Pech v. Morgan CA2/3

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Filed 6/1/26 Pech v. Morgan CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RICHARD PECH, B335584

Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant Los Angeles County
and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
18STCV04084
v.

THOMAS E. MORGAN III,

Defendant, Cross-
Complainant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Richard Pech and Richard Pech, in pro. per.,
for Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Appellant.

Joshua R. Furman Law Corp. and Joshua R. Furman
for Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Respondent.
_________________________
Plaintiff and cross-defendant Richard Pech appeals a
judgment entered on the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant and
cross-complainant Thomas E. Morgan III on Morgan’s claim for
legal malpractice; and the trial court’s order granting judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on Pech’s claim for an
account stated. Pech principally contends the evidence compelled
a finding in his favor on his affirmative defense to the legal
malpractice claim; and the court misapplied the law governing
account stated claims based on attorney fee billing statements
in granting JNOV. The record does not support these or Pech’s
other claims of error. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Parties
Plaintiff and cross-defendant Richard Pech is an attorney.
Defendant and cross-complainant Thomas Morgan is the trustee
of the Beverly C. Morgan Family Trust (the Trust) and a Trust
beneficiary.1 Morgan originally served as trustee from January
2014 until his court-ordered suspension in March 2017. In June
2019, the court reinstated Morgan as trustee.
2. Pech’s Complaint
In November 2018, Pech sued Morgan for unpaid legal fees,
asserting claims for breach of contract, account stated, and
quantum meruit. The operative pleading alleges Pech has
represented Morgan and “dozens of his related entities” in
“numerous legal matters” for nearly twenty years, mostly
in connection with mobile home parks that Morgan either
owned or managed for business entities owned by the Trust.

1 Beverly Morgan is Thomas Morgan’s late mother.

2
After Beverly Morgan’s death in January 2014, Morgan
allegedly began consulting Pech about potential disputes
involving the Trust. Under an informal agreement based on
their years-long personal and professional relationship, Pech
monitored Trust developments, particularly those related to
anticipated litigation by Morgan’s sister, Nancy Shurtleff.
In May 2014, Shurtleff filed a petition challenging the Trust,
alleging Morgan had exerted undue influence over their
late mother.
In June 2014, Pech and Morgan entered into a retainer
agreement, which Morgan executed in his capacity as trustee.
The same month, Pech filed a petition for interpretation of
the Trust in the Orange County Superior Court (the Trust
Litigation).
From November 2014 to January 2017, Pech represented
Morgan in the Trust Litigation, including in connection with
Shurtleff’s petitions to remove or suspend Morgan as trustee.
Pech sent Morgan periodic billing statements during this time,
listing balances totaling several hundred thousand dollars
in fees. Each page of each statement included the notation,
“PLEASE EMAIL/FAX US IF YOU DISPUTE ANY AMOUNT
ON THIS BILL.” The complaint alleges “Morgan never
questioned, disputed, or objected to the services or costs in any
of the statements” and he paid the full balance of each statement
in his capacity as trustee.
In January 2017, the probate court denied Shurtleff’s
motion to suspend Morgan as trustee. However, the court
observed that Morgan appeared to have used Trust assets to
pay for expenses incurred in his personal capacity, including
to defend against Shurtleff’s claim of undue influence and

3
other claims challenging testamentary gifts made to Morgan
as a Trust beneficiary. Accordingly, the probate court ordered
Morgan to file an accounting of Trust assets that he may have
used to finance his personal defense.
In March 2017, the probate court suspended Morgan
as trustee and appointed Bruce and Lee Ann Hitchman (the
Hitchmans) as interim trustees.2 On April 7, 2017, Pech emailed
Morgan, stating, “Now that [the probate court] has appointed
interim trustees, paying my statements from January 1, 2017
through your reappointment as trustee is your personal
responsibility.” (Bold and underlining omitted.) Based on
these “changed circumstances,” the complaint alleges “Pech and
Morgan agreed to update the Trust Litigation Retainer to reflect
Pech’s representation of Morgan in his individual capacity” and
“Morgan orally agreed that he would be personally liable under
the Trust Litigation Retainer for payment of the fees and costs
for the Trust Litigation until such time as he was reappointed
as trustee.” Consistent with this alleged novation, Pech
continued to send Morgan billing statements, and Morgan paid
Pech a total of $200,000 from his personal checking account
in full and partial satisfaction of Pech’s February, March, and
April 2017 statements.3

2 Pech’s complaint does not allege or otherwise disclose why
Morgan was suspended. As we will discuss, the evidence shows
Pech prepared and filed an accounting that the probate court
determined was “wholly inadequate,” and Morgan was suspended
for his failure to follow the court’s order.
3 Pech alleges the April 2017 statement for $194,608.72
was only partially paid, while Morgan paid in full the February
and March statements totaling more than $187,000.

