. Western Auto Supply Agency (1937)
19 Cal.App.2d 424, 427 [dismissals without prejudice ordinarily
“affect no right or remedy of the parties and [indicate] that there
has been no decision of the case upon the merits,” leaving the
parties “free to litigate the issue as though the action had not
been commenced”].)

15
DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

STONE, J.

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