4
In June 2017, Morgan allegedly told Pech he wanted “a
more ‘friendly probate face’ ” to appear before the probate court,
given the court’s adverse orders and comments during recent
hearings. Later that month, Morgan associated attorney
Justin Gold into the Trust Litigation.
Although Gold took on a more public‑facing role, Pech
continued working on the matter and generating substantial fees.
The complaint alleges Morgan “never questioned, disputed,
or objected to the services or costs” reflected in Pech’s billing
statements, but Morgan did not pay any statements issued after
April 2017. Nevertheless, from June to December 2017, Pech
and Morgan allegedly had a series of communications in which
Morgan promised to pay Pech all amounts due and owing for
Pech’s work on the Trust Litigation.
In December 2017, Morgan substituted Pech out of the
case, citing concerns that Pech’s relationship with the probate
court was “ ‘beyond repair.’ ” Morgan nevertheless kept Pech
on other matters and told Pech he was expected to continue
assisting the “new Probate ‘front’ legal team.” On December 29,
2017, Morgan’s new counsel, Scott Bertzyk, filed a substitution
of attorney, formally ending Pech’s representation. Pech’s final
billing statement, dated May 31, 2018, reflected an unpaid
balance of $580,186.40.
3. Morgan’s Cross-Complaint
In August 2019, Morgan filed a cross-complaint against
Pech for legal malpractice and related claims.4 The operative

4 Morgan asserted his cross claims in both his individual and
trustee capacities. On Pech’s demurrer, the trial court dismissed
the trustee claims as untimely. Only Morgan’s individual claims
remained when the case went to trial.

5
pleading alleges Pech undertook to represent Morgan in the
Trust Litigation in both Morgan’s individual and trustee
capacities; however, Pech failed to advise Morgan that this
concurrent representation presented a conflict of interest that
necessitated certain protective measures under established
probate law. Pech allegedly breached the standard of care by,
among other things, failing to obtain a conflict waiver; failing
to maintain separate files or to prepare separate invoices for
each representation; and failing to ensure Trust assets were
not used to pay attorney fees generated to represent Morgan
in his individual capacity.
The cross-complaint primarily focuses on Morgan’s
suspension and the consequences that followed. According to
the pleading, Shurtleff’s petitions sought to remove Morgan as
trustee and to reduce his inheritance by eliminating a valuable
testamentary gift. Although these petitions implicated different
interests—challenging both Morgan’s authority as trustee and
his beneficial interest in certain Trust assets—Pech allegedly
instructed Morgan to use Trust resources to pay all of Pech’s fees,
rather than counseling Morgan to use personal funds for his
individual defense.5 When the probate court learned of the

5 The cross-complaint alleges this was plainly negligent
advice under the established rules stated in Whittlesey v. Aiello
(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1231 [when an attorney undertakes
to represent the interests of certain beneficiaries over others,
“counsel must seek compensation from the parties who stand
to gain from the litigation, not the trust”] and Moeller v. Superior
Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1134 [“If a predecessor trustee
seeks legal advice in its personal capacity out of a genuine
concern for possible future charges of breach of fiduciary duty,
the predecessor may be able to avoid disclosing the advice to

6
arrangement, it ordered Morgan to file an accounting of all
Trust assets spent on his personal defense.
Pech filed an accounting with a single sentence stating,
“The amount of trust assets spent or incurred by, or allocated to,
the Trust[ ] to defend Morgan in his personal capacity is
$254,650.00.” The accounting did not disclose the amount of
Trust assets spent on behalf of Morgan in his trustee capacity,
nor did it offer an explanation or justification for the
expenditures of Trust resources for his personal defense.
Instead, the accounting explained that, to arrive at the $254,650
figure, “the Law Offices of Richard Pech undertook the review
and analysis of the attorney-client privileged communications
and/or work product consisting of detailed statements of fees and
costs sent to Morgan to inform him of the nature and amount
of work occurring in connection with the active and ongoing
legal matters in this case,” which the accounting characterized
as “information [that] lies in the heartland of the attorney-client
privilege.” The cross-complaint alleges Pech filed the accounting
without giving Morgan “adequate time to review or understand
the response,” without advising Morgan “as to the import and
standard for probate accountings,” and without seeking Morgan’s
“input as to how to approach the accounting.”
The probate court responded by suspending Morgan
as trustee and directing the parties to meet and confer on
the appointment of a private professional fiduciary to serve
as interim trustee in his place. The court’s order explained:
“[T]he accounting that was filed is wholly inadequate and does

a successor trustee by hiring a separate lawyer and paying for
the advice out of its personal funds.”].

7
not conform, in any respect, to the accountings required by the
Court. The accounting is, in fact, so inadequate that its filing
appears to be for the sole purpose of paying lip service to the
Court’s order.”
Notwithstanding the probate court’s order, Pech allegedly
failed to meet and confer about an interim trustee, while
advising Morgan “not [to] participate in the process at all,
lest his participation be viewed as tacit acquiescence to the
suspension order.” Pech’s advice gave Morgan’s litigation
opponents the space to nominate their “hand-selected fiduciaries”
—the Hitchmans—as interim trustees and, after the Hitchmans’
appointment, to align themselves with the interim trustees to
make “onerous demands” on Morgan. This included a demand—
based largely on the inadequate accounting—to turn over all of
Pech’s legal invoices. Pech refused to produce the invoices and
advised Morgan not to produce them either. In the end, Morgan
was forced to accede to the demand, after the probate court
issued an order to show cause regarding contempt and an
appellate court denied Pech’s petition for a writ of mandate.
In June 2017, “recognizing that Pech had antagonized”
the probate court, Morgan associated co-counsel into the Trust
Litigation to help present his case in “a way better calibrated
to success.” However, it soon became clear that having co-counsel
“try to rei[n] in Pech was not enough,” and, in December 2017,
Morgan finally terminated Pech’s representation and replaced
him with a different law firm. Over the next year and a half,
Morgan’s new counsel worked to correct the damage allegedly
caused by Pech’s “substandard representation,” finally securing
Morgan’s reinstatement as trustee in June 2019. During the
period, Morgan incurred approximately $2 million in legal fees

8
to pay his new attorneys, which he claimed as damages for
Pech’s alleged malpractice.
4. The Jury Trial
Pech represented himself at trial and testified on his
own behalf, largely corroborating the allegations of his operative
pleading. He testified it had been his custom over nearly four
decades of practice to send clients detailed billing statements;
as of November 2017, Morgan had not said he would not pay
Pech’s bills; and, until April 2018, Morgan had never disputed or
questioned Pech’s billing statements. Pech testified his unpaid
fees totaled over $580,000 and, based on his review of over 3,000
pages of billing statements, this was also the reasonable value
of the services he rendered to Morgan in the Trust Litigation.
As for his alleged negligence and Morgan’s claimed
damages, Pech admitted his invoices did not differentiate
between work performed for Morgan in his trustee versus
individual capacity and Pech never advised Morgan not to use
Trust assets for his personal defense. While he did not respond
to proposals from Shurtleff’s counsel regarding potential
professional fiduciaries to serve as interim trustee, Pech testified
he had no reason to believe the Hitchmans would engage in
intentional misconduct that amounted to “pillaging” and
“looting the Trust.”
Morgan likewise testified on his own behalf and generally
corroborated the allegations in his cross‑complaint. He testified
Pech never advised him of the risks of using Trust funds to pay
Pech’s fees and it was only after retaining new counsel that
he learned of the protective measures he should have taken to
maintain separation between his trustee duties and beneficiary
interests. Nevertheless, Morgan admitted he did not dispute

9
Pech’s bills until April 2018—nearly a year after hiring his first
new attorney—but he claimed he remained silent only because
he trusted Pech to protect him in the Trust Litigation. After
Pech’s representation ended, Morgan’s new lawyers worked to
resolve the case and to secure Morgan’s reinstatement as trustee.
By the time of his reinstatement, Morgan had paid his new
lawyers over $2.4 million.
Morgan’s new lawyers—Justin Gold and Scott Bertzyk—
also testified regarding Pech’s alleged negligence and Morgan’s
claimed damages. Gold testified it was clear that Pech had failed
to advise Morgan not to use Trust assets to pay for his personal
defense, and this act of professional negligence was the root cause
of all the costly litigation that followed Morgan’s suspension and
the Hitchmans’ appointment. Bertzyk likewise testified that
“[a]lmost everything” he had to do in litigating with Shurtleff
and the Hitchmans stemmed from Pech’s negligence in failing to
segregate his fees and later attempting to withhold his invoices.
Gold’s fees totaled over $580,000; Bertzyk’s fees totaled over
$1.89 million.
5. Verdict and Post-Trial Motions
The jury returned a mixed verdict. It denied relief on
Pech’s contract claim, finding a valid fee agreement existed but
Pech had failed to perform his contractual obligations. However,
the jury awarded Pech damages on his quantum meruit and
account stated claims, finding the reasonable value of Pech’s
services and the amount owed on the account was $497,880.90.
On Morgan’s cross-claim, the jury found Pech had negligently
caused Morgan to suffer $323,188.25 in damages.
Both sides filed post-trial motions for new trial and JNOV.
The trial court denied Pech’s motions and granted Morgan’s.

10
With respect to the quantum meruit claim, the court concluded
the jury’s finding that a valid fee agreement existed precluded
recovery grounded on an implied covenant to pay. As for the
account stated claim, the court concluded Pech’s evidence was
insufficient for two reasons: (a) the undisputed evidence proved
Pech’s billing statement did not comply with Business and
Professions Code section 6148, rendering the statements
inadequate to serve as stand-alone contracts to pay; and
(b) evidence of Morgan’s silence when presented with the bills
was insufficient to establish his consent to the amounts stated.
The court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor
of Morgan on his cross-complaint and Pech’s contract claim,
and on the court’s order granting JNOV with respect to Pech’s
quantum meruit and account stated claims. Pech filed a timely
notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The Evidence Did Not Compel a Finding in
Pech’s Favor on His Superseding Cause Defense
At trial, Pech primarily contested the causation element of
Morgan’s professional negligence claim, arguing the Hitchmans’
intentional misconduct following their appointment as interim
trustees constituted a superseding cause of Morgan’s claimed
harm. On appeal, Pech contends the trial court erred in denying
his JNOV motion because, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict,
the undisputed evidence compelled a finding in his favor on this
affirmative defense.6 Specifically, Pech argues there is no legal

6 As a general rule, a trial court may grant JNOV “only if
the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Begnal v.
Canfield & Associates, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 66, 72.) Pech,
however, had the burden to prove his affirmative defense, and

11
precedent for imposing malpractice liability against an attorney
where a court-appointed fiduciary “later looted” a former client’s
trust. The argument misses the mark. Contrary to Pech’s
premise, Morgan did not seek—and was not awarded—damages
on any theory that the Hitchmans looted the trust.
The doctrine of superseding cause absolves a tortfeasor
of liability, even where his conduct was a substantial
contributing factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm,
“when an independent event intervenes in the chain of causation,
producing harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the
original tortfeasor should have foreseen that the law deems it
unfair to hold him responsible.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 573, fn. 9 (Soule); accord Crouch v. Trinity
Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995,
1022.) California has adopted the “modern view” of the doctrine
embodied in section 448 of the Restatement Second of Torts:
“ ‘The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort

therefore it would be “ ‘misleading’ ” to characterize the operative
standard as whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s
verdict. (Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare County
Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 965–966; see also
Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 760
[“defendant has the burden to prove the affirmative defense
of superseding cause”].) “ ‘This follows because such a
characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on
(1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof,
and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable conclusion that the party
with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the case.’ ”
(Valero, at p. 965.) Thus, on appeal (as it was on Pech’s JNOV
motion) the question is “ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding
in favor of [Pech] as a matter of law.’ ” (Id. at p. 966.)

12
or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting
therefrom, although the actor’s negligent conduct created a
situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to
commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood
that such a situation might be created, and that a third person
might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort
or crime.’ ” (Kane v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1979)
98 Cal.App.3d 350, 360.)
As the Restatement’s formulation makes clear, the
superseding cause defense applies only where the third party’s
conduct was the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s claimed harm,
and where the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen the
kind and degree of harm that resulted. (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th
at p. 573, fn. 9; see Torres v. Xomox Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
1, 18 [“Third party [conduct] which is the immediate cause of
an injury may be viewed as a superseding cause” when “ ‘the
risk of harm’ ” caused “is so highly extraordinary as to be
unforeseeable.”].) The defense thus operates at the intersection
of causation and foreseeability—it does not arise simply because
a third party engaged in independent wrongdoing after the
defendant’s negligence.
At trial, Pech sought to establish his affirmative defense
primarily by introducing verified pleadings Morgan had filed
against the Hitchmans seeking to recover damages to the Trust
and a group of affiliated business entities the Hitchmans
allegedly harmed while serving as interim trustees.7 As Pech

7 The pleadings are (a) a verified petition in the Trust
Litigation that Morgan filed in his capacities as trustee and
beneficiary to recover damages incurred by the Trust due to the

13
recounts in his opening brief, those pleadings alleged the
“ ‘Morgan family business empire’ ” was “ ‘depleted by the
Hitchmans’ tortious actions’ ”; the Hitchmans regularly “ ‘abuse
their roles as professional fiduciaries to gain access to, and then
plunder, the fortunes of families they are supposed to serve’ ”;
and the Hitchmans “ ‘engaged in this misconduct intentionally,
and acted with oppression, fraud and malice.’ ” (Underlining
and italics omitted.) Pech also elicited testimony from Morgan,
Gold, and Bertzyk apparently for the purpose of establishing
that Morgan had sued the Hitchmans for—as Pech put it
in examining the witnesses—“looting the Trust and taking
[Morgan’s] inheritance and the family’s inheritance as well.”
The problem with Pech’s argument (and with the case
he presented at trial) is Morgan did not ask the jury to award
damages for harm to the Trust or to his inheritance. Rather,
Morgan sought to recover the legal fees billed by successor
counsel Bertzyk and Gold for—as Bertzyk testified—“cleaning up
the mess [Pech] created” when his malpractice caused Morgan
to be suspended as trustee. Morgan’s evidentiary presentation
at trial was consistent with this theory: he introduced evidence
of the fees he paid to Bertzyk and Gold to position the case
for a settlement reinstating him as trustee, but he introduced
no evidence of the harm the Hitchmans may have caused to

Hitchmans’ alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and (b) a verified
complaint filed in the Orange County Superior Court by Morgan
and several of his business entities that the Hitchmans allegedly
harmed through unlawful conversions and interference with
business relationships while serving as interim trustees.

14
the Trust or to his inheritance.8 Morgan’s counsel made the point
explicit in closing argument: We “[d]on’t care about all the stuff
happening with [the lawsuit against] the Hitchmans”—“[t]hat’s
for the Hitchmans.” “[O]ur number that we’re asking you for [is]
just those fees” billed by Bertzyk and Gold—“the legal fees that
were caused by Mr. Pech because [Morgan] had to get Justin
Gold and Scott Bertzyk to fix all this stuff for [Morgan] to put
him back in his family trust.” And, the jury was instructed
accordingly: “The following are the specific items of damages
claimed by Thomas E. Morgan, III: legal fees and costs incurred
by the lawyers hired to replace Richard Pech in order to deal
with the problems caused by Mr. Pech’s wrongful conduct
and to restore Mr. Morgan as trustee.”
Pech’s superseding cause argument fails because it is
directed at a damages theory that Morgan never advanced.
Whatever harm the Hitchmans may have inflicted by
“subsequently looting the trust,” Morgan did not ask the jury
to hold Pech responsible for that injury. The superseding cause
defense, as we have explained, operates to sever the causal link
between a defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s claimed
harm. Where the plaintiff’s claimed harm is the reasonable

8 Pech nonetheless questioned Morgan about whether,
absent the Hitchmans’ conduct, “there would have been more
money in the Trust [that] [Morgan] would have received.”
Morgan’s counsel objected to this line of inquiry on the ground
that Pech’s questions misstated the pleadings and encroached
on the jury instructions. The trial court overruled the objection,
concluding Morgan could “answer how much [was] taken from
him, which is different from how much he believes Mr. Pech
owes him.” Notably, Pech agreed with the court’s formulation,
adding, “You paraphrased it better than I did.”

15
and foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence—
here, the legal fees Morgan necessarily incurred to undo the
consequences of Pech’s malpractice and secure his reinstatement
as trustee—the doctrine has no application, regardless of what
independent wrongdoing a third party may have committed
in the aftermath of the defendant’s negligence.
Pech does not address Morgan’s actual damages theory,
nor does he attempt to demonstrate that he could not reasonably
have foreseen that Morgan would incur legal fees to obtain
reinstatement after Pech’s negligence caused Morgan’s
suspension. The omission is fatal to Pech’s argument. Because
Pech has not shown that the evidence compelled a finding
in his favor on his superseding cause defense, the trial court
did not err in denying his motion for JNOV.
2. The Trial Court Reasonably Exercised Its Discretion
to Manage Pech’s Pro Per Direct Testimony
Pech represented himself in propria persona and testified
as a witness in support of his fee claims. To manage his direct
examination, the trial court ordered Pech to write out his direct
examination questions beforehand and to provide the questions
to the court and opposing counsel in advance of his testimony.
Under the court’s adopted procedure, Pech’s legal assistant
(a nonlawyer) would read the questions aloud, Pech would
answer orally, and Morgan’s counsel would have the opportunity
to object before each answer was given. The court’s purpose was
to ensure that Pech’s direct examination proceeded in an orderly
question-and-answer format consistent with the rules of evidence,
while accommodating Pech’s decision to forgo counsel.
Pech contends the trial court abused its discretion and
violated his constitutional right to due process by ordering him

16
to prepare a written “script” of his direct examination questions
for the court’s and opposing counsel’s advance review. He argues
the order was unprecedented and unnecessary, and that it
subjected him to an awkward and burdensome procedure
that no represented party would be required to endure. Pech
maintains that, as a self-represented litigant, he was entitled
to conduct his own direct examination in the same manner as
any attorney examining a witness (i.e., Pech the lawyer should
have been permitted to ask Pech the witness questions), and
that the trial court’s order impermissibly singled him out for
disparate treatment. He further contends the order conflicted
with established rules governing the conduct of trial by self-
represented parties, including the right to present oral testimony.
In Pech’s telling, the cumulative effect of these deficiencies
rendered the script procedure fundamentally unfair and
warrants reversal of the judgment, without a showing
of prejudice. We disagree.
A trial court has inherent as well as statutory discretion
to control the proceedings, including the mode and manner of
witness interrogation, to ensure “the efficacious administration
of justice.” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 700, disapproved
on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 &
fn. 22; see Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a) [“The court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode of interrogation of a witness
so as to make interrogation as rapid, as distinct, and as effective
for the ascertainment of the truth, as may be, and to protect the
witness from undue harassment or embarrassment.”]; Code Civ.
Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(3) [the court has the power to “provide for
the orderly conduct of proceedings before it”].) The court is to be
accorded “[c]onsiderable latitude” in managing trial proceedings,

17
and its orders will not be disturbed unless it exceeded the bounds
of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered, “to
the prejudice of the appellant[ ].” (Commercial Union Assur. Co.
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 515, 525; Denham v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.)
Even where error is established, a judgment may not be reversed
unless the appellant demonstrates it resulted in a miscarriage
of justice. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800;
cf. In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291
(Marriage of Carlsson) [“ ‘Denying a party the right to testify
or to offer evidence is reversible per se.’ ”].)
We recognize the “script” order was unconventional—
particularly the condition requiring Pech to provide his written
questions to opposing counsel in advance—but the record
does not support Pech’s claim that the order deprived him of
fundamental due process. Marriage of Carlsson is instructive.
The husband in that case appealed a judgment of dissolution
entered after a bench trial, arguing “the trial court denied him
his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial” by ending
the trial “in the middle of [the husband’s] case-in-chief without
giving him an opportunity to complete the presentation of
evidence or offer rebuttal evidence.” (Marriage of Carlsson,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.) The reviewing court agreed,
concluding “the court’s summary termination of the trial
infringed on [the husband’s] fundamental right to a full
and fair hearing.” (Id. at p. 291.) Although the trial court’s
exercise of discretion to “expedite proceedings” normally would
be reversable only upon a showing of prejudicial error, the lower
court’s intervention was “ ‘reversible per se’ ” because it deprived
the husband of his “ ‘right to testify or to offer evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)

18
As the Marriage of Carlsson court explained, “the judge abruptly
ended the trial in the middle of a witness’s testimony, prior to
the completion of one side’s case and without giving the parties
the opportunity to introduce or even propose additional evidence.
This was reversible error.” (Id. at p. 292.)
Unconventional as it might have been, the script order
did not deprive Pech of his right to testify or to offer evidence.
Indeed, Pech does not identify a single question that was
excluded from his script, a single subject of testimony he was
prevented from addressing due to the script order, or any other
concrete limitation the order imposed on the substance of his
direct examination.9 To be sure, he complains the procedure

9 Pech repeatedly asserts that “opposing counsel objected
that he was ‘not sticking to the script.’ ” Our review of the record
confirms otherwise: it was Pech himself—not Morgan’s counsel—
who used that phrase. Moreover, the wrangling over the script
order that Pech highlights arose almost entirely in the context
of a different logistical problem—how to introduce a voluminous
number of exhibits without losing the jury’s attention—a
difficulty that was ultimately resolved (at Pech’s own suggestion)
by a straightforward stipulation. Even then, when Pech
expressed concern that he had “lost a lot of testimony”
by testifying via script, the trial court promptly clarified:
“You haven’t lost it forever”; “You’re still on the stand”; “I’m
definitely not precluding further elaboration of exhibits that
are in evidence.” Pech responded, “I understand.”
Pech’s suggestion that the script order deprived him of a
fair opportunity to conduct redirect examination fares no better.
The record shows that after his cross-examination was
completed, Pech had an entire weekend to prepare his redirect.
Pech was not denied his right to present testimony or to offer
other evidence.

19
was awkward and burdensome, but procedural inconvenience
is not prejudice, let alone structural error that transgresses the
right to due process. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial,
not a frictionless one. Because the script order did not deny Pech
his fundamental right to testify and offer evidence, it is not
reversible per se.
Nor can we find a prejudicial abuse of discretion on the
record presented. The trial court was confronted with an unusual
situation largely of Pech’s own making: he chose to represent
himself and he chose to testify as a witness in support of his
own claim. These circumstances created a genuine procedural
complication. By proceeding without counsel, Pech placed the
court in the position of having to ensure that his testimony could
be taken in a manner that preserved opposing counsel’s ability
to make timely objections and that protected the integrity of
the record presented to the jury.
The script order was a reasonable response to that
difficulty. A self-represented litigant is entitled to the same
fair treatment as any other party but is not entitled to
special dispensation from the court’s management of orderly
proceedings. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975,
984–985 [self-represented litigants held to same rules of
procedure as parties represented by counsel]; Taylor v. Bell
(1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1009 [A lay person who tries his
own case “must expect and receive the same treatment as if
represented by an attorney—no different, no better, no worse.”].)
The trial court’s order ensured that Pech’s direct examination
would proceed in a question-and-answer format that gave
Morgan’s counsel a meaningful opportunity to object before

20
each answer was given—precisely the kind of procedural
protection that undergirds the adversarial trial system.
Pech cites a list of rules and authorities he contends
establish an abuse of discretion, but none supports his position.
He relies on Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 for
the proposition that a self-represented litigant must be permitted
to testify orally at trial. (See id. at p. 1360 [order “calling for the
admission and use of declarations at trial” was not permissible
to the extent it “conflict[ed] with the hearsay rule”].) But the
script order did not deprive Pech of oral testimony—he testified
orally, in open court, before the jury. The order governed only
the format by which questions were put to him—not the manner
in which he answered them. The right to present oral testimony
was not abridged.
Pech also cites two federal decisions, neither of which aids
him. In United States v. Beckton (4th Cir. 2014) 740 F.3d 303,
the reviewing court upheld an order requiring a self-represented
defendant to testify in question-and-answer format, reasoning
the procedure was necessary to afford opposing counsel a fair
opportunity to object. (See id. at pp. 304–305; see also id.
at pp. 306–307 [“the district court’s refusal to allow [the
defendant] to testify in narrative form was not ‘arbitrary or
disproportionate,’ ” even though “it may be uncomfortable
for a pro se litigant to question himself”].) In United States
v. Nivica (1st Cir. 1989) 887 F.2d 1110, the reviewing court
similarly declined to find error where the trial court required
a pro per litigant to pose questions to himself rather than testify
in narrative form. (See id. at pp. 1120–1123.) While these
federal decisions are not binding, they are instructive, and they
cut squarely against Pech’s position. As we have explained,

21
the trial court’s order ensured that Pech’s direct examination
would proceed in the question-and-answer format necessary “to
assure opposing counsel the opportunity to lodge any objection
prior to [the witness’s] answer.” (Beckton, at p. 306.)
At bottom, the trial court balanced Pech’s right to present
his direct testimony orally against Morgan’s right to make timely
objections and the court’s interest in maintaining an orderly
and intelligible record. The script order struck that balance
reasonably. Pech does not identify any instance in which he
was prevented from presenting testimony he wished to offer.
He has not shown a prejudicial abuse of discretion.
3. The Trial Court Reasonably Exercised Its Discretion
to Exclude Pech’s Undisclosed Expert
Pech contends the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Morgan’s motions in limine to exclude his proposed
expert from testifying on the reasonableness of Pech’s fees
and the standard of care applicable to Morgan’s malpractice
cross-claim. The trial court excluded the proposed expert
on the ground that Pech failed to make an expert disclosure
in response to Morgan’s exchange demands. Pech argues the
demands were untimely and therefore could not serve as a
valid basis for exclusion. We disagree.
A party may not present expert witness testimony at trial
if he has unreasonably failed to comply with the statutory
expert disclosure requirements. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.300.)
Exclusion of undisclosed expert testimony is compelled by both
the statute and fundamental fairness: “When an expert is
permitted to testify at trial on a wholly undisclosed subject area,
opposing parties . . . lack a fair opportunity to prepare for cross-

22
examination or rebuttal.” (Bonds v. Roy (1999) 20 Cal.4th 140,
147.)
The procedures governing the exchange of expert witness
information are keyed to the initial trial date. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 2034.220.) A trial court may order disclosure at a
later date, as commonly occurs when a trial continuance carries
forward the statutory deadlines tied to the new trial date. (See
id., §§ 2024.020, subd. (b); 2024.050.) Critically, the Discovery
Act does not provide for objections to an expert demand. A party
that believes a demand for expert exchange is untimely must
move for a protective order quashing the demand. (See id.,
§ 2034.250, subd. (b)(1).) Our authorities on this point are
uniform: a party served with an expert demand must either
designate experts in conformity with the demand or seek a
protective order—he may not simply ignore the demand. (See
Cottini v. Enloe Medical Center (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 401, 419
(Cottini); Zellerino v. Brown (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1112
(Zellerino) [“The Legislature did not provide for objections
to demands for exchanges of experts. . . . [¶] . . . Each of the
standard treatises on discovery describe[s] the procedure for
obtaining a protective order once a demand for exchange of
experts has been made: None mentions the possibility of filing
an objection.”].)
Pech contends Morgan’s expert exchange demands were
untimely because they were served in May and August 2021—
more than fourteen months after the deadline tied to the original
trial date of May 14, 2020. Although the court continued the
trial date several times, Pech argues the court did not reopen
discovery until it entered an October 18, 2021 minute order
providing: “Only the expert witness discovery cut-off date shall

23
follow the new trial date. All other statutory cut-off dates are not
continued.” Because Morgan did not serve a new expert demand
after that order, Pech maintains the earlier demands were
nullities that could not support exclusion of his expert. Rather
than comply with Morgan’s demands or seek a protective order,
Pech served an objection to the demand and otherwise declined
to disclose his expert.
Even if Pech’s timeliness objection had merit, his failure
to disclose his proposed expert was nonetheless improper.
Pech’s remedy for an untimely expert demand was to move for
a protective order—not to serve a unilateral objection and treat
the demand as a nullity. (See Code Civ. Proc., § § 2034.250,
subd. (b)(1); Cottini, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 419; Zellerino,
supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1112.) As Morgan correctly frames
the issue, Pech had two options when faced with the demand
for exchange of experts: either make the disclosure or seek
relief from the court. He chose neither. That choice was an
unreasonable failure to comply with the expert disclosure
procedures and warranted exclusion of the proposed expert’s
testimony under Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.300.
Notably, Pech does not challenge or otherwise attempt to
distinguish Cottini or Zellerino in his reply brief. He offers only
the assertion that the issue “does not need further argument.”
The concession speaks for itself. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding Pech’s undisclosed expert.
4. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Morgan’s
Motion for JNOV
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Pech on his
quantum meruit and account stated claims, awarding him
$497,880 as both the reasonable value of the services rendered

24
and the stated amount that Morgan promised to pay on the
account. The trial court granted JNOV as to both claims.
Pech challenges the ruling with respect to the account stated
cause of action only.10 He contends the trial court ignored
controlling Supreme Court authority recognizing that an
attorney’s billing statements can, like any other bill, serve as
the basis for an account stated. (See Crane v. Stansbury (1916)
173 Cal. 631, 636 (Crane); Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d
17, 25 (Trafton).) While Pech is correct that an attorney’s bill
may, under proper circumstances, support an account stated
claim, the authorities he cites do not conflict with the trial court’s
ruling—on the contrary, Trafton compels the conclusion the
court reached.
A trial court must grant JNOV “if it appears from the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing
the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support.”
(Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th

10 The trial court granted JNOV on the quantum meruit
claim, concluding Pech could not obtain relief on an implied-
in-law promise to pay reasonable value when the jury had found
the parties had an actual agreement covering compensation
under which Pech had failed to perform. (See Hedging Concepts,
Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410,
1419–1420 [“equitable entitlement to a quantum meruit payment
is not implied where the parties have actual contract terms
covering payment”; thus, where “trial court made a factual
finding that the parties had formed an actual, not an implied,
contract” and also found that “the condition precedent to
payment had . . . not been satisfied,” plaintiff was not entitled
to quantum meruit relief].) Pech does not challenge this ruling.

25
62, 68.) We review the ruling de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court. (Ibid.)
“An account stated is an agreement, based on prior
transactions between the parties, that all items of the account
are true and that the balance struck is due and owing from
one party to the other.” (Trafton, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 25.)
“ ‘The bill of an attorney for services, like any other bill, may
under proper circumstances and conditions be the subject of
an account stated.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Crane, supra, 173 Cal. at
p. 636.) The agreement underlying an account stated need not
be express; it may be implied from the circumstances, including
a debtor’s failure to object to a statement of account within a
reasonable time. (Trafton, at p. 25.) However, because accounts
stated “were ‘intended to preserve and protect legitimate
demands but not to create obligations independent of prior
indebtedness,’ ” the rendering of an account, even one to which
the alleged debtor has not objected, “cannot create a liability
where no liability existed before.” (Id. at p. 26.)
The trial court granted Morgan’s motion challenging
the account stated verdict on two independent grounds.
First, relying on Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 467
(Leighton), the court reasoned that Pech’s periodic billing
statements could not serve as “ ‘stand-alone attorney fee
agreement[s]’ ” because they did not comply with the
requirements of Business and Professions Code section 6148
—among other deficiencies, they were not signed by Morgan
and did not identify costs and expenses incurred. (See Leighton,
at p. 494; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6148, subds. (a) & (b).)11 Second,

11 Business and Professions Code section 6148 regulates
the form and content of fee agreements that do not involve a

26
and independently, the court concluded, “even had Morgan
not objected to the bills, that does not satisfy Pech’s burden
of showing consent.” (See Zinn v. Fred R. Bright Co. (1969)
271 Cal.App.2d 597, 600 (Zinn) [“The essential elements of
an account stated are: (1) previous transactions between the
parties establishing the relationship of debtor and creditor;
(2) an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on
the amount due from the debtor to the creditor; (3) a promise
by the debtor, express or implied, to pay the amount due.”].)
On appeal, Pech exclusively challenges the trial court’s
reliance on Leighton. He argues Leighton is inapposite because,
unlike in that case, the jury here found that a fee agreement
complying with Business and Professions Code section 6148
existed between the parties. (Cf. Leighton, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th
at p. 494 [rejecting argument that invoice constituted “a stand-
alone attorney fee agreement as well as a statement of her
account” where invoice did “not comply with the requirements
of section 6148,” and there otherwise was “insufficient evidence”
of “the existence of a written attorney fee agreement”].) In
Pech’s telling, the existence of a compliant fee agreement renders
the Leighton court’s analysis beside the point, and Trafton and
Crane are therefore controlling—standing, as they do, for the

contingency fee. (Pech v. Morgan (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 841,
850.) Its purpose is to ensure that “ ‘clients are informed of
and agree to the terms by which the attorneys who represent
them will be compensated.’ ” (Ibid.) “The ‘[f]ailure to comply
with any provision of [section 6148] renders the agreement
voidable at the option of the client, and the attorney shall, upon
the agreement being voided, be entitled to collect a reasonable
fee.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6148, subd. (c).)

27
proposition that an attorney’s billing statements, like any other
bills, may support an account stated claim under the right
circumstances. (See Trafton, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 25; Crane,
supra, 173 Cal. at p. 636.) Pech does not, however, address
the trial court’s independent conclusion that Morgan’s silence in
the face of Pech’s billing statements was insufficient, as a matter
of law, to establish the consent element of Pech’s account stated
claim. We conclude this independent ground for granting JNOV
was consistent with—and, indeed, compelled by—our high court’s
holding in Trafton.
As discussed, an account stated claim is meant to
“ ‘preserve and protect legitimate demands’ ”—it is not a
mechanism for creating obligations “ ‘independent of prior
indebtedness.’ ” (Trafton, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 26.) Here, the
jury found Pech failed to perform his contractual obligations
under the fee agreement with Morgan and, thus, Pech had no
legitimate preexisting demand under the contract for the fees
reflected in his billing statements. Because an account stated
cannot conjure a valid claim out of a demand the claimant had
no legal right to make, “the rendering of an account, [even if]
not objected to, cannot create a liability where no liability
existed before.” (Ibid.)
Trafton is controlling on this point. There, our Supreme
Court rejected an attorney’s contention that his client’s two-year
silence in the face of a statement of account constituted implied
consent to the amounts stated. (See Trafton, supra, 69 Cal.2d
at pp. 20–21, 25–26.) The trial court had found there was
no agreement fixing the attorney’s fee, and thus the “amount
shown in the statement as a ‘balance due’ did not represent
a preexisting liability” supporting an account stated claim. (Id.

28
at p. 26.) Our Supreme Court agreed. While the Trafton court
acknowledged “an attorney is entitled to recover the reasonable
value of his services if there is no express employment contract
providing for his compensation,” it emphasized an attorney
“ ‘may not unilaterally determine his own fee . . . without the
knowledge or consent of the client.’ ” (Ibid.) Nor could the
attorney “circumvent this obstacle” by proffering the client’s
“failure to object to the statement of account . . . as an assent
to pay the amount therein specified.” (Id. at p. 27.) To imply
consent from the client’s silence, our high court explained, “would
be to permit the creation of the obligation by the rendering
of the account ‘independent of prior indebtedness.’ ” (Ibid.)
The same reasoning applies here. The jury found Pech
failed to perform his contractual obligations and was therefore
entitled to nothing under the fee agreement. But even assuming
Pech had some entitlement to the reasonable value of the services
he rendered, Trafton is clear that he could not unilaterally
determine what that value was, state it in a bill to Morgan,
and then rely on Morgan’s silence as implied consent to it.
By claiming Morgan’s failure to object to his billing statements
amounted to acquiescence in the amounts stated in them, Pech
was doing precisely what Trafton forbids—attempting to fix his
own fee and create an obligation by the rendering of an account
independent of any legitimate prior indebtedness. (Trafton,
supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 26–27.) The trial court correctly
concluded evidence of Morgan’s silence was insufficient to
establish his agreement to the amount Pech claimed was due.

29
(See Zinn, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 600.) The court properly
granted JNOV.12
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Thomas E. Morgan III is
entitled to costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

12 Because we conclude Pech was not entitled to damages on
his account stated claim and Pech does not challenge the jury’s
verdict on his contract claim or the trial court’s grant of JNOV
on his quantum meruit claim, we need not address his contention
that the court erred by admitting evidence offered to offset the
amount of his fee claims.

30

